Route Army north of the old Yellow River and heavily besieging them, so we
must immediately figure out countermeasures.
11. No matter how serious the situation, we are nonetheless surely able to break
through it. This kind of confidence should be built up throughout the Party. We
have to, on the one hand, hold fast to our base areas in North China and Central
China and, on the other, repel the attacks from Chiang Kaishek; such is the serious
situation in which we find ourselves. How to break through the situation in a methodical, planned, and orderly fashion is the problem we seek to solve today.
12. We look forward to hearing your opinions.

Telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and
Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Others on
Intensifying Preparations to Smash
Chiang Kaishek's Serious Attack

(November 1, 1940)

1. Chiang Kaishek has already informed us that those elements of the New
Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army now in Central China and Shandong
must all move to North China before November 20.1 According to reliable reports,
Chiang has already ordered Tang Enbo, with nine divisions under his command,2
and Li Pinxian, with three divisions under his command,3 to leave immediately for
Henan and Anhui, and prepare to attack you once the deadline has passed. There
are undoubtedly already deployments in southern Anhui and central Hubei set for
attack.
2. You should immediately intensify all aspects of military and political preparation, reinforcing the troops, strictly carrying out training, gathering assets, intensifying the creation and consolidation of bases, strengthening united front work
within friendly armies, reinforcing political work within the military ranks, and
planning in advance how to smash this serious attack by Chiang Kaishek. It is of
utmost importance to carry out propaganda in advance among the masses within
[the border areas] about how evil anticommunism is.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 175, where it is reproduced
from Wannan shibian.
1. The November 20 deadline had been set forth in a telegraphic order sent to the Communist leadership on October 19, signed by Bai Chongxi and He Yingqin. This was the so called hao order (hao being the telegraphic code designation for that date), which constituted the Guomindang's response to the New Fourth Army's defeat of Han Deqin and the
expansion of its influence in Jiangsu and Anhui. This order directed that all Communist
troops, whether south or north of the Yangzi, be moved within one month to a staging area
north of the Yellow River. For the context, see above, the Introduction.
2. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above the note to the text of September 19, 1940.
3. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.