REPORT
(June 10, 1939)

The Characteristics of the Present Situation

The characteristics of the present situation are as follows: the possibility of surrender by the Guomindang has become the greatest danger, and the Guomindang's
anti-Communist activities are steps in the preparation of that surrender. The possibility of the Guomindang's surrender existed from the very beginning of the War
of Resistance; it is not something that came up suddenly today. Its becoming the
greatest danger in the overall picture at present is, however, a phenomenon of the
current political situation. The Guomindang's anticommunism has also existed
since the establishment of the United Front and is not something that suddenly
happened today, but turning anticommunism into a direct step in preparing to surrender is a reality of the present.
The current situation results from the following three factors: (1) the Japanese
policy of inducing capitulation; (2) international pressure; and (3) the vacillation
of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie. I will now discuss them one after the
other below.

I. The Historical Development of Japan's Policy of Inducing Capitulation
1. Japan's basic policy toward China is to destroy China and establish a so called "New Order in East Asia." This is firm and unchanging, and is also unalterable in the eyes of the Japanese aggressors. The January 2, 1939, editorial of Tokyo's
National News (the official organ of the military) stated: "The problem immediately at hand does not allow for the slightest retreat, nor for a moment's hesitation.

The incident has reached its concluding phase. Any misstep in ruling the state
would not only result in losing the fruits of the war, but would also affect the
country's destiny. History teaches us that the latter phase of a war is many times
more difficult than the initial phase. The unfortunate examples of Germany and
Russia during the Great War in Europe must be thoroughly understood by politicians and citizens alike." (Shijie zhishi, Vol. 9, no. 1, February 1.)
To sum up in a single sentence, this means that the basic principle of aggression
must be thoroughly carried out; otherwise, dangers such as the German and Russian revolutions will arise. From this it is plain to see that to believe that Japan
could make fundamental concessions and that the status quo before the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident could be restored without a protracted war, by the application of pressure from Britain and the United States (as Chiang Kaishek and many
people in the Guomindang believe), is nothing but a fantasy.
2. Japan's basic policy (general line) of "destroying China and establishing a
New Order in East Asia" is firm and will not waver voluntarily. The methods (or
tactics) for carrying out this basic policy, however, are a combination of soft and
hard measures that have a certain flexibility, and certain temporary, partial, and
superficial concessions may even be made in order to realize the fundamental goal.
In general, political enticement to surrender was the primary method before the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident; military attack was the main method from Marco
Polo Bridge to [the fall of] Wuhan; and political enticement to surrender has been
primary once again from Wuhan to the present.
3. To understand that the enemy's basic policy is firm and unchanging and that
their tactics for applying it alternate between soft and hard methods, one need only
look at the following materials:
a. Before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a hard policy was adopted, the Three
Northeastern Provinces were actually occupied,¹ and the method of diplomatic enticement to surrender was applied to China as a whole.
i. Tanaka's memorial to the throne before the Manchurian incident (the letter of July 25, 1927, the second year of Showa, from Prime Minister and
of the Japanese Third Fleet, Tanikawa Ryō,¹³ said on the 27th, "The
Japanese empire will never be satisfied with its success up until now,
as it is still far from the outcome of the overall plan. Imperial soldiers
act according to the general intent of the empire, serve the eternal peace
of the Orient, and hope to reach the goal of thorough progress." This
indicates that their intention is to continue military attacks.
v. Hirota's New Year's Eve (1937) speech: "If friendly ally China can
understand the important point that Japan is striving for peace in East
Asia, it can avoid today's misery and pain. The Japanese government
deeply hopes to begin a new peace in 1938 and resolve all problems."
This shows that soft methods could be used if there were surrender.
vi. The famous declaration of January 16. On December 11 (two days
before the occupation of Nanjing) the Cabinet made the decision, the
Imperial Court Conference adopted it on the 12th, Nanjing was occupied on the 13th, China's Chairman Chiang issued an open letter to the
people of the whole country on the 17th, and on January 16 the [Japanese] government put out this declaration. The essential idea is as follows: In the future, the National Government will not be regarded as
an opponent, and a new government is expected to be set up. Chinese
territorial and political sovereignty and the rights and interests of the
various other powers in China shall be respected. This shows a policy
that is hard, and methods that are hard as well.

