Reading Notes on *Selected Philosophical Works* Compiled by Ai Siqi[1]

(After May 1939)

Introduction: The Party Character of Philosophy

II. Philosophy Is a Science with Party Character

Dialectical materialism is precisely these two terms. Dialectical materialism proceeds from reality, grasps reality in its development, and discovers within reality the emergence and extinction of specific phenomena; therefore, it is the most thoroughgoing materialism. [p. 7]

The diversity of mutually contending philosophical systems ultimately converges into two parties, two fundamental currents in philosophy. If one of the principal contending classes does not stand on the side of one current, it cannot carry out class struggle politically; similarly, in philosophy, it is impossible to escape the camps of the two parties. Lenin pointed out in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*: Bogdanov and other philosophers, in attempting to transcend the fundamental parties in philosophy and create an "objective" philosophy, were led to idealism. Bogdanov's supra-party philosophical pronouncements are merely deception, merely a betrayal of the materialist party. "The attempt to escape these two fundamental currents in philosophy is nothing other than a conciliatory fraud."[1] (Lenin) Marx and Engels waged an unsparing struggle against such attempts. They were able, beneath the cover of generally scholarly phraseology and beneath the cover of so-called "latest discoveries," to expose the struggle of the principal parties in philosophy. Lenin said: "Marx and Engels were consistently party men in philosophy. They were able to discover in all the newest currents the betrayal of materialism and the tacit acceptance of idealism and fideism."[2]

In philosophy, just as in politics, two parties struggle against each other. By what is it determined that a specific class appears in political struggle as the bearer of a definite world outlook? The world outlook depends on the historical position of a specific class and the role that class plays in social development... [pp. 8–9]

[1] See Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. (*Selected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 347)
[2] See Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. (*Selected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 346)

[3] Mao Zedong changed the character "或" (or) to "成" (become).

Of particular importance for understanding the new Leninist stage in philosophy is the doctrine of dialectics viewed as epistemology. Lenin demonstrated in epistemology that our philosophy is party philosophy, demonstrated the active, revolutionary character of our philosophy. He said: "Only materialist dialectics establishes a higher foundation for the inseparable unity of theoretical activity and practical activity."

A specific class knows, in its practical activity, to subordinate the surrounding reality to itself and to transform the surrounding reality. The materialist Feuerbach, as well as the French materialists of the eighteenth century, merely explained the world, but the important thing, as Marx said, is to change the world. The essential point of materialist dialectics viewed as epistemology—Lenin said—is the revolutionary transformation of objective reality, the conversion of necessity into freedom. To translate this sentence into the language of class struggle, it is socialist revolution. [p. 10]

The world is divided into two contending camps: the socialist camp and the capitalist camp; two parties: the revolutionary party and the reactionary party, confronting each other.

In every science, a stubborn struggle between the two worlds is waged. Philosophy, as the concentrated expression of the ideology of a specific class, likewise reflects this struggle ever more clearly. Therefore, retreat from the proletarian camp is always accompanied by a betrayal of dialectical materialism. The Second International's shift to the side of the bourgeoisie began with the revision of Marxism, particularly with the revision of materialist dialectics.

Party, that is, it means revolutionary action.

Struggle against the enemy, and the enemy comes under our control; struggle against nature, and nature comes under our control.

Philosophy is the concentrated expression of the ideology of a definite class.

Ye Qing[1] "" began. Bernstein, in the 1890s, used this method; his betrayal of Marxism began with an attack on dialectics.

Bernstein used his own self-created theory of the peaceful evolutionary development of capitalism to counter the dialectical theory of leaps, the theory of revolution.

The revision of materialist dialectics was carried out against its most important aspect—activeness, revolutionary character. This revision is an attempt to break the unity of theoretical activity and practical activity, a unity which, in materialist dialectics, is precisely "internally and inseparably" combined. Instead of enhancing the activeness and enthusiasm of the proletarian struggle, Bernstein advocated the impossibility of transforming capitalist reality. [p. 11]

Old materialism is passive, purely reflective.

Although Plekhanov struggled for materialism, he sometimes uncritically relied on old materialism, that passive, "purely reflective" old materialism which Marx had so bitterly denounced... [p. 12]

The Party, headed by Stalin, exposed the two main forms of distorting Marxism-Leninism, namely mechanism and Menshevizing idealism; further pointed out that all attempts to depart from dialectical materialism inevitably lead to, and all major political errors are none other than

[1] Ye Qing, i.e., Ren Zhuoxuan (1896–1990), a native of Nanchong, Sichuan. Joined the Chinese Communist Party in his early years. After being arrested in 1928, he betrayed the revolution and engaged in anti-communist propaganda activities. Joined the Kuomintang in early 1939. After 1949, served as Deputy Director of the Kuomintang Central Propaganda Department, etc.

departures from dialectical materialism. Political errors.

