November 2, 1940. At several recent Central Committee meetings it was noted that this anti-Communist campaign differs from the previous one; if handled carelessly, it could have grave implications for the future. Accordingly, both the declaration and the relevant directives, once drafted, were put on hold. Today’s meeting discussed your proposal of yesterday, and the prevailing view remains to maintain outward composure while mounting effective resistance. It was decided to withhold the declaration for the time being, issuing instead a brief internal directive and a reply to He Baishi’s “Hao” telegram. This anti-Communist drive has been initiated by the Kuomintang, and the danger of capitulation is very serious. We should allow the various middle forces to engage in extensive debate and speculation. Until the opportune moment arrives, there is no need to rush into action; it will not be too late to speak up later. There are still eleven days before the deadline set in He Baishi’s “Hao” telegram. We plan to draft the reply within the next few days and transmit it around the tenth. There is no urgency to respond prematurely. As for a declaration on the current situation, although a basic assessment has been made and a draft prepared, we must first observe the outcome of the Japan–Soviet negotiations and the U.S. presidential election, as well as the evolving Japan–Chiang Kai-shek relationship, before deciding whether to issue it. With regard to deployments in the South and related propaganda countermeasures, all comrades concur with your views and those of the Southern Bureau, without any dissent. Concerning military dispositions in Central and North China, minor redeployments will commence shortly, while the larger-scale move—preparing to shift 150,000 troops—is currently under consultation with Peng Dehuai. This too should proceed gradually, without undue haste. Should Chiang Kai-shek surrender this time, the country would inevitably fall apart. With half a million troops at our disposal and the support of the entire nation, despite countless difficulties, we would be able to break the impasse. Regarding the offensive launched by Tang Shengzhi and Li Zongren, we must absolutely not permit them to seal us off. We need to strike deep into the rear areas of the anti-Communist forces. This is the unanimous consensus of all members of the Secretariat. What is your opinion? Please let us know.