Our Opinions About Political Work in the Field
by the Eighth Route Army
(August 13, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Luo [Ruiqing] and Lu [Dingyi], Nie [Rongzhen],
Peng [Zhen] and Zhu [Liangcai]:1

At your meeting,2 you should discuss in detail the July 7 decision of the Central
Committee,3 as well as the various recent instructions of the Central Committee
and the General Political Department. Apart from this, we also have the following
suggestions:
1. In the War of Resistance, the political work in the military forces under the
leadership of the Communist Party should have an independent character. This
independence is based on the Party's policy, as well as on the independence of the
Communist Party in the national struggle. Consequently, it is wrong to blur the
principle of independence in our political work and to ignore the bad influence of
the tradition and practices of the Guomindang army on us. Nonetheless, what we
call the independence of our political work in no sense requires that we copy all
the practices of the Civil War period. On the contrary, we should determine the
various concrete policies of our political work in accordance with the environment of the national war. We must turn the political work of the army into a powerful weapon for realizing every single one of the Party's policies.
2. The political organs of the army, and the military officers at every level,
particularly the military and political cadres, must understand and master the Party's
policy and tactics. We must recognize that the understanding and mastery of the
Party's policy and tactics by the cadres in the army is far from adequate. Hence we

must strengthen tactical education among the cadres, so that it will become one of
the most important items in the education of the cadres. The military must observe
the strictest discipline in relations with the population. In places where our political power and local Party [organizations] have not yet been established, the political organs of the army should be totally responsible for setting up political power
and the local Party, and, during the process of establishing them, the Party's policies must be strictly carried out. In districts where political power and the local
Party have been completely established, the army should not interfere in the work
of the local political power and of the Party. Instead, it should respect them and
become a model in observing the laws and decrees. We should wage a rigorous
struggle against behavior in the army which violates discipline in dealing with the
residents, does not take good care of the base area, wastes manpower and material
supplies, or shows disrespect for the government and the local party, as well as
every action that departs from the Party's policy.
3. In order to sustain the bitter struggle in the enemy's rear, we must unite all
the cadres in the entire Party. Thus it is necessary to stipulate clearly the following
relationships:
a. As regards relations between the Party in the military and the local Party, the
Party in the army should be held responsible more often and more strictly;
when a dispute occurs, the Party in the military should be reprimanded more.
b. As regards relations between the cadres from outside the local area and the
local cadres, we should demand more from the cadres from outside the local
area and reprimand them more often.
c. As regards relations between the veteran cadres and the new cadres, we should
demand more from the veteran cadres and reprimand them more often.
d. As regards relations between the regular army and the local armed forces,
and between the old units and the new units, we should demand more from
the regular army and the old units and reprimand them more often.
4. Taking into consideration the dispersed circumstances of the units, and the
present situation of political work, we should pay attention to the following in the
mode of leadership and workstyle of our political work:
a. Its overall character. We oppose those who care only about partial interests
and selfish departmentalism.
b. Its progressive character. Study more, summarize more, and oppose conservatism and the failure to seek progress.
c. Its complexity and diversity. Oppose those who simplify everything, who
are formalistic, and who perform their duty in a perfunctory way.
d. Its planned and organized character. Oppose those who are impetuous, act
blindly, and do reckless things.
e. Its unity. Strive to unite dispersion and concentration, spontaneity and obedience to orders.
f. Its practicality. Oppose those who are unrealistic, extravagant, and exaggerate their achievements.

g. Its meticulousness. Oppose those who are crude and careless and pay attention only to appearances.
h. Its militancy. In an attempt to ensure that political work is truly adapted to
the combat environment.
5. As regards the work to root out the traitors from the enemy and puppet troops,
the General Political Department has already sent out instructions in a telegram.
Regarding work with the cadres, work with civilians, propaganda and education work, and so on, the General Political Department will send out instructions
in subsequent telegrams.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De]
Wang [Jiaxiang] Tan [Zheng]

--- Notes

Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 553–55, where it is
reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Zhu Liangcai (1900–1989), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party
in 1927. Beginning in the Jiangxi period, he served as political commissar in a number of
Red Army units and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was deputy head of the
Political Department of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Information about all
the other recipients of this telegram can be found in notes to documents translated above.

2. This is a telegram to a meeting of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army
for Field Operations and of cadres of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.

3. That is, the "Decision Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy" translated
above.