ix. During the 73rd session of the Diet in late January:
Diet: "The act of declaring war is still under consideration. The decision depends upon China's attitude in the future." So the door to peace
remained open.
This reflected the struggle within the Japanese government between
Kaishek régime is about to collapse, but it is imperative to continue to
intensify the war so as to accelerate the downfall of Chiang's régime
and cause third countries to give up their attempts to assist Chiang.
Means other than war may be more effective and cost less if they
cause Chiang to negotiate for peace." Here is one person advocating
both war and peace in the course of a single speech.
xi. Konoe's May 2nd speech on preparation for protracted war: "In order
to overthrow Chiang's régime and eradicate the source of disaster in
East Asia, we should not hesitate to devote even several years' time.
At the same time, the whole country's citizens should do their utmost
to assist the two pro-Japanese and anti-Communist régimes of North
China and Central China."
xii. Hirota's May 9th speech at the conference of local senior officials,
advocating the prudent handling of the [China] Incident: "The China
Incident has entered a second stage, in which Chiang Kaishek's régime
is propagating the idea of a protracted War of Resistance and going in
for domestic unity, but has not been able to reach the goal of unity.
On the other hand, the provision of military supplies by various countries and aid to China from the Soviet Union are actual facts. Therefore, the imperial government must take these facts into consideration
1938.)
xvi. The hard-line doctrine of Itagaki. 33 Itagaki issued a statement on July
1: "As long as Chiang's régime remains in existence, there is absolutely no possibility of peace between China and Japan. Today, Japan
can no longer join hands with Chiang Kaishek in peace negotiations."
On the first anniversary of the Incident, on July 7, Itagaki issued this
statement: "From now on, no matter how many years the war is prolonged, there is only one road for the empire to take (note: this refers to the military conquest of China). Aside from this there is no way to
achieve a hundred years of peace in the Orient."
xvii. Establishment of a China Affairs Board to oversee the exercise of authority in China---a president, a vice-president, and five ministers. Not
only the occupied areas, but the unoccupied areas as well would come
within its jurisdiction.
xviii. The driving out of Ugaki by the Japanese Army Ministry on September 29th. Ugaki resigned in anger over differences with the Army
Ministry regarding policy toward China. 34
c. From [the fall of] Wuhan to the present a change in tactics from hard to
soft.
i. Having occupied Guangzhou on October 12th and Wuhan on October 25th,
and having seen Chiang Kaishek's open letter to the people, issued on the
30th, advocating a protracted War of Resistance, the Japanese government
chose November 3, Meiji Commemoration Day, or what is called Emperor's
Day, on which to issue an important declaration, clearly indicating a change
in tactics. Its main points are as follows: (1) "The National Government
has become a local government, and if it continues to resist Japan, then
military actions will definitely not cease until this government is destroyed";
(2) "Japan's objective is to build a new order of perpetual security in East
Asia. This means Japan, China, and Manchukuo joining together and establishing relations of mutual assistance and interdependence in political,
economic, cultural, and other spheres"; (3) "As for the National Government, if it is able to abandon its previous mistaken policies, and if it can be
regenerated by other personnel and built up and maintained, then the Empire will not reject it." The policy has changed, with the declaration that
the policy of not regarding the National Government as an interlocutor
and insisting on establishing a puppet government is to be abandoned, and
according to the declaration the National Government may be accepted as
an interlocutor, but only on condition that Chiang leave office.
ii. The Konoe statement of December 22, which was supported by Wang
Jingwei in a circular telegram and bitterly repudiated by Chiang Kaishek
in a speech. Its main points are as follows: (1) "The three countries of
China, Japan, and Manchukuo should regard the establishment of a new
order in East Asia as the common goal, unite and have close and friendly
relations, engage in a common defense against Communism, and offer
one another economic support"; (2) "Therefore, China must establish full
state-to-state relations with 'Manchukuo"; (3) "Conclude a Sino-Japanese agreement for defense against Communism, station anti-Communist
troops in specified areas, and make Inner Mongolia a special region for defense against Communism"; (4) "Sino-Japanese economic mutual assistance: subjects of the empire have the freedom to reside and do business in China, and Japan is to be granted facilities to develop and make
use of natural resources in North China and Inner Mongolia"; (5) "Japan
is willing to consider returning the concessions and relinquishing extraterritorial rights." This is a reiteration of the basic policies of the November 3 declaration, with added concrete content. The National Government
and Chiang Kaishek (Chiang's existence is permitted beginning at this
point) are both allowed to exist provided they submit to Japan. Japan may
withdraw from Central and South China, but North China is to be kept,
though nominal sovereignty may not be required.
iii. The Hiranuma Cabinet35 has maintained these policy guidelines unaltered
up until the present.
iv. Japan's instigating a broad "peace movement" in China, establishing a
so-called "Association for Peace and the Cessation of War," holding public meetings and distributing handbills everywhere. For a long time no
mention has been made of establishing a unified central government. It
has been touched on occasionally, but only to frighten Chiang. Unless
Chiang fights a War of Resistance to the end, they may yet change their
minds about him.
v. The huge plot to drive a wedge in the cooperation between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party and make use of the Three People's Principles.
The Japanese Matsumoto Shin'ichi wrote an article entitled "On the Question of Winning Over the Masses of the Chinese Nation," in which he says:
"The purpose of the empire's use of force is, first, to defeat thoroughly
the anti-Japanese régime and armed forces and, second, to bring about
mutual assistance and harmony between the two nations of China and
Japan, and the establishment of peace in the Orient. The former is the
means to achieve the latter. But these two things prove that the reality in
China is in fact one of mutually opposing contradictions. If we consider
the developments since the Incident, although the guiding principles of
the anti-Japanese régime were erroneous, Chiang's régime in fact has the
character of a national régime and enjoys the support of a majority of the
Chinese nation. This is why the present régime has been able to win the
enthusiastic support of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Youth
Party, the various anti-Japanese fronts, and the old soldiers. At present,
we wish, on the one hand, to destroy Chiang's régime and, on the other
hand, to cooperate with the Chinese nation. In fact, this amounts to the
fruitless exercise of climbing a tree to catch a fish. The more we seek to

```text
overthrow Chiang, the more the Chinese nation will support him. If we try
to overthrow Chiang, we will lose our hold on the popular masses, and if
we wish to hold onto the popular masses, we cannot overthrow Chiang.
Thus our country's basic difficulty lies here.
"Both the Provisional Government and the Reform Government are
still without a base among the popular masses. Those with a popular mass
base are the northern and southern governments, which would not be difficult to merge. But the program of the new government should be under
the banner of the Guomindang's Three People's Principles, and the task
of the new government should be the realization of Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood. In other words, the enemy's banner is similar
to ours, and it is hard to avoid getting them muddled and confused. But we
can tell them to use 'Fight the War of Resistance while realizing the Three
People's Principles' as a rallying call, while we respond with the call to
'Cooperate with Japan as we establish the Three People's Principles.'"
"Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists constitutes the backbone of the anti-Japanese united front, so it is truly necessary to smash it."
"The objective of the battle at Wuhan was to shatter the cooperation
between the Guomindang and the Communists, so the occupation of Wuhan
is like a wedge driven between the Guomindang and the Communists, and
both military and political tactics are aimed at dispersing the forces of the
Guomindang and the Communists."
(For the above text see Dagongbao, January 23 of this year.)
vi. The Shanghai Daobao pointed out as early as February 17 the danger of a
Far Eastern Munich: "On the one hand, it seeks truth from facts and tries
to strengthen local governments and organize so-called Jiang-Han type
governments. 36 On the other hand, it is carrying out an even larger conspiracy of an international nature. The main design of this conspiracy is to
compel and entice the two countries of Britain and France to use the form
of international conferences (open or secret) to force China and Japan into
compromise with each other, even though Japan has declared in the past
that it does not want the involvement of third countries in resolving the
conflicts between China and Japan." It also said, "It is wrong to believe
that Wang Jingwei is finished and everything will be fine. He may play a
very evil role in the future."
The twenty-nine items I have listed above illustrate the historical development of Japan's policy of luring China into capitulation, and fully
illustrate the following three points:

First, Japan's overall policy of destroying China is extremely firm and
will certainly never change. It is resolved to turn China into its colony and
establish a so-called "New Order in East Asia."
Second, however, its methods for carrying out this policy are a combination of soft and hard, with a shift in emphasis according to the times.
Before Wuhan, force was primary, but there was peacemaking in the midst
of war. After Wuhan, peacemaking has been primary, but there is still
some fighting to press for surrender.
Third, it is still trying to manipulate Britain, the United States, and
France into calling a peace conference in the Far East, so that the danger
of a Far Eastern Munich hangs over the heads of the Chinese people.
4. In the above three sections, the first points out that [Japan's] basic orientation is firm and unchanging. The second shows that it uses both soft and hard
methods. The third indicates, by citing twenty-nine pieces of evidence, the historical development of its switch from the use of hard methods of application to soft
ones and demonstrates that the greatest danger at present is surrender. Now this
fourth section explains the reasons for its peace offer from the financial, economic,
and military standpoints. Japan finds itself in tremendous difficulties in terms of
finance (altogether 12 billion yen in three years; 2.55 billion the first year, 4.85
billion the second year, 4.65 billion the third year), the economy (huge increases
in imports and a drastic decline in exports, military industries overshadowing peace
industries, high inflation, deterioration in people's standard of living, exhaustion
of cash reserves, and unstable foreign currency reserves), and the military situation (insufficient forces and dispersion of forces). It still has to prepare to cope
with an international war, so it tries hard to induce China to surrender, divide the
anti-Japanese front, make use of Wang Jingwei to persuade and entice Chiang
Kaishek, and is preparing to make use of the Three People's Principles and the
Guomindang. This conspiracy is extremely vicious. The enemy's war is nothing
to fear, but its peace offer is very dangerous. The Dagongbao has called it a "peace
of the hanged-man's ghost," in that it would bring China to its death.
5. To demonstrate its sincerity for peace to the Guomindang, Britain, and the
United States, Japan has been using major force to carry out a "mopping-up" operation against the Eighth Route Army (fifteen divisions and regiments in North
China) and now is further plotting to attack northern Shaanxi as a step to induce
the Guomindang to surrender to Japan and oppose the Communists.
The above is Japan's policy of inducing surrender.
II. Pressures from Britain, the United States, and France
The second factor making China's surrender the greatest danger at present is the
pressure exerted on the Chinese government by the British, American, and French
capitulationists.
The laissez-faire policy of nonaggressor countries such as Britain, the United
States, and France toward the war of aggression perpetrated by aggressor countries
``` is, as pointed out by Stalin, due neither to their lack of strength nor simply to their
fear of revolution but, rather, stems from their conspiratorial scheme of "sitting
atop a mountain to watch the tigers fight."
In the beginning they encouraged Japan to go to war, saying that "China can be
defeated within three months." Subsequently they gave up Shanghai, causing the
fighting to take place deeper in the interior. They were willing to let Hong Kong
be encircled, allowing Japan to occupy Guangzhou and Hainan Island. They provided Japan with great quantities of military supplies, enabling Japan to carry out
a war of attrition.
On the other hand, they also proclaimed their support for China and have already provided some assistance by lending small sums of money and donating a
small quantity of military supplies, enabling China to engage in the war of attrition
with Japan. They often talk up the "inevitability of China's victory" to boost China's
morale in the war of attrition.
The central purpose of all this is to wear out the two sides in a war of attrition, so
that they can wait until both sides are exhausted, and then come out with their "healthy
bodies" and order both sides to cease fire and have both sides listen to them.
Their connivance at the aggressive acts of Germany and Italy in the West has
this same purpose.
They hope that Germany and the Soviet Union will fight each other, so that
they can stand on the sidelines and watch the war, and then plunder them when
they are exhausted.
This is why they have never agreed to the general security plan proposed by the
Soviet Union.
This is why they have not been willing to guarantee the security of the three
Baltic states (making an opening to facilitate a German attack on the Soviet Union).
Herein lies the reason for the one-sided character of the war (the war of aggression is harmful to the interests of Britain, the United States, and France, yet Britain, the United States, and France have adopted the stance of onlookers).
When the snipe and the clam grapple with each other, the fisherman profits this is the present policy of the British, American, and French imperialists.
There are deep contradictions between these nonaggressor countries and the
aggressor countries, but unless things reach a certain point they will not abandon
their "fisherman's" policy.
Molotov's statement "Britain and France have made some progress, but this
so-called progress is superficial and without substance" and Stalin's statement
"Don't be used by others" mean that Britain and France have not given up their
fisherman's policy and that one should not be taken in by them.
The possibility exists that Britain, France, and the Soviet Union may reach an
agreement, but it is still difficult to be optimistic about it at present, and even after
such an agreement were reached it could still be broken. The danger of a new
Munich has by no means gone away.
The Sixth Plenum pointed out that the British, American, and French governments are not reliable, and that only their peoples can be relied upon. The antiwar
and antifascist forces among the British, American, and French peoples are gradually on the rise, and only such forces are ultimately reliable.
The Soviet Union has proclaimed its continuing support for China, but it absolutely does not approve of China's surrender.
The Far Eastern Munich designed and promoted by Britain, the United States,
and France is now approaching a critical moment. They seem to be thinking this
way: hoping that China continues to fight for another half year, so that both sides
are worn down somewhat, at which point the time will have come for the curtain to
rise on a Far Eastern Munich.
The second factor in the danger of China's surrender lies in this sort of international situation.

III. The Vacillation of the Chinese Landlord and Bourgeois Classes
1. The Inevitability of Betrayal by the Bourgeoisie.
a. The following was pointed out at the conference of soviet area representatives in May 1937:37 "The Chinese bourgeoisie, which may be able to participate in opposing imperialism and feudalism under certain historical
conditions, will, because of its political and economic weakness, waver and
turn traitor given different historical conditions. This law has already been
proved in Chinese history. Therefore, history has already rendered the verdict that the task of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal, bourgeois-democratic revolution in China cannot be carried out under the leadership of the bourgeoisie,
but can achieve its objective only under the leadership of the proletariat."
b. The Central Committee's decision of August 25,38 1937, states: "Because
serious weaknesses, as described above, still exist in the present War of Resistance, many unfavorable circumstances such as setbacks, retreats, internal
splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and so on may arise
in the future course of the War of Resistance. The loss of Beiping and Tianjin
is the gravest lesson since the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces. 39 Therefore, it should be recognized that this War of Resistance is an arduous and
protracted war."
c. The Sixth Plenum pointed out the serious existence of a crisis of compromise
and placed opposition to capitulation and compromise in the first position. It
pointed out that the Guomindang has a bright future, but that at the same time
there are obstacles in its path, and that if they are not overcome there will be
no bright future: "It is very obvious that the statement that all parties and
groups have a bright future under the overall precondition of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front includes the idea of efforts to
overcome conservative tendencies within the various parties. If conservative
tendencies that are detrimental to the War of Resistance and the united front
are allowed to exist and to develop further, the bright future will be put at
great risk. This applies equally to all parties and groups, including the
Guomindang, the Communist Party, and other parties and groups." The
Guomindang is a party whose backbone is made up of the bourgeoisie, and
which is under the guidance and leadership of the bourgeoisie.
2. The Guomindang After the Fifth Plenum
a. The main direction of the Fifth Plenum was still alliance with the Communist
Party and resistance against Japan, but at the same time it already contained
some elements of anticommunism and capitulation to Japan: (i) it decided on
the orientation of relying on international pressure to achieve the peaceful
resolution of the problems between China and Japan; (ii) it decided on the
orientation of guarding against and opposing the Communists (but not by
war) and establishing a "Committee for Preventing Communism."
b. An atmosphere in favor of peace prevailed for a time:
Opposition to a Far Eastern Munich was prohibited. An article entitled
"Will Britain Create Another Munich in the Far East?" was cut from the
latest issue of Wenzhai, published in Chongqing.
Many publications have carried articles advocating reliance on sanctions
against Japan imposed by Britain and the United States, their intention being
to hold an international mediation conference to solve the problem.
Many people in government and party organizations advocate peace, and
there are such people in the military as well.
The "possibility of capitulation by the Guomindang" has always existed,
but it has now become the greatest danger. If it is not overcome, China's War
of Resistance will suffer great setbacks.
c. The Guomindang is already in the process of making essential preparations
for its surrender; that is to say, it is engaging in anticommunism. Anticommunism is the most important component of the preparations for surrender.
Over the past six months, anticommunist activities have been especially
intense in North China, Central China, the south, and the northwest. In North
China: the Eighth Route Army has recovered lost territory from the hands of
the Japanese, and the Guomindang has "recovered lost territory" from the
hands of the Communist Party. In the Northwest: The Communist Party has
not overstepped the boundaries of the border areas even by an inch, whereas
the Guomindang has launched armed invasions against many border areas
(Zhenning, Ningxian, Xunyi, Jingbian, and Wayaobao). The reason is that
the Communist Party is the biggest obstacle to capitulation, and capitulation
cannot be realized without anticommunism.
Everything is a pretext; preparing for surrender is the reality.
Countless false documents have been fabricated.
The three factors or three causes described above have caused the current situation to become a grave struggle between the capitulationists and the partisans of
the War of Resistance, in which capitulation could become the greatest threat at
present, and anticommunism is an inevitable step in preparing for surrender.
Of the three reasons, the vacillation of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie is
the primary one. If one does not waver oneself, the enemy's policy of inducement
to surrender will be ineffectual, and international persuasion and pressure to surrender will be of no use.
This situation is different from that at the time of the Sixth Plenum. Then the
resistance war was still at its peak. Chiang's declaration of October 30 and his
December 26 refutation of Konoe's statement are evidence of this. Now is a time
when the enemy relies upon inducing capitulation as the primary method, and it
has already produced some results. It is a time when Britain and the United States
are stepping up their incitement to surrender, and it is after the Guomindang's
Fifth Plenum decided to rely on Britain and the United States and to carry out
anticommunist policies. Therefore, even though at that time opposition to capitulation was primary, the reality of the situation was not as grave as it is now.
Over the past eight months the situation has evolved to the most critical stage of
anticommunism and capitulation. Therefore, a new and concrete task has been
added, which is to fight capitulation with all our might.
Various pretexts for preparing to capitulate:
The first pretext-the Communist Party is making trouble. This is false. Fabricated documents. Attacks on the border areas. Failure to pay the Eighth Route
Army. The whole country carries out a good united front policy and supports
Chiang and the government. There is no agrarian revolution in the whole country.
The heroic fighting of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.
The second pretext-plots by the Soviet Union. This is false. [The Soviet Union]
aided the Chinese revolution in 1927. It provided the greatest help to China in its
War of Resistance over the past two years. It has never conspired to invade any
other country. Most countries are friendly and allied with it.
The third pretext-financial and economic difficulties. This is false. As long as
the new policies of the Sixth Plenum are adopted, any difficulties can be overcome. The experience of the Red Army in the past, or the Eighth Route Army at
present, in surmounting difficulties is clear proof.
The fourth pretext that the people are weary of war. This is false. Japan is
now making such propaganda, and to make such statements amounts to echoing
Japanese propaganda. The people are dissatisfied with the conscription law, and
they hate the erroneous methods used, not the War of Resistance itself. In addition, extreme suppression of the people's movement.
The fifth pretext that the military is weary of war. This is false. It slanders the
anti-Japanese armies. Most of the officers and soldiers are fighting for national
liberation. Most of the officers and soldiers are fed up with the civil war.
The sixth pretext there is no international assistance. This is false. A resistance war depends mainly on ourselves and not on others. The powerful assistance of the Soviet Union and the sympathy of the people of all countries. The governments of Britain, the United States, and France are inherently unreliable.
The seventh pretext-the enemy is too strong. This is false. The enemy is already greatly exhausted, will have expended in three years 12 billion yen, and its
troops are insufficient and spread thin. Our terrain is better and our morale is
higher.
There are many other pretexts.

