inevitably follow the disastrous track taken by France. The anti-Communist policies of the past have already greatly weakened the anti-Japanese forces, and unless this policy is changed, there is no hope of victory against Japan.
3. Emphasize the conditions that are favorable to the War of Resistance. Especially emphasize the great strength of the Soviet Union, and the advantages of the
world revolutionary situation. Emphasize that the resistance forces in China are in
no way to be compared with those of France. Make propaganda regarding the
achievements of the Chinese people in three years of heroic struggle, in order to
strike a blow at the feelings of pessimism and isolate the capitulationist faction.
4. Emphasize self-reliance. To this end, we must demand that the Guomindang
change its way of doing things in the War of Resistance. For example, it should
immediately convene a democratic national assembly, abolish its anti-Communist
policy, change its workstyle of relying on secret agents, change its erroneous financial and economic policies, its cultural and education policies, its military conscription policy, and so on, and publicize the fact that the Eighth Route Army and
the New Fourth Army are model examples of self-reliance.
5. Emphasize uniting as one. It was entirely necessary for us to emphasize the
struggle for self-defense during a period of time in the past, for otherwise it would
not have been possible to beat back the anti-Communist high tide of that period and
bring about a renewed awakening of the diehard faction. Now that the anti-Communist high tide is receding, we should once again emphasize uniting. Past struggles,
too, were precisely for the purpose of achieving unity. Party members must be
made to understand that the present emphasis on uniting in no way means a halt to
all struggle. So long as the anti-Communist policy of the Guomindang does not
stop for a single day, we cannot stop struggling from a position of self-defense. But
now the main firepower of our struggle should be directed against the real
capitulationist faction, rather than against the ordinary diehards. At a time when the
anti-Communist high tide has already receded and some of the diehards have shown
the beginnings of a turn for the better, we should emphasize unity in dealing with
them, to make it easier to get an extension of the period of cooperation.
6. The development of our military strength (this is absolutely essential) is limited to the war zone, to the area behind the enemy lines, and to the territory within
the twenty-three xian of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and we shall
take no actions whatsoever in the Guomindang rear areas that could lead to conflict. There are certain units that are unwilling to penetrate the enemy's rear but,
when the situation is very grave, want to move into the Guomindang rear areas
and think of returning to the guerrilla life of the civil war period. This is a mistaken
way of thinking.
7. There are some Party members who, in accordance with the resolution of the
Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, which in the end was not upheld, laying
down the policy of not developing Party organizations in any friendly armies (including the Central Army and miscellaneous forces), have completely ceased all
organizing activities, in order to help establish the credibility of the Party and

expand the work of making friends, in the attempt to get 2 million friendly troops
to continue the War of Resistance. Those areas in which this work of making
friends has yielded no results whatsoever should be severely criticized by the Party.
8. Let it be announced to the Guomindang and to the whole country that we
have not turned our backs on our declaration of September 22, 1937 (that in order
to fight for the thorough realization of the Three People's Principles, we have
stopped land revolution, abolished the policy of insurrections, turned the Red Army
into the National Revolutionary Army, and turned the soviets into local democratic
governments). In the past, in the present, and in the future, we have carried out and
will resolutely carry out this promise of ours. But the Guomindang has turned its
back on its promises, for example, on the question of the right of political parties
to exist legally, on the question of recognizing the border regions, and on carrying
out the Three People's Principles and the Program for the War of Resistance and
National Reconstruction. All of these promises have been violated. We must demand that the Guomindang fulfill its promises and smash the fraudulent declaration that "the Communist Party has turned its back on its promises."
9. Rectify leftist errors in carrying out the united front policy. For the past year,
a great many leftist errors have occurred in the struggle against friction. For example, in the military struggle some places were unable to maintain the principle
of self-defense; Chinese traitors were beaten indiscriminately; in our financial and
economic work, there were ultraleftist policies encroaching on the property of
merchants through excessive fines and punishments, and so on. The principle of
the political power of the union of the various classes was not put into practice,
and there was a go-slow in applying the directive of the Central Committee on the
political power of the "Three-Thirds System." Long-term plans were not made for
the base areas, no care was taken of the base areas, and human and material resources were wasted. These people displayed skepticism toward the Central Committee directive on "recruiting large numbers of intellectuals" and did not carry it
out.¹ In dealing with the diehard elements, they simply struggled with them without trying to unite with them. They regarded the Guomindang as made up entirely
of diehards and failed to understand that the majority of Guomindang members
belong to the intermediate faction, and that there are many progressives, so the
diehards constitute only a very small minority. They even go so far as to treat
diehards as if they were Chinese traitors, and intermediate elements as if they were
diehards, and to demand that the intermediate elements act just like progressives,
not recognizing the position of the intermediate elements. They showed a lack of
confidence in non-Party cadres, did not get close to them, and were not accustomed to working together with non-Party cadres. They even went so far as to
execute diehards who had been arrested and execute spys and so on. All these

