Introducing The Communist
(October 4, 1939)

The Central Committee has long planned to publish an internal Party journal, and
the process of building such a party. On the whole, moreover, the subjective and
objective conditions for building such a party are already present; indeed this great
undertaking is now in the making. No ordinary Party publication is equal to the
task of carrying out this great undertaking. A special Party periodical is necessary,
and that is why The Communist is being published.
To a certain extent, our Party is already national in scale and already has a mass
character. Moreover, so far as its leadership core, some of its membership, its
general line, and its revolutionary work are concerned, it is already a Bolshevik
party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally.

That being the case, what new tasks are there, and why set a new task at this
time?
The reason is that we now have large numbers of new Party members and many
task we have set ourselves, the task of "building a Bolshevik Chinese Communist
Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character and which is fully
consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally."
We now want to build this kind of party, but how shall we go about it? We are
now determined to build this kind of party, but what must we do to reach this goal?
The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the history of our Party's
eighteen years of struggle.
It is fully eighteen years since our Party's First National Congress in June 1921.
In these eighteen years the Party has gone through many great struggles. The members of the Party, its cadres, and its organizations have tempered themselves in
these great struggles. They have experienced both splendid victories and grave
defeats in the revolution. They have experienced the establishment of a national
united front with the bourgeoisie, and they have also experienced the breakup of
this united front and engaged in a bitter armed struggle with the bourgeoisie and
its allies. During the last three years, it has again found itself in a period of establishing a national united front with the bourgeoisie. The road of development of
the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party has passed through this
kind of complex relationship with the Chinese bourgeoisie. This is a special historical feature, a feature peculiar to the revolutionary process in colonial and semicolonial countries and not to be found in the revolutionary history of any
capitalist country. Furthermore, since China is a semicolonial and semifeudal country whose political, economic, and cultural development is uneven, a country whose
economy is predominantly semifeudal and whose territory is vast, it follows that
It is because of these two basic specific features, in fact precisely because of
them, that the process of building up and bolshevizing our Party is proceeding
under special circumstances. Its failures and successes, its retreats and advances,
its contraction and expansion, its development and consolidation are all inevitably linked to its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When our
Party takes a correct political line on forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or
breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its
relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization. Similarly, when our Party handles the
question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its
development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it handles this question
incorrectly, it moves a step backward in these respects. Thus, for eighteen years
the processes of building and bolshevizing the Party have been closely linked to its
political line, to the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united
front and armed struggle. This judgment has clearly been confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Or, conversely, the more bolshevized the Party
becomes, the more correctly it can decide upon its political line and handle the
questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly
confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history.
Consequently, the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in China's revolution. Having a correct grasp of these three questions and their interrelations with each other
is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. We are
economy is predominantly semifeudal and whose territory is vast, it follows that
the character of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is bourgeois-democratic, that the revolution's principal targets are imperialism and the feudal forces, 6
and that its primary motive forces are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban
petty bourgeoisie. At certain times and to a certain extent, various other elements,
such as the national bourgeoisie, have also participated. It also follows that the
principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution is armed struggle. Indeed, the
eighteen-year history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin has said: "A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed
people are fighting the armed counterrevolution." This is perfectly true. This specific feature, peculiar to semicolonial China, is absent or is different in Communist parties in the various capitalist countries. Thus, two basic specific features of
the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party emerged in the process
of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution: (1) a revolutionary national united
front with the bourgeoisie is either established or forced to break up; and (2) armed
struggle is the principal form of the revolution. Here we have not considered the
Party's relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic
special feature, first, because these relations are in principle the same for Communist parties all over the world and, second, because armed struggle in China is, in
essence, peasant war, and the Party's close relations with the peasant war and its
relations with the peasantry are one and the same thing.
It is because of these two basic specific features, in fact precisely because of
them, that the process of building up and bolshevizing our Party is proceeding
under special circumstances. Its failures and successes, its retreats and advances,
