September 8, 1939. The National Political Consultative Conference was established on the anniversary of the War of Resistance and has now been in existence for over a year. When we accepted appointment to the Conference, we issued a statement entitled “Our Views on the National Political Consultative Conference.” In that statement, we pointed out: “In the present intense environment of the War of Resistance, the convening of the National Political Consultative Conference clearly signifies a step forward in our country’s political life toward a democratic system, and it likewise marks progress in the unity and solidarity of all parties, all ethnic groups, all social classes, and all regions. Although, in its method of formation and in the definition of its powers, the Conference is not yet a fully representative body with complete authority as we would wish, this does not diminish its role and significance today—the role of further uniting all forces throughout the nation in the struggle for national salvation through resistance, and the significance of serving as an initial beginning toward genuine democratization of national political life. Therefore, we Communists, while continuing to strive for the future establishment of a fully representative people’s congress elected by universal suffrage, will participate in the work of the National Political Consultative Conference with the most active, zealous, and sincere attitude.”  Over the past year, the Conference has held three sessions. Looking at its work to date, its greatest achievement lies in truly reflecting the broadest aspirations of the Chinese people on the most urgent and central political issue facing China today: steadfastly upholding national self-defense and fighting to final victory, while combating all tendencies toward compromise and the nefarious activities associated therewith. In the declaration of the first session, it was solemnly proclaimed: “The Conference hereby, on behalf of all the people, solemnly declares: The Chinese nation shall, with unwavering resolve, mobilize all its material and human resources to wage a protracted war of self-defense and for the cause of humanity against this vicious and brutal aggressor, until the day of final victory is achieved.” The first session also unanimously resolved to “uphold the government’s established policy, as declared by Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, of total, prolonged resistance aimed at seizing the initiative,” and called upon the entire nation to “resist resolutely, never yield, remain steadfast and unswerving, so as to accomplish the tasks of resisting aggression and building the nation.” At the third session, it was again resolved that “the established national policy of resistance must be adhered to to the very end,” and the people were urged to “strengthen their confidence, march in unison, unite wholeheartedly from beginning to end, in order to restore our territorial sovereignty and the integrity of our administration, and thus to complete the great undertaking of resisting aggression and building the nation.” Beyond these matters, concerning various specific issues related to the war effort and nation-building, members of the Conference submitted more than three hundred proposals. Though some were more pressing than others and some more detailed while others more general, each one reflected careful consideration with the aim of contributing positively to the cause of resistance and national reconstruction. It is regrettable, however, that the vast majority of the Conference’s resolutions have yet to be effectively and concretely implemented by the government, thereby diminishing the actual impact of its work and failing to meet the ardent expectations of our fellow countrymen.  As Communist members of the National Political Consultative Conference, during our year of service we have, in accordance with the position set forth in our statement of July 5 last year and guided by the Central Committee’s instruction to maintain “a clear political stance and a spirit of sincere unity,” and under the guidance and encouragement of progressive figures throughout the country, joined with our colleagues in the Conference to strive for the realization of the will and demands of the Chinese people. We are convinced that the highest aspiration, will, and demand of the people today is to secure victory in the War of Resistance, as well as to consolidate and expand the nationwide unity and progress essential for achieving and safeguarding that victory. Accordingly, in the three previous sessions of the Conference, we repeatedly proposed motions such as “supporting the government’s implementation of the Program for Resisting Aggression and Building the Nation,” “supporting Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government in intensifying nationwide unity and pursuing a protracted war to final victory,” and “supporting Chairman Chiang’s stern condemnation of the Konoe Declaration and its adoption as the sole standard for future national policy on the war.” All of these motions were adopted with the support of the entire membership. Furthermore, with regard to fundamental issues pertaining to the war effort—such as army building, conscription, the development of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, the implementation of democratic governance, and the protection of the people’s rights—we consistently put forward specific proposals. Throughout our year of work, we have firmly maintained our