as well as part of Shandong; and consolidate the area west of the Tianjin-Pukou
railroad, east of Kaifeng, south of the old Yellow River, and north of the new
Yellow River³ in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan-Anhui Border Region within half a
year-then there will be some possibility that the united front may take a turn for
the better. (Of course, the diehards will hate us all the more.) Besides, if our military counteroffensive does not stop for a while in the major regions, even though
our military actions are still defensive in nature, the intermediate factions may
regard us as extreme and excessive. There will then be the possibility that we
might lose the sympathy of the intermediate factions. Therefore, whether from the
point of view of consolidating our forces or from the point of view of striving to
win over the sympathy of the intermediate factions, it is necessary to halt temporarily the military struggle between the two sides.

3. Now that it is necessary and possible for the military struggle between the
two sides to come to a halt, our specific steps should be: (a) Seriously restore our
ties with Yan Xishan; look for concrete ways to work out a compromise between
the new and old armies and to bring the New Army and the Sacrifice League again
under the command of Yan Xishan⁴; (b) Strive to get Chiang, Yan, and Wei to
recognize that the Jundu, Fenyang, Linfen, Tunliu, Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe,
and Daming line should constitute the battle line between the two sides.⁵ Their
units, such as those under Zhu Huaibing,⁶ located north of that line should be
transferred southward, and our forces south of that line should be transferred northward. We shall only keep two lines of army service stations, one from Huanqu to

3. In June 1938, in order to impede the progress of the Japanese armies, the Chinese
authorities broke open the Yellow River dikes. The river swept across the path of the advancing Japanese and found a new outlet to the sea south, rather than north, of the Shandong
peninsula. (For a brief account of the circumstances, see the *Cambridge History of China*,
Vol. 13, p. 555.) This change in the course of the river still persisted in 1940; hence the
distinction between the "old" and the "new" Yellow River.

4. Regarding the old and new armies, see above, the text of December 6, 1939. The
Sacrifice League, or League for Sacrifice to Save the Country, had been founded in September 1936. Outwardly, it was a bureaucratic organization controlled by Yan Xishan's officials, but in reality it was an anti-Japanese mass body under the direct leadership of members of the Chinese Communist Party.

5. The line of demarcation suggested by Mao, running from Jundu through intermediate
points to Daming, lies in southeastern Shanxi. In naming these and other places, Mao was
seeking to define areas assigned to Guomindang units and to the Communist forces. This
was part of the scaling down of conflict at the end of the "First Anti-Communist Upsurge"
and was intended to restrain Peng's Eighth Route Army from pushing its tactical advantage
too far. This document shows how detailed and specific Mao could sometimes be in his
directives to lower levels. It should be read in conjunction with the more general statement
of the following day.

6. Zhu Huaibing (1892-1968), a native of Hubei, had participated in the 1911 Revolution. After graduating from the Baoding Military Academy in 1917, he held a variety of
military and political posts in the 1920s and 1930s. In April 1938, he was appointed commander of the Ninety-seventh Army, a position he still occupied in March 1940.

the Taihang mountains and the other from Yonghe to Linshi. Some troops will be
deployed along these two army service station lines, their sole mission being to
safeguard communications and not to engage in any local work. If their side can
guarantee that they will not carry out attacks to the north of this line, then even if
they have Shi Yousan, Gao Shuxun, Ding Shuben,⁷ Zhu Huaibing, Pang Bingxun,
Fan Hanjie, and Wang Jingguo⁸ build defensive fortifications to the south of this
line, we can only accept this. Only if their forces cross this line and attack northward will we launch a resolute counterattack. (c) Of the two points noted above,
the emphasis at present should be put on the second. And the emphasis within the
emphasis is on Zhu Huaibing's withdrawing from the three *xian* of Cixian, Wuan
*xian*, and Shixian, and recognizing that Huguan and Linxian are areas for us to
station troops. Please consider whether, if their side is only willing to recognize
the Pingshun-Cixian line as the border between the two forces and demands that
we withdraw from Huguan and Linxian, we can agree to withdraw from these two
*xian*. Also, please think about postponing for a couple of days the measures for
carrying out the counteroffensive against Zhu Huaibing, so as to wait for the results
of the negotiations. Yuan Xiaoxuan⁹ should continue the negotiations in Luoyang.
It is appropriate that he not leave for the time being. We will not attack the three
units of Shi, Gao, and Ding south of Daming. What is my elder brother's view? I
hope that you will consider these matters and let me have your reply.

[Mao] Zedong [Wang] Jiaqiang¹⁰

7. Shi Yousan was at this time deputy commander of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region
and commander of the Sixty-ninth Army (see also above note, January 30, 1940). Gao
Shuxun was at this time commander of the New Eighth Army of the Thirty-ninth Group
Army. Ding Shuben, a native of Anhui, was at this time commissioner of the Guomindang
government in the Puyang Special Region.

8. Pang Bingxun was deputy commander of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region and
commander of the Twenty-fourth Army Group. Fan Hanjie was at this time commander of
the Guomindang's Twenty-seventh Army. Wang Jingguo was commander of the Thirteenth
Group Army of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

9. Yuan Xiaoxuan was at this time head of the operational office of the Eighth Route
Army in Luoyang.

10. As noted earlier, Jiaqiang is an alternative *ming* for Wang Jiaxiang.

Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions
and Consolidate the Positions Won

(March 5, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. There is the necessity and the possibility that the armed struggle against
friction may decline for a time in the major regions of the northwest and of North
China. This is because we have already basically put down Chiang [Kaishek]'s
military offensive, while at present Chiang is in no position to carry out a large-scale campaign to "suppress the Communists." We have won great victories in
Shanxi, Hebei, and the border region. The question of winning the upper hand in
North China has basically been resolved. Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and Wei¹ cannot
ignore these facts. Consequently, there is the possibility that their side's armed
offensive may be halted temporarily and that they may seek a harmonious understanding with us for a time. During the past two weeks, Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and
Wei, together with Jiang of Shaanxi and Zhu of Gansu,² have more or less revealed
this intention.

2. The present task for our side is to strive for internal peace in the major regions, so that we may be able to concentrate our forces to consolidate our existing
positions within half a year. This task is of very great significance. If we are able to
consolidate twenty-three *xian* in the border areas to make them really like the
border region; consolidate northwestern Shanxi and the eastern part of Suiyuan in
the Shanxi-Suiyuan region; consolidate the area north of the Linfen, Tunliu,
Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe, and Daming line in southeastern Shanxi and in Hebei,

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 517-20, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek, Cheng Qian, Yan Xishan, and Wei Lihuang.
Regarding Cheng, see the relevant note to the text of January 11, 1940. Regarding Yan
Xishan, see Vol. V, p. 61, note 8, and above, the note to the text of December 6, 1939. Wei
Lihuang (1897-1960), a native of Anhui, had participated in the Northern Expedition and
in the campaigns of 1931-1934 against the Communists in Jiangxi. At this time, he was
commander of the First War Zone, and governor of Henan.
2. Jiang of Shaanxi is Jiang Dingwen (1895-1974). Regarding him, see above the relevant note to Edgar Snow's September 24 interview with Mao. Zhu of Gansu is Zhu
Shaoliang, commander of the Eighth War Zone. See above, the relevant note to "The Current Situation and Our Policies," January 11, 1940.