Strategic Deployments in North and
Central China

(June 1, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], and Zuo [Quan], and inform also Chen [Guang]
and Luo Ronghuan, and [Huang] Kecheng:

1. To assure the occupation of North China is the fixed policy of the enemy.
The enemy's "scorched earth campaign" has added to the difficulties suffered by
our forces and made it difficult for us to expand. There are also increasing problems with the finances and with the food, rifle, and ammunition supplies of our
forces.

2. The Guomindang's policy is to lock us up in the rear of the enemy and make
us fight a war of attrition with the enemy, prevent us from moving southward, and
sever the routes by which our forces can move to our own rear.

3. Therefore, as regards strategic deployment, we have the following views:
a. Along the northern line, that is, areas such as central Hebei, Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi, and northwestern Shanxi, the primary orientation is to persist in
struggle rather than to expand our forces. This is because if we are to expand
our forces [there], we will have problems with supplies and guns. We would
only add difficulties to persisting in our struggle. Therefore, a portion of the
main force in this area should move southward, but the local forces there
should be very greatly strengthened, and the guerrilla war should be greatly
expanded. In the main force in these areas, the rule that 60 percent of the men
must have guns should be observed, and the phenomenon of many men and
few guns should be avoided.

b. Along the south line, that is, the areas of southeastern Shanxi, southern Hebei,
Shandong, and so on, except for Shandong, it is difficult to have major expansion. Kecheng's column and the detachments of Peng and Zhu¹ should
immediately move to Central China. Their original defense sector shall be
taken over by the 129th Division, and the forces being moved southward
from the northern line.

c. Central China is an area the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party
must fight over. Although the situation is not very tense right now, it is the
best opportunity for our forces to move southward. We will not be able to
move southward if there is some slight result from the negotiations. The Zhu-Peng detachment and the Huang Kecheng column should set out immediately. Huang should command in person all the forces, or at least two brigades,
in the move southward. If there are some small losses in North China, they
can be compensated. But if we should miss the opportunity in Central China,
the whole position will become more difficult in the future. We request that
[Peng] Dehuai consider the above and reply by telegram.

Mao [Zedong] Zhu [De] Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 549-50, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. The reference is to the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan Detachment of the 115th Division
of the Eighth Route Army, with Peng Mingzhi as commander and Zhu Diaoxin as political
commissar.