Resolution of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party on the
Current Situation and the Party's Tasks

(February 1, 1940)

1. One distinguishing feature of the domestic situation during this current period of strategic stalemate between the enemy and ourselves is the increasingly
apparent and intense struggle between the big bourgeoisie's capitulationist tendencies, on the one hand, and the orientation of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie toward resistance, on the other. Because the
progressive anti-Japanese forces within the country are not yet sufficiently strong
to prevail over the forces of capitulation and retrogression, the danger of capitulation and retrogression is still grave and remains the major danger in the current
situation. But as a result of the resistance to capitulation and retrogression on the
part of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army,
on the part of a majority of the Guomindang, and on the part of people throughout
the country, because of Japan's resolute course toward the destruction of China,
because of the continuing existence of relatively serious contradictions between
Britain, the United States, and France, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other,
and because the war in Europe has weakened the positions of Britain and France in
the Far East, thus making it very difficult to convene a Far Eastern Munich conference rapidly, as well as the strength of the Soviet Union and its policy of active
support for China-all these internal and external conditions make it very difficult
to capitulate and to launch an anti-Communist war on a national scale. The conditions prevailing on the two sides of the issue have given rise to a situation of
intense conflict between the progressive anti-Japanese forces and the forces of
capitulation and retrogression. The outcome of this conflict will be either a turn
for the better or a turn for the worse in the current situation. But the possibility that
the situation may improve has by no means been ruled out. If the overall policy is
correct, and if in addition the whole nation makes an effort, it is possible to change
the present situation and secure a turn for the better. Our primary task is to reinforce the progressive anti-Japanese forces, resist the forces of capitulation and
retrogression, strive for a turn for the better in the situation, and prevent it from

This text was first published in *Jiefang*, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it
from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 7, pp. 205-8, where it is reproduced from this source.

taking a turn for the worse. It is obviously wrong to believe that the situation can
only become worse and rule out the possibility of improvement and, as a result, to
give up any effort in that direction and merely prepare passively to cope with any
nationwide contingencies.
2. The recent disclosure of the Japan-Wang [Jingwei] agreement, the preparations for setting up a puppet central government, and the publication of Chiang
Kaishek's declaration denouncing Wang have dealt a new blow to the
capitulationist, anti-Communist, and diehard factions within the country and given
a new impetus to the forces in favor of the War of Resistance, uniting with the
Communists, and the pursuit of progress. This is conducive to the achievement of
an improvement in the situation. But at present, not only have the forces of capitulation and retrogression not yet been dealt a fundamental blow, but they are likely
to become even more rampant, and partial and localized incidents may continue to
break out. This is because the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie headed by Wang Jingwei
is working in concert with the domestic forces of capitulation and retrogression,
while at the moment the progressive anti-Japanese forces are not yet able to unite
rapidly to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression. In his declaration
Chiang Kaishek emphasized the War of Resistance, but he did not emphasize unity
and progress. Without nationwide unity and progress, however, it would be impossible to persist in the War of Resistance or to win final victory. Therefore, a process
of arduous struggle lies ahead in order to avoid a possible turn for the worse in the
situation and to strive for a turn for the better. Also, we must be prepared at all
times to deal with any incidents (at the moment, mostly partial and localized incidents) that may arise, and maintain a high level of vigilance at all times.
3. To strive for an improvement in the situation and overcome the danger of a
turn for the worse, it is imperative to emphasize the three points of the War of
Resistance, unity, and progress, without omitting a single one of them. Moreover,
on that basis, we must resolutely carry out the following ten great tasks. First, we
must make our propaganda against Wang and the Chinese traitors even more widespread and universal, resolutely expose all the plots for capitulation and splits,
strike at the capitulationists and anti-Communists ideologically and politically,
demonstrating resolutely, unequivocally, and concretely that to oppose the Communist Party is a counterrevolutionary measure of the capitulationists as they prepare to capitulate. Second, we must energetically develop the united front throughout
the country in every domain, including parties, governments, armies, people, and
scholarship, organize the progressive forces, and cooperate closely with the majority of the Guomindang members in order to oppose the capitulationists and
anti-Communists. Third, we must launch a broad movement in favor of constitutional government and strive to create democratic politics. Without democratic
politics, victory in the War of Resistance is mere fantasy. Fourth, we must resist all
the attacks by the capitulationist and anti-Communist forces. All the attacks waged
by capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards must be resolutely countered
according to the principle of self-defense, applying the principle: "We will not


attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack."1
Otherwise these forces may run rampant, the united front will disintegrate, and the
War of Resistance will be lost. Fifth, we must develop in a big way an anti-Japanese
movement of the popular masses. We must unite with all the intellectuals who are
in favor of resisting Japan and help them to integrate themselves with the anti-Japanese movements of the popular masses and with the guerrilla war against
Japan. Otherwise, our strength will be insufficient for striking blows against the
capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards. Sixth, we must conscientiously
carry out rent, interest, and tax reduction, improve the lives of the workers, and
give economic assistance to the popular masses. Only thus can the anti-Japanese
enthusiasm of the popular masses be unleashed; otherwise it would be impossible.
Seventh, we must consolidate and enlarge all our anti-Japanese base areas and set
up in all these base areas anti-Japanese democratic régimes which are wholly elected
by the people and exclude completely the capitulationists and anti-Communists.
Such régimes are not régimes of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, but
democratic régimes of all those who support resistance to Japan and support democracy. They are joint democratic dictatorships of several revolutionary classes.
All the plots to undermine the anti-Japanese base areas must be resolutely smashed.
All the Chinese traitors and anti-Communists who are hidden in the anti-Japanese
armed forces, the anti-Japanese régimes, and the anti-Japanese organizations must
be eliminated. Eighth, we must consolidate and expand the progressive armies, for
without these armies China would perish. Ninth, we must expand and develop the
anti-Japanese cultural movement and raise the cultural and theoretical level of the
anti-Japanese people, armies, and cadres. Unless there is an anti-Japanese struggle
on the cultural front, integrated with the overall anti-Japanese struggle, the resistance to Japan cannot be victorious. Tenth, we must consolidate the organization
of the Communist Party and develop the Party organization in those localities where
it is nonexistent or weak. Without a powerful Communist Party, none of the important problems relating to resisting Japan and saving the country can be solved. If
the above-mentioned ten great tasks can be performed resolutely, concretely, and
correctly, the progressive anti-Japanese forces can definitely be strengthened and
consolidated, so as to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression, secure an improvement in the situation, avoid a turn for the worse, and smash the
plots of the big-bourgeois elements to sabotage the War of Resistance and the
united front.

4. The slogans for propaganda and agitation at present are:

a. Support the national policy of fighting Japan to the end, oppose the traitorous agreement signed by Wang Jingwei!

b. People of the whole country, unite! Support Chairman Chiang and strike
down the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei!
c. Support the National Government and overthrow the puppet Central Committee headed by Wang Jingwei!
d. Support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist
Party and overturn Wang Jingwei's anti-Communist policy!
e. Anticommunism is Wang Jingwei's plot to split the united front! Down
with all anti-Communist Chinese traitors!
f. Reinforce national unity and eliminate internal friction!
g. Reform domestic politics, promote the campaign for constitutional government, and set up anti-Japanese democratic régimes!
h. Abolish the restrictions on political parties! Legalize all anti-Japanese parties and groups!
i. The people have the right to freedom of speech, publication, assembly,
and association to resist Japan and save the country.
j. Promote movements of the popular masses, carry out the reduction of
rent, interest, and taxes, improve the lives of the workers!
k. Consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, oppose the plots and sabotage
by the national traitors, anti-Communists, and diehards!
l. Support the troops that have performed meritorious service in the War of
Resistance Against Japan and make ample provisions for the battlefront!
m. Develop a culture of resistance to Japan, protect progressive youth, and
suppress the speeches of Chinese traitors!
n. Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

1. Mao repeated this formulation of the "principle of self-defense" in the text of March
11, 1940, translated below, and in other statements of this period. He also used it freely, in
rather difference circumstances, in the course of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969.