Interviews with Edgar Snow
(September 24-26, 1939)¹

I. The United Front and Problems of Policy²
Snow: There seems to exist some discrepancy between the Guomindang's description of the political basis of the War of Resistance, and the Communist Party's.

The latter repeatedly emphasizes that the united front is the political basis of the
war (see Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War," "On the New Stage," etc.), while this
phrase nowhere plays a role in the Guomindang literature and statements. The
Guomindang sees the political basis of the war as the submission of the Communists and all other political groups to the dictatorship of the Guomindang.
Thus, in Chongqing I had an interview with General Zhang Qun³ and asked
him his opinion on this point. He said there was no question of a united front at
present, that there was only one legal party in China, the Guomindang, and but one
legal government, the National Government. The "border region governments"
were completely illegal and eventually would be abolished. General Jiang Dingwen4
told me the same thing in Xi'an. He said there was no other legal party in China
except the Guomindang. The Communist Party "ceased to exist" after its agreement with the Generalissimo. Therefore there is at present no question of a united
front. [The Communist Party had no legal position whatsoever in China], although
the former Communists, as part of the Guomindang army, had a right to maintain
offices and depots. Chen Lifu last year said practically the same.
Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek himself recently told a German correspondent
that "there is not a single Communist left in China," which obviously denies the
legal existence of the Communist Party, hence the conception of the united front.
What is your answer to such statements? Wherein lies the legal foundation of
the united front? The legal foundation of the Communist Party? Is it possible to
have a nominal united front between two parties when one party denies the existence of the other?

Mao: The united front has actually already existed in China for some time. In the
minds of the majority of the people, and in their utterances, writings, and actions as well, the united front is recognized as something real as well as nominal. But a
small minority, though in reality it must perhaps acknowledge the united front,
verbally tries to deny it, so that in their utterances and writings there is no such
thing as a united front. We used to call these people's attitude Ah Q-ism, because
the character Ah Q portrayed in Lu Xun's story always said he was right, was
triumphant, whereas others were always wrong, always defeated. From an Ah Qist's viewpoint, there seems to be no united front. If you do not believe that, just
refer to Lu Xun's "True Story of Ah Q."

There is a small group of people in China who have always very much wanted
to be like Hitler, ignoring facts. Everyone knows that Hitler said some time ago
that the Soviet Union is only a name, and there is really no such country in the
world. But after a while Hitler became more educated and made some progress.
On August 23, 1939, he suddenly discovered not only the nominal existence of the
USSR, but the reality of it. (He signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.-
E.S.) Among China's Ah Q-ists I think there are many who may make similar
progress. If today they still deny the existence of the united front, and even the
existence of the Communist Party, it is quite possible that some day in the future
they may recognize the existence in name and in reality of the Communist Party
and of the united front. There was a sage long ago in China called Mencius, who
once said: "My eyesight is sharp enough to examine a point of autumn hair, but I
do not see a wagonload of faggots." These words would very aptly describe today's
Ah Q-ists.

As for the question of our submission to the dictatorship of the Guomindang,
perhaps there are some Guomindang members who believe that and say that, but
I consider that they are free to think as they like. Since they eat, sleep, their tongues
are in their own mouths, and they have so-called brains, which are unique to higher
animals-since they meet all these conditions, they therefore have such a freedom,
the freedom to talk nonsense. Personally, I support the democratic principle of Mr.
Sun Yatsen, and I will not interfere with this freedom of theirs. In fact, just now I
am too busy to bother about it. As for submission, I don't know what the other
political groups say, but I know that since the first day of its existence the Communist Party has been entirely independent and has never sacrificed its independence
for one day, half a day, one hour, or one minute. It has never submitted to any party
or any group or any person. It is the most difficult thing conceivable to secure such
submission from the Communist Party.

I trust that the great majority of Guomindang members who have a conscience
and are sincere would not say all the things you mentioned, because they all understand that the War of Resistance and unity are primary.

As for Mr. Chiang Kaishek's having denied the existence of Communists in
China, I don't think that can be true. This is because, first, Mr. Chiang is a statesman and possesses not only political common sense, but something more. Second,
since Mr. Chiang is the leader of the War of Resistance, he should not have said
such a thing. Third, if he really did say that, is it not in contradiction to a former
speech? On September 23, 1937, Mr Chiang made a statement in which he fully
recognized the legal status of the Communist Party. Hence I do not believe that it
is possible for Mr. Chiang to have made such a statement, since it is lacking in
political sense, detrimental to unity and the War of Resistance, and is contradictory to his previous statements. Yet if he did in fact say this, then we have a right to
have him correct it. The ancients said: "The faults of the superior man are like the
eclipses of the sun and the moon. He has his faults, and all men see them; he
changes again, and all men look up to him." If Mr. Chiang really did say such a
thing, then he is truly mistaken, and it is a mistake that the entire membership of
the Communist Party cannot abide, so we must have him correct it.

