I. Issues of War and Revolution

(1) On the Soviet Union Not Joining the War
When the two imperialist factions fail to prevent war, the people will rise to oppose it, and the Soviet Union will stay out.
The realization of this plan of non-participation is the fruit of the Soviet Union’s twenty years of struggle, the result of the people of the world supporting the Soviet Union, the result of the Soviet Union skillfully exploiting the contradictions among imperialist powers, and the greatest victory in the world strategy of the proletariat, for it not only protected the Soviet Union but also secured the triumph of world revolution.
This victory was consummated by the two agreements—the German-Soviet and the Finnish-Soviet agreements[2]—and henceforth the task is to consolidate it.

(2) On the Two Imperialist Fronts
The so-called two imperialist fronts or two united fronts does not mean that there are no contradictions and struggles among the allied nations on each side. Contradictions and struggles exist and are severe.
For instance, there are contradictions and struggles among Britain, the United States, and France, and between these three and other small nations.
Likewise, there are contradictions and struggles among Germany, Italy, and Japan, and between these three and other small nations.
Nor does it mean that each front is fixed and unchanging.
On the contrary, they are not fixed and are subject to change—and changes have already occurred.
On one side, there have been changes in Northern Europe, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Balkans, and the major change in France, reflecting the weakening of the front—that is, the Anglo-American-French front.
On the other side, there has been a strengthening of the front—that is, the German-Italian-Japanese front.
Thus, the current state of imbalance has been created.
Japan, for a time leaning toward Britain and the United States, now shows a tendency to lean toward Germany and Italy. This is because the fascist faction within Japan is about to replace the Anglo-American faction.
Neither side has completely fixed alliance treaties—for example, between the United States and Britain and France, between Britain and France and Northern Europe, and the Netherlands and Belgium, or between Germany and Italy and Japan.
This is what is meant by contradictions, struggles, and changes within the fronts.
There will continue to be contradictions and struggles, and further changes will occur.
If we disregard all this, then on one side Germany, Italy, and Japan seek to overturn the status quo, while on the other side the so-called democratic countries (including the Netherlands and Belgium) seek to maintain it. Both sides share certain common interests, and therefore a united front of a sort has already come into being; each side comprises several dozen or a dozen-plus countries.
At present, in terms of territory, economic power, and naval strength, Britain and the United States remain stronger, while Germany, Italy, and Japan appear strong due to Germany’s military victories and the vast territories it has occupied.
Whether in the East or the West, the struggle between the two imperialist fronts has now mainly shifted from the continents to the seas; no decisive battle has yet been fought in this domain, so huge conflicts still lie ahead.
Even if Britain were to submit, American maritime supremacy would still remain.
The United States holds to the Monroe Doctrine plus cosmopolitanism—“What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is also mine.” It is unwilling to relinquish its interests in the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Both Germany and Italy are relatively weak at sea, and France’s capitulation did not change this situation.
Germany and Italy, together with Japan, cannot manage the colonies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium without destroying the British and American navies.
On one hand, there is the Versailles-Washington system; on the other hand, there are those who oppose this system and attempt to establish a new Versailles and a new Pacific system.
This struggle is not yet over.
That is to say, there are still contradictions among the imperialist powers that can be exploited for revolution, and they must be so exploited.
The Soviet Union must exploit them, India must exploit them, China must exploit them, and the proletariat and oppressed nations of all other countries must exploit them.
We are now in an era of great upheavals and great changes in the world, not an era of “peace” and “capitalist stability.” That era long since ended and can never be re-established.
If one fails to see this, it is because the following points have been incorrectly assessed:
1. Overestimation of the counterrevolution.
(1) The contradictions among imperialist powers have widened due to the war, not narrowed; (2) The bourgeoisie and capitalist systems in all countries are losing the people’s trust; (3) Social Democrats are losing trust; (4) The destructiveness of war, etc.
2. Underestimation of the revolutionary forces.
(1) The existence of the Soviet Union; (2) The existence of the Chinese revolution; (3) The upsurge of the Indian revolutionary movement; (4) The existence of the Communist Parties in Europe and other countries.

(3) Revolution Is Inevitable
1. A victory of Germany and Italy over Britain and France would be equivalent to breaking two imperialist chains, while new imperialist chains might be broken just as—or even before—they are fastened. The capitalist front could be broken through in three places—Europe, India, and China—which would mean essentially breaking through the entire capitalist front.
2. In Europe, a purely October Revolution is no longer possible; there it can only be an October Revolution plus the Soviet Red Army. Yet the time for such a move has not yet arrived.
3. At present, what we have is the Soviet Union’s eight-hour working day and the maturing of the world revolutionary situation, not world revolution itself. For now, we should still make use of the imperialist war; this is the eve of world revolution.

II. The China Question

(1) The Question of Improvement
1. Initial improvement—external cooperation between the two parties and two armies, aimed at awakening the broad masses and isolating the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.
2. Thorough improvement—only when a united-front government is established that includes the Communist Party and all other parties, groups, circles, and armies.
3. Rid ourselves of pessimism—the possibility of initial improvement and thorough improvement exists. Our allies are vast in number, and for now the national bourgeoisie is still an ally.
4. Rid ourselves of illusions—as long as the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are in power, there can be no thorough improvement.