1. See above, the directive of December 1, 1939.


phenomena are expressions of the left deviationist errors which result from narrowminded thinking. If they are not corrected, they will damage the Party's united
front policy. But at the same time, we should not show leniency to rightist errors,
such as feeling pessimistic about the current situation, unprincipled accommodation to the Guomindang, having a negative attitude toward establishing anti-Japanese bases or toward the development of the anti-Japanese forces, failing to
be alarmed by the Guomindang secret agent policy, confusing the differences between the principles of communism and of the Three People's Principles, concern
among the cadres with getting rich, greed and corruption, bureaucratism and
routinism at work, and even fear of self-criticism, and so on. If these are not corrected, the Party will lose its independence and its revolutionary future.
10. Strengthen education on the united front for the whole Party. Party members must be made to understand that united front education is an important part of
class education. While Party members must understand how to realize the independence of the proletariat, it is also necessary that they be made to understand
how the proletariat can join in a united front with other classes to defeat the common enemy. These two points are inseparable aspects of Party education, and neither of them can be casually discarded. In the Party, even today, there are still a
number of cadres who do not understand questions of tactics within the united
front. They simplify complex issues, and all kinds of errors result from this. For
this reason, the entire Party must strengthen tactical education and overcome the
phenomenon of cadres who oversimplify. Such tactical education should be introduced into the formal curriculum for cadre education and made an important criterion for a passing grade.
11. Continue the work of consolidating the Party. At present, the basic organizational direction is consolidation rather than expansion and an emphasis on quality rather than on quantity. We must strictly examine cadres and eliminate secret
agents within our ranks, in order to defend ourselves effectively against the
Guomindang policy of infiltration. We must clean out three kinds of people: spies
(those elements sent by the enemy and by the Guomindang, and those who have
been bought), opportunists (those who have infiltrated the Party for the sake of
their personal interest, as evidenced by serious corruption and degeneration, and
divorced themselves from the masses), and excessively backward elements (nominal Party members who do not attend meetings, do not pay Party dues, and do no
work at all). Toward other elements, we must intensify our educational efforts. We
must see to it that Party members understand the two different principles of "Within
the Party be strict, outside the Party be generous" and know that these two different principles complement each other in practice. At present, the opposite phenomenon exists: within the Party, we are, on the contrary, generous, and outside
the Party we are, on the contrary, strict. This phenomenon must be corrected.
12. Strengthen organizational work within each and every base area. Now there
are some base areas, such as the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, in which
there has been good organizational work, and in which military affairs, politics,

finance, economics, cultural work, and education are all on the right track. But in
a number of other districts, because there is insufficient understanding of how to
maintain long-term struggle, some big weaknesses still exist. We must realize that
from now on the struggle will be extremely arduous. In order to sustain it for the
long term, it is necessary to change our former crude and careless work-style, and
replace it with organizational work that is well planned and careful, and also to
carry out the correct Party tactics in all areas. Otherwise we shall inevitably fail.
13. We must continue to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the
New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units. These are the most basic
forces that will guarantee victory in the War of Resistance. The direction of expansion is the territories occupied by the enemy. In districts where manpower and
material resources have already created difficulties, the primary orientation is toward consolidation, while in other districts the primary orientation is toward expansion, while consolidating at the same time.
14. In all districts within which the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth
Army are engaged in battle, the Central Committee directive on disintegrating the
enemy armies and the puppet armies must be resolutely applied. Within one year
from now, there must be evidence of success in disintegrating the enemy and puppet armies. We must recognize that our successes in this area over the past three
years have been very slight.
15. In Guomindang-held areas, the Party must strictly carry out the Party's
policies of organizational concealment and selectivity. But toward those outside
the Party, we must carry out the tactics of a broad united front, in order to expose
and isolate the capitulationists.
16. In those territories occupied by the Japanese, we must carry out strictly the
tactics of concealing the Party organizations and of careful selection of cadres.
Outside the Party, while cautiously organizing the masses, strengthen the workers' movement, actively disintegrate the enemy and puppet armies, and win over
Chinese traitors who are double agents, in order to isolate the Japanese bandits and
Chinese traitors, and finally drive them out.
17. Strengthen work among overseas Chinese. Find ways to make contact with
the national independence movements in India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies,
Annam, Siam, and the Philippines, give them as much support as possible, and
bring about coordination between their struggles and our struggle.
The Central Committee calls upon all Party comrades to fight resolutely to
carry out the above tactics, for this is the way to guarantee that difficulties will be
overcome, that the threat of capitulation will be overcome, and that the situation
will be changed for the better.