position: “We represent the Chinese Communist Party in the National Political Consultative Conference, and we sincerely desire to engage in close cooperation and joint efforts within the Conference with the Kuomintang and other parties, as well as with non-affiliated patriotic comrades, so that we may amicably and harmoniously deliberate and decide upon all concrete measures and plans conducive to securing victory in the war and successfully building the nation.” At the same time, we have resolutely exposed and mercilessly denounced all doctrines harmful to the war effort and all arguments advocating peace at any price or surrender. During the second and third sessions, the treasonous ravings of Wang Jingwei and his henchman Li Shengwu, though expressed in veiled forms, were vigorously refuted and rebuked by us and by the majority of our fellow members.  Over the past year, although we acknowledge that our contributions within the National Political Consultative Conference have been modest, we can confidently assert that we have consistently upheld a clear principle of unity and resistance, acting in accordance with the will and aspirations of the people, without ever straying from that path. Now that the government has officially extended the terms of office of the members of the Conference by one year, we wish to share with our colleagues in the Conference and with the entire nation our views on the current situation and on how best to secure victory in the war going forward.  The present phase of the War of Resistance is characterized, on the one hand, by growing difficulties for the enemy after two years of aggressive warfare, while at the same time the prospect of ultimate victory for our side becomes increasingly clear. On the other hand, however, the Japanese aggressors have not only failed to alter their policy of destroying China; rather, they have become even more insidious, more ferocious, and more ruthless in carrying out their long-standing plan to annihilate our country. They are also employing ever more cunning tactics to exploit the Chinese themselves and to sustain the war through war. Militarily, they have temporarily halted large-scale offensives on the front lines in order to concentrate their forces on sweeping through and eliminating guerrilla zones behind enemy lines, seeking thereby to both paralyze our will to resist and to consolidate their own foothold in the occupied territories. Politically, they are working to prop up and manipulate Wang Jingwei, loudly promoting his false claims of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and to the Communists and urging Japan’s surrender, while intensifying their efforts to fabricate puppet parties, puppet governments, and puppet armies. Simultaneously, they are inciting Wang’s followers and other disloyal elements within our ranks to sow discord and carry out anti-Communist and anti-Chiang activities, in an attempt to create conditions that would force China to capitulate. Economically, they are implementing policies of plunder, exploitation, and predatory development, in order to realize their sinister scheme of sustaining the war through the use of China’s resources to massacre its people. Meanwhile, within our own camp, there exists a segment of the population that either believes the enemy has softened its policy of destruction or that the Sino-Japanese question can be resolved through some form of international conference. Consequently, they abandon the correct conviction of self-reliance and fail to undertake any practical preparations for a counteroffensive. Indeed, some even disregard the imminent danger of national subjugation, focusing instead on internal affairs—particularly on campaigns against the Communists and on plots to undermine the united front—and relentlessly persecuting all progressive forces while subjecting many promising young people to oppressive measures. Such internecine strife, like boiling beans to fuel the fire, only serves to weaken our collective resolve when faced with external aggression. The consequences extend beyond undermining the nation’s confidence in ultimate victory; they also erode international sympathy for the Chinese people. Moreover, mounting difficulties such as shortages in military manpower and the depreciation of the legal tender further exacerbate a sense among certain quarters that, despite their good intentions, they lack the means to defeat the enemy. All of these factors have deepened and intensified the national crisis confronting China.  Meanwhile, recent developments in the international arena have brought about profound changes in the context of our war effort. The signing of the Soviet–German Non-Aggression Pact has shattered the anti-Communist axis, leaving Japan diplomatically isolated and creating internal upheaval within its ranks—both of which should prove advantageous to our cause. At the same time, Germany’s fascist aggression against Poland has triggered a European war, prompting Japan to exploit the heightened tensions on that continent in order to intensify its all-out campaign to destroy China. Furthermore, the growing inclination of British appeasers to seek a compromise with Japan at the expense of China introduces additional complications into our strategic landscape. Thus, both the domestic and international environments surrounding China’s war effort are currently undergoing rapid and momentous transformations.  