And yet it is true that the legal position of the Communist Party is nonexistent. The Chinese government has never carried out what Mr. Chiang stated on
September 23, 1937, which was to give the Communist Party full legality. There is
likewise no legal basis given to other parties outside the Communist Party. This
simply proves that China is not yet a country with a constitutional government and
is not yet a country with a legal system. No wonder all the people in the country
want to conclude the "period of tutelage" (under the Guomindang) and institute
constitutional government.

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been recognized personally
by Mr. Chiang several times in front of the Communist Party's representative,
Comrade Zhou Enlai, at the time of the 1936 Xi'an Incident and in the spring
and summer of 1937. In the winter of 1937 the Executive Yuan of the National

Government formally ratified [legislation giving it a legal position]. The fact that
it has not yet been promulgated and that the appointment of officials for the
border regions has not yet been approved merely proves that the Executive Yuan's
standard of efficiency must be far too low and that bureaucratism in the Chinese
government is truly very serious. No wonder the people of the whole country are
demanding the thorough reform of administrative organs.¹⁶ The situation should
be improved.

Snow: China's foreign policy emphasizes that China's struggle is on the side of
democracy, and against fascism, and that China belongs in the ranks of the democratic powers. Is there, then, any basis for such a claim that China is a democratic
country? Has China made any progress toward democracy since the war began?
Have the people gained any political power? Here I don't refer to conditions in the
border regions or in the guerrilla areas, but to that part of Free China¹⁷ under the
direct control of the Central Government.

Mao: There is one basis for such a claim, which is the official name of our state.
Do not the people of various countries call us *Zhonghua minguo*—the Chinese
Republic? I think that this is the only basis for the claim. But if we refer the claim
to reality it is obviously not true. China *today* is an undemocratic country. Mr. Sun
Yatsen's principle of democracy has existed for decades now, but so far it has not
been realized. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the country want to see
it realized, and some day it probably will be realized. When that happens there will
be another basis for the claim. I hope this claim will be added, because not only
would it be advantageous for diplomatic discussion, but, most important, it would
facilitate the War of Resistance.

Snow: If China has not made any progress toward democracy during the war,¹⁸
what change has actually taken place in the character of the Central Government?
Is it not still an exclusively Guomindang dictatorship?

Mao: There have been some changes in [the government's] policies, [if not in the
government itself]. They have stopped fighting a civil war and have begun to fight

Japan. This is a change in policy. But as regards other policies, such as those
referring to democracy and people's livelihood, there have been no changes. Therefore people throughout the country are now fervently demanding the realization of
the principles of democracy and people's livelihood. We cannot say that there has
been any organic change in the government. It is still a one-party dictatorship of
the Guomindang. This dictatorship has aroused discontent in the whole nation,
and it is a condition which must be changed. During the recent session of the
People's Political Council in Chongqing, Mr. Chiang said in his opening speech
that all talented people should be mobilized,¹⁹ and the Political Council passed a
resolution proposing that the "period of tutelage" be brought to an end and that
constitutional government be established. This is good news. The people all over
China are now very anxious about all this, because if China's domestic politics are
not reformed and democracy is not realized, then not only will it be impossible to
defeat Japan but China will surely be dismembered.

Snow: (During another conversation I asked Mao whether the Communists would
actually participate in a coalition government if they were offered any cabinet posts.
I said I had been told that in 1938, when the government was at Hankou, one or two
minor cabinet posts had been offered to the Communists, but that they had declined. It was said that the Communists did not want to take part in a coalition
government because they were afraid the foreign powers might not approve of
such a development, it would frighten wavering Chinese elements into the camp of
compromise and defeatism, and the Communists did not want to assume any responsibility in a government in which they could not control policy. Mao Zedong
denied that any cabinet posts had ever been offered the Communists. He said that if
any such proposal were made, the Communist Party would be glad to participate.)
Have any changes occurred in the class basis of the Chinese government as a
result of the war?

Mao: In my view there have been some *partial* changes. The richest people along
the seacoast and [in the cities] along the Yangzi River have mostly become Chinese
traitors and semitraitors. This group finds representation in Wang Jingwei. People
of this class can no longer be relied upon to support the government. The basis of
a government for the War of Resistance should mainly rest upon, and will eventually have to rest upon, the middle class and the vast peasantry, because only these
classes are the great force maintaining the War of Resistance.

Snow: Do you mean that the government actually represents the middle class and
the peasantry more than it did formerly?²⁰

Mao: I am saying that reliance should be placed upon these two classes, not that
it already has been placed upon them. I am talking about the future of the government and not its present condition.