The Future of the War of Resistance (a rough estimate, not to be
viewed rigidly)

The War of Resistance must, however, absolutely be pursued. The Anti-Japanese
National United Front and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be consolidated and developed, and the banner of the Three
People's Principles and the slogan of a republic based on the Three People's Principles must certainly be maintained. This is the Party's basic mission.
The possibility of a Guomindang surrender and the possibility of a continuation of the War of Resistance are two different possibilities. There are
capitulationists, and there are resistance fighters, which are two phenomena.
"Many setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial
compromises may occur"-this is one aspect. "But we believe that the War of
Resistance that has already been launched, because of the efforts of our Party and
the people of the whole country, will definitely break through all obstacles and
continue to advance and develop." "As long as the masses in their millions can
truly be organized to enter the Anti-Japanese National United Front, victory in the
War of Resistance Against Japan is not in doubt"-this is yet another aspect. (All
citations from the "August decision.")
There are two possible futures for the War of Resistance: the first is that the
majority resists and the minority surrenders; the second is that the majority surrenders and the minority resists.
As regards the protracted and tortuous nature of the Chinese revolution, in the
first case the outcome will be prolonged and tortuous; in the second case, the
outcome will be even more prolonged and tortuous.
We have never imagined that the War of Resistance should be won quickly or
that it should be a linear progression (in the form of a straight line) but have,
instead, always put forward the idea that it would be prolonged and subject to
many twists and turns (a zigzag line). Nor have we ever suggested that capitulation could be overcome and victory won without mobilizing the people of the
whole country and carrying out democratization of the state. Overcoming capitulation and winning victory must be accomplished by the majority of the people
and by all patriotic and progressive elements from all parties and groups.
It is impossible to imagine that everyone in the entire Guomindang would surrender, without a solitary exception.

In the failure of the Great Revolution of 1927, the entire Guomindang surrendered to imperialism and launched an anticommunist war. But at that time the situation was that: (a) no imperialist [power] had fought its way into China; (b) all the
imperialists aided Chiang Kaishek in fighting communism, and all countries were
in a stable situation for the time being; (c) the Guomindang had not suffered the
bitterness of anticommunist war and was able to mobilize troops; (d) the people of
the whole country had not had a taste of anticommunist wars or learned any painful
lessons, nor had they any experience of being deceived; (e) the Communist Party
did not have the experience of the period of the failure of the united front, nor did it
have any armed forces (all had been defeated), and most of all it lacked experience
in fighting a war; (f) the world was not in a period of revolution and war but, rather,
in a period of reaction; and (g) the Soviet Union was not as strong as it is today.
But there were still people such as Song [Qingling], He [Xiangning], and Deng
Yanda40 who persisted in the revolution and did not turn traitor.
After "September 18" there were Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, Zhao Bosheng,
Dong Zhentang, and Ji Zhentong, as well as Ji Hongchang and Ren Yinqi, Zhang
Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, and Chen Jitang and Sun Ke.41
Moreover, there is today a history of two years of the War of Resistance.
Even if there were a Miaga or a Hacha, China is not, after all, Spain or Czechoslovakia.42
1. If there are capitulationists (and this is inevitable; there is already a Wang
Jingwei, and a Zhang Jingwei and a Li Jingwei are sure to emerge), there will also
be those opposed to surrender.
2. If there are those who are resolved to surrender and never turn back, there
may also be those who surrender for a time and prepare to fight again.
3. If there are those who capitulate first and join the fight later (some people have
to be traitors to their country once before they can become good), there will also be
those who capitulate first, then join the fight, and then surrender once again.
4. The people and officers may be deceived at the beginning, but wake up and
resist later. For example, falsehoods such as "the Communist Party causes trouble,"

"the Eighth Route Army has turned traitor," "the international situation is bad,"
"finances are extremely difficult," "the Soviet Union wants to turn China Red,"
"temporary submission enables us to plan resistance," and so on are certain to
appear.
5. The enemy will definitely not permit the existence of a nationwide, unified
capitulation clique that is not subject to outside interference and will surely adopt
a policy of causing splits and division. At that time many puppet régimes may exist
simultaneously to facilitate their rule. Various armed capitulationists may engage
in internecine wars among themselves-China is a country most likely to have
civil wars (with large territory and a dispersed economy) and most experienced in
civil war.
6. The enemy may first make a concession and then intervene. When he
concedes-there may be surrender; when he intervenes-there may be internal
division.
7. Franco did not, after all, take in Miaga, nor did Hitler shelter Hacha. In the
end, Japan will only collect people such as Wang Jingwei.
8. The experiences of the people and the military in Manchuria have become
known to everyone. It is certain that the Chinese armies cannot be eliminated; it is
also certain that captured guns will be used to fight.
In general, the situation at that time will surely be one of confusion and not one
of unification. At that time, the Communist Party will become the savior of the
people of the whole country and the people of the whole country will yearn for the
Communist Party as they do for the beginning of a new year. At that time, the
Chinese people's confidence in the Soviet Union will surely be increased. At that
time, the international situation will be one of war and revolution. At that time,
Japan will possibly clash with Britain, the United States, and France. If such a
situation occurs, it will be precisely a reflection of the protracted and tortuous
reality of the Chinese revolution.
It is inconceivable that such an undemocratic government as the present one
could resist to the very end. It is unthinkable that such a government could win
final victory. We have never had any such hope or made any such statement.
The only government able to lead the resistance against Japan to victory is a
government that is willing to mobilize the people of the whole country, including
the Communist Party.
In transforming anything old, there is a process of defection and overcoming it.
At that time, an anti-Japanese national united front government (which includes
the Communist Party) may emerge.
At that time, China may have three different types of government-Japanese
puppet government, semipuppet government, and anti-Japanese government. The
struggle between these several types of government may produce a situation of
what is called a stalemate. The so-called stalemate may be a stage with a situation
just like this.
It is also because of this sort of situation that to win quick victory is impossible.
It is also because of this sort of situation that the country will not be destroyed.
In future, there are only two possible outcomes to the War of Resistance, as
mentioned above: (1) the majority fights a war of resistance and the minority surrenders; (2) the majority surrenders and the minority fights a war of resistance. If
it is the second possible outcome that occurs, the circumstances may be as described above. But the first outcome is not completely hopeless at this point. Here
are the reasons.
Domestically: (a) many soldiers support the War of Resistance; (b) the resistance faction within the Guomindang; (c) the Communist Party's opposition to
capitulation; (d) the people's opposition to capitulation.
Internationally: (a) the Soviet Union's assistance; (b) the lessons of Spain and
Czechoslovakia; (c) public opinion among the peoples of Europe and America.
In Japan: financial, economic, and military difficulties.
It can be brought about, however, only through consolidation and expansion of
the united front.
If the second outcome occurs, it means the breakup, not only of the government, but also of the Three People's Principles and of the Guomindang:
The Three People's Principles and Guomindang of the Japanese-now being
created through Wang Jingwei. These are a fake Three People's Principles and a
fake Guomindang.
The intermediate Three People's Principles and Guomindang-already in the
bud, now in the process of racing ahead. These are a half-true and half-fake Three
People's Principles and Guomindang.
The Three People's Principles and Guomindang of the Chinese people-now
emerging, in the process of developing. These are the true Three People's Principles and Guomindang.
Whether the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang can avoid the kind
of breakup described above (a breakup [of some sort] is inevitable) depends upon
what kind of efforts are made by the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the
people of the whole country.
Therefore, there are several kinds of possible scenarios for the stalemate phase:
1. A stalemate in which the majority resists and the minority capitulates-which
means overcoming the possibility of capitulation and having the majority resist
and continue fighting. Aside from sabotaging Japan's political schemes, its military attacks are halted as well. This is the first possible scenario for the stalemate,
the ideal one and the one most to be hoped for.
2. A stalemate in which the majority surrenders and the minority resists (the
Communist Party and all those who refuse to surrender will continue the War of
Resistance, despite being a minority)--even though the majority of forces have
capitulated and only a small force is left to resist. But as long as the small forces
and the bases of resistance can be consolidated, a stalemate with the enemy may
still be maintained, the way a small contingent of the Red Army in the base areas
maintained a stalemate with the enemy in the past. The difference is that it was a
civil war in the past, but from now on it is against Japan and the Chinese traitors,
not a civil war.