Under this new domestic and international conjuncture, the pressing task before the Chinese people is to clearly discern the various characteristics and potential trajectories of these changing circumstances, to adhere steadfastly to the policy of total resistance, to guard against the peril of premature compromise, to strengthen national unity and to oppose all schemes of division, and to advance the nation as a whole while resisting all reactionary and retrograde tendencies. At the same time, we must actively seek out every favorable development and factor in the rapidly evolving international situation that might bolster our external support, so as to overcome all dangers, surmount all obstacles, build up our strength, and prepare for a decisive counteroffensive. To address the current difficulties and perils and to make serious preparations for a national counterattack, we believe that efforts should be concentrated on the following fronts:  A. On the political front:  1. Mobilize the entire nation against compromise and surrender; expand the movement against Wang Jingwei; purge hidden remnants of Wang’s faction and all elements inclined toward capitulation from within our ranks.  2. Strengthen the wartime government; unify military and civilian leadership; draw on talent from all parties and factions; and enhance the efficiency of wartime administrative institutions.  3. Implement wartime democracy; severely punish illegal repression of the populace and youth; and effectively guarantee the people’s rights to freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, and armed resistance.  4. Rigorously root out corruption and malfeasance; promote local self-governance.  5. Establish arbitration bodies in each locality to resolve labor–landlord disputes, thereby substantially improving the living conditions of poor workers and peasants, increasing popular enthusiasm for the war effort, and facilitating military recruitment.  B. On the military front:  1. Develop guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines—to transform the rear areas into a front line and to accumulate small victories into a major triumph. To this end, it is imperative to:  (a) Formulate and implement governing programs for guerrilla bases based on the principles of the Program for Resisting Aggression and Building the Nation, taking into account local conditions and circumstances.  (b) Subordinate the military and administrative authority of each guerrilla base to the command of a main force unit that has distinguished itself through outstanding achievements in the war of resistance in that region.  (c) Provide regular arms supplements and essential economic assistance to guerrilla units from the central government.  (d) Dispatch troops who are determined to persist in guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, possess strong political awareness and discipline, and have the capability to expand guerrilla operations into new areas.  (e) Ensure that all personnel and units sent behind enemy lines prioritize unity in defeating the enemy and faithfully adhere to the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, refraining from sowing internal discord that would only benefit the enemy.  (f) Enable these units to implement democratic governance and establish genuinely self-governing resistance authorities elected by the local population and approved by higher-level authorities; concurrently, pursue policies to improve living standards, rallying broad sections of the populace to dismantle puppet authorities and disband puppet armies, so that our human and material resources may be used for our own purposes rather than for those of the enemy.  2. Train a new national defense force—to uphold the policy of total resistance and, in particular, to prepare for a successful counteroffensive capable of driving the enemy out of our territory when favorable conditions arise, it is essential to cultivate a new core of national defense troops. To this end, it is necessary to:  (a) Select veteran units with a distinguished combat record from the front lines, regardless of party affiliation or regional origin, as the foundation for the new force.  (b) Standardize the organizational structure of the national defense force.  (c) Subject the officers of the national defense force to modernized military training and robust political education based on the original systems of the units from which they were drawn, while preserving the fine traditions of those units.  (d) Ensure that all equipment, allowances, and supplies for the national defense force are provided on an equal basis, but at a higher level than for ordinary troops.  (e) Conduct training for the national defense force according to a fixed schedule and plan, led by senior officers of proven competence and experience, carried out in designated zones and in group sessions.  (f) Establish a national defense industry and accelerate foreign procurement, aiming to equip X national defense divisions with modern weaponry within two years.  C. On the economic front:  To disrupt the enemy’s construction and development efforts and to promote our own production and conservation. To this end, it is necessary to:  1. Undermine the enemy’s economic infrastructure and material development in the occupied territories; launch a nationwide campaign to boycott enemy goods; prohibit the production and sale of items that could directly aid the enemy—for example, certain specialized military supplies—and require anyone using such goods to obtain them exclusively through state-controlled channels.  