Snow: Has there been a change in the classes represented by the government?

Mao: No, there has not been such a change.

Snow: Does the present government represent the landlords and the bourgeoisie?

Mao: Yes. The present government is still on the whole representative of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, but many representatives of these classes have already
fled.

Snow: Then what do they represent?

Mao: In the sense of its anti-Japanese war policy, the foundation has mainly been
placed upon the middle class and the vast peasantry, and these classes are already
represented, but with regard to policies concerning democracy and livelihood, this
has not yet been the case. 21

Snow: Because the Communist Party has abandoned propaganda emphasizing
class conflict, abolished its soviets, submitted to the leadership of the Guomindang
and the Guomindang government, adopted the Three People's Principles, ceased
confiscating the property of landlords and capitalists, 22 and stopped organizational
work and propaganda in the Guomindang areas, many people now assert that Chinese Communists are in fact no longer social revolutionaries but mere reformists-bourgeois in methods and in aims. How do you answer such claims? Do you
not still maintain that the Chinese revolution is anti-imperialist and antifeudal,
with the possibility of transformation, at a certain stage, into socialist revolution
and that the responsibility of the Communist Party is to lead the nation toward that
revolution?

Mao: We are always social revolutionaries; we are never reformists. There are
two main objectives in the thesis of the Chinese revolution. The first consists of
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie together bringing about a national democratic
revolution. We are now in the midst of achieving this part, and we are determined
to do a thorough job of it. But the thesis has a second part, which consists of the
proletariat leading the peasantry in carrying out socialist revolution. This, too, must be achieved, and completely achieved. For the present the revolution is national democratic in character, but after it has developed to a certain stage it will
be transformed into socialist revolution. The present "becoming" of the social
revolutionary part in the thesis of the Chinese revolution will turn into its "being"-unless our work in the present phase is a failure, in which case there is no
early possibility of social revolution.

Snow: Has China also the possibility of developing, before or after the completion
of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution, toward fascist dictatorship? Are fascist groups in China increasing or decreasing in strength?

Mao: There is no possibility of a fascist dictatorship developing in China. Half the
country is already colonized, and the other half is menaced by the same fate. The
Chinese economy is still mostly semifeudal in character. These are the reasons that
our fascist dreamers have no future. If, in the past, we inaptly and misleadingly
described a certain Chinese political organization as "fascist," and if we now refer
to that force, we can see that it is weakening, not strengthening. It is very obvious
that in such a country as China, anyone who tries to create fascism is destined to
break his own neck. 23

Snow: The Communist Party claims to hold hegemony over the workers and peasants of China. Aside from the leadership of the peasants in the border regions, and
the leadership of the Red Army, which has some proletarian elements, how does
the Communist Party in actual practice assert its leadership over the industrial
proletariat of China-80 to 90 percent of which is now dwelling in places held by
Japanese imperialists? In what way is the Communist Party educating both peasants and proletariat to be conscious of the present anti-Japanese and antifeudal
aims of the revolution?

Mao: The Communist Party's claim to leadership over the workers and peasants is
of two kinds, political and organizational. For example, in places such as the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and in the guerrilla districts in North China
under the Eighth Route Army, we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony over the workers and peasants. Elsewhere, wherever there is a
Communist Party organization, all peasants and workers who subscribe to the
Communist Party main principles are following the Communist Party's political
leadership. Where they have already been organized there is organizational leadership as well.

(Under this logic it is evident that the Communists consider all the armed forces
participating in the anti-Japanese war as under their influence, since resistance is
the central demand of the Communist Party in the present stage of the revolution.
Other people would quickly deny this and call it wishful thinking; but it is the
logic which enables the Communists to endure other restrictions on their activity.
As long as resistance continues, they believe, revolutionary struggle continues,
and consequently the period of "transformation" draws nearer.-E.S.) 24
Education of workers and peasants to understand the need to fight Japan and
oppose the forces of the Chinese traitors is being done by Communist Party members orally, in writing, and mainly through the Party's actions in resisting Japan. 25

Snow: Do you think the War of Resistance thus far has strengthened or weakened
the feudal elements in China? Just where, in the present Communist program, are
the antifeudal aims of the revolution expressed? Are they being realized anywhere
outside the border regions? Is it possible to win the war unless the antifeudal program of the revolution is simultaneously carried out on a national scale?26

Mao: Here what I must say first is that in the present stage of the Chinese revolution the problem of primary importance is resistance to Japanese imperialism.
Antifeudal tasks may [for a while] have to be subordinated to the major anti-Japanese issue. Our antifeudal program [in this period] consists of demands for
nationwide democracy and the improvement of people's livelihood by such measures as the elimination of exorbitant taxes and levies and the reduction of rent and
loan interest.

