On Handling the Shanxi Incident

(February 12, 1940)

Zhu, Peng; He, Guan; Teng[1]:

A. According to a telegram from the Southern Bureau, Ye Jianying met with Cheng Qian. Cheng expressed the following: Regarding the Shanxi issue, Yan considers the New Army a matter of military discipline and cannot refrain from punitive action. However, the Central Government cannot resolve the New Army issue in the same manner as Yan (i.e., by military suppression). It can only transfer the New Army out of Shanxi to give them an opportunity to redeem themselves through meritorious service. The Central Government will provide funding, but the New Army will not be placed under the Eighth Route Army, as the Eighth Route Army also lacks funds. A telegram has been sent to Zhu De to relay this to the New Army, instructing them to send representatives to the Field Headquarters for discussions, etc.

B. From here, in the name of Xiao Jinguang, a telegram was sent to Yan Xishan expressing willingness to mediate the struggle between the old and new forces and offering to send someone to meet with Yan. [Yan] replied, defending his punitive action against the New Army and the attack on the Chen Detachment as unavoidable, but without a resolute tone rejecting mediation. His tone toward the Eighth Route Army was also not harsh. Regarding sending someone to meet and negotiate, he stated, "I do not refuse. If Director Xiao has the time, I hope he will come for a discussion," etc.

C. Our opinions:

1. Under the Central Government's policy of sowing discord, Yan may reach a compromise with the New [Army]. It is also advisable for the New Army, under favorable conditions, to remain under Yan's command and restore its legal status. Our policy is to temporarily maintain neutrality toward Yan, preventing Yan from allying with the Central Government against us and preventing the New Army from coming under Central Government command, as both would be disadvantageous.

2. If Zhu and Peng receive the telegram from the Field Headquarters, they should immediately relay it to the leaders of the New Army, instructing them to forward the Field Headquarters' telegram to Yan, expressing that the New Army still supports Yan, does not bypass Yan to contact the Central Government, and that the New Army must absolutely not send representatives to the Field Headquarters or Chongqing for negotiations.

3. Negotiations with Yan should be conducted by Xiao Jinguang in the form of intermediary mediation, while the leaders of the New Army should communicate with Yan via telegram, expressing their hope that the old and new armies will restore unity and jointly resist Japan under Yan's leadership. The telegrams should only mention this aspiration, without raising conditions such as punishing Chen Changjie, etc. The tone must be moderate and sincere, allowing Yan to save face and leaving room for a shift in position, so that Yan and the old army feel there is hope, thereby facilitating Xiao Jinguang's negotiations.

4. Yu Tao may be kept in northwestern Shanxi for two weeks. If there is a need for him at that time, a decision can be made then to send him to Qiulin.

5. The unity within the New Army is particularly important. Liang Huazhi has repeatedly spread rumors that the New Army will inevitably split within three months. Please pay serious attention to this matter. The New Army should seek survival and development independently and autonomously, and the Eighth Route Army should provide more assistance.

Mao, Wang

February 12

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[1] Refers to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Guan Xiangying, and Teng Daiyuan.