Given that this is holding a position rather than retreating further, and that this
is the only anti-Japanese army in the whole country, it is also a kind of stalemate
situation.
This is the second type of stalemate situation.
3. A stalemate that starts with the minority forces and ends up with the majority
forces—this is the third type of stalemate.
By persisting in the War of Resistance, persisting in the united front, persisting
in protracted warfare, persisting in cooperation between the Guomindang and the
Communist Party, and persisting in the Three People's Principles, the minority
forces will divide and win over the strongholds of the capitulationists and then
strive to get the majority forces to fight in the War of Resistance. At that time, if a
counteroffensive against the enemy cannot be mounted yet, it is still a stalemate.
We are striving for the first type of stalemate. There is also the second if we
have no alternative, and in the future there may also be the third type.
Dangers do exist, but the overall future is bright.
People who express desperation in perilous situations and those who cannot
see brightness when they are in darkness are simply cowards and opportunists.
As early as the 1937 congress of soviet areas, the inevitability of betrayal by the
bourgeoisie was pointed out.
As early as August 1937 the Central Committee again pointed out that the "War
of Resistance will be arduous and protracted" and that "many setbacks, retreats,
internal divisions, and betrayals may occur."
In November the dangers of national capitulationism, class capitulationism,
and so on were pointed out.
We predicted all of this; its occurrence is no accident.
The future of the War of Resistance can be only good or bad. We are striving
for a good outcome and are prepared at the same time to deal with even the worst
possible situation if it should occur.
The overall future is bright, but a prolonged and tortuous process of struggle is
required. There is no victory to be won in a short period or through a straight path.
We have always opposed theories of quick victory and of the loss of our country,
and we still do so today.
To equate betrayal by landlords and the bourgeoisie with the loss of the country
means failure to see: (a) the existence of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route
Army, and the New Fourth Army; (b) the anti-Japanese sentiments among the
allied anti-Japanese forces; (c) the resistance faction in the Guomindang; (d) those
among the bourgeoisie who are unwilling to capitulate at the moment; (e) the
bourgeoisie who are still subject to oppression in the enemy-occupied areas; (f)
the large numbers of petty bourgeoisie and peasants; and (g) aid from the Soviet
Union. It is absolutely wrong to be blind to these growing forces, to see only the
surrender of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and then conclude that the whole
world is dark, and to panic, waver, and run away.
The Sixth Plenum said that the stalemate phase is bound to be a stage "even
more difficult but, at the same time, more progressive." More difficult because aside from the enemy, capitulation and betrayal have occurred. More progressive
because the Guomindang could make more progress through various forms of
struggle (including war), and because a Guomindang that persists in resisting Japan continues to cooperate with the Communist Party. Some turn traitor and the
majority resist Japan—this is the situation we hope for. We hoped for this in the
past and continue to do so now, and we must strive for it. The majority turns traitor
(or even everyone seems to do so for a time) and some resist Japan—this situation
is not what we hope for, but it is possible. If it occurs, we must turn it around; this
is also possible, and we should strive to realize it.

The Present Tasks

Taking into account the two possible situations, favorable and unfavorable, described above, and particularly the possible unfavorable situation, what are the
Party's tasks?
First, the whole Party should strive to prepare itself ideologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so as to be able to cope
with any incident at any time—all sorts of unexpected attacks and all sorts of big
and small incidents.
Second, the whole Party should strive to ally itself very closely with all patriotic progressive elements, all patriotic progressive members of the Guomindang
(at the upper levels, the middle levels, and the masses in the lower levels), and also
to mobilize the masses together with them (in areas ruled by the Guomindang we
must work together with them, not by ourselves alone). We must also wage
anticapitulation struggles and openly expose the true nature of anticommunism as
preparation for surrender, so that the capitulationist faction and the anticommunist
elements may be isolated, and resistance against Japan may be continued.
Here it is necessary to strengthen the work on, and the personnel of, the united
front.
Third, no matter what the circumstances, the Party's basic task is to consolidate
and enlarge the Anti-Japanese National United Front and persevere in cooperation
between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and in the Three People's
Principles. This orientation must be adhered to, without allowing the slightest
wavering.
These are the Party's general tasks.
Based on the tasks described above, the Party should pay attention to understanding, explaining, and carrying out the necessary work on the following questions:
1. The question of whether or not the orientation of the Sixth Plenum is consistent with the current orientation.
The orientation of the Sixth Plenum is correct, and the Sixth Plenum has had a
great impact throughout the country. Our orientation of actively uniting the whole
country to strive for victory in the War of Resistance has penetrated the hearts of
the people even more deeply thanks to the dissemination of the documents of the
Sixth Plenum. Our united front work and the Party's organizational work have developed further throughout the country because of the directives of the Sixth
Plenum.
At present the danger of capitulation and anticommunist conspiracies has become the primary danger. Therefore, it is necessary to point out this new situation
(in the past, it had not yet become a reality, so it could only be pointed out in
general terms; now it has already become a real possibility, and hence it needs to
be pointed out specifically). Only thus can we overcome the danger of capitulation
and also prepare to carry out the necessary policies for dealing with capitulation in
timely fashion, when from being a possibility it becomes a reality. The basic orientation, however, remains that of the Sixth Plenum, and, provided only that we
give proper guidance, the actual content of the War of Resistance may be developed to a higher stage.
2. The question of why we should now prepare ourselves ideologically and
organizationally, and prepare public opinion and the masses as well.
Here one must understand the experience of the failure of the Great Revolution
in 1927.
At that time there was no mental preparation, and this was the main reason for
failure. Now preparations must be made.
At that time, there could not be another national front, but we were also too
absolute in some respects. Now it is necessary to persist in a long-term national
front.
At that time, there was a complete failure of the revolution as a whole, and the
Party's line was to first retreat and then attack. Now there is no question of retreat
with respect to the line. At present, it is a question of partial and temporary tactical
conservatism during continued attacks, or of taking cover to prepare for attacks
right away (if capitulation becomes a reality).
At that time, because of the arrival of the reactionary period and the Party's
lack of preparation and experience, the ranks were in confusion and the measures
taken were erroneous (adventurism, for example). Now there should be an orderly
retreat and defense (some temporary and some long-term) or counterattacks in the
areas that have already fallen and in areas occupied by those planning to surrender; in other areas, the offensive orientation is to be maintained.
At that time, large numbers of new Party members left the Party or betrayed it.
Now such things may still happen under certain circumstances, so it is necessary
to prepare beforehand. Historical experience shows that garbage inevitably falls
off at revolutionary turning points (even if it is a temporary, partial turning point),
and this is not a bad thing. But attention must be paid to guiding new Party members properly, especially the large numbers of young students; they will be useful
in the future.
At that time, the domestic and international situation was dark; now it is basically bright.
At that time, the Central Committee was dominated by opportunism, and the
Central Committee after reorganization still lacked experience. Such a situation
no longer exists.
At that time, a large backbone of cadres had not yet been created; now it has
been.
I have made eight points of comparison above. In spite of all this, it is still
necessary to prepare ourselves psychologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so that we can triumphantly surmount difficulties, develop the war against Japan and the Chinese revolution to a higher stage,
and avoid possible defeat.
3. The question of why the national front, cooperation between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party, and the Three People's Principles should be pursued
even if capitulation should become a reality.
The main reasons have already been addressed in explaining the future of the
War of Resistance. Here I shall say only this:
a. The national united front must be preserved throughout the process of resisting Japan. Although many landlords and bourgeois elements leave it through
betrayal and become its enemies, betrayal by the landlords and the bourgeoisie
takes place gradually and not all at once. There must be cooperation with
those who remain. To neglect this point will surely cause big mistakes. Hence,
the united front should still remain, throughout the whole process of fighting
Japan, a united front of various parties and factions, various classes, various
nationalities, various groups, and various armies.
b. It is the same with cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist
Party. Some members of the Guomindang have left and become enemies, but
with those who remain there should still be cooperation. We should use the
authentic Guomindang to oppose the false Guomindang, and win over the
neutral Guomindang. The possibility of a future alliance between the
Guomindang and the Communist Party on an equal footing still exists. Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is the organizational basis of the united front, and neglect of this point will also give rise to
big mistakes.
c. It is the same with the Three People's Principles, which are the political basis
of the united front, and are principles and guidelines applicable to the process
of resistance against Japan. We should use the true Three People's Principles
to counter the false Three People's Principles and win over the neutral Three
People's Principles. This is the policy that should be adopted in conditions
where there are several types of Three People's Principles. There are differences between the Three People's Principles and Communism even in the process of resisting Japan, but in the process of resisting Japan they have one
common point, which is that if the Three People's Principles are understood as
they were interpreted at the Guomindang's First National Congress, the two
do not fundamentally conflict with each other as regards the political program
during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is therefore wrong
for many people, both within and outside the Party, to look down on the Three
People's Principles, considering them a fundamentally reactionary, deceitful, and empty ideology or dogma. This way of thinking stems from a failure to
distinguish between the true Three People's Principles and the false Three
People's Principles.
d. As regards the question of ideological struggle, over the past two years, and
particularly over the past six months, those who write articles on behalf of
the Guomindang, including Trotskyites such as Ye Qing43 and others, have
issued many "divisive and erroneous thoughts" that are not only against Communism but also against the true Three People's Principles. These amount to
the thinking of the fake or intermediate Three People's Principles and should
also be severely denounced and repudiated. Of these, the most blatant are the
arbitrary noises about the so-called theories of "national conditions" and "unification." In fact, they claim that only the Three People's Principles and the
Guomindang are suited to the national conditions of China, but their false
Three People's Principles and false Guomindang are most unsuited to the
national conditions of China, while Communism and the Communist Party
are entirely suited to Chinese conditions. The claim that the border areas and
the Eighth Route Army are not unified, and should be eliminated to complete
their so-called unification, actually corresponds to a false unification that
goes against nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood and runs
completely contrary to the interests of the War of Resistance. It is arbitrary,
empty talk that totally contradicts the differences and struggles in the course
of unification which are a fact of social history. Before the old semifeudal
régime changes into a truly revolutionary democratic régime, the border areas and the Eighth Route Army must exist. Only when the revolutionary democratic régime has been established, and the danger of anticommunism has
disappeared, can the two abandon their present special characteristics. Otherwise this is nothing but a counterrevolutionary demand.
4. The question of supporting Chiang.
The slogan of supporting Chairman Chiang was correct in the past and is correct now. As long as Chiang leads the War of Resistance for a single day we shall
continue to support him (of course the condition is fighting the War of Resistance),
and he should be shown no disrespect.

