The Policy That Should Be Adopted Toward the
Intermediate Forces

(April 12, 1940)

Chen and Luo, Xuefeng, Hu Fu,¹ and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] (for
transmittal to Zuo and Huang), Xu and Zhu, Liu and Deng,² and Xiang Ying:

The policy in a certain quarter is to get all the intermediate factions to struggle
against us, thus causing injury to both sides, and causing us to give offense to the
various intermediate factions and putting us in an isolated position. Therefore, we
must adopt the following policy toward Yu Xuezhong, who is near Chen and Luo,
He Zhuguo and Sun Tongxuan,³ who are near Xuefeng, the Sichuan army, the
Guizhou army, and the Northwest Army, who are near [Li] Xiannian, and the
Guizhou army, which is near Hu Fu:
1. Send people over directly, or indirectly ask people to convey the message, or
openly send letters and leaflets to express our position: that we are totally unwilling to get involved in friction with them. We should ask them to consider the
overall situation and preserve friendships so as to avoid injuries to both sides while
the third party benefits. Such appeals should be constantly repeated.
2. When they are attacking us, under pressure by the orders from a certain
quarter, we should first make some concessions, on condition that our fundamental interests are not harmed, so as to demonstrate our sincerity. We should strive
for compromises and patching up our relations before things go too far.
3. When they attack us in total disregard of everything, hurting our fundamental interests, we should resolutely deal a heavy blow at some of their units to serve
as warning. Afterward, we still strive for mutual compromise.
4. It is only when the intermediate factions turn into firm, immutable diehards
like Lu Zhonglin and Shi Yousan that we shall adopt the policy of breaking with
them completely and wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, and cleanly. The nature of this policy is also to serve as warning to other intermediate factions, to
make them fearful, so they will refrain from engaging in friction.
It is left to you to decide how the above orientation should be carried out concretely in view of the circumstances. When the central forces attack us, we should
adopt the same policy. This is because among the various ranks of officers in the
central forces, only some officers and the system of political instruction are diehards. Most are intermediate factions, and there are also some progressives. We
absolutely must not regard all central forces as diehards.
Central Secretariat and
Military Affairs Commission