Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces, and
Resist the Onslaughts of the
Anti-Communist Diehards
(May 4, 1940)
1. In all regions behind enemy lines and in all war zones, stress should be laid
not on particularity, but on identity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. While
each region has its individual peculiarities, they are all identical in that all are
confronted by the enemy and all are engaged in the War of Resistance, whether in
North, Central, or South China, in the areas north or south of the Yangzi River, or
in the plains, the mountain or lake regions, and whether the force involved is the
Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or the South China Guerrilla Forces.¹
It follows that in all cases we can and should expand. The Central Committee has
pointed out to you this policy of expansion time and again. To expand means to
reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Guomindang's
restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Guomindang, not to expect
official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support
but, instead, to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base
areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action, and
build up united front organs of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party. In Jiangsu Province, for example, despite the verbal attacks and the
restrictions and oppression by anti-Communist elements such as Gu Zhutong, Leng
Xin, and Han Deqin,² we should gain control of as many districts as possible from
Nanjing in the west to the seacoast in the east, and from Hangzhou in the south to
Xuzhou in the north, and do so as fast as possible and yet steadily and systematically; and we should independently expand the armed forces, establish organs of
political power, set up fiscal offices to levy taxes for resistance to Japan and economic agencies to promote agriculture, industry, and commerce, and open up

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xuanji, 2nd edition (1991), pp. 753-58. No
contemporary text is available.
1. The South China Guerrilla Forces was the name given at this time to a number of
Communist-led guerrilla detachments in Guangdong.
2. On Gu Zhutong, see the relevant note to the text of April 3, 1940. Leng Xin (1900-1987), a native of Jiangsu, graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in the first class.
In 1939, he became commander of Guomindang guerrilla forces in the Third War Zone. On
Han Deqin, see the relevant note to the text of March 29, 1940.
470
MAY 1940 471
schools of various kinds to train large numbers of cadres. The Central Committee
previously instructed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100,000
men, with as many rifles, and to set up organs of political power promptly in the
regions behind the enemy lines in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces before the end
of this year. What concrete measures have you taken? Opportunities have been
missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more
difficult.

2. At a time when the anti-Communist diehards in the Guomindang are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulating to Japan, we should stress struggle and
not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. Therefore, whether in the theoretical, the political, or the military sphere, we should as a matter of principle
firmly resist all verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards designed to contain, restrict, and oppose the Communist Party, and
our attitude toward them should be one of firm struggle. This struggle must be
based on the principle of fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with
restraint, that is, on the principles of self-defense, victory, and truce, which means
that every concrete struggle at present is defensive, limited, and temporary in nature. We must take tit-for-tat action and conduct a determined struggle against all
the reactionary verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards. For instance, when they demanded that our Fourth and Fifth Detachments be moved to the south, we countered by insisting that it was absolutely
impossible to do so; when they demanded that the units under Ye and Zhang³ be
moved to the south, we countered by asking permission for a portion of these units
to move to the north; when they charged us with having undermined their conscription plans, we asked them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth
Army; when they said we were carrying on wrong propaganda, we asked them to
stop all their anti-Communist propaganda and to rescind all decrees and orders
that cause friction; and whenever they launch military attacks against us, we should
smash them by counterattacks. We are on just grounds in carrying out this tit-fortat policy. And it is not only the Central Committee of our Party that should take
action whenever we are on just grounds, but every unit of our army should do so.

3. Ye is Ye Fei (1914-1999), a native of Fujian, who joined the Chinese Communist
Party in 1932. After the main force of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, Ye was
involved in setting up the eastern Fujian base area and led guerrilla warfare there for three
years. In 1938-1939, he served as a regimental commander in the Third Detachment of the
New Fourth Army. At this time, he was commander of the First Detachment under the
northern Jiangsu headquarters. In the notes to the first edition of the Selected Works (p. 731
of the Chinese edition, and p. 436 of the English edition) Zhang is identified as Zhang
Yunyi, who is referred to below. The second edition indicates that the reference is to Zhang
Daoyong (alternate name Taoyong). Since the revised edition has been more carefully edited on the basis of a wider range of sources, we assume this is correct, but have been unable
to find more information about this commander.