There is a nationwide democratic movement growingly widespread among not
only workers and peasants but also among the petty bourgeoisie such as large
numbers of intellectuals, students and other youths, cultural workers, progressive
thinkers, statesmen, scientists, military men, and so on. The obstacle that confronts this movement is an archaic political system that has impeded its development. Therefore, changing that political system (without endangering resistance)
is an important task. Without a doubt, unless it is changed, and unless democ- racy is realized, there can be no victory in the anti-Japanese war (italics mineE.S.). 27 Resistance and democracy are the two edges of a single sword. Some people
pretend to support resistance but to reject the principle of democracy. In reality
they do not want the anti-Japanese struggle to succeed but, rather, want to drag it
toward failure. 28

Snow: In China some of the capitalists have fled to Wang Jingwei's side. This
means that China's national bourgeoisie and compradore class no longer makes
up the government's main component. Under such circumstances, the government
has already lost the force upon which to rely, so why has it continued to represent
these classes for such a relatively long period of time, and why has it not raised the
organizational position of the workers and peasants?

Mao: This is being stubborn. The class basis has changed, but the government's
organizational structure still has not changed. Because these people will try to
hold out in their positions, draw their salaries, and not let others in. Therefore
changing the organizational structure of the government requires a process, and it
cannot be achieved overnight.

II. International Questions

(September 26, 1939)

Snow: After the signature of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact there were
fears in Chongqing that it might be followed by a Russo-Japanese nonaggression
pact. The USSR did at one time urge Japan to sign such a pact. Do you consider it
a possibility at present? If no, why is it impossible?

Mao: If such a pact would hinder the support of the USSR for China, then it would
not be signed. Under the condition that it would not interfere with that support,
however, it could be signed without harmful effects. The Soviet Union has interests in common with the world liberation movement and also with the national
semicolonial and colonial revolution. The Soviet Union will not sign a pact which
is disadvantageous to those movements.

Snow: I read your comment on the signature of the Soviet-German pact. You
seem to think it unlikely that the Soviet Union can be drawn into the European
War. . . . Do you think the USSR would remain neutral, as long as it is not attacked, even if Nazi Germany appears to be near victory?

Mao: The Soviet Union will not participate in this war, because both sides are
imperialists, and it is simply a robber war with justice on neither side. Both sides
are struggling for the balance of power and rule over the peoples of the world.
Both are wrong, and the Soviet Union will not become involved in this kind of
war, but will remain neutral.

But the Soviet Union will not adopt a neutral policy in all wars. In the case of
righteous wars of liberation it will not remain neutral. This has consistently been
the Soviet policy for twenty years. For example, the Soviet Union supported the
Republican Army of Spain. From 1937 till now it helped China in the anti-Japanese
war. The movement of Russian troops into Poland on September 17 was also for
the purpose of liberating the Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples.

The Soviet Union will support national liberation movements in colonial and
semicolonial countries and it will support people's (social revolutionary) movements in capitalist countries whenever they rise. It will support revolutionary warfare but remain neutral in purely counterrevolutionary wars.

As for the outcome of the present European war, the Soviet Union cannot be
frightened by the threat of the victorious power to herself, whether it is England or
Germany. Whenever the Soviet Union is attacked, it will have the support of the
people of various countries and of the national minorities in colonial and
semicolonial countries.

The center of the anti-Soviet movement today is no longer Nazi Germany. It is
among the so-called democratic countries, with Great Britain in the lead. Under
Chamberlain's leadership the governments of the so-called democratic countries
are organizing a vast front which aspires to involve Italy and Japan. With this they
expect first to defeat Germany, and then to attack the Soviet Union. The present
international situation has undergone profound changes.

Snow: I understand you to mean that you see no difference between fascism and
the cause of the democracies of England and France?

Mao: No, there is no difference in their positions in this war. Chamberlain is
organizing a world front with which to surround the Soviet Union, anti-Japanese
China, and Germany. His purpose is to stop the war in China, overthrow Hitler,
and isolate the Soviet Union, so that it will be convenient to organize an anti-Soviet drive later on. Chamberlain, as the leader of reactionary international capitalism, understands that if he does not act in that way the anti-Japanese war can
achieve victory, Germany can recover her colonies, India can win her independence, and his own rule and that of his colleagues will collapse.