(2) The Question of Retrenchment
At present, this is a partial, tactical retrenchment within a strategic offensive (the policy of concealment).
But strategically, and in overall terms, we remain on the offensive (the broad united-front policy).

(3) The Questions of National and Democratic Revolution
1. Resistance to Japan and revolution are one and the same.
2. National revolution and democratic revolution are both distinct and consistent. Roughly, they can be divided into two stages—one-sided resistance and total resistance—but both fall within the process of resistance. At present, we are in an entire revolutionary stage of resisting Japan and eliminating traitors; there is no separate, pure stage of land revolution. It is a question of resisting Japan and eliminating traitors, not a simple question of land revolution.
3. “The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of political power.” Slogan: Overthrow Japanese imperialism and establish a democratic republic—“Resist Japan, build the nation.” Strategy and tactics: the Anti-Japanese National United Front. There are four forms of the united front: (1) In Kuomintang-controlled areas: a united front of those out of office and those in office. (2) In the areas of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army: a united front within the government between our Party and other parties and classes. (3) A united front between the Kuomintang government and our government. (4) In the big cities occupied by the enemy: a lower-level united front.
4. At present, the united-front government is partial; in the future, it should become a nationwide united-front government. Without such a government, victory in the War of Resistance cannot be achieved.
5. The national revolution and the democratic revolution are simultaneous; it is not that the democratic revolution stage comes after the national revolution is concluded. Places like Wutai Mountain[3]—in the early and middle periods of the resistance. The whole country—in the later period of the resistance. Anti-friction struggles—the democratic revolution within the national revolution.

(4) The Question of the Middle Forces
1. Viewed on a global scale: The oppressed nations are the middle group between imperialism and the proletariat, but they are part of the proletarian revolution’s allied forces.
2. Viewed in terms of the resistance camp (as distinct from the enemy camp): The diehards, or the big landlords and big bourgeoisie of China, are the ruling class, a vacillating class, not a middle group. Treating them as a middle group confuses the people’s perception. The middle bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie—these are the middle group. The lower petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat—these are the progressive group.

(5) The Question of Emphasizing Unity and Struggle
1. We have always stressed unity, and will continue to do so—in dealing with all who support the resistance.
2. We have always stressed struggle, and will continue to do so—in dealing with all capitulationists.
3. We stress both unity and struggle—in dealing with all diehards who both resist Japan and oppose the Communists.
4. At times we stress unity, at other times struggle—depending on whether the diehards’ attitude is primarily one of unity or primarily one of opposing the Communists.
5. Struggle is for the sake of unity—to prolong the duration of cooperation.
6. In every field (political, military, cultural), at present unity is the primary emphasis. But in every field, there is at the same time struggle—because the Kuomintang diehards’ policy of opposing the Communists has not changed.
7. Even at present, in some places, the anti-friction struggle may manifest itself as a local upsurge, as in northern Jiangsu.

(6) The Question of the Sources of Deviations
Right deviation—arises from landlord-bourgeois influences.
“Left” deviation—arises from peasant and petty-bourgeois influences.
Objective causes—the two mentioned above.
Subjective causes—insufficient education (insufficient self-criticism).

(7) The Question of the Border Regions
Two base areas that have been put on the right track—the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region.
Thanks to the efforts of the Party, the government, and the army.
Shortcomings: insufficient revolutionary order; too few united-front activities; too much bureaucratism.
Strengthening: through the efforts of the Central Committee, the border regions, and everyone.

(8) The Question of Study
1. We are in a new era of war and revolution.
2. Everything is in flux; we must not use a rigid, formalistic viewpoint but a lively, dialectical viewpoint to observe all changes.
3. For example, the present resolution contains many new elements. This is not to say that the past was wrong, but that objective conditions have changed and our subjective understanding must adapt to these changes: Internationally—the ascendancy of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Soviet Union outside the war, the ferment of revolution; domestically—new difficulties, new dangers of capitulation, the possibility of initial improvement, the decline of the anti-Communist high tide (lasting three months already), and the growth of the “left” deviation danger, etc.
4. The united front in three periods: the period of the Great Revolution, the period of civil war, and the period of the War of Resistance.
Results were achieved in the first two periods, but errors were also made—Chen Duxiu’s absolutism (all alliance, denial of struggle) and the absolutism of the late civil war period (overthrow everything, without a correct tactic toward certain potential allies).
Now we should enlarge our achievements and avoid mistakes. It is necessary to intensify strategic education on how to win over allies without losing our own standpoint. Formalism and old-style thinking are useless. The idea that one can learn it all by a certain date, or that there are some innate geniuses, is deceptive. What is useful is to study the concrete environment and concrete strategy from a Marxist viewpoint—to put in real hard work.

Notes

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[1] These are the main points of the conclusions delivered by Mao Zedong at the Yan’an meeting of senior cadres during the discussion of the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and the Party’s Policies.”
[2] Refers to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed on August 23, 1939, and the Finnish-Soviet Peace Treaty signed on March 12, 1940, in Moscow.
[3] “Wutai Mountain” here refers to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei anti-Japanese democratic government established in the Wutai Mountain region.