The possibility exists, however, that under certain circumstances Chiang may
not persist in the War of Resistance. How we react at such a time merits careful
consideration. Of course, there has to be some reaction at such a time, but it must
be an appropriate reaction based on the principle of helping to unite the majority
to fight the War of Resistance and continue the cooperation between the
Guomindang and the Communist Party. "Anti-Chiang" slogans may not be revived lightly or casually.
Chiang harbors enmity toward the Communist Party; this is a fact that he himself has demonstrated. We must strictly guard against sabotage of our Party by
him and his subordinates; of that there is no doubt.
Actively helping Chiang and urging him to move in a positive direction remains our overall policy. To those outside [the Party], we should talk not about
"capitulation by the Guomindang" but, rather, about the "capitulationist faction
among the landlords and the bourgeoisie."
5. The question of opposing Wang [Jingwei].
"It is wrong to think that Wang is already finished; Wang can still play a big
role." This is absolutely correct. There is no doubt that the Chinese traitors in
Wang's network are more harmful to China than other Chinese traitors. Wang has
followers and sympathizers in the government, in Party organizations, and in parts
of the army.
Opposition to capitulation must be linked with opposition to Wang; this is more
convenient and realistic.
6. The question of fighting Japan and eliminating spies.
If a serious instance of betrayal should occur, the Party should pay utmost attention to appropriate countermeasures, in accordance with the principle of not
divorcing itself from the majority of the Guomindang.
At such a time the slogan of resisting Japan and eliminating spies is necessary,
and a war to resist Japan and eliminate spies (simultaneously resisting Japan and
eliminating spies) is also unavoidable. But we must absolutely not detach ourselves from the majority of the Guomindang and lightly undertake rash actions.
The war to eliminate spies can (and must) be launched only when it is understood
and demanded by the majority of people. The current opposition to Wang, for
example, is in line with this principle.
7. The question of democracy and the people's livelihood.
It is impossible to lead the war against Japan to victory without a revolutionary
democratic government. The masses of people throughout the country have long
yearned for a democratic-centralist and clean government that would fight Japan
and give freedom to the people. Hence, in the future, "striving for democracy"
should be linked to the movement for "opposing capitulation and continuing the
War of Resistance."
"Improving the people's livelihood" should also be linked to it in the same
way. Only resisting Japan, however, makes it possible to practice democracy, and
only resisting Japan and democracy make it possible to improve the people's lihood. This is the reality of the present political situation and should be clearly
understood.
8. The question of friction.
The friction and armed struggles, having the character of sabotage and of preparation to capitulate, that have been carried out since the Fifth Plenum of the
Guomindang in Hebei and Shandong, and especially in the border areas, must be
resolutely resisted. Such resistance is useful, but it must be limited strictly to a
position of self-defense and absolutely not allowed to overstep that boundary so as
to provide the provocateurs with a pretext to break up the united front. The objective of such defensive battles against friction is to consolidate the cooperation
between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. For this purpose, accommodation and concession are also necessary under certain circumstances.
Struggle is not to be forgotten in unity, and unity is not to be forgotten in struggle.
Neither of the two may be neglected or abandoned, but unity is primary, and [there
may be] "friction but no splits."
Strictly guard against provocations, and do not be taken in.
9. The question of not developing our Party organizations within friendly armed
forces and withdrawing our Party organizations from within certain armed forces.
Based upon the experience of the past six months, the decision of the Sixth
Plenum not to develop Party organizations among troops that are fighting Japan
and cooperating is basically correct. Development of Communist Party organizations within Chinese armed forces should generally be restricted to Chinese traitor
forces or forces that are preparing to turn traitor, the objective being to sabotage
them. Such development should not be undertaken in other cases. A firm policy of
sabotage should be adopted toward any armed forces that have become Chinese
traitor forces or are directly preparing to become such. Where problems hindering
cooperation have already arisen in certain anti-Japanese forces because of the matter
of Party organizations, their withdrawal should be publicly announced so as to
ensure the continuation of cooperation.
10. The question of assisting friendly parties.
a. Do our best to help all progressive elements, but the extent of assistance
should also depend on the degree of progress.
b. Refuse to help all backward elements and hopeless elements so as to prevent them from turning around to attack us after building up their strength.
There have been many lessons in this regard in the past. In a word, unconditional assistance will not be offered.
c. Make the utmost efforts to intensify work on all patriotic and progressive
elements, urging them to oppose capitulation. Many capable cadres must
be assigned to this work, and they must not slacken for a moment. Work on
intermediate elements should also be intensified.
11. The work of the various departments of the Center after the Sixth Plenum.
Over the past three years, and particularly since the Sixth Plenum, various work
departments of the [Party] Center have been gradually restored and established. In addition to such long-established departments as the Military Affairs Commission,
the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Department for Work
in Enemy-Occupied Areas, and the Youth Commission, newly established organs
are the United Front Department, the Women's Commission, the Labor Commission, the Department of Finance and Economy, the Department for the Education
of Cadres, the General Political Department, the Commission for Party Newspapers, the Commission for North and Central China, the Commission for the Northwest, and the Commission for the South. The organization of the Secretariat has
also been improved, making sixteen organs in all. The restoration and establishment of these central work departments is a great achievement after the severe
losses suffered during the Long March, a great event that gladdens the heart.
12. The question of the organization of the Center.
a. The Politburo will meet once a week in the future.
b. The Secretariat handles day-to-day matters.
c. Notification on major matters is to be carried out in the name of the Center,
and on minor issues in the name of the Secretariat.
d. Distribution of personnel is based on the principle of ensuring the soundness of leadership by the Center, while strengthening local leadership at the
same time.
e. The various departments of the Center are to be streamlined and, at the
same time, strengthened.
13. Education of cadres.
During the past two years, seventeen schools have been established under the
Center's direct guidance: the Anti-Japanese University, the Shaanxi Public School,
the Party School, the Marxist-Leninist Institute, the Lu Xun Academy of Art, the
Youth Training Class, the Women's University, the Workers' School, the Medical
School, the Communications School, the training class of the Organization Department, the training class for administrators, the Border Region Party School,
the Lu Xun Normal School, the Border Region Middle School, the Lu Xun Primary School, and the Kindergarten. The larger ones have more than 10,000 students, and the smaller ones have several hundred or several dozen students. Several
thousand cadres are engaged in educational work, and more than 30,000 students
have either graduated or are still in training. This is a tremendous achievement, a
phenomenon unprecedented in the past eighteen years. The significant results of
the work done by these students are not evident yet, but in a few years they will be.
This orientation should be continued in the future. For material reasons and because of enemy dispositions, [the schools] are to be set up in the border areas and in
North China. Those that go to the north remain under the direction and management
of the Center, but their supervision has been delegated to the Northern Bureau.
14. The study movement.
a. The study movement launched by the Center after the Sixth Plenum for
cadres throughout the Party has been of primary importance in raising the
theoretical and cultural levels of all Party cadres.

b. All cadres currently working in all the various Party, government, military,
popular, and educational organs should work and study at the same time.
c. Depending on the level, culture and theory may be stressed equally, or one
may receive more emphasis.
d. This is a kind of long-term higher education.
e. The system of two hours of study every day.
f. Work, engage in production, and study at the same time.
g. Stress both spontaneity and compulsion, and the unity between theory and
practice.
h. Diligent students are to be rewarded, and lazy ones punished.
i. Leading bodies and personnel in charge of cadre education are to be set up
in all organs, schools, and military units at all levels.
15. The production movement.
Wherever, whenever, and however possible, the agricultural, industrial, and
cooperative movement must be developed among the people, and within organs,
military units, and schools, using the method of self-reliance to solve all or a part
of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and daily necessities, and to overcome
difficulties so as to contribute to the War of Resistance Against Japan.
The production movement in the border areas this year has been carried out in
earnest. We must continue to sum up experiences to reach the goal of resolving
difficulties.
16. The youth movement.
There have been achievements since the Sixth Plenum. It is correct for the Youth
Commission and the Joint Office for Youth to concentrate on leading the youth
movement.
The orientation for the youth movement: hold firmly to the united front among
youth, maintain the attitude of the May Fourth letter to the Three People's Youth
League so as to win over the majority of the youth under the banner of continuing
the War of Resistance and of a democratic republic.
17. The women's movement.
The Center has promulgated guidelines for the women's movement and begun
the work of building a women's commission. Local leading bodies for women's
work are also in the process of being set up gradually. The greatest deficiency
among our cadres has always been that in female cadres. Moreover, the experience
of the women's movement has not yet been summed up. This shortcoming must be
corrected. Without a group of capable and specialized female cadres, it will be
impossible to develop the women's movement.
18. The labor movement.
Guidelines for work in the labor movement have been issued, a labor commission is beginning to be set up, and a workers' school has been opened. Among the
mass movements, the labor movement is relatively weak. There are also too few
workers among Party members. Improvements should be made in these two respects in the future.