Snow: That seems a rather large order for Mr. Chamberlain. I wonder if you mean
that, while fighting Germany, Chamberlain's real attention is centered upon the
destruction of Russia? It appears to me that Chamberlain has got his hands full
with Hitler for the present, without planning an even larger war against Russia.
Would it not be logical for him to try to win Russia's friendship, if possible, in
order to beat Hitler, even if he does have some designs on Stalin in the future? Do
you mean that he formerly dreamed of diverting Hitler's attack toward the East, or
that he is actively planning it now, or that he hopes to consummate such a front out
of the present war?

Mao: He formerly dreamed of it, he actually plans it now, and he hopes to realize
it later. Why? Because in front of Chamberlain there is not only the problem of
Hitler, but also the problem of revolt in India, and among people in his own country, while the Soviet Union is the supporter of the colonial revolutions and the
people's (revolutionary) movement in capitalist countries themselves. Hence
Roosevelt also sympathizes with Chamberlain.

Snow: What effect will the European war have upon Japan's strategy in Eastern
Asia and Japan's foreign policy?

Mao: Japan will utilize the European war for two purposes. The first is to intensify
her invasion of China, and the second is to extend her aggression to the South Sea
Islands. First of all, however, she must destroy China, and she will concentrate her
main attention on that task, for the present. She will not take part in the European
war. By remaining a nonparticipant she can continue to trade with France and
Britain and America, and perhaps also borrow money from them. Without foreign
trade and loans it will be difficult for Japan to overcome China.

Germany is quite busy with her own affair in Europe at present, and can no
longer look after Japan. The Soviet Union has little trade with Japan; furthermore
she will not loan one copper to Japan. The question is whether Britain, France, and
America will help Japan to destroy China, and it is a very grave question.

The second Japanese objective during the European war involves ambitious
hopes indeed. But whether or not Britain, France, and America are defeated in
Europe, Japan will concentrate her fleet in the south. At that time a Japanese attack
on the Dutch East Indies will become a possibility, because they are an intermediate point between frontal Anglo-Japanese conflict, being a sphere of important
British influence but not a British colony. Japanese militarists find the Dutch Indies
very attractive, with abundant natural resources and a large population. If Great
Britain, France, and the U.S.A. adopt a policy which helps Japan and makes it
possible for her to achieve victory over China, they will simply be arming Japan
for a future attack in which they themselves will be the target.

Japan hopes to get rich in this world war. Roosevelt is also hoping to get rich.
Roosevelt wants to win leadership in the capitalist world. He wants Chamberlain for a secretary and Japan for part of his guard, his rearguard-with Hitler and
Mussolini in the vanguard. But he shakes his head sadly at Stalin and says that
Stalin is not useful to him.

Snow: Would you say that the war in Europe is likely to have a decisive effect on
the outcome of the Sino-Japanese struggle, then?

Mao: If Britain, France, and the U.S.A. carry out a policy which gives material
help to Japan it may have a decisive effect.... Otherwise, by relying mainly upon
herself, and the principle of self-sufficiency, China can and should defeat Japan
during this period of world war and chaos.

Snow: Obviously the European war must greatly weaken the position of Britain
and France in China. That means, perhaps, the weakening of both Anglo-French
resistance to Japan, and Anglo-French assistance to China. Where China's dependence on foreign powers is concerned, therefore, the role of Soviet help is enormously increased, and in particular the Northwest route of supplies becomes more
important. Likewise Soviet policy toward Japan in Siberia and Outer Mongolia. Is
Soviet help to China likely to be enlarged to a degree sufficient to compensate for
the weakening of Anglo-French assistance?

Mao: If China continues determinedly to resist, and cooperates closely with the
Soviet Union, the latter's help will not only compensate for diminishing Anglo-French assistance, but will far surpass it in importance. Fundamentally, Britain
and France have not been "helping" China. Their policy is simply one of noninterference with the war, thus far, but not one of positive assistance to China.

Snow: In this connection, is it possible that this greater Soviet help to China's
liberation movement may take a form somewhat similar to what you called Soviet
aid to the Belorussian and Ukrainian liberation movements? There is, for example,
a powerful anti-Japanese national liberation movement in Manchuria, and there
are similar liberation movements in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Is it possible
that the Soviet Union may give these liberation movements help by sending in
armed anti-Japanese expeditions?

Mao: According to Leninism such a possibility exists.... But the fundamental
question is whether the Chinese fight for themselves.

Snow: With the Soviet occupation of Poland, by agreement with Nazi Germany,
Russia appears to be cooperating with the totalitarian Axis in the partitioning of
weaker states. That will certainly be a widely expressed view. In any case, the new
Soviet policy means the collapse of the so-called United Front of the democratic
countries (including the USSR) against Fascism. How will this affect the political slogans of China's war against Japan? Until now China has appealed for the support of the capitalist democracies against totalitarian Japan. Do the past slogans of
Chinese diplomacy now lose their validity?