its contraction and expansion, its development and consolidation are all inevitably linked to its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When our
Party takes a correct political line on forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or
breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its
relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization. Similarly, when our Party handles the
question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its
development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it handles this question
incorrectly, it moves a step backward in these respects. Thus, for eighteen years
the processes of building and bolshevizing the Party have been closely linked to its
political line, to the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united
front and armed struggle. This judgment has clearly been confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Or, conversely, the more bolshevized the Party
becomes, the more correctly it can decide upon its political line and handle the
questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly
confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history.
Consequently, the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in China's revolution. Having a correct grasp of these three questions and their interrelations with each other
is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. We are
now able to draw correct conclusions¹⁰ by virtue of our country's¹¹ abundant experience during the eighteen years of the Party's history, a rich and profound experience of failures and successes, retreats and advances, contraction and expansion.
Which is to say that we are now able to handle the questions of the united front,
armed struggle, and Party building correctly. It also means that eighteen years of
experience have taught us that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building
are the Chinese Communist Party's three magic weapons, its three principal magic
weapons for defeating the enemy in China's revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and a great achievement of the Chinese
revolution.
Here let us briefly discuss each of these three magic weapons, each of these
three questions.
In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the
Chinese bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different sets of
circumstances or during three different stages: the first Great Revolution, ¹² ten
years of civil war, ¹³ and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the course
of these three stages, the following laws have been proved: (1) Because the greatest oppression in China is national oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie can
be counted on to take part in the struggle against imperialism and the feudal warlords at certain times and to a certain extent. Therefore, at such times the proletariat
should form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as much as
possible. (2) Because, on the other hand, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is economically and politically feeble, in other historical circumstances it will vacillate
and become turncoat. Therefore, the composition of China's revolutionary united
front cannot remain the same at all times, but is liable to change. At a certain time
the bourgeoisie¹⁴ will take part in it, at another time it may not.¹⁵ (3) Because of the
vacillating nature of the bourgeoisie, even when the bourgeoisie¹⁶ (especially the
big bourgeoisie) joins the united front alongside the proletariat in struggling against
the common enemy, they¹⁷ still view as disadvantageous to them any ideological,
political, and organizational development of the proletariat and its political party,
try to impose restrictions on them, and employ disruptive tactics such as deception,
blandishments, undermining, and savage attacks on them. Moreover, they are doing all this to prepare for capitulating to the enemy and splitting the united front. (4)
The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry. (5) The urban petty bourgeoisie is
also a reliable ally. Not only were these laws proved during the period of the first
political party, and to ensure that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or
its party alone; and that they betray the revolution whenever the revolution conflicts with their own selfish interests or with those of their party. For us to neglect
all this is Right opportunism. The characteristic feature of Chen Duxiuism²² in the
past is that it amounted to a Right opportunism that led the proletariat to accommodate itself to the selfish interests of the bourgeoisie and its party, and this was the
subjective reason for the failure of the first Great Revolution. This dual character of
the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution has an enormous
effect on the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and on party building.
Without an understanding of this dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie it is
impossible to understand the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and
party building. One important component of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is the political line of both unity with the bourgeoisie and struggle
against it. An important component of the Chinese Communist Party's party building is, in fact, its development and tempering through both unity with and struggle
against the bourgeoisie. Unity here means the united front.²³ Struggle means the
"peaceful," "bloodless" ideological, political, and organizational struggle that goes
on when we are united,²⁴ and which turns into armed struggle when we are forced
to break with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand that it should unite
with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, the Party cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop. If our Party does not understand that it should wage a stern
and resolute "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, then
the Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and the
revolution will fail. If our Party does not wage a stern and resolute armed struggle
against the bourgeoisie when forced to break with it, our Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will likewise fail. All this has been proved by the history
of the last eighteen years.

The armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party is peasant war under
proletarian leadership. Its history, too, can be divided into three stages. The first
stage was participation in the Northern Expedition of the bourgeoisie. At that time
our Party had already begun to realize the importance of armed struggle, but it did
not understand it fully, and it had not yet understood that armed struggle is the
principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution. The second stage was the ten
years of civil war.²⁵ Our Party had already established its own independent armed
forces, learned the art of fighting independently, and established base areas of the
people's political power. Moreover, it was already able to achieve direct or indirect
coordination of armed struggle, the principal form of struggle, with many other
necessary forms of struggle—that is, to coordinate it directly or indirectly on a
nationwide scale with the workers' struggle, the peasants' struggle (this is the main
thing), the struggle of the youth, the women, and all the people, with the struggle
for political power, the struggles on the economic, anti-espionage, and ideological
fronts, and with other forms of struggle. And this armed struggle was the agrarian
revolution of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, which constitutes the second stage in our Party's history of armed armed struggle. The third
stage is the present stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan. In this stage we are
able to make use of our experience of armed struggle in the first, and especially the
second stage, and our experience of coordinating armed struggle with all other
necessary forms of struggle. In general, this kind of struggle²⁶ means guerrilla
warfare. What is guerrilla warfare? It is the unavoidable²⁷ and therefore the best
form of struggle for the people's armed forces to employ over a long period in a
backward country, a large semicolonial country, to defeat the armed enemy and
create their own bases. For the past eighteen years²⁸ both our Party's political line
and its party building have been closely tied to this form of struggle. It is impossible to understand our political line or to understand our party building in isolation from armed struggle, from guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle is an important
component of our political line. For the past eighteen years, our Party has increasingly learned the line of armed struggle and has persisted in it. We have come to
understand that, in China, without armed struggle neither the proletariat nor the
people nor the Communist Party would have any standing, and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. Over the past eighteen years the development,
consolidation, and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of
revolutionary wars and are inextricably linked to guerrilla warfare; without armed
struggle, without guerrilla warfare, the Communist Party would not be what it is
today. All comrades throughout the Party must not forget this experience, which
was paid for in blood.