19. The work of eliminating spies.
Under the new circumstances, the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage our Party,
army, and border area governments is gradually showing itself to be increasingly
serious and is bound to become more serious in the future. This greatly increases
the importance of our struggle to eliminate spies. For this reason the entire Party
must pay more attention to this aspect and must allocate and train the necessary
numbers of capable cadres to work in this field.
All members of the Guomindang arrested or captured because of espionage or
armed attacks against us are generally handled according to the principle of no
executions and no capitulation (no capitulation means they should not be coerced
into writing a confession or forced to declare the abandonment of their beliefs), so
as to win over the majority of the Guomindang.
20. The question of Party organization.
a. Small in number but highly capable. Now is not the time for widespread
expansion. In general, recruitment should cease, and the principle should
be small in number but highly capable.
b. Tightly [organized].
c. Eliminate saboteurs, protect the Party.
d. Class education, Marxism.
e. Strictly carry out secret directives.
21. Self-reliance.
The Party, the army, everything.
Be ready to cope with the worst conditions.
22. The question of North China.
The situation in North China could become extremely grave, and there is the
possibility that the enemy's main forces will attack North China. Consequently,
the Eighth Route Army and the Party in North China must pay serious attention to
the possibility that this sort of situation may arise and make preparations on all
fronts, including the military, politics, finance, Party organization, the united front,
and so on, based on the principle of meeting the needs of persisting in a guerrilla
war and coping with the greatest difficulties.
The Party in North China is responsible for providing the Center with the necessary funds. The political significance of such funds is enormous.
23. The question of Central China.
The work of the Party, the guerrilla war, and the movement of the popular masses
in Central China must be greatly expanded, and our own bases built in a complex
environment to serve as a pivotal area in the whole country's prolonged War of
Resistance. United front work must be improved, and it should also be linked with
expansion and progress in the work of the New Fourth Army. The basic principle
is to send most of the cadres of the border areas to Central China.
24. Defend the border region.
a. The border region is our fundamental base, the place where the Center is
located, the seat of authority for the whole country; it must be resolutely
defended; b. The enemy's attack against the border region is a step aimed at making
China capitulate;
c. It is possible that the enemy may attack Yan'an;
d. Even if Yan'an should fall, the border region must still be maintained. Everyone should prepare to live the life of guerrilla warfare, a most difficult
but most exciting life;
e. The number one problem is food. Overcome difficulties through self-reliance;
f. Large numbers of students and staff workers are to go to the front;
g. Do a good job of protecting and educating young students, new cadres, and
new Party members;
h. Preserve a leadership group, an education group, and a military affairs group.
Relying on excellent terrain and the excellent masses, a way will certainly
be found.
25. Mobilize large numbers of students and staff workers to go to the front.
a. Strengthen education, strengthen work at the front;
b. Return to the front after graduation, the sooner the better;
c. Because of the enemy situation;
d. Because of expenses;
e. It is decided that 10,000 people are to go.
f. Political and organizational mobilization should be carried out very well;
g. The rear area is suitable for leadership in education and for guerrilla warfare, but there are still quite a few people there;
h. Cadres must be given appropriate assignments;
i. More students must be kept in the rear area depending on circumstances;
j. Names of the schools must be preserved, both at the front and in the rear.
26. The Seventh [Party] Congress.44
a. Complete elections before August 1;
b. Meet in October;
c. Struggle to unite the whole Party and oppose capitulation;
d. Those who can come and those who can participate in the congress.
27. Struggle on two fronts.
a. Against the Right:
Blind to the dangers of capitulation and anticommunism;
Yielding to the pressure of the Guomindang;
Seeing no way out of the current situation (losing sight of the future);
Lacking a class stand;
Fearful of and cowed by hard struggle.
b. Against the Left:

A dark China, a dark world, a dark border region, and a dark self;
Preparing to sabotage the united front, negate the cooperation between the
Guomindang and the Communist Party, abandon the Three People's Principles, isolate oneself, and take blind actions.
c. Veteran cadres should form the backbone and lead the large numbers of
new Party members and new cadres to advance toward a higher stage of the
resistance war, and attack the difficult positions.
28. Unite and overcome everything.
a. There must be further unity:
As long as the Center and the senior cadres are united, the whole Party can
certainly unite.
As long as the Communist Party is united, it will certainly be invincible.
The savior of the people of the whole country is the Communist Party.
b. There must be further centralization:
The individual obeys the organization, the minority obeys the majority, the
lower levels obey the higher levels, and the whole Party obeys the Central
[Committee].
c. The whole country45 is united as one, its command is centralized, and it will
conquer all.

Conclusion

(June 13)

I. The Question of the Current Situation
1. It is absolutely correct to say that the main factor in capitulation is the wavering of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie.
2. Two possible types of capitulation must be overcome—(1) partial surrender,
and (2) surrender of the majority. The first is a possibility at present, in a situation
where the majority is fighting the War of Resistance; the other is a possibility in
the future, in a situation where the majority may have surrendered. But doing the
present work facilitates future work; the two are inextricably linked.
3. According to the definition of the Sixth Plenum, only a balance between
enemy forces and our forces under certain circumstances constitutes a stalemate.
In that case, not only is it impossible to call the present phase one of stalemate but,
if a Li Jingwei appears, that will mean that the enemy has already organized (he is
trying hard to organize) his strategic reserves and is deploying them in combat—
encircling our positions from the rear (beyond a doubt, national counterrevolution
is a strategic ally of imperialism). At such a point, there would be even less of a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, but we would rather have suffered a
major defeat. Such a time would be characterized by the fact that we were being
attacked by Japanese imperialism plus Li Jingwei (China's Franco). Hence it would
be much more serious than the past strategic withdrawal and would by no means
constitute any sort of stalemate.
4. Right now, Japanese imperialism is organizing two strategic allied armies.
One is that of international capitulationists, and the other is of Chinese
capitulationists. The former is used to encircle China from without, and the latter
is used to outflank China from within. The direction of our efforts is to mobilize
the anticapitulationist forces both internationally and within the country, to defeat
these two allied armies of the enemy. So long as they have not been defeated, there
is no stalemate phase.
5. The frontal enemy (the main forces of Japanese imperialism) may yet launch
more military attacks. It is wrong to say that such a possibility does not exist.
Although he faces economic and financial difficulties and problems of manpower
and military capability, there still exists the possibility of enemy offensives in
terms of real strength and timing. Therefore, not only is it necessary, on the one
hand, to defeat the flank attacks of the new enemy; it is also necessary, on the
other hand, to prepare to continue to defeat the frontal attacks of the old enemy.
This is the only way to achieve a balance of strength between the enemy and
ourselves and to bring about a stalemate.
6. This is not to say, however, that a stalemate will emerge only when the real
strength of the frontal and flank enemies has been reduced to such an extent that it
is equivalent to that of our anti-Japanese armies in all respects. It is not a question
of equalizing real strength but, rather, that our real strength plus the enemy's weaknesses plus international constraints equals a stalemate.
7. Therefore, a stalemate may emerge under three conditions:
a. A large geographical area, a large population, and a consolidated position
can create a balance between the enemy and ourselves. For example, the
midpoint of the Russian civil war and the midpoint of the war in Europe.
China, since the beginning of the War of Resistance, has had large territory
and a large population, but not a solid position (political corruption and
troublemaking by the capitulationists), so there is no stalemate yet. If efforts
can be made to overcome the danger of surrender, and in the process of overcoming it politics are reformed and positions consolidated, then a stalemate
will occur. This is the first condition.
b. A balance may also occur in areas that are small (meaning that directly controlled base areas are small, though the country is large) and have fewer
people but have a consolidated position. For example, the Red Army's ten
years of fighting and, to a certain extent, the Northeast Volunteer Army,
during a certain period. If betrayal by the majority became a reality in the
future, the remaining minority could still create a balance, as long as the
"Encirclement and Suppression" were continuously smashed, and in this way
a condition of stalemate would be present. The current situation in North
China can be described as a temporary small-scale stalemate. Prolonging the
situation in North China will turn it into a protracted small-scale stalemate.
c. The transformation of a small-scale stalemate, as described above, into a
large-scale stalemate is achieved through expansion of the united front and
victories in the anti-encirclement-and-suppression struggle. If at the time it
is still impossible to launch strategic counterattacks (and it is still during a
period of counteroffensive campaigns), then it remains a phase of stalemate.
8. If betrayal by the majority is inevitable in the course of the War of Resistance, then there will have to be an entire phase of stalemate according to the
following formula: a temporary large-scale stalemate after Wuhan (the current
situation can be called a stalemate in a certain sense, but it can only be called
temporary because the positions are not solid)-a small-scale stalemate some time
later-another large-scale stalemate some time later still.
The main characteristic of such a change is that from an insecure to a consolidated position. A long-term stalemate demands consolidated positions. With this
condition satisfied, a balance may be maintained even with small numbers, and,
without it, even large numbers may not be able to achieve it. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for large quantities (many people and large areas). But the key element remains strong quality. What is meant by consolidated positions is
consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas and consolidation of the united front.
9. There is a real stalemate situation in North China, but it is still temporary. By
proposing to "persist in the guerrilla war in North China," we aim to transform the
temporary stalemate into a long-term one. If all other places except North China
have become dark (as happened to the New Fourth Army and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region), then even though it is a partial situation in terms of geographical area and the number of people, North China will be the only region
where anti-Japanese forces exist, and this will still signify strategic stalemate. This
is a hard situation, but we should be prepared for it. We will continue to work to
the end, and we can continue to work to the end, even if the major half of the sky
becomes dark and there is only the Communist Party left to resist the Japanese.
Continuing the work in this way for three to five years, arousing the masses, attracting friendly allied forces, and gradually forming a grand new anti-Japanese
front, we will become the core and leading force in the War of Resistance against
Japan and the salvation of the country.
So, no matter how you describe it, our future is bright, but the road is a very
difficult one.
10. At present, it is precisely the time for readjustment of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves (the forces of the enemy and our forces), to see
which side can win over the majority and which side has the best quality, for this
will decide which side wins and which side loses. The issue of who will win and
who will lose is still undecided, and both sides are renewing their efforts to create
favorable conditions.

The front will inevitably be reorganized and it must be reorganized. A portion
of our allied forces (that consisting of the landlords and the bourgeoisie) may
become a force allied with the enemy. But we should never allow all of them to go.
We must seek support from another part of them, and it is entirely possible to do
so. We still have broad allied forces which have not yet been mobilized. If the
Chinese peasants, the Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers, the international
proletariat, and the power of the Soviet Union are mobilized, the enemies are
doomed.

The enemies are counterrevolutionary and we are revolutionary. This difference in nature determines who wins the final victory. But the tactics used in directing the war play an even greater role in deciding which side wins. Without the
latter factor, and relying only on one's superior quality, victory can still not be
obtained.

