Operational Principles of the New Fourth Army
(October 12, 1940)

To Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and Huang Kecheng:

With regard to operational principles for the New Fourth Army.
1. Under instigation by Britain and the United States, Chiang [Kaishek] may
join the British-American front, and there is the possibility of the entire southern
region's turning into a world of darkness. Because Chiang takes an anti-Japanese
stand, however, we cannot start any guerrilla warfare in the areas under
Guomindang control in the south. The defeat of Zeng Sheng's troops in the East
River area¹ is proof of this. Therefore, headquarters should seize this opportunity
to cross the river immediately and make eastern Anhui its base area. This may
certainly not be delayed any longer. As for the combat troops in southern Anhui,
some of them should be moved northward, and the rest should stay and persist in
guerrilla warfare.
2. Han [Deqin] has been thoroughly defeated and is suing for peace,² which is
clearly for the purpose of gaining a respite and awaiting reinforcements. At this
time Huang Kecheng should, under the pretext of providing reinforcements to
Chen Yi, send troops to Dongtai to join with Chen's troops, and with his main
forces take the vast area to the north and to the east of Xinghua (the Eighth Route
Army is responsible for the area north of the Dongtai River), thereby forcing Han
to give up his policy of opposing us, to recognize our anti-Japanese base areas, and
to stop the operations of his troops attacking western Anhui. On the other hand,
Chen Yi will not refuse peace negotiations and, at the same time, will consolidate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 562-63, where it is reproduced from Mao's manuscript original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. On March 8, 1940, an advance guerrilla detachment led by the Chinese Communist
Party in the Fourth War Zone, consisting of a newly organized battalion commanded by
Zeng Sheng, and the Second Battalion, in all nearly 700 men, was encircled by the
Guomindang 186th Division in Guangdong. They succeeded in escaping from the encirclement and retreated toward Haifeng and Lufeng, but this was the Guomindang rear area, and
they were obliged to flee into the forests and mountains. By July and August, only about a
hundred of them remained.
2. At the beginning of October 1940, Han, who was chairman of the Jiangsu provincial
government and commanded more than 30,000 troops, had been decisively defeated by a
force of only 7,000, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu.

and enlarge the forces and expand the base areas, to demonstrate that we are acting
in self-defense and not otherwise. Our troops in eastern Anhui should arrange
immediately to build up a westward defense and hold fast to the base areas in
eastern Anhui. At the same time the Guangxi army should be called on to oppose
civil war and emphasize unity in facing the enemy. We cannot afford to lose eastern Anhui. If it is lost, Chiang Kaishek will necessarily set up blockade lines along
the Grand Canal and the Huai River to block off our future westward advance.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang]