October 1, 1940, No. 151: Germany, Italy, and Japan will soon launch large-scale operations. If Germany does not attack Britain, it will turn its attention to Africa and India, at which point Britain will be thrown into utter confusion. Japan will follow its policy of first seizing the Dutch East Indies and then sweeping through China. Once Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, and the four Dutch possessions fall into Japanese hands, the Anglo-American faction in Chongqing will again find itself in a state of panic. The United States, being inadequately prepared, may not enter the war immediately. Should Germany attack Britain, the U.S. Navy would have to simultaneously confront the Axis powers in both the Atlantic and the Pacific and would be unable to concentrate its forces against Japan in the latter theater. Consequently, even if Japan launches an offensive against the Dutch East Indies, a U.S.-Japan war might not yet break out. At that juncture, the Anglo-American clique in Chongqing will be left staring helplessly, their present high spirits tinged with wishful thinking. Their aspiration to abandon the War of Resistance and join the Anglo-American alliance is genuine; yet they also fear that Britain and the United States cannot be relied upon. Should Japan occupy the Dutch East Indies while a U.S.-Japan conflict fails to materialize, and should Britain be reduced to shambles by the combined onslaught of Germany, Italy, and Japan, this faction might still opt for a Pétainist course. Thus, they remain torn between the Anglo-American path and the Pétainist one, still hesitant to alienate the Soviet Union too sharply, and reluctant to make a firm decision to wage all-out war against the Communists. Since the big bourgeoisie is wavering, so too are the national bourgeoisie, the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie, and many centrist elements. Under such circumstances, we have ample room to maneuver.

2. However, we must reckon with the most difficult, most dangerous, and darkest possible scenario and take this as the starting point for all our preparations, rather than basing our plans on optimistic assumptions. The bleakest prospect is that Japan’s prolonged siege of Singapore proves futile, allowing the U.S. Navy to secure control of the city; meanwhile, Germany’s assault on Britain comes to naught. In light of this assessment of the international and domestic situation and the corresponding directives—No. 171—the danger of the Chinese Anglo-American faction abandoning the War of Resistance and aligning themselves with the Anglo-American camp would greatly increase, and the risk of the majority of centrists rallying behind Chiang Kai-shek would likewise grow. We must further assume a scenario in which the U.S. Navy concentrates its strength, defeats the Japanese Navy, compels Japan’s surrender, and induces the Japanese Army to withdraw from China. Subsequently, the United States would arm and finance the Anglo-American clique in Chongqing, transforming China from a Japanese colony into an American one, and turning the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC into a full-scale civil war. There could be no darker outcome than this. Even under these conditions, we remain undaunted, for our Party has been tempered, the Chinese people are mired in dire suffering, the ruling class is rife with internal contradictions and beset by countless difficulties, and a world revolution is bound to erupt, with the Soviet Union standing ready to support it.

3. There exists an intermediate possibility: a stalemate between Japan and the United States, between China and Japan, between the KMT and the CPC, and between Britain and Germany in Europe—a state of general lukewarmness pervading both China and the entire world. We must prepare to deal with this eventuality as well, and we are capable of doing so.

4. In short, we need to be ready for every conceivable scenario. Whatever the situation, we must have a plan. For now, our priority is to prepare for the darkest possible outcome. Our countermeasures consist in calmly confronting the KMT’s offensives: adopting a defensive posture militarily—remaining stationary unless attacked—and politically emphasizing united resistance against Japan. We should explain to the KMT, the centrist forces, and the broad masses the perils of both the Pétainist approach and the Anglo-American line, while stressing the importance of an independent and self-reliant War of Resistance. We should make clear that the current anti-Communist and anti-Soviet stance is merely a prelude to abandoning the War of Resistance and joining the Anglo-American alliance. Within KMT-controlled areas, our Party should execute a complete and secure retreat, while each base area should strive for complete self-sufficiency (as already arranged in the border regions). By sustaining this position for another year, the international situation is likely to undergo profound changes. For the time being, we are in a period of preparedness and waiting. O().