Current Problems of Tactics in the
Anti-Japanese United Front
(March 11, 1940)

1. The present political situation is as follows: (a) Japanese imperialism has
been dealt a heavy blow by China's War of Resistance and is already incapable of
launching any more large-scale military offensives, so the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves has now reached the stage of strategic stalemate.
But the enemy is still holding fast to its basic policy of destroying China and is
pursuing it by such means as undermining the anti-Japanese united front, intensifying the "mopping-up" campaigns in the rear areas, and stepping up economic
aggression. (b) Britain and France are finding their positions in the East weakened
by the war in Europe, while the United States is continuing its policy of "sitting on
the mountaintop watching the tigers fight," so that an Eastern Munich conference
is out of the question for the moment. (c) The Soviet Union has gained new successes in its foreign policy and is maintaining its policy of giving active support to
China's War of Resistance. (d) The pro-Japanese section of the big bourgeoisie,
already having completely capitulated to Japan, is ready to play the puppet. The
pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie may continue to resist Japan, but
its proneness to conciliation remains serious. It follows a dual policy. While desiring to remain united with the various non-Guomindang forces to cope with Japan,
it is doing all it can to suppress them, and especially the Communist Party and the
other progressive forces. It forms the diehard section of the anti-Japanese united
front. (e) The intermediate forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups, often take a middle position between
the progressives and the diehards because of their contradictions with the main
ruling sections of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and
with the working class and the peasantry, on the other. They form the middle
sector of the anti-Japanese united front. (f) Recently, the Communist-led progressive forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie have
grown much stronger and in the main have succeeded in creating base areas in
which anti-Japanese democratic political power has been established. Their influence is very great among the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie

Our source for this text is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp.
744-52.
MARCH 1940 439
throughout the country and is also quite considerable among the middle forces.
On the battlefield the Communists are fighting roughly as many Japanese troops
as is the Guomindang. They form the progressive section of the anti-Japanese
united front.
This is the present political situation in China. In these circumstances the possibility still exists of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it
for the better; the Central Committee's resolutions of February 1¹ are entirely
correct.
2. The basic condition for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is the
extension and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. The tactics required
for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces,
and combat the diehard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to
be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle. In the period of the antiJapanese united front, struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle.
If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding,
it will perish. This truth is gradually being grasped by Party comrades. However,
there are still many who do not understand it; some think that struggle will split the
united front or that struggle can be employed without restraint, and others use
wrong tactics toward the middle forces or have mistaken notions about the diehard
forces. All of this must be corrected.
3. Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, boldly expanding the Eighth
Route Army and the New Fourth Army, establishing anti-Japanese democratic
base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organization throughout
the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth,
women, and children, winning over intellectuals in all parts of the country, and
spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a
struggle for democracy. Steady expansion of the progressive forces is the only
way to prevent the situation from deteriorating, to forestall capitulation and splitting, and to lay a firm and indestructible foundation for victory in the resistance to
Japan. But the expansion of the progressive forces is a serious process of struggle,
which must be ruthlessly waged not only against Japanese imperialism and the
Chinese traitors but also against the diehards, because the diehards are opposed to
the growth of the progressive forces, and the middle sector is skeptical. Unless we
engage in resolute struggle against the diehards and, moreover, achieve tangible
results, we shall be unable to resist their pressure or dispel the doubts of the middle
sector. In that case the progressive forces will have no way of expanding.
4. Winning over the middle forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie,
the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups. They are three distinct

1. See the document dated February 1, 1940, "Resolution of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks."


categories, but as things are, they all belong to the middle forces. The middle
bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie as distinct from the comprador
class, that is, from the big bourgeoisie. Although it has its class contradictions
with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class,
it still wants to resist Japan and also would like to grasp political power for itself,
because it is oppressed by Japanese imperialism in the occupied areas and kept
down by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in the Guomindang areas. When it
comes to resisting Japan, they are in favor of united resistance; when it comes to
winning political power, they are in favor of the movement for constitutional government and they try to exploit the contradictions between the progressives and
the diehards for their own ends. This is a stratum we must win over. Then there are
the enlightened gentry who are the left wing of the landlord class, that is, landlords
with a bourgeois coloration, and their political attitude is roughly the same as that
of the middle bourgeoisie. Although they have class contradictions with the peasants, they also have their contradictions with the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. They do not support the diehards and they, too, want to exploit the contradictions
between us and the diehards for their own political ends. On no account should we
neglect this section either, and our policy must be to win them over. As for the
regional power groups, they are of two kinds-the forces which control certain
regions as their own and the troops of miscellaneous brands which do not. Although these groups are in contradiction with the progressive forces, they also
have their contradictions with the current Guomindang central government because of the self-seeking policy it pursues at their expense; they, too, want to
exploit the contradictions between us and the diehards for their own political ends.
Most of the leaders of the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class
and the big bourgeoisie and, therefore, progressive as they may appear at certain
times during the anti-Japanese war, they soon turn reactionary again; nevertheless, because of their contradictions with the Guomindang central authorities, the
possibility exists of their remaining neutral in our struggle against the diehards,
provided we pursue a correct policy. Our policy toward the three categories of
middle forces described above is to win them over. But this policy differs from
that of winning over the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and it also
varies for each category of the middle forces. While the peasants and the urban
petty bourgeoisie should be won over as basic allies, the middle forces should be
won over as allies against imperialism. Among the middle forces, it is possible for
the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight
against Japan and also in the setting up of anti-Japanese democratic political power,
but they fear land revolution. In the struggle against the diehards, some may join
in to a limited degree, others may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others
a rather reluctant neutrality. But, apart from joining us in the war, the regional
power groups will at most observe a temporary neutrality in our struggle against
the diehards; they are unwilling to join us in establishing democratic political power
since they themselves belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie.

