Supplementary Directive on the Incident in Southwestern Shanxi and Our Policy[1]

(December 9, 1939)

To supplement our telegram of the 6th, the following assessment and policy are put forward:

A. Assessment of the Incident in Southwestern Shanxi:

(1) Yan[2] seized the opportunity when Comrade Dehuai went to Yichuan for negotiations to launch an attack on the New Army in western Shanxi. His aim is to demonstrate his strength to us and obtain concessions from us, so that he can firmly control the two areas of southwestern and northwestern Shanxi, suppress the forces of the New Faction and our own, and thereby prepare a relatively advantageous position for when he carries out capitulation.

(2) The relations between the Old Faction and the Japanese are well coordinated, and Yan himself is already decided on capitulation and anti-communism. However, it seems he has not yet made the final decision on carrying out capitulation and openly opposing communism. Yet his subordinates, the most reactionary elements such as Wang Jingguo, Chen Changjie, Qiu Yangrui, Bo Youcheng, and Zhao Chengshou, are extremely active, scheming to create a situation of capitulation and anti-communism to force Yan to make the decision.

(3) Yan has connections with certain capitulationist elements in Chongqing.

(4) Yan has connections with Wang Jingwei.

(5) On the whole, the current situation is in a period of arranging capitulation, not yet in the period of carrying out capitulation.

(6) In the two areas of southeastern and northeastern Shanxi, the strength of the pro-resistance faction is greater than that of the capitulationist faction; in the two areas of southwestern and northwestern Shanxi, the strength of the capitulationist faction is greater than that of the pro-resistance faction. In the view of the capitulationists, they can

[1] This is a directive from Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhu De, Zuo Quan, Peng Dehuai, Chen Shiju, Lin Feng, Peng Shaohui, Luo Guibo, Zhao Lin, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, and Peng Zhen.
[2] Yan, i.e., Yan Xishan.

Supplementary Directive on the Incident in Southwestern Shanxi and Our Policy

succeed in suppressing the pro-resistance faction in these two areas. But in reality, the combined forces of the New Army, the masses, and the Eighth Route Army mean the strength of the pro-resistance faction is not small. There are contradictions within both the Old Faction and the Old Army. As long as the policy is appropriate, the pro-resistance faction can achieve victory.

(7) The two areas of southwestern and northwestern Shanxi are the pivotal link between North China and the Northwest. They must be held in the hands of the pro-resistance faction; the capitulationist faction must absolutely not be allowed to win, otherwise it will be very dangerous.

B. Our Policy:

(1) Resolutely counterattack Yan’s offensive and strive for the victory of the pro-resistance faction.

(2) All relevant parties should take advantage of the moment when Yan has not yet made the final decision, and should exploit the certain contradictions that still exist within the Old Faction between figures like Yang Aiyuan and Zhao Daiwen on one side, and Wang Jingguo and Chen Changjie on the other. Focus attention on opposing Wang and Chen. New Faction members everywhere should collect evidence of the crimes of Wang, Chen, and others to report to Yan, and try to win over Yang and Zhao.

(3) Resolutely defend the anti-Japanese progressive forces, making no concessions in principle. Only when negotiating with Yan can we express willingness to make concessions on certain specific issues.

(4) Regarding military attacks by the capitulationist faction, the New Army should adopt a defensive posture. That is, when the Old Army attacks the New Army, it should employ mobile warfare to deliver a powerful and advantageous counterattack and destroy them. When necessary, the Eighth Route Army should support the New Army with appropriate forces to beat back the Old Army (preferably under the name of the Dare-to-Die Corps).

(5) Anticipate that the New Army may suffer some defeats and that defections may occur, and be prepared for some defeats and partial defections. Even so, do not be afraid. As long as each area has a reliable core force of three to four thousand troops, held in the hands of loyal and capable commanders, and employs mobile warfare and guerrilla tactics, coordinated with assistance from the Eighth Route Army and the masses, it will be possible to defeat the capitulationist faction.

(6) Unity and resolve within the New Army, the political power, and the Sacrifice League are of primary importance. All truly unstable elements must be expelled.

(7) The slogans should be:

(i) Request Commander Yan to punish the chief culprits behind the Western Shanxi Incident.

(ii) Resistance to Japan first, unity first; oppose splitting, oppose civil war.

(iii) Support Commander Yan in resisting Japan to the end; strike down the traitors who are destroying the anti-Japanese forces.

(iv) All Jin-Sui troops unite, turn your guns outward; Chinese do not fight Chinese.

(v) Those who destroy the resistance to Japan are traitors.

(vi) The troops and people of Shanxi unite, strictly guard against the provocations and sowing of discord by Japanese imperialism.

(vii) The troops and people of Shanxi unite to strike down the traitors.

The above slogans should be openly propagated by the New Faction, but for the time being, do not write the names of Wang Jingguo and Chen Changjie. When pointing out their names, use only oral propaganda.

(8) The Eighth Route Army should outwardly adopt a mediating attitude, but in reality actively support the New Army.

(9) To consolidate the position in southwestern Shanxi, the Headquarters, besides transferring back one regiment of Chen[1]’s detachment, should also prepare to transfer another regiment there.

(10) To consolidate the position in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division should prepare, at an appropriate moment, to transfer one regiment to reinforce Peng Shaohui.

Mao, Wang

December 9

[1] Chen, i.e., Chen Shiju.