The process of building up the Party, the process of its development, consolidation, and bolshevization, likewise has three distinct stages. The first stage was that
of the Party's infancy. In the early and middle phases of this stage, the Party's line
was correct and the revolutionary zeal of the rank and file and of the cadres was
extremely high; hence the victory of the first Great Revolution. But, after all, ours
was then still an infant party, a party lacking experience with regard to the three
basic problems of the united front, armed struggle, and party building, a party
without any knowledge of, or without ample understanding of the specific features
and laws of the Chinese revolution or of Chinese history and society, a party that
did not yet have a comprehensive, unified understanding of the relation between
the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence,
in the last phase of this stage, at the critical juncture of this stage, those elements
occupying a dominant position in the Party's leading body failed to lead the Party
in consolidating the victories of the revolution, were deceived by the bourgeoisie,
and caused the revolution to suffer a defeat. During this stage, Party organizations
expanded, but were not consolidated, and they were unable to help Party members, Party cadres, and Party organizations become solid ideologically and politically. There were a great many new Party members, but they were not given the
necessary Marxist-Leninist education. There was also considerable work experience, but it was not properly summed up. Many opportunists sneaked into the
Party, but they were not purged. Both enemies and allies were scheming to stab
our Party in the back,²⁹ but there was no sense of vigilance. Activists came forward in great numbers within the Party, but they were not able to form the backbone of the Party in time. The Party had some revolutionary armed units under its
command, but it was unable to keep a tight grip on them. All these circumstances
stemmed from lack of experience, lack of a profound revolutionary consciousness, and lack of a unified understanding of³⁰ the theory of Marxism-Leninism
and the practice of the Chinese revolution. This was the first stage of party building. The second stage was the ten years of civil war.³¹ Because it had gained experience in the first stage, because it had achieved a better understanding of the
specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution and of Chinese history and
society, and because of progress in linking the theory of Marxism-Leninism and
the practice of the Chinese revolution,³² our Party was therefore able to wage a
victorious soviet struggle³³ for ten years. Although the bourgeoisie turned traitor, the Party was able to rely firmly upon the peasantry. The Party organization not
only developed once again, but also achieved consolidation. Although the enemy
tried daily to stab our Party in the back, the Party drove out the saboteurs. Not only
did large numbers of cadres come forward within the Party, but these cadres were
able to become the Party's backbone. The Party blazed the trail of people's political power and thereby learned the art of ruling the country and bringing peace and
security to the people. The Party created strong armed forces and thereby learned
the art of war. All these were great advances and great successes for the Party. In
the course of these great struggles, however, some Party members34 fell into the
quagmire of opportunism or did so for a time. This stemmed once again from their
failure to learn humbly from past experience, the fact that they did not understand35 the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution and sorely lacked
knowledge of Chinese history and society, and their failure to achieve a unified
understanding of the relation between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of
the Chinese revolution. As a consequence, throughout this stage some people in
the Party's leading organs were unable to adhere completely and at all times to
correct political and organizational lines. At one time the Party and the revolution
were damaged by Li Lisan's36 "Left" opportunism, and at another time by "Left"
opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the White areas. All of
this, however, was defeated at two historic meetings of the Party, its Fourth Plenum and its Zunyi Meeting. It was after the Zunyi Meeting (the meeting37 at Zunyi,
Guizhou, in January 1935) that the Party definitively took the Bolshevik road, 38
and laid the foundation for its subsequent victory over Zhang Guotao's Right opportunism and for the establishment of an Anti-Japanese National United Front.
This was the second stage in the process of the Party's development. The third
stage in the process of the Party's development is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This stage has lasted three years already, and these three years
of struggle have extremely great significance. Drawing upon its experience in the
preceding two revolutionary stages, upon its organizational strength and the strength
of its armed forces, upon its high political prestige among the people of the whole
country, and upon its deeper and more unified understanding of Marxist-Leninist
theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution, the Party has not only established the Anti-Japanese National United Front but has also been conducting a
great War of Resistance Against Japan. Organizationally the Party has stepped out
of its narrow confines and has become a major national party. Its armed forces are
also growing anew and are becoming still stronger in the struggle against the Japanese bandits. The Party's influence among the people of the whole country is becoming more extensive. These are all great achievements. On the other hand, the
Party has developed, but large numbers of new Party members39 and many new
organizations have not been consolidated. There is still a vast difference between
them and the older members and organizations. They40 do not yet have very much41
revolutionary experience. They do not understand, or have limited understanding
of, the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution or about Chinese history and society. They are still far from having a deeper and more integrated understanding of the unity between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese
revolution. During the expansion of the Party's organizations in the past, even
though the Central Committee stressed the slogan, "Greatly42 expand the Party,
but do not let a single bad element in," actually many careerists and enemy saboteurs did manage to sneak in. Although the united front was formed and has been
maintained for three years now, the bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie, has constantly been trying to destroy our Party, the big bourgeois capitulators
and diehards have been instigating serious friction and conflict throughout the country, and the anti-Communist clamor can be heard everywhere. 43 The big bourgeois
capitulators and diehards seek to use all this as preparation for capitulating to Japanese imperialism, breaking up the united front, and dragging China backward. Ideologically, the bourgeoisie is attempting to dissolve communism; politically and
organizationally, it is trying to abolish the Communist Party, abolish the border
regions, and abolish the Party's armed forces. Under such circumstances, it is undoubtedly our task to overcome these threats of capitulation, fragmentation, and
retrogression, to maintain as far as possible the national united front and
Guomindang-Communist cooperation, to strive for continued resistance against
Japan and continued unity and progress, and at the same time to prepare against all
possible eventualities so that, in case they occur, the Party and revolution will not
suffer unexpected losses. To attain this goal, it is necessary to consolidate the Party's
organization and its armed forces, and to mobilize the people of the whole country
for resolute struggle against capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression. The
accomplishment of this task depends upon the efforts of the whole Party, upon the
unrelenting and persistent struggle of all Party members, Party cadres, and Party
organizations everywhere and at every level. We are confident, moreover, that the
Chinese Communist Party, with its eighteen years of experience, will be able to
accomplish all these goals through the joint efforts of its experienced older cadres
and its vigorous and youthful newer members and cadres, through the joint efforts of its well-tried Bolshevik Central Committee and its local organizations, and through
the joint efforts of its powerful armed forces and the progressive popular masses.
These are the principal experiences and principal problems of our Party in its
eighteen years of history and during its three separate stages.
Eighteen years of experience tells us that the united front and armed struggle
are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united
front for carrying on armed struggle. The party organization is the heroic soldier
wielding the two weapons of united front and armed forces to storm and shatter
the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to one another.
How are we to build up our Party today? How can we build a "Bolshevik
Chinese Communist Party, a Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass
character, a Party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally"? All this may be grasped by studying our Party's history, by looking
at party building in connection with the united front and armed struggle, in connection with the problem of both uniting with and struggling against the bourgeoisie, and with that of persistence in guerrilla warfare against Japan by the
Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the establishment of anti-Japanese
base areas.
To sum up eighteen years of experience and the present new experience on the
basis of a unified understanding of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution and to spread it throughout the Party so that the
Party becomes strong as steel and avoids repeating past mistakes this is our task.