II. The Question of Transformation
1. We have said that we should prepare ourselves to cope with new possible
situations and a possible Miaga. This should be done in accordance with the general line of the Sixth Plenum. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenum, prepare
to counter a possible Miaga (or a Hacha) and to adopt a policy of temporary retreat
in the area occupied by a Miaga. So far, one cannot imagine a 180 degree change
as compared to the Sixth Plenum. That is to say that if there are changes, they will
not be changes in the line. They will be partial and temporary changes of strategy
and tactics for the purpose of preventing unexpected attacks. This point must first
be made very clear. We must adhere resolutely to the past general line.
2. At present, what we should strive for with the utmost efforts, with the whole
strength of our Party, is to avert the possibility of capitulation; to win over the
majority to resist Japan; and to support, help, supervise, and criticize the
Guomindang and Chiang in order to enable them to overcome the tendency of
capitulation in the struggle against Wang and in their future development. This is
the central task at present.
3. Therefore, it is imperative to stress unity, unified actions, and long-term
cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but not to stress
other matters. These emphases are the only means to overcome the crisis of capitulation and are the only ways to prepare ourselves better to cope with possible turns
of events. All of this is to isolate the capitalists and not oneself.

III. On Several Questions of Tactics
1. The question of consolidating the Party (the policy of organizational streamlining). Since the decision of the meeting held in March last year, the Party has
grown greatly in numbers throughout the country. The present task is to consolidate it. So generally speaking, further recruitment should stop for the time being.
Of course, this does not mean that not even one person should be admitted. There
are some places where the membership should still be expanded. The suspension of recruitment is intended to facilitate consolidation, elimination of spies, and education. There will be further expansion in the future.
2. The Party should protect new Party members and cadres very well. The main
responsibility rests on the shoulders of old Party members and old cadres. The
relationship between new Party members and old Party members, and between
new cadres and old cadres, should be dealt with well. If this is not done well, the
old Party members and old cadres must bear the main responsibility. It is entirely
reasonable to forgive new Party members and cadres, but there is no reason to
treat old Party members and cadres in the same way. There were some erroneous
viewpoints regarding this question in the past. The matter is broadly similar to the
relationship between the main forces and the local and guerrilla forces.
Large numbers of cadres should be promoted from among the new Party members.
3. Intensify inner-Party education. Combine class education with national education. But at present, class education should be emphasized, while not neglecting
education in the united front.

Textbooks of an intermediate level should be compiled, and, on philosophical
questions, the emphasis should be on historical materialism.
4. Local cadres should be promoted. Without local cadres, including middlelevel and senior ones, it is impossible to establish and consolidate the bases.
Oppose the tendency toward "imperial envoys," and oppose the attitude that
despises "country bumpkins." Do away with the appellation "country bumpkins."
5. We must protect revolutionary intellectuals, and not repeat past mistakes.
Without revolutionary intellectuals, the revolution cannot be victorious. The
Guomindang is competing with us for young people, and the army should definitely take in large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. Worker and peasant
cadres should be persuaded to swallow them and not to be afraid of them. Without
the help of revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants cannot improve themselves. Without intellectuals, the work of managing the country, the Party, and the
army cannot be done. The government, the Party bureaus, and the mass movements should also attract revolutionary intellectuals.
6. The question of suspending the expansion of the Party and withdrawing the
Party from friendly allied parties and troops. From the perspective of the overall
situation, suspension and withdrawal are beneficial. Otherwise, the overall situation may be affected by this matter alone and the united front may be disrupted.
The revolution cannot triumph without seeking the support of the Chinese armies,
and, at present, this support can best be obtained in political terms. Setting up
Party organizations there will hinder gaining political support.
Rely on mouths rather than on organizations (under the temporary conditions),
and depend on higher levels rather than on lower levels.

On the one hand, withdraw the Party, and, on the other, strengthen liaison,
accepting a certain independence of united front work.
In general, the policy of sabotage is to be carried out only in the armies, governments, and political parties of real capitulationists. In principle, only the policy of winning political support is adopted in all other cases. Some special departments may not follow the approach of withdrawal.
7. Not killing Guomindang members is of great significance. This does not
mean not killing traitors and spies, and a few defectors, or those who endanger the
revolution at critical moments.
8. It is inappropriate to put excessive emphasis on democracy and people's
livelihood. Now it is essential to stress the opposition to capitulation (emphasize
the War of Resistance). There should not be several priorities at the same time.
They are linkages and not priorities.
In the Guomindang-ruled areas, democracy and people's livelihood are propaganda slogans, and not calls for action.
On troop recruitment, taxation, and production issues, an attitude of support as
well as criticism should be adopted. The attitude of fundamental opposition cannot be adopted.
9. Local policies. There should be local policies that are clear and suitable to
the local conditions and various situations. Later, the Center should give attention
to providing guidance.
10. Mass movements should be strengthened. This is the meaning of what is
called preparing the masses. It does not imply downgrading class struggle in order
to overcome capitulationism. Only by correctly promoting class struggle, and linking it to the united front, can capitulation be overcome. It is dangerous to have
only unity and no struggle. The masses are our ultimate support, and the ultimate
support of the War of Resistance.
11. The problem of the Muslims.
12. The publication of internal Party periodicals should be started immediately.
Localities should also run publications.
13. Other matters.
The overall conclusion is the following: Unite to surmount all difficulties.

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 196-237, where it is reproduced
from documents in the Central Archives. The outline of the report is based on a handwritten
copy; the outline of the conclusion is taken from a printed text bearing Mao's own corrections. The outline can also be found in Volume 2 of the 1948 edition of the Selected Works;
there are slight textual variations between that version and the one translated here.
2. Tanaka Giichi (1863-1929) became prime minister in April 1927. He had served as
minister of war, and was a forceful advocate of military values. Some doubts have been
expressed about the authenticity of the memorial to the throne here attributed to him, but he
consistently took a strong line in dealing with China.
3. Ichiki Kitokurō (1867-1944) became minister of court affairs in 1925. (The Chinese
text has wrong characters for Ichiki's given name or ming.)
4. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian Incident (also called the Mukden Incident
took place. Officers of the Japanese Guandong Army blew up a small segment of railway
tracks some five miles north of the Mukden station, and taking this as a pretext, the Guandong
Army seized control of most of southern Manchuria. The response of the United States,
Britain, and the League of Nations was indecisive, and on September 15, 1932, Japan recognized Manchukuo.
5. The reference is to Amau Eiji (1887-1968), who was at this time chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This statement has often been referred to
as an "Asian Monroe Doctrine."
6. Hirota Kōki (1878-1948) was foreign minister in January 1936; he became prime
minister in February. Regarding his "three principles" and the Chinese reaction to them, see
Volume V, p. 175, note 1, and numerous other references throughout that volume. He was
the only civilian sentenced to death by the Tokyo Tribunal.
7. Matsumuro Kōryō (1886-1969), also known as Matsumuro Takeyoshi.
8. Shortly before midnight on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops conducting maneuvers
near the Marco Polo Bridge, a strategic rail junction located some ten miles from Beiping,
were fired upon, or claimed to have been fired upon, by Chinese forces. The next day, in
telegrams to Chiang Kaishek and other Guomindang commanders, Mao called for a War of
Resistance to recover the lost territories, and for shedding every last drop of blood to drive
out the Japanese bandits. (See Volume V, pp. 695-96). On August 7, Chiang Kaishek formally decided to wage an all-out War of Resistance.
9. I.e., the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
10. The reference is to the "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Current Situation
and the Party's Tasks" of August 25, 1937, translated in Saich, Rise to Power, pp. 791-92.
11. Sugiyama Gen (1880-1945) was an enthusiastic partisan of a hard line against China.
He committed suicide in 1945 after arranging for the surrender of the Japanese army.
12. Annan (Annam) was the current Chinese term for Vietnam.
13. We have been unable to find information about this person.
14. Kawagoe Shigeru (1881-1969) was Japanese ambassador to China between 1936
and the beginning of 1938.
15. Hitaka Shinrokurō (1893-1976) became Japanese consul general in Shanghai in
1938.
16. Oskar Trautmann (1877-1950), then German ambassador to China.
17. The two Chens are Chen Guofu (1892-1951) and Chen Lifu (1900-2001), at the
time members of the Guomindang's Central Standing Committee. For details regarding
Chen Lifu, see below the relevant note to Edgar Snow's interviews of September 24-26,
1939 with Mao Zedong.
18. He Yingqin (1890-1987) a native of Guizhou Province, was at this time chief of
staff of the Guomindang government's Military Affairs Commission and commander of
the Fourth War Zone.
19. Sun Ke (1891-1973), the son of Sun Yatsen, was at the time president of the Legislative Yuan of the Guomindang government.
20. Yu Youren (1879-1964), a native of Shaanxi Province, was a member of the
Guomindang central government's Standing Committee and president of the Judicial Yuan.
21. Bai Chongxi (1893-1966) was deputy chief of staff of the Guomindang government's
Military Commission.
22. Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945), who had become prime minister in June
1937.
23. The Minseitō ("Progressive Party" or "Democratic Party") was one of the two main
political groupings in the Diet at this time.
24. Shimada Toshio (1877-1947), a long-time member of the Diet, was active in Japanese politics throughout his life.
25. The reference is to the army minister, Sugiyama Hajime. Mao's statement that he
had foreseen a protracted war is puzzling, for Sugiyama had, in fact, prophesied in 1937
that the "China Incident" would be over in a month.
26. The so-called "Reform Government of the Republic of China" (Zhonghua minguo
weixin zhengfu) was a Japanese puppet government which had been established in Nanjing
in March 1938 and theoretically had authority over Nanjing, Shanghai, and the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui.
27. Tani Masayuki (1889-1962), a career diplomat, had been made director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau in 1930. In 1942, he was to become foreign minister
in the government of General Tōjō.
28. The "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" (Zhonghua minguo linshi
zhengfu) was a Japanese puppet government established in Beiping in December 1937,
with authority over Beiping, Tianjin, and provinces in North China controlled by Japan.
29. In March 1940, both of these puppet governments were merged with that of Wang
Jingwei.
30. The reference is to Nagai Ryūtarō (1881-1945), minister of communications in the
Konoe government, who was an enthusiastic partisan of "Asia for Asiatics" and the New
Order in East Asia.
31. The reference is to an armed conflict lasting two weeks along the border between
Korea (then a Japanese colony) and the Soviet Union near Zhanggufeng, a peak on the
seacoast just inside Soviet territory, in late July and early August 1938. The Tokyo Tribunal
concluded that Japanese troops had provoked the Soviet forces. In any case, they were
roundly defeated, and a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Moscow. (The text in the
Mao Zedong wenji is taken from a handwritten copy in the Central Archives. As pointed out
by the editors in a note, the name of the mountain in this version contains an error: the
middle character in Zhanggufeng has been replaced by an entirely different character pronounced "gao" instead of "gu." We have not felt obliged to follow them by incorporating
the wrong spelling in the text.)
32. We have not been able to identify this newspaper, which was apparently published in
Hong Kong.
33. Itagaki Seishirō (1885-1948) had been, in 1931, chief of staff of the Guandong
Army and one of the prime movers in the "Mukden Incident," which marked the beginning
of Japan's invasion of China. At this time, he was the Japanese minister of the army.
34. Ugaki Kazushige (1868-1956) became foreign minister in May 1938, and resigned,
as Mao indicates, in September.
35. Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867-1952) was prime minister at this time. A partisan of the
alliance with Germany, he resigned the prime ministership in August 1939, following the
conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, which he saw as a betrayal.
36. "Jiang-Han" is the title of an ode in the Book of Poetry III, 3, 8 (Legge, Vol. IV, pp.
551-55). At one level, it can be taken here simply as a reference to Wuhan, which is located
at the confluence of the Great River (the Yangzi) and the Han River. Some allusion may
also be intended to the content of the ode in question, which is about putting down rebellion
and establishing peace throughout the empire.
37. The version of this document in the 1948 edition of Mao's Selected Works gives the
incorrect date of April 1936 for this conference.
38. The 1948 edition of the Selected Works wrongly dates this citation August 15 instead of August 25.
39. When, as was increasingly the case, Mao referred to the Four rather than the Three
Northeastern Provinces, the fourth was Jehol (Rehe), now incorporated into Hebei.
40. On these three, see regarding Song Qingling, Volume V passim, especially Mao's
letter to her on pp. 356-57, and regarding He Xiangning, Mao's letter to her in Volume V,
pp. 682-83. Deng Yanda (1895-1931), who had been director of the general political department of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition, opposed
Chiang Kaishek beginning in 1930 and became the leader of the Third Party. As a result, he
was executed for treason in 1931.
41. As is obvious from the context, all of those cited here had shown themselves willing
to cooperate with the Communists to a greater or lesser degree in the previous few years. On
Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the two protagonists of the Xi'an Incident, see Volume
V, p. 61, notes 4 and 7. On Dong Zhentang, see Volume V, p. 89n.5. On Feng Yuxiang, see
Volume V, p. 460n. 1. On Cai Tingkai, see Volume V, passim. On Sun Ke (also known as Sun
Fo), the son of Sun Yatsen, see above note 19 on p. 108.
42. The reference is to José Miaga, commander of the Republican armies in Madrid,
who rebelled and surrendered the city to Franco in March 1939; and Emil Hacha, president
of Czechoslovakia, who accepted Hitler's occupation of his country in the same month.
43. Ren Zhuoxuan, alternate name Ye Qing (1896–1987), spent the years 1920-1925 in
France, where he joined the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, as well as the Guomindang. He
soon became one of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in France, but was
expelled from the country as one of the organizers of a demonstration against the Chinese
legation. Returning to China in 1927 after a year in the Soviet Union, he led underground
activities in Hunan, was sentenced to death, but somehow escaped with his life. In 1928,
after being arrested again, he renounced his membership in the Communist Party, but retained his Marxist and socialist views. Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in
1937, he concluded that Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles were the answer to China's
problems, and in 1939 he rejoined the Guomindang.