Mao: With the outbreak of the European war, world political relations underwent
profound changes. Germany gave up her anti-Soviet and anti-Comintern (sic!)29
policy. On the other hand, the so-called democratic countries began to utilize war
to bring an end to democracy. These so-called democratic countries became the
center of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, antidemocratic, and antipopular movements
and the enemy of the colonial and semicolonial people's movements.
Germany and England are both imperialist countries. Both the fascist countries
and the so-called democracy England are robber imperialists. The war between
them is an imperialist war, waged against the will of their own peoples, and against
the will of the people of the USSR.
The center of world reaction now lies in England. Chamberlain is the world's
Public Enemy No. 1. Formerly the Soviet Union, and the Communist parties of all
nations, made great efforts to win over Chamberlain, and induce him to resist
fascism, in cooperation with the USSR. But the reactionary governments of the
capitalist class in the so-called democracies, with Chamberlain in the foreground,
finally rejected these offers, refused to cooperate with the USSR, and as a result
the second imperialist war was enlarged.
Chamberlain was never sincere in opening Anglo-Russian negotiations. He was
determined that the talks should lead nowhere. In this way he chose war, rather
than peace, for it was obvious that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from cooperation, there could be no guarantee of peace. Even Lloyd George, a great spokesman for the capitalist class, recognized that.
Meanwhile Germany took advantage of Chamberlain's policy, abandoned its
anti-Comintern stand, and made a nonaggression pact with the USSR. That changed
the face of the whole situation. With the liquidation of the Nazi anti-Soviet, anti-Comintern policy, the distinction formerly drawn between fascist and democratic
capitalist countries lost its validity, and no longer serves as a political measurement. The period of attempting to win over the capitalist class and its governments
to form a United Front with the USSR becomes a thing of the past. A new standard
is necessary to distinguish between various countries, based upon a new situation.
How shall we classify them?
In one category belong those countries which carry on, or help to carry on, or
really openly and positively support, unjust and robber imperialist wars. In a second category belong those countries which support popular liberation wars. The

Thank you! That is perfect.

Route Army has defended its Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar war area for two years against
Japan, but Poland had no "Wutai" (Wutai shan, the mountainous base of the Communist troops in northern Shanxi) and no Eighth Route Army. All this weakness
clearly indicates the incompetence and wickedness of the Polish government. We
should waste no tears over imperialistic Poland.
Finally, concerning the Soviet Union. The Nazi invasion of Poland presented
the Soviet Union with the problem: whether to permit the whole Polish population
to fall victim to Nazi persecution, or whether to liberate national minorities of
Eastern Poland. The Soviet Union chose to follow the second course of action.
In Eastern Poland there is a vast stretch of territory inhabited by 8 million
Belorussians and 3 million Ukrainians. This territory was forcibly seized from the
young socialist soviet republics as the price of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and fell
under the domination of the reactionary Polish government. Today the Soviet Union,
no longer weak and young, takes back its own and liberates them.
News dispatches from the front describe the welcome which the minorities of
Poland are giving to the Red Army. The people carry food and beverages to the
Red troops, hail and embrace them, and cheer them as saviors. There is no such
news from places occupied by German and French troops. This shows that the war
of the Soviet Union in this case is a just war, and in the interest of liberating national minorities and oppressed peoples.

Snow: But Domei reports much the same sort of hearty welcome wherever its
Army takes the New Order to East Asia. I dare say the German press is telling the
German public about the enthusiasm with which its bombs were received in Poland also. It is customary in these days for a conquered people not only to submit,
but to congratulate their conquerors.

Mao: (laughing) Nobody believes Domei reports, and though I have not seen any
German claims of a welcome in Poland I am sure nobody would believe them, if
made. In the case of reports about the welcome given Soviet troops, there are
independent observers there who can see for themselves whether or not they are
true. . . .

In conclusion, it should be noted that the main problem now facing the Soviet
Union is the attempt made by Chamberlain to realize his old policy. On the one
hand, he is blockading Germany and putting immense pressure on Germany's
western front. On the other hand, he is attempting to buy off Italy and Japan, and to
appease Germany. By presenting Hitler with Hungary and Rumania, in exchange
for the abrogation of the Soviet-German Pact, he hopes to turn German rifles toward the East.
Those aims of Chamberlainism not only exist at present but will continue to
exist in the future. Soviet occupation of Poland is for the purpose of liberating the
Belorussians and Ukrainians, and recovering the territory of the Union, but it is
also a concrete method of consolidating the German-Soviet Pact, and frustrating
the schemes of Chamberlain. Recent news indicates that the policy has achieved
very great success.30

