The Current Political Situation and the Policy Toward Yan Xishan[1]

(January 11, 1940)

Comrade Dehuai[2]:

Your telegram dated the 30th [3] has been received, and the Secretariat has already sent a reply, which I trust you have received. The time for a nationwide downpour has not yet arrived; the task throughout the country remains to organize the progressive forces, strive to win over the middle strata, and smash the vacillation and reaction of the big bourgeoisie—this possibility has not yet been lost. The most serious problem at present is the reactionary stance of Yan Xishan, who is now the most reactionary element within the big bourgeoisie. His schemes are extremely vicious, and he has already blockaded the Lüliang Mountains and the Zhongtiao Mountains. Our countermeasure is to use the forces under He and Guan[4] first to seize the whole, or at least the greater part, of northwestern Shanxi, while the forces in southeastern Shanxi consolidate the positions there that have not been lost, recover part of the positions already lost, and—this is of utmost importance—open a route to Luoyang. Then, He and Guan, together with a force from southeastern Shanxi, should each dispatch a unit to attack the Lüliang Mountains, at least recovering the original positions of the Chen Detachment[5] and a line of communication, thereby opening up the Yanshui Pass. If at that point Yan Xishan is willing to negotiate peace (this possibility has not yet been lost), then let him occupy the greater part of the Lüliang Mountains, while we hold only a small part and a line of communication, and leave it at that; otherwise, it will be difficult to avoid an expansion of hostilities. The situation in the border region shows signs of improvement.

[1] Yan Xishan, then Commander of the Second War Zone of the Kuomintang.

[2] Dehuai, i.e., Peng Dehuai, then Deputy Commander of the Eighth Route Army.

[3] The 30th day of the month.

[4] He and Guan, referring to He Long and Guan Xiangying, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[5] Referring to the Independent Detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army in western Shanxi, with Chen Shiju as its detachment commander.

The 97th Division in Longdong has already withdrawn. Cheng Qian and Zhu Shaoliang[1], under orders from Chiang[2], have expressed a desire for peace, and we are sending Elder Xie[3] to Gansu as our negotiating representative. Japan has decided to support Wang Jingwei, and the policy of the Japanese military in China remains hardline. This cannot but affect the attitude of the Kuomintang, so the possibility of improvement has not yet been entirely cut off. The internal struggle within Japan at present is a struggle between Japan’s exclusive domination of China or ceding a portion of rights to Britain and the United States. The military’s policy of exclusive domination seems to hold the advantage, and a cabinet crisis is brewing in Japan—the outcome will become clear in a few days.

Zedong

January 11

[1] Cheng Qian, then Director of the Tianshui Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission of the Kuomintang government. Zhu Shaoliang (1891–1963), a native of Wujin, Jiangsu, then Commander of the Eighth War Zone of the Kuomintang army.

[2] Chiang, referring to Chiang Kai-shek.

[3] Elder Xie, referring to Xie Juezai (1884–1971), a native of Ningxiang, Hunan. Then Vice President of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and formerly representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Eighth Route Army office in Lanzhou.