--- Notes

1. The Three Northeastern Provinces, as they are commonly called in English (the Chinese, dong sansheng, means literally "three Eastern provinces") were Heilongjiang, Jilin,
and Fengtian. Together they constituted Manchuria.

concurrently Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi² to the emperor delivered
through Minister of Court Affairs Ichiki Kitokurō)³ stated that "to conquer the world, China must be conquered first," and laid down the policy
of destroying China.


ii. The occupation of Manchuria on September 18, 1931.⁴
iii. Amau's statement of April 17, 1934 (the statement made by Amau⁵ on
behalf of the Foreign Ministry) declared: "Peace in the East is Japan's
responsibility, so it opposes China's actions contrary to peace in the East
and the actions of any other country that hinder peace in the East." This is
an open declaration of their policy to destroy China.
iv. Hirota's Three Principles of January 21, 1936⁶ (Hirota formally announced
the three principles in the Diet), namely: first, friendly relations with Japan; second, recognition of Manchuria [i.e., Manchukuo]; and third, joint
resistance to Communism.
v. The six conditions in the secret report in the spring of 1937 by Matsumuro
Kōryō,⁷ chief of the Japanese North China Intelligence Organization, all
expressed a combination of soft and hard methods to be carried out simultaneously.
b. From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident⁸ to [the fall of] Wuhan, to carry out
their hard policy, firm military attacks were adopted as the primary method,
and political enticement to surrender was secondary.

i. A few days after the July 7 incident⁹ of 1937, Foreign Minister Hirota
made a declaration of nonexpansionism. Our Party's August Resolution pointed out that this was a "smokescreen to cover up offensives"
but, at the same time, implied that "by surrendering you will avoid
attacks."¹⁰ ii. On July 27, 1937, Army Minister Sugiyama¹¹ made a war statement at a
special session of the Diet: "Absolutely determined to take punitive action, the Army authorities have already made important preparations."
This indicates that the method would be the hard one of fighting to obtain surrender.
iii. The conditions for peace put forward by Japan since the outbreak of
fighting. According to the British Evening Standard, responsible persons of the Japanese government have presented the following conditions to Chiang Kaishek. There are six points altogether:
(1) independence of Inner Mongolia; (2) autonomy of North China;
(3) occupied Shanghai as a Japanese concession; (4) fishing rights
along the coast from Shanhaiguan to Annan;¹² (5) China's withdrawal
from the League of Nations; (6) no building of an air force (Jiefang
bao, November 13, 1937). This shows the things it demanded, and to
this day their demands are, generally speaking, still within this range.
iv. After Nanjing was occupied on December 13, 1937, the commander

vii. On January 20, 1938, the Japanese ambassador to China, Kawagoe
Shigeru, 14 said in an interview with journalists: "I am being recalled to
Japan, while Councilor Hitaka15 remains in Shanghai. The purpose of
his remaining in Shanghai, however, is not at all because we still wish
to make representations to the Chinese government, but, rather, to make
arrangements with foreign diplomatic personnel with regard to incidents that might occur. The door is already closed on reestablishing
negotiations with the National Government. Even if the National Government were to reconsider its attitude in the future, it could only enter
into negotiation with the new Chinese institutions, and could not deal
with Japan." Since the declaration of January 16, this statement was the
most undisguised in pointing to war as primary and accommodation as
secondary and in talking about overthrowing Chiang Kaishek and establishing a new government.
viii. There remained, however, [an element of] peace within the war[like
stance]. On January 20 Reuters reported that Hirota announced in the
73rd Diet four conditions of peace through German mediation: (1) abandon the alliance with the Communist Party to resist Japan and recognize "Manchuria"; (2) establish demilitarized zones in certain areas
and set up administrative organs in these areas; (3) economic cooperation between China, Japan, and Manchuria; (4) reparations from China.

These were the minimum conditions for negotiating peace, the conditions presented to Chiang by Trautmann. 16 Chiang at one point considered accepting them, and Wang Jingwei's "take one example" referred
to this (Chiang, the two Chens, 17 and He, 18 as well as Sun, 19 Yu, 20 and
Bai21 all took part in discussing the question of accepting). In the end
Chiang rejected them, but Hirota announced them in the Diet.


Konoe's22 opening speech: "The solution to the war requires a long
period of time." "The present government has adopted firm policies
and will no longer have any relations with China's Guomindang government in the future."
Hirota's statement, announcing the four conditions put forward by
Trautmann (see above).
Minseitō23 Diet members demanded that the government guarantee never to discuss conditions for peace with the Guomindang government.
Diet member Shimada Toshio24 asked straight out, why not declare
war on China?
The Japanese government announced four key points in its policy
toward China: (1) There would be absolutely no negotiations with the
Guomindang government; (2) To stop arms shipments to China, it was
still possible to declare war against China; (3) They would assume a
position of guardianship toward the new régime in North China;
(4) Third-party mediation would absolutely not be tolerated. But as
late as January 29, Konoe indicated again in the same session of the

those advocating peace and those advocating war. At the time, Sugiyama
issued a statement on this question about "the need to prepare for a
protracted war," in opposition to the faction advocating peace.25
x. The Japanese ambassador in Shanghai (to the Reform Government), 26
Tani Masayuki, 27 issued a statement on March 9, saying, "The Chiang


and handle the present incident with care. When the Tianjin-Pukou
line is occupied, the Provisional Government 28 and the Reform Government should carry out a merger at once. 29 The imperial government supports this to the utmost, for the purpose of merger and
unification and for successful and positive development." The enemy
uses the Military and the Foreign Office, one to represent the hard
line and one the soft, but there is either soft within the hard (espionage agencies in the military) or hard within the soft (the Foreign
Office), alternately playing the hero and the villain.
xiii. After Xuzhou fell, the enemy vowed to fight on to Kunming. Xuzhou
fell on May 19th, and on the 22nd the enemy's frontline commander
made a speech saying, "After the capture of Xuzhou, the war has by
no means stopped. There are three steps in the war: The first step is the
major battle of Xuzhou; the second step is the assault on Hankou; the
third step is the attack on Chongqing or Kunming." How firm a statement this is!


xiv. Minister Nagai30 issued a statement on June 17th that Chiang's régime
must be overthrown: "The government's current policy toward China
is aimed at toppling Chiang's régime, assisting the new government,
building a new China, and laying the foundation for a permanent peace
in East Asia. Other policies must proceed along this line."
xv. At the time of the Zhanggufeng Incident, 31 it was reported that Japan
put forward five conditions for peace: "As the border dispute between
Japan and the Soviet Union intensifies day by day and may turn into a
large-scale war, today (August 5) a breath of peaceful air between
China and Japan has wafted over Hong Kong. The morning edition of
the Zici xibao32 carried initial reports on the five conditions of peace
put forward by Japan to China, and by afternoon all the evening papers carried the news. The five conditions are: (1) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from occupied areas, but Chinese troops are not to move
in; (2) Recognition of "Manchukuo"; (3) Leasing of Hongkou, Zhabei,
and Jiangwan to Japan for a period of ninety-nine years; (4) Reparations for losses suffered during this war; (5) Joint defense against the
Communists." (Xingdao ribao report from Hong Kong on August 5,

44. It had been decided in 1938, at the Sixth Plenum, that the Seventh Congress should
be held in 1939, as indicated in the text which follows but, because of the difficulties caused
by the war, it took place only in the spring of 1945.

45. The version in the 1948 Selected Works has here "the whole Party," which makes
more sense in the context.