MARCH 1940 441
The middle forces tend to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should
educate and criticize them appropriately, with special reference to their vacillating
attitude.
The winning over of the middle forces is an extremely important task for us in
the period of the anti-Japanese united front, but it can be accomplished only under
certain conditions. These are: (a) that we have ample strength; (b) that we respect
their interests; and (c) that we are resolute in our struggle against the diehards and
steadily win victories. If these conditions are lacking, the middle forces will vacillate or even become allies of the diehards in the latter's attacks on us, because the
diehards are also doing their best to win over the middle forces in order to isolate
us. These middle forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the
decisive factor in our struggle against the diehards; we must therefore be prudent
in dealing with them.
5. The diehard forces at present are the forces of the big landlord class and the
big bourgeoisie. Divided at the moment into the group that has capitulated to Japan and the group that favors resistance, they will gradually become still further
differentiated. Within the big bourgeoisie, the group favoring resistance to Japan
is now different from the group that has already capitulated to Japan. It pursues a
dual policy. It still advocates unity against Japan, but at the same time it follows
the extremely reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces in preparation for its eventual capitulation. As it still favors unity against Japan, we can still
try to keep it in the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer the better. It would
be wrong to neglect our policy of winning over this group and cooperating with it
and to regard it as having already capitulated and as being on the verge of launching an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, we must adopt tactics of struggle
to combat its reactionary policy and carry on a determined ideological, political,
and military fight against it, because all over the country it pursues the reactionary
policy of suppressing the progressive forces, because instead of carrying out the
common program of the revolutionary Three People's Principles it stubbornly
opposes our efforts to do so, and because it works hard to prevent us from going
beyond the limits it has set for us, that is, it tries to confine us to the passive
resistance it practices itself and, moreover, it tries to assimilate us, failing which it
applies ideological, political, and military pressure against us. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to meet the dual policy of the diehards, and such is our policy
of seeking unity through struggle. If in the ideological sphere we can put forward
correct revolutionary theory and strike hard at their counterrevolutionary theory,
if in the political sphere we adopt tactics suited to the times and strike hard at their
anti-Communist and antiprogressive policies, and if in the military sphere we take
appropriate measures and strike back hard at their attacks, then we shall be able to
restrict the effective range of their reactionary policy and compel them to recognize the status of the progressive forces, and we shall be able to expand the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate their forces. What is more,
we shall be able to induce those diehards who are still willing to resist Japan to


prolong their participation in the anti-Japanese united front and shall thus be able
to avert a large-scale civil war of the kind that broke out before. Thus the purpose
of our struggle against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front
is not only to parry their attacks in order to protect the progressive forces and
enable the latter to go on growing. It is also to prolong the diehards' resistance to
Japan and to preserve our cooperation with them and avert large-scale civil war.
Without struggle, these progressive forces would be exterminated by the diehard
forces, the united front would cease to exist, there would be nothing to hinder the
diehards from capitulating to the enemy, and civil war would break out. Therefore, struggle against the diehards is an indispensable means of uniting all the antiJapanese forces, achieving a favorable turn in the situation, and averting large-scale
civil war. All our experience confirms this truth.
There are, however, several principles that must be observed in the struggle
against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front. First, the principle of self-defense. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked,
we will certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without
provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies
the defensive nature of the struggle. The military attacks of the diehards must be
smashed-resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely. Second, the principle
of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight
without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must
know how to exploit the contradictions among the diehards and must not take on
too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle
of a truce. After repulsing one diehard attack, we should know when to stop and
bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce
should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity
with the diehards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with
them. On no account should we fight on ceaselessly day after day or be carried
away by success. Herein lies the temporary nature of each struggle. Only when
they launch a new attack should we counter with a new struggle. In other words,
the three principles are to fight "on just grounds," "to our advantage," and "with
restraint." By keeping to this kind of struggle, waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the
middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, and we can also make the diehards
think twice before attacking us again, compromising with the enemy, or starting
large-scale civil war. Thus a favorable turn in the situation will become possible.
6. The Guomindang is a heterogeneous party which includes diehards, middle
elements, and progressives, but taken as a whole it must not be equated with the
diehards. Some people regard the Guomindang as consisting entirely of diehards
because its Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counterrevolutionary friction-mongering decrees as the "Measures for Restricting the Activities
of Alien Parties" and has mobilized every ounce of its strength for counterrevolu-