On another occasion I asked Mao whether, in his opinion, Russia's occupation of
Poland was primarily justified by strategic-military necessity or political necessity.
Mao seemed to think that the governing factor was strategic necessity, but that
the move was partly military and partly political. The political side was not related
directly to the world condition of the revolutionary movement but to the Soviet
Union's historic relations with Eastern Poland. The Soviet-German Pact, on the
other hand, was not political but a strategic-military necessity. Stalin wanted it in
order to block Chamberlain's effort to build a coalition against Russia. Mao claimed
that Chamberlain had clearly indicated to Hitler that he had to make a choice
between fighting Russia or fighting England. If Hitler attacked Russia, Chamberlain was prepared to tolerate his occupation of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and
the Baltic states. If not, he would use Poland to oppose Hitler. Stalin was then
compelled to seek his own agreement with Hitler.
I suggested to Mao that the Soviet policy was bound to produce its own dialectical reaction, and quite possibly would strengthen Hitler to a degree which might
represent a real menace to the USSR. The immediate effect of Soviet policy would
be greatly to weaken Communist parties in England, France, and America, driving
away from them especially the liberal petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and throwing
great confusion into the ranks of the working class itself. If the C.P. opposed the
war it would be suppressed-as it had already been in France. All peripheral leftwing groups who actively opposed the war would also be suppressed. Such a development would strengthen reactionary and conservative elements. Fascist
dictatorial methods, under the guise of war mobilization necessities, would quickly
spread. The paralyzing of this vanguard element would greatly weaken the opposition to appeasement efforts on the part of Chamberlain and Daladier in seeking a
bargain with Hitler, and the chances for a future anti-Soviet combination might
considerably improve. The transformation of the imperialist war into a united imperialist attack on the USSR was thus conceivably rendered possible by the present
Soviet-German Pact.
Mao disagreed. He believed the Pact guaranteed Soviet Russia the security it
needs against German attack. "Hitler is in Stalin's pocket," he said.
So all is well-unless it turns out that there is a hole in Stalin's pocket.

---

Notes

These interviews were first published by Edgar Snow in the China Weekly Review, January
13 and 20, 1940, under the title "The Chinese Communists and Wars on Two Continents." As
Mao states in the second interview, his own secretary took down the proceedings directly in
Chinese. It is presumably this record which provided the basis for the text of the first interview, printed from a manuscript in the Central Archives bearing Mao's own corrections, that
appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 238-46. This version is considerably fuller than the
published English text. The additional material may have been deleted either by Snow or by
the editors of the China Weekly Review, in order to save space or because it was considered of
lesser interest to the Western reader. In any case, we have taken this Chinese version as
authoritative and have amended the translation of Mao's remarks accordingly. Words and
sentences thus added to the published version are set in italics. Generally speaking, Snow's
questions have been left as they appear in the published text, on the assumption that he
himself knew best what he had asked, but in a few instances points have been added from the
Chinese transcript in order to show what Mao thought he was supposed to be answering.
Changes, not specifically noted here, have been made in the orthography of Chinese names
and in other minor details to bring the usage into conformity with that in this series, and
variants of little substantive interest between the English and Chinese texts have been ignored. In borderline cases, we have avoided tampering with Snow's English version. For
example, in order to retain the atmosphere of the period, "Chiang weiyuanzhang" has been
left as "Generalissimo Chiang," or simply "the Generalissimo," rather than replacing this by
"Chairman Chiang." Unfortunately, the second interview, dealing with international affairs,
is not included in Mao Zedong wenji. The Chinese text in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp.
105-23, comprises both interviews, but it is taken from a volume published in China in 1982
which simply translates the 1940 English version back into Chinese. In the case of the second interview, therefore, we have reproduced the text from the China Weekly Review, while
correcting a few typographical errors and making minor changes in usage as indicated above.
1. In the China Weekly Review, the two interviews are dated September 25 and September 26, respectively. Mao Zedong wenji dates the first September 24. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 138,
gives the same date for the first interview, but, although it alludes briefly to the content of
the second interview, it does not indicate precisely when it took place. Assuming that the
first interview, for which an official record is cited, was held on the 24th, the second might
have been either on the 25th or on the 26th. The subtitles for the two interviews are taken
from the version published in 1940.
2. The main titles of the two interviews are taken from the printed text of these interviews in the China Weekly Review.
3. Zhang Qun (1888-1991) was a native of Sichuan Province. In 1908 he went to Tokyo
to study at the Japanese Military Academy; while there, he joined the Tongmenghui. He
returned to China at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, and, beginning in the 1920s he
occupied various posts, first in the Beijing warlord government, and then in the Guomindang.
In 1938, he was appointed deputy head of the National Government's Executive Yuan. At
this time, he was also head of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of National Defense.
4. Jiang Dingwen (1895-1974), zi Mingsan, was a native of Zhejiang Province. A graduate
of the Zhejiang Military Academy, he played an important role at the Huangpu Military
Academy from its first session, and there established close links with Chiang Kaishek. In
the 1930s, Chiang appointed him to various commands in the war against the Communists.
During the Xi'an Incident, he served as intermediary between Xi'an and Nanjing. At this
time, he was commander of the Tenth War Zone.
5. This and other passages in square brackets are missing from the Chinese text.
6. Chen Lifu (1900-2001), a native of Zhejiang, obtained a master's degree in mining
engineering from the University of Pittsburgh. On returning to China, he became confidential secretary to Chiang Kaishek and, thereafter, thanks to his close links to Chiang, occupied various important posts in the Guomindang party and government. As noted in Volume V, he played a conciliatory role between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist
Party during the Xi'an Incident of 1936. In 1939, he was head of the Organization Department of the Guomindang and minister of education in the National Government.
7. Snow's parenthetical comments, generally signed with his initials, are reproduced
here as they appear in the 1940 version.
8. Legge, Vol. 2, pp. 141-42. This is from Book I, part I, "King Hui of Liang." Mencius
is telling the king about the difference between not doing something and not being able to
do it. Obviously Mao is implying that the "Ah Q-ists" refuse to see something they have the
power to see.
9. Snow's text has "December" here; this is an obvious error.
10. Analects, Book XIX, Chapter 21, translated in Legge, Vol. I, p. 346. Mao cited this
same passage in 1959, after the Lushan Conference, in urging his comrades to recognize
their mistakes and correct them. See his speech of September 11, 1959, in S. Schram (ed.),
Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1974), pp. 153-54.
11. Instead of "nonexistent," the 1940 text has "really very incompletely realized."
12. Snow's text in the Review here includes the words "democratic" and "united" to
describe what China is not.
13. Snow's text adds "and parties" here.
14. According to Sun Yatsen's theory, a period of tutelage (under the Guomindang, as
indicated by Snow's parenthetical note) would be required to prepare the people of China
for democracy and constitutional government.
15. The 1940 version has "Border Government" instead of "border region."
¹⁶. With regard to the previous two sentences, there are major discrepancies between the
Chinese version and Snow's published interview. The second sentence does not appear in
Snow's text. The beginning of the first one, in Snow's version, becomes the following two
sentences: "Why was such a bill ever promulgated and why did the Central Government
approve the appointment of officials for the Border Government, if both are illegal? Such
confusion on the part of high officials merely suggests that their standard of efficiency is
really too low."

