assistance from the Eighth Route Army or from enough cadres who have military
experience, the local Party has already created all by itself forces which are relatively combat-effective and are on the way to becoming regular ones. They will
become the main force with which to persist in the War of Resistance in Shandong.
2. Make an effort to expand the Shandong column and to engage in the work of
consolidation and training, so as to turn them rapidly into regular forces. Use the
troops to cover and support the local Party in the extensive organization of local
armed forces, so as to check the enemy. Gradually replace the losses of the main
force, in order to free it from regional constraints so it can cope with battles on a
larger scale.
3. Establish a regular supply system. The temporary method of taking food
from the people cannot last long and affects adversely the combat effectiveness
and regularization of the forces. The Jiaodong Bank may issue bank notes. After
exchanging them for other currencies, they can be sent to southern Shandong and
other regions for use. After we obtain political power, money shall be printed,
grain procured, and taxes collected so as to develop a long-term plan for solving
the problem of supplies for our forces.
4. Improve the work in the political organs and strengthen their linkages with
the various contingents. Clarify the organizational principle of our forces (the Eighth
Route Army is an armed force of the workers and farmers, and also of the Chinese
people, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; it is not a united
front armed force) and all the most important posts should be filled by Party members. Correct the improper democratic style of work and the local Party work-style
in our forces.
5. Enhance the role of the Party cells and Party members. Not only is the Party
cell a school to recruit and educate Party members, but also, in particular, it should
become a strong fortress within the company. Every Party member should be not
only a model soldier but also a leader for the non-Party masses.
6. There are many cadres with an intellectual background in the Shandong column. An effort should be made to do a good job in educating them, correcting their
weaknesses and strengthening their revolutionary stand. We propose that the
Shandong column send a batch of cadres of intellectual background to the 115th

Division and the 115th Division send a batch of cadres with military experience to
the Shandong column. This will be of great benefit to the work of both sides.
7. Those forces which are near the 115th Division may establish contact with it,
organize tours by cadres, and absorb the experience of the main force. The 115th
Division should take the matter of allocating 2,500 men to the Shandong column
very seriously. A good job should be done to educate and explain things to those
officers and men who are to be sent.
8. A study should be done with regard to work on the armed forces formerly
belonging to the Buddhist associations which have already been reorganized into
the Eighth Route Army. Generally speaking, an effort should be made to assimilate them and to turn religious armed forces into progressive armed forces. Party
organizations should be set up within these forces. But caution and a step-by-step
approach are required, so as to avoid provoking rebellion.

Mao [Zedong]
Wang [Jiaxiang]
Teng [Daiyuan] Tan [Zheng]

(1906-1996), a native of Jiangsu, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and
participated in the Long March. In 1939 he was deputy head of the Political Department for
field troops.
The distribution lists for this telegram, and for the preceding one of the same date,
forcefully illustrate how far down the chain of command Mao was prepared to reach in
order to communicate his instructions and opinions.
9. The Jiaodong Bank was a branch of the Beihai Bank, which had been established in
1938 to serve the needs of the base areas. Its headquarters were in Shandong.
```

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assistance from the Eighth Route Army or from enough cadres who have military
experience, the local Party has already created all by itself forces which are relatively combat-effective and are on the way to becoming regular ones. They will
become the main force with which to persist in the War of Resistance in Shandong.
2. Make an effort to expand the Shandong column and to engage in the work of
consolidation and training, so as to turn them rapidly into regular forces. Use the
troops to cover and support the local Party in the extensive organization of local
armed forces, so as to check the enemy. Gradually replace the losses of the main
force, in order to free it from regional constraints so it can cope with battles on a
larger scale.
3. Establish a regular supply system. The temporary method of taking food
from the people cannot last long and affects adversely the combat effectiveness
and regularization of the forces. The Jiaodong Bank may issue bank notes. After
exchanging them for other currencies, they can be sent to southern Shandong and
other regions for use. After we obtain political power, money shall be printed,
grain procured, and taxes collected so as to develop a long-term plan for solving
the problem of supplies for our forces.
4. Improve the work in the political organs and strengthen their linkages with
the various contingents. Clarify the organizational principle of our forces (the Eighth
Route Army is an armed force of the workers and farmers, and also of the Chinese
people, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; it is not a united
front armed force) and all the most important posts should be filled by Party members. Correct the improper democratic style of work and the local Party work-style
in our forces.
5. Enhance the role of the Party cells and Party members. Not only is the Party
cell a school to recruit and educate Party members, but also, in particular, it should
become a strong fortress within the company. Every Party member should be not
only a model soldier but also a leader for the non-Party masses.
6. There are many cadres with an intellectual background in the Shandong column. An effort should be made to do a good job in educating them, correcting their
weaknesses and strengthening their revolutionary stand. We propose that the
Shandong column send a batch of cadres of intellectual background to the 115th
Division and the 115th Division send a batch of cadres with military experience to
the Shandong column. This will be of great benefit to the work of both sides.
7. Those forces which are near the 115th Division may establish contact with it,
organize tours by cadres, and absorb the experience of the main force. The 115th
Division should take the matter of allocating 2,500 men to the Shandong column
very seriously. A good job should be done to educate and explain things to those
officers and men who are to be sent.
8. A study should be done with regard to work on the armed forces formerly
belonging to the Buddhist associations which have already been reorganized into
the Eighth Route Army. Generally speaking, an effort should be made to assimilate them and to turn religious armed forces into progressive armed forces. Party
organizations should be set up within these forces. But caution and a step-by-step
approach are required, so as to avoid provoking rebellion.

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Teng [Daiyuan] Tan [Zheng]

(1906-1996), a native of Jiangsu, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and
participated in the Long March. In 1939 he was deputy head of the Political Department for
field troops.
The distribution lists for this telegram, and for the preceding one of the same date,
forcefully illustrate how far down the chain of command Mao was prepared to reach in
order to communicate his instructions and opinions.
9. The Jiaodong Bank was a branch of the Beihai Bank, which had been established in
1938 to serve the needs of the base areas. Its headquarters were in Shandong.