These two deviations in philosophy are closely linked with deviations from the Party's line. Mechanism, the main philosophical danger, simultaneously became the philosophical basis of the main political danger, the Right deviation. The philosophy of the mechanists denies the dialectics of internal contradiction, leaps, and qualitative differences between one stage of development and another; it has many correspondences with the views of the Right deviation. The Right deviation's theory of class conciliation, its preaching of the peaceful transition of the kulaks to socialism, its obliteration of the qualitative differences between the various stages of the New Economic Policy, and so forth, all find their methodological basis in mechanism. [p. 14]

Extracting the revolutionary content, the abstract propositions of the idealists tinged with Menshevism, separated from concrete reality, are fundamentally characterized by what the Trotskyites say. Completely ignoring the concrete historical situation, issuing abstract slogans unrelated to actual reality—this is precisely the characteristic of the Trotskyites. Because of this, Trotsky in practice skipped over necessary stages of development (Trotsky's slogan in 1905, "Abolish the Tsar, a workers' government," and the super-industrialization at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress, etc.), and thus in theory formulated the principles of Marxism-Leninism in a formulaic way (their mechanical application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism entirely from the outside, unsuited to actual reality). [p. 15]

Regardless of the internal circumstances of things, rigidly applying Marxist principles to things, saying that things should be thus and so. This is "applying the principles of Marxism entirely from the outside."

China's advocates of quick victory are not only subjectivists but also mechanists who view problems one-sidedly. The "weapons alone decide everything" theorists and the national subjugation theorists are not only mechanists but also subjectivists.

Of course, the "idealists tinged with Menshevism" and the Trotskyites, as well as the mechanists and the Right-wingers, are not identical currents. For example, the Trotskyites fundamentally support the philosophy of idealism tinged with Menshevism, but at the same time are mechanists. Similarly, the Right-wingers also take mechanism as their basis, yet on many issues turn to idealism... [p. 16]

III. Lenin's Struggle Against Menshevism for Party Philosophy

...Lenin strictly criticized the capitulation of opportunism before spontaneous growth, and countering it, pointed out the three forms of class struggle: economic struggle, political struggle, and theoretical struggle; pointed out that the significance of theoretical struggle is the guide for the labor movement. Theory is contained within the political struggle of the proletariat viewed as a plan, and is subordinated to the latter, constituting an important factor of the latter. [p. 18]

Theory is an important factor, a component part, of political struggle.

In reality, if all the activities of the subject class and the Party ultimately only accommodate themselves to existing things, then can such an attitude towards reality produce a concrete theory? Is this not merely going along with things on its own? This is in principle negating the possibility, through the active and independent struggle of the class

Zhang Guotao Chen Duxiu (at that time the proletariat and the peasantry) on the class front, of creating a different relation of forces from the existing relation of forces. [pp. 18–19]

In China, sometimes it is advantageous to unite with the bourgeoisie while simultaneously carrying out independent propaganda and organizational work. Sometimes it is advantageous to break with the bourgeoisie in order to carry out the struggle independently.

Why is it advantageous for us to adopt the strategy that opens up the latter direction of development? —Lenin questioned thus. Why do these two directions of development not have equal significance for us? Why do we proceed with all our strength towards the direction of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry? This is because the revolution of the toilers and peasants can, with the greatest speed and the least sacrifice, approach the next link of the revolution—the socialist transformation. [p. 19]

Marx's revolutionary theory, through the hands of the Mensheviks, was severed from the concrete conditions under which it was realized on the basis of Russian reality in 1905. On the one hand, principles became empty, general propositions—formulaic; on the other hand, the recording of new facts divorced from principles provided a crawling empiricism. That is, it provided a theory that felt satisfied merely by recording scattered individual facts outside of their general connections. [p. 21]

There are also such people in China.

