Decision of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party on
Recruiting Intellectuals¹
(December 1, 1939)

1. In the long and cruel war of national liberation, in the great struggle to build
a new China, the Communist Party must be good at recruiting intellectuals, for
only thus can we organize great strength for the War of Resistance, organize the
peasant masses in their millions, develop the revolutionary cultural movement,
and expand the united front.² Without the participation of the intellectuals, victory
in the revolution is impossible.
2. Our Party and our army have made considerable efforts to recruit intellectuals during the last three years, and many revolutionary intellectuals have been recruited to join the Party, the army, and the organs of government and to participate
in the cultural movement and the mass movement, thus broadening the united front.
This is a major achievement. But many army units³ have still not paid attention to
the importance of the intellectuals and still regard them with some apprehension or
are even inclined to reject them. Many of our training institutes are still hesitant
about enrolling young students in large numbers. Many of our local Party branches
are still reluctant to recruit intellectuals to join the Party. All these phenomena
result from the failure to understand the importance of the intellectuals for the
revolutionary cause, the difference between intellectuals in colonial and semicolonial
countries and those in capitalist countries, and the difference between intellectuals
who serve the landlords and the bourgeoisie and those who serve the working class
and the peasantry. They also result from the failure to grasp the seriousness of the
situation in which the bourgeois political parties are desperately contending with
us for the intellectuals and in which the Japanese imperialists are also trying in
every possible way to buy over Chinese intellectuals or poison their minds. Above
all, this problem results from the failure to understand the favorable conditions
created by the fact that our Party and our army have already developed a strong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 87-89, which reproduces a version
issued by the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in 1942.
3. Consequently, from now on attention should be paid to the following points:
a. All Party organizations in the war areas and all army units led by the Party
should recruit large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals into our
army and training institutes, and to work in our organs of government. Provided only that they are willing to fight Japan, and are fairly loyal, hardworking, and able to endure hardship, we should try in every possible way to
recruit all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, give them political education,
and help them to temper themselves in war and work and to serve the army,
the government, and the masses. Taking each case on its merits, we should
admit into the Party those intellectuals who measure up to requirements of
Party membership. As for those who do not qualify, or do not wish to join the
Party, we should have good working relations with them and lead them to
work side by side with us.
b. In applying this policy of recruiting intellectuals in large numbers, we must
without a doubt take great care to prevent the infiltration of those elements
sent by the enemy and the bourgeois political parties and to keep out other
disloyal elements. We must be very strict about keeping out such elements.
Those who have already sneaked into our Party, army, or government organs
must be cleaned out resolutely but discriminately, on the basis of conclusive
evidence. But we must not on that account suspect reasonably loyal intellectuals, and we must be strictly on guard against the false accusation of innocent people by counterrevolutionaries.
c. We should assign appropriate work to all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals
who are reasonably loyal and useful, and we should earnestly give them political education and guidance so that in the long course of the struggle they
gradually overcome their weaknesses, revolutionize their outlook, identify
themselves with the masses, and merge with the older Party members and
cadres and the worker and peasant members of the Party.
d. We must earnestly persuade those cadres, especially certain cadres in the
main forces of our army, who are opposed to the admission of intellectuals to
participate in our work and make them understand the necessity of recruiting
intellectuals for our work. At the same time, we should work effectively to
encourage worker and peasant cadres to study hard and raise their cultural
level. Thus we will bring about simultaneously the transformation of worker
and peasant cadres into intellectuals, and the transformation of intellectuals
into members of the worker and peasant masses.
e. In the main, the principles stated above are also applicable in the war zones⁴
and in the occupied areas,⁵ except that, on admitting intellectuals into the

Party, even greater attention must be paid to their degree of loyalty, so as to
ensure still tighter Party organization in those areas. We should maintain
suitable contact with the broad masses of non-Party intellectuals who sympathize with us and organize them in the great struggle for resistance against
Japan and for democracy and in the cultural movement and the work of the
united front.
4. All comrades must understand that a correct policy toward the intellectuals is
an important condition for victory in the revolution. There must be no repetition of
the incorrect attitude toward the question of the intellectuals which Party organizations in many localities and army units adopted during the Agrarian Revolution.
Moreover, the proletariat's goal of producing its own intellectuals can absolutely
not be attained without the help of the existing intellectuals. The Central Committee hopes that the Party headquarters⁶ at all levels and all Party comrades will give
this matter their serious attention.

--- Notes

1. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals → Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals

2. United front → Revolutionary united front

3. Army units → Army cadres
core of well-tested cadres and are thus capable of leading the intellectuals. Because
of this, erroneous tendencies have arisen regarding the question of intellectuals.

4. The war zones → The areas ruled by the Guomindang

5. The occupied areas → The areas occupied by the Japanese bandits


6. Party headquarters → Party committees