---

Notes

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 65-79, which reproduces the
text as it appears in the supplementary volume to the 1947 Chinese edition of Mao's Selected Works.
1. Bolshevik → Bolshevized (This change occurs repeatedly throughout the present document; subsequent occurrences are not footnoted.)
2. Large numbers of new Party members and many new branches → Many new branches
composed of large numbers of new Party members
3. Civil war → Revolutionary civil war
4. A national party → A major national party
5. Bourgeoisie → Big bourgeoisie
6. Feudal forces → Feudalism
7. "A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the
armed counterrevolution." → "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and also one of the advantages of the Chinese
revolution."
The above citation is from Stalin's speech of November 30, 1926, to the Executive
Committee of the International, entitled "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," which
appears in Volume VIII of his Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954),
p. 379. Stalin's own term was "armed revolution," not "the armed people." This is a particularly flagrant instance of citing out of context. As Mao knew very well, when Stalin made
this statement, the "armed revolution" he was talking about was represented by the Northern Expedition, under the leadership of Chiang Kaishek, in whose revolutionary credentials
Stalin still had full confidence.
8. In Communist parties → In the history of the revolutions led by Communist parties
9. With the bourgeoisie → Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
10. Correct conclusions → Correct conclusions concerning these three questions
11. Our country's → Our
12. The first Great Revolution → The first Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927
13. Ten years of civil war → The war of agrarian revolution from 1927 to 1937
6. Feudal forces → Feudalism
7. "A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the
armed counterrevolution." → "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and also one of the advantages of the Chinese
revolution."
The above citation is from Stalin's speech of November 30, 1926, to the Executive
Committee of the International, entitled "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," which
appears in Volume VIII of his Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954),
p. 379. Stalin's own term was "armed revolution," not "the armed people." This is a particularly flagrant instance of citing out of context. As Mao knew very well, when Stalin made
this statement, the "armed revolution" he was talking about was represented by the Northern Expedition, under the leadership of Chiang Kaishek, in whose revolutionary credentials
Stalin still had full confidence.
8. In Communist parties → In the history of the revolutions led by Communist parties
9. With the bourgeoisie → Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
10. Correct conclusions → Correct conclusions concerning these three questions
11. Our country's → Our
12. The first Great Revolution → The first Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927
13. Ten years of civil war → The war of agrarian revolution from 1927 to 1937
¹⁴. Bourgeoisie → National bourgeoisie
¹⁵. In the Selected Works version, the following passage is inserted here:
(3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is comprador in character, is a class that
directly serves imperialism and is kept by it. For this reason, China's comprador big
bourgeoisie has always been a target of the revolution. But because the various groups
within this Chinese comprador big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialisms,
when contradictions among these imperialist powers become sharper and when the
spearhead of the revolution is directed against a particular imperialism, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other imperialist powers may join the struggle
against that particular power to a certain extent and for a certain time. At such times,
in order to weaken the enemy and add to its own reserves, the Chinese proletariat
may form a united front with these big bourgeois groups and should maintain it as
much as possible, provided that it is advantageous to the revolution.

As a result of this addition, points 3, 4, and 5 have been renumbered.
¹⁶. The bourgeoisie → The comprador big bourgeoisie
¹⁷. They→ It continues to be very reactionary, and it firmly opposes
¹⁸. Ten years of civil war → Agrarian revolution
¹⁹. Three years of the War of Resistance → Present War of Resistance
²⁰. It must oppose → It is necessary to combat the error of
²¹. The bourgeoisie → The bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie)
²². Chen Duxiuism → Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism
²³. United front → United front with the bourgeoisie
²⁴. United United with the bourgeoisie
25. Ten years of civil war → War of agrarian revolution
26. This kind of struggle → Armed struggle at the present time
27. Unavoidable → Indispensable
28. For the past eighteen years → Down to the present
29. Both enemies and allies were scheming to stab our Party in the back → Our Party
was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues of both enemies and allies
30. Lack of a unified understanding of → Lack of skill in integrating
31. Ten years of civil war → War of Agrarian Revolution
32. Because of progress in linking → Because our cadres had a better grasp of the theory
of Marxism-Leninism and had learned more about how to integrate Marxist-Leninist theory
with Chinese revolutionary practice
33. Soviet struggle → Agrarian revolutionary struggle
34. Party members → Comrades
35. The Selected Works text inserts here: "Chinese history and society and"
36. Li Lisan's Comrade Li Lisan's
37. The meeting → The meeting of the Central Politburo held
38. Bolshevik road The road of bolshevization
39. Large numbers of new Party members → Large numbers of new Party members have
not been given education, and
40. They → Many of the new Party members and new cadres
41. Very much → Sufficient
42. Greatly Boldly
43. Everywhere → Incessantly
44. Bourgeoisie Big bourgeoisie

