On Small Guerrilla Groups—An Important
Form of Struggle in Guerrilla Areas

(January 22, 1940)

The experience of the War of Resistance in North China in the past two and half
years tells us that the War of Resistance in the enemy rear in the future will involve
protracted and hard struggle. Under the circumstances, if we want to persist in the
struggle until victory is achieved, the work of the local Party organizations must
concentrate on the launching of the mass campaigns, because the mobilization of
the masses is the foundation for the performance of all the work of the Party, the
government, and the army.

Broadly speaking, areas in North China can be classified into three categories.
The first is the base areas for the War of Resistance, that is, those areas that are
relatively consolidated, large, and already joined in one piece so the enemy cannot
enter them at will, like Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, southeast Shanxi, and northwest
Shanxi. The second is the enemy-occupied areas, that is, the strong points the
enemy has seized by force and their neighboring areas. The third is the guerrilla
areas, places held now by the enemy and now by us. The third category is the
largest in area. The above-mentioned areas are not always fixed. They can and
often do change categories from time to time. When urban and rural strongholds
held by the enemy and their puppets are captured by us and after we have done
some work there, they are turned from the category of guerrilla areas to that of
base areas, and our already existing base areas are expanded. If a part of our base
area is occupied by the enemy or by the puppets, that base area is reduced that
much in area, and the enemy-occupied area or guerrilla area is augmented by that
much. This kind of shift in category has happened before, is still happening now,
and may well continue to do so for some time to come. It should be understood
that temporary reduction of the base areas and the temporary augmentation of the
enemy-occupied or guerrilla areas are possible. Our overall policy is to attack the
enemy in guerrilla areas, reduce and eliminate the enemy strongholds, turn the
guerrilla areas back again into base areas, and expand our base areas so that in the
future they can be coordinated with the efforts of the whole country and finally
drive the Japanese bandits out of China.

Our source for this text is Chen Yun wenxuan, Vol. 1, pp. 124-27. This text was written by
Chen Yun in Yan'an and revised by Mao Zedong.


I am not going to dwell on the establishment of base areas or the work in enemy occupied areas. Let us now study the methods that can be used to mobilize the
masses to fight the enemy in guerrilla areas. What method have the people in the
guerrilla areas of North China adopted? Nothing exceptional: all the activists among
the people in the guerrilla areas have been organized into "small guerrilla groups"
under the leadership of Party branches, township governments, or mass organizations. Although the small guerrilla groups vary in size, in weaponry, and in the
role they are able to play, they have one thing in common, that is, they serve as
links that join the Party, government, and mass organizations together and have
dealt blows to the Japanese bandits. The small guerrilla groups are armed organizations of the masses. They were invented by the people in the Jiangxi soviet area
when they were combating the five campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression." The invention later developed vigorously under the active leadership of the
Party, and is now widely applied in North China. It has been proved by actual
experience to be an important form of struggle and a pattern of organization well
suited to the circumstances of the guerrilla areas. After a study of the circumstances in seven districts of North China, I have come to the conclusion that this
experience can be widely applied. Naturally, the small guerrilla groups cannot last
long without the backing of guerrilla detachments and regular armies.

The role that the guerrilla groups have played is very important. Specifically
speaking, it is manifested in the following aspects:

First, the small guerrilla groups are a form that can best mobilize the masses to
participate in the War of Resistance. In guerrilla areas, which suffer constant devastation from the enemy, the people, to protect their own interests, have to get
organized and exercise armed resistance. Thus the struggle of these people to protect their own interests has become identical with the interests of the War of Resistance of the whole nation; the struggle of every household and every village to
safeguard its home has become identical with the struggle of the people of the
whole country to defend the base areas for the War of Resistance. That is why it is
easy for the people in guerrilla areas to see that their own interest is inseparable
from the interest of the War of Resistance. The use of small guerrilla groups as a
method to mobilize the masses to participate in the War of Resistance is readily
embraced by the masses of the people.

Second, in small guerrilla groups, Party members are toughened, cadres trained,
and the Party, government, and mass organizations consolidated. Historical experience has demonstrated that only by relying on armed forces can the Chinese
Communist Party survive (as a big party, not as an underground small party) and
develop. This has become even clearer in the present war zone. The Party cannot
survive without an armed force. The Party's survival depends on armed struggle,
and armed struggle in return can temper and develop the Party. Similarly, without
armed struggle, it is impossible to set up and enhance political power in base areas.
Had there been no guerrilla groups, guerrilla areas would have become enemy occupied areas and, then, the Party and government organizations of the area in


question would have shrunk or even collapsed. Party members joining in guerrilla
groups and leading the masses of the people in the struggle against the enemy and
puppets: this is the best way to train new Party members. Bad elements who have
sneaked into the Party will reveal their true colors in ruthless struggle. Those wavering elements who cannot endure will be cleared out. At the same time, military
cadres for local Party organizations will be trained and brought up from the tough,
complex, and extensive struggle.
Third, small guerrilla groups are a powerful aid to the regular armies and guerrilla detachments. Regular armies operate within the base areas and occasionally
in guerrilla areas, and guerrilla detachments, making the regions bordering base
areas and guerrilla areas their support, mainly operate in guerrilla areas, while
small guerrilla groups stay in regions bordering base areas and guerrilla areas and
in all guerrilla areas and serve as an aid to regular armies and guerrilla detachments. Small guerrilla groups are the core of self-defense corps, and they exist
even in the absence of the latter. If the guerrilla areas are covered with guerrilla
groups, regular armies and guerrilla detachments will find it much easier to carry
out their operations. Small guerrilla groups are not only an aid to the regular armies
and guerrilla detachments but also a reliable foundation for the expansion of the
regular armies and guerrilla detachments.
So, the necessity to intensify our work with guerrilla groups is self-evident.
How shall we intensify our work with guerrilla groups?
First, it is important to enhance the understanding of the guerrilla groups by
the cadres, transform the perfunctory manner of dealing with them, and do a good
job in organizing small guerrilla groups, as a basic way of mobilizing the masses
to carry on the armed resistance against Japan. Party branches should become the
cores of guerrilla groups. At the initial stage, it is advisable to form one or two
guerrilla groups made up of advanced elements and, then, developing it step by
step, set up a large number of groups, with the primary group led by the cadres as
their center.
Second, do not incorporate guerrilla groups at the wrong time. When there is a
widespread growth of guerrilla groups, it is then right to incorporate some of them
into guerrilla detachments or regular armies, and at the same time continued efforts
should be made to foster more small guerrilla groups. The small guerrilla groups
should not be incorporated when they are only beginning to burgeon and their incorporation would deprive the masses of something they rely on, and consequently
make them vulnerable to the enemy's devastation. In this case, guerrilla groups
should be helped to a vigorous growth before some of them get incorporated.
Last, Party organizations in all base areas for the War of Resistance Against
Japan and in all guerrilla areas should sum up the work, from the lower levels to
upper levels, on guerrilla groups and the growth of guerrilla detachments, selfdefense corps, and guerrilla groups in coordination with each other, and study
their correct interrelationship. The summing up of work will lead to further development in our work in guerrilla areas: this is what we hope for.