Comrade Dehuai [1]: I have today carefully read your telegram of the first [2].
From a broad strategic perspective, we must avoid any further clashes with the Nationalist forces in the Lingchuan and Lin County areas. Should they continue to press forward, we should withdraw northward. Only if their advances persist despite repeated warnings should our troops retaliate; in that case, the responsibility for escalation would clearly lie with them. Otherwise, such an action would be highly detrimental to our political position.


At present, the focus of our struggle should shift to the Huai River region. Li Pinxian [3] is currently deploying troops to exert pressure on the Xuefeng and Hufu areas [4]. Chiang Kai-shek has taken notice of this area and is attempting to sever the link between our forces and the New Fourth Army. The key to our future lies in the Central Plains; if we do not act now, it will become even more difficult later.


Therefore, I propose redeploying the 344th Brigade between the Longhai Railway and the Huai River to assist Peng Xuefeng in establishing a base area and to provide support to Hufu. Subsequently, a portion of these forces could be advanced further into northern Jiangsu, thereby integrating the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army into a unified whole.


Such a move would also introduce a new front in the eastern theater, forcing Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang [5] to redirect their attention eastward, thereby lessening their focus on North China and allowing us to consolidate our position there more effectively.


As for the current situation in North China, it is imperative that we bring our operations there to an orderly close. Otherwise, we risk being drawn into a defensive posture.


Once our political position becomes defensive, Chiang Kai-shek will launch a counteroffensive, vigorously propagandizing that we are acting unjustifiably. At that point, we would find ourselves at a severe disadvantage, having lost the moral high ground we previously enjoyed.


Chiang will also exploit the Zhu Huaibing incident [6] to his advantage. He Yingqin [7] has already reported on it once at a standing session of the Consultative Political Conference [8]. Next month, the Consultative Political Conference will convene its fifth plenary session. The inspection teams he has dispatched to Luoyang and other locations are now returning to Sichuan, where they will undoubtedly make much of the matter.


We must therefore prepare to meet Chiang’s new offensive on the political front. To achieve this, we need to immediately halt our military operations and adopt a defensive stance: when the enemy advances, we retreat without firing a single shot, strictly obeying orders. Only in this way can we secure a politically just and advantageous position.


Please consider these proposals and reply at your earliest convenience.
Zedong, printed from the manuscript on the sixteenth day.


Notes: [1] Dehuai refers to Peng Dehuai, who at the time served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army. [2] Refers to a telegram dated March 13, 1940 (the “first” day of the month) from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, in which Peng stated that Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang were steadily pressing toward Lin County. Our forces were prepared to respond in a defensive posture, aiming to destroy one or two of their divisions. “In this way, the prospects might improve, although there would also be a risk of escalating armed conflict—though not to the point of a nationwide anti-Communist war.” [3] Li Pinxian (1892–1987), native of Cangwu, Guangxi. At the time, he held the posts of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Fifth War Zone and Commander of the 21st Group Army, as well as Chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government of the Kuomintang. [4] Refers to the border region of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, where Peng Xuefeng served as commander and political commissar of the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, and to the anti-Japanese base area in eastern Anhui, under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi (“Hufu”), who was Secretary of the Central Bureau of the CPC in the Central Plains. [5] “Chiang” refers to Chiang Kai-shek, and “Wei” refers to Wei Lihuang, who at the time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s First War Zone. [6] Zhu Huaibing was then commander of the Nationalist Army’s 97th Army. In February and March 1940, Chiang ordered him to unite the forces of Pang Bingxun, Zhang Yinwu, Hou Ruyong, and others to launch a three-pronged attack against the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army in the Taihang Mountains, but these forces were defeated by the Eighth Route Army. [7] He Yingqin was at the time Chief of Staff of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government and Minister of Military Affairs. [8] The Consultative Political Conference refers to the National Consultative Political Conference, an advisory body established by the Nationalist government during the Anti-Japanese War. In order to unite in the resistance against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party sent representatives to participate in this body.