MARCH 1940 443
tionary friction-mongering in the ideological, political, and military spheres throughout the country. But this is a mistaken view. The diehards in the Guomindang are
still in a position to dictate its policies, but numerically they are in a minority,
while the majority of the membership (many are members in name only) are not
necessarily diehards. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions among them, follow a policy of differentiating between their sectors, and do our utmost to unite with the middle and progressive
sectors of the Guomindang.
7. On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, we must
make sure that the political power established there is that of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front. No such political power exists as yet in the Guomindang
areas. It is the political power of all who support both resistance and democracy,
that is, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the
Chinese traitors and reactionaries. It is different from the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and is also somewhat different from a strictly workerpeasant democratic dictatorship. Places in the organs of political power should be
allocated as follows: one-third to the Communists, representing the proletariat and
the poor peasantry; one-third to the Left progressives, representing the petty bourgeoisie; and the remaining one-third to the middle and other elements, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Only Chinese traitors and
anti-Communist elements are disqualified from participation in these organs of
political power. This general rule for the allocation of positions is necessary; otherwise it will not be possible to maintain the principle of Anti-Japanese National
United Front political power. This allocation of places represents the genuine policy
of our Party and must be carried out conscientiously; there must be no halfheartedness about it. It provides a broad rule which has to be applied according to
the specific conditions, and there must be no mechanical filling up of quotas. At
the lowest level the ratio may have to be somewhat modified to prevent domination by the landlords and evil gentry, but the fundamental spirit of this policy must
not be violated. We should not labor the question of whether the non-Communists
in these organs have party affiliations or what their party affiliations are. In areas
under the political power of the anti-Japanese united front, all political parties,
whether the Guomindang or any other, must be granted legal status so long as they
cooperate with and do not oppose the Communist Party. On the question of suffrage under this political power, the policy is that every Chinese who reaches the
age of eighteen and is in favor of resistance and democracy should have the right to
elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, party affiliation, sex, creed,
or educational level. The organs of anti-Japanese united front political power should
be elected by the people and then apply to the National Government for confirmation. Their form of organization must be based on democratic centralism. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the anti-Japanese
united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, opposition to confirmed Chinese traitors and reactionaries, protection of the


people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the antiJapanese social strata, and improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants. The establishment of this anti-Japanese united front political power will exert
a great influence on the whole country and serve as a model for anti-Japanese
united front political power on a national scale; therefore this policy should be
fully understood and resolutely carried out by all Party comrades.
8. In the struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces,
and isolate the diehard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals,
whom the diehards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore it is an important
and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring
them under the influence of our Party.
9. In propaganda, the following guidelines should be stressed:
a. carry out the "Testament of the Director General" by arousing the masses for
united resistance to Japan;
b. carry out the Principle of Nationalism by firmly resisting Japanese imperialism and striving for complete national liberation and the equality of all the
nationalities within China;
c. carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute freedom to resist Japan and save the nation, by enabling them to elect governments at all levels, and by establishing the revolutionary democratic political
power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front;
d. carry out the Principle of the People's Livelihood by abolishing exorbitant
taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing land rent and interest, enforcing the
eight-hour workday, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce, and
improving the livelihood of the people; and
e. carry out Chiang Kaishek's declaration that "every person, young or old, in
the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan
and defending our homeland."
All these points are in the Guomindang's own published program, which is also
the common program of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But the
Guomindang has not been able to carry out any part of this program other than
resistance to Japan; only the Communist Party and the progressive forces are able
to carry it out. It is a simple enough program and is widely known among the
people, yet many Communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the popular
masses and isolating the diehards. From now on we should keep attention focused
on the five points of this program and popularize them through public notices,
manifestos, leaflets, articles, speeches, statements, and so on. In the Guomindang
areas it is still only a propaganda program, but in the areas reached by the Eighth
Route Army and the New Fourth Army it is already a program of action. Acting
according to this program we are within the law, and when the diehards oppose
our carrying it out, it is they who are outside the law. In the stage of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution, this program of the Guomindang is basically the same as
ours, but the ideology of the Guomindang is entirely different from that of the
MARCH 1940 445
Communist Party. It is only this common program of the democratic revolution
that we should put into practice, and on no account should we follow the ideology
of the Guomindang.