¹⁷. The Chinese text refers here to "territories not under enemy occupation," rather than
to "Free China."

¹⁸. The Chinese text omits the preceding clause.

¹⁹. Snow's text adds here, "regardless of party affiliations, to work for the country."
²⁰. The Chinese version adds here: "and that there are fewer capitalists represented."
21. The last four pairs of comments are greatly condensed and presented as a single
question and answer in Snow's version.
22. Here the Chinese version has: "ceased confiscating the land of landlords,"
23. Instead of this last sentence, Snow's version has the following two: "But it is misleading to apply the term 'fascist' to such a force, for China is fundamentally too weak (in
economic development) to support a fascist movement. Those who imagine otherwise, and
try to create 'fascism' in China, are destined finally to break their necks."
24. This note by Snow does not, of course, appear in the Chinese version.
25. In Snow's text, the preceding paragraph reads as follows: "You ask how the Communists are educating the workers and peasants (in non-Communist areas) to fight against
Japan and against feudalism. Something can be done, and is being done, by propaganda.
Much is done through the organization of anti-Japanese activities, through which also the
people can come to understand the necessity for the overthrow of feudalism."
26. Here the Chinese version adds the following sentence to Snow's question: "Since it
is not even possible for the peasants to organize themselves to resist Japan-to say nothing
of meeting the demands of reforming the countryside could the antifeudal task of the
revolution be realized in the midst of the war?"
27. In the Weekly Review version, this sentence is italicized for emphasis. To avoid confusion with the use of italics for variants, we have set it in boldface here.
28. In Snow's version, these two sentences read: "In reality they do not want to use
either edge of the sword. They are dragging the anti-imperialist struggle toward failure."
The text of this interview as published in the China Weekly Review ends here; the next
question and answer do not appear in it.
29. The parenthetical remark *sic!* appears in the text as published, and also in Snow's
manuscript. Its appearance here is puzzling. The Anti-Comintern Treaty of November 1936
between Germany and Japan was, after all, a fact of international life prior to 1939.
30. This is the end of the September 26 interview. Snow's concluding remarks follow.
Nothing is known about the "other occasion" when Snow discussed these matters with
Mao.