--- Notes

now, at last, we can say that the plan has become a reality. Such a journal is necessary to build a Bolshevik¹ Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and
has a broad mass character and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. This necessity is all the more obvious given the present
situation. Special features of the present situation are, on the one hand, that the
danger of capitulation, of fragmentation, and of retrogression within the Anti-Japanese National United Front is increasing daily and, on the other hand, that our
Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party.
The Party's task is to mobilize the masses to overcome the dangers of capitulation,
fragmentation, and retrogression and to prepare against all possible eventualities,
so that, should such things suddenly occur, the Party and the revolution would not
suffer unexpected losses. At a time like this, the publication of an internal Party
journal of this sort is necessary indeed.
This internal Party journal is called The Communist. What is its mission? What
topics will it deal with? How will it differ from other Party publications?
Its mission is to help build a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, and which is fully consolidated
ideologically, politically, and organizationally. The construction of such a party is
urgently needed for the victory of the Chinese revolution, and we are just now in

new branches,² and they cannot yet be considered to have a broad mass character,
to be ideologically, politically, and organizationally consolidated, or to be
bolshevized. At the same time, the problem of raising the level also arises with
respect to the older Party members and the older branches, as does the problem of
making further progress in ideological, political, and organizational consolidation
and in bolshevization. The circumstances in which the Party now finds itself and
the responsibilities it is shouldering are quite unlike those in the civil war³ period
of the past; the circumstances are much more complex and the responsibilities
much heavier.
This is the period of a national united front, and we have formed a united front
with the bourgeoisie; this is the period of a War of Resistance Against Japan, and
the armed forces of our Party are at the front fighting a ruthless war against the
enemy in coordination with friendly armies; this is the period when our Party has
developed into a national party and is no longer what it was before. If we look at
all these factors together, we shall understand how glorious and momentous is the

the character of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is bourgeois-democratic, that the revolution's principal targets are imperialism and the feudal forces,6
and that its primary motive forces are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban
petty bourgeoisie. At certain times and to a certain extent, various other elements,
such as the national bourgeoisie, have also participated. It also follows that the
principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution is armed struggle. Indeed, the
eighteen-year history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin has said: "A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed
people are fighting the armed counterrevolution." This is perfectly true. This specific feature, peculiar to semicolonial China, is absent or is different in Communist parties in the various capitalist countries. Thus, two basic specific features of
the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party emerged in the process
of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution: (1) a revolutionary national united
front with the bourgeoisie is either established or forced to break up; and (2) armed
struggle is the principal form of the revolution. Here we have not considered the
Party's relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic
special feature, first, because these relations are in principle the same for Communist parties all over the world and, second, because armed struggle in China is, in
essence, peasant war, and the Party's close relations with the peasant war and its
relations with the peasantry are one and the same thing.

now able to draw correct conclusions10 by virtue of our country's¹¹ abundant experience during the eighteen years of the Party's history, a rich and profound experience of failures and successes, retreats and advances, contraction and expansion.
Which is to say that we are now able to handle the questions of the united front,
armed struggle, and Party building correctly. It also means that eighteen years of
experience have taught us that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building
are the Chinese Communist Party's three magic weapons, its three principal magic
weapons for defeating the enemy in China's revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and a great achievement of the Chinese
revolution.
Here let us briefly discuss each of these three magic weapons, each of these
three questions.
In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the
Chinese bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different sets of
circumstances or during three different stages: the first Great Revolution, 12 ten
years of civil war, 13 and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the course
of these three stages, the following laws have been proved: (1) Because the greatest semicolonial countries and not to be found in the revolutionary history of any
capitalist country. Furthermore, since China is a semicolonial and semifeudal country whose political, economic, and cultural development is uneven, a country whose

Great Revolution and during the ten years of civil war,¹⁸ but they are also being
proved during the three years of the War of Resistance.¹⁹ Therefore, with regard to
the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (and, in particular, with
the big bourgeoisie), the political party of the proletariat must carry on a stern,
resolute struggle on two fronts. On the one hand, it must oppose²⁰ neglecting the
possibility that the bourgeoisie may make revolution at certain times and to a cer- tain extent, regarding the bourgeoisie in China as the same as the bourgeoisie in
capitalist countries and consequently neglecting the policy of forming a united
front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it for as long as possible. This is "Left"-
deviationist closed-doorism. On the other hand, it must also combat treating the
revolutionary nature and revolutionary program, policies, ideology, practice, and
so on of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie as though they were one and
the same, and neglecting the differences in principle between them; neglecting the
fact that the bourgeoisie²¹ not only exerts an influence on the petty bourgeoisie and
the peasantry but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist
Party in a strenuous effort to put an end to their ideological, political, and organizational independence, to turn them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its