2. Provide state funding and incentives for private investment to expand cooperative movements between industry and agriculture, broadly develop various practical industries, and strive to increase agricultural output.  3. Encourage austerity campaigns within military and civilian institutions.  D. On the fiscal front:  Radically reform existing practices and fully implement wartime fiscal policies. To this end, it is necessary to:  1. Ensure proper coordination between the issuance of legal tender and the circulation of capital, so as to prevent disparities in currency values between coastal and inland regions.  2. Exercise strict and thorough control over foreign exchange transactions; establish a foreign exchange committee under the auspices of the National Political Consultative Conference to periodically review the Ministry of Finance’s approvals and usage of foreign exchange, thereby preventing all forms of manipulation and illicit profiteering.  3. Rigorously inspect and prohibit private manipulation of the financial markets and tampering with the legal tender, especially by officials seeking personal gain through speculative practices; offenders shall be severely punished.  4. Allow provinces in war zones, particularly those that have fallen under enemy occupation, to issue limited quantities of local paper money and vouchers.  5. Launch a nationwide campaign to solicit funds from overseas Chinese communities and domestic banking circles, providing firm guarantees of fund availability and facilitating domestic investment.  6. Tailor tax policies to local conditions, applying progressive rates of business tax, income tax, and inheritance tax where appropriate, gradually revising land taxes to eliminate excessive burdens and exemptions.  7. Strictly enforce the confiscation of collaborators’ property; for landlords who have fled to enemy-held territory, the state shall collect tribute on their behalf, though at a reduced rate compared to what would normally be due, treating such payments as direct revenue.  8. Revise the national budget from the central to the local level: increase allocations related to the war effort as needed, while minimizing expenditures unrelated to the conflict and eliminating any unnecessary items.  9. Reduce the emoluments of all government officials, especially high-ranking ones, setting them at a lower level than those of their military counterparts; abolish special allowances and concurrent salaries, and terminate all commissions or kickbacks derived from public borrowing or procurement.  E. On the diplomatic front:  Strive to isolate Japan as much as possible and to strengthen external support. To this end, it is necessary to:  1. Closely collaborate with all peoples and governments that sympathize with and assist China in its war of resistance, seeking to increase both material and moral support for our cause.  2. Firmly oppose any attempts by foreign governments to sacrifice China in order to reach a compromise with Japan, and uphold a policy of diplomatic independence and self-reliance.  3. Assist the National Political Consultative Conference, various parties, and different mass organizations in dispatching delegations to countries around the world to engage in extensive public diplomacy, thereby enhancing the support of democratic and peace-loving forces for our nation.  F. On the front of inter-party cooperation:  Strengthen the sincere unity among all resistance-oriented parties, especially the friendly and cooperative relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, which constitutes a fundamental guarantee for implementing the aforementioned measures, overcoming the dangers posed by the current situation, and ultimately defeating the Japanese aggressors and Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime. To this end, it is necessary to:  1. Legally enshrine the rights of all anti-Japanese parties and thoroughly abolish all so-called measures ostensibly designed to contain other parties.  2. Strictly prohibit discrimination and oppression directed against the Communist Party and other resistance-oriented parties, and strictly forbid any interference with the professional and personal rights of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants—on the grounds of alleged party affiliation or ideological differences—so as to foster a nationwide phenomenon of sincere and unified cooperation.  3. Widely incorporate talent from all parties and factions into the various undertakings of the resistance movement, refusing to exclude qualified individuals simply because of their partisan affiliations.  At a time when the enemy’s threat is grave and imminent, and when global affairs are undergoing rapid and dramatic change, the Chinese people’s demand and aspiration is to persevere in total resistance, to consolidate domestic unity, and to advance the nation as a whole, so as to effectively strengthen our capacity for resistance and to prepare for a counteroffensive against the enemy. As representatives of the people and as messengers of the people, we members of the National Political Consultative Conference hereby issue this joint statement prior to our fourth session, hoping that our fellow citizens and our colleagues in the Conference will offer guidance, encouragement, oversight, and constructive criticism, and that together we may continue to strive, both inside and outside the Conference, alongside our compatriots across the nation.  Mao Zedong Chen Shaoyu Qin Bangxian Lin Zuhuan Wu Yuzhang Dong Biwu Deng Yingchao September 8