Eclecticism

The subjective, non-materialist standpoint is even more so; it accidentally separates facts from reality, often superficially and mechanically unifying them. In such circumstances, a basis is established for interpreting that fact in isolation. This is called eclecticism. Under eclecticism, the general basis and the connections between individual events are lost. The general basis connecting individual facts and individual aspects—this is precisely the concrete

Many people commit this error.

reality, i.e., a definite society. If one does not proceed from concrete reality, but from extremely abstract theoretical propositions, in such a case all basis is lost—because it is this basis that causes various facts to be unified in a specific manner. When the general basis is lost, connections become artificial, arbitrary products, and important facts are abandoned. Lenin said: "In the field of social phenomena, the most prevalent method, the most fruitless method, is nothing more than separating individual facts and playing with examples. In order to lay a foundation in fact, one must without exception grasp the totality of facts related to the question under investigation, and not individual facts. Otherwise, one will arbitrarily select and collect facts, will ignore the objectively interdependent relations of the entire historical phenomenon, and, for the sake of emphasizing meaningless things, adopt a 'subjective' method of treatment."

The danger of the method of analogy—Chinese people commit it too much. Analogy must be of truly similar kinds. If the form is similar but the reality is different, and analogy is recklessly applied, there is no case where error does not occur. For example, comparing the Russian Revolution with the Chinese Revolution, comparing the Northern Expedition War with the Soviet War

Lenin analyzed the question of the imperialist war in this way. The war of 1911 manifested the internal contradictions of capital at its highest stage of development. This war was an inevitable product of the era of capitalist decay. The war occurred because of the plunder of colonies and the redivision of the world. We cannot support this predatory war. We must counter this war with the slogan of civil war. The defenders of the fatherland, however, clamored at Lenin's faction, saying this proposition was wrong. The war of 1914 had positive aspects. Because this war aroused the national liberation of various countries (the Balkans, Belgium). Did not Marx, during the war era of 1854 to 1876, once express sympathy for one side among the belligerent nations?—the Mensheviks

comparing the First World War with the current great war.

Lenin wrote thus: "Such reasoning is sophistry, because it substitutes the historical era of the distant past for the present situation."[1] All this eclecticism was covered up using Marx's name. Pretending to be truth while distorting facts, embellished eclectic dialectics[2]—the Mensheviks used this to replace the concrete dialectical world outlook. The Mensheviks and others of their ilk, in order to justify their betrayal, erected the famous slogan of defending the fatherland, using sophistry to combine the movement for defending the fatherland with internationalism. Internationalism and the movement for defending the fatherland are not incompatible—such words were uttered in the camp of the Second International. Not only that, they also said that the movement for defending the fatherland merely allowed the laborers of each country to defend their own fatherland, to act according to their own will. The Mensheviks, severing individual facts and individual aspects from the connections of the entire historical situation, provided fragments of "theoretical" justification directly supporting the bourgeoisie.

But the Mensheviks used a theoretical basis serving as a signboard to cover up their own loss of integrity. This was precisely one of the conspicuous peculiarities of the sophistry prevalent in the camp of the Second International at that time. Sophistry—concealed loss of integrity—often uses a lying signboard to replace actual

[1] See Lenin, *The Sophistry of the Social-Chauvinists*. (*Collected Works of Lenin*, Vol. 21, People's Publishing House, 1959 edition, p. 162)
[2] Mao Zedong changed the term "dialectics" (辩证) to "sophistry" (诡辩).

The countless sophistries in China today.

Sophistry is a form of subjective idealism.

content. On the surface, it seems flexible, but in reality, it escapes from one proposition to another. On the surface, it seems to have a theoretical basis, but in reality, it is sophistry. Sophistry is falsehood, it is hypocrisy, i.e., words and deeds are completely different. Sophistry panders to the accommodating nature of the Mensheviks, most fittingly suits the spirit of the Mensheviks. Lenin said: The characteristic of all opportunism lies in its accommodating nature. We must understand and consider this peculiarity of the Mensheviks.

The political party serving moribund capital also has a corresponding peculiar world outlook. Not wanting to speculate on the future of humanity, and fearing the future, drives them to vulgar idealism, circuitous empiricism, and a standpoint of interpreting reality with subjective sophistry. Complete betrayal of the working class is complete betrayal of dialectical materialism. [pp. 22–25]

IV. Struggle on Two Fronts

Separating philosophy from the struggle of the Bolshevik Party, separating theory from practice—this is reviving one of the most harmful traditions and dogmas of the Second International. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Party assessed the entire enterprise of the Deborin faction as idealism tinged with Menshevism.

Mechanism likewise only studies individual sciences, not the basic science

Idealism is that which, in cognition, extends and exaggerates one of the features or aspects of reality—Lenin said. [p. 34]

Unlike Plekhanov, Lenin treated materialist dialectics as a unified system, permeating the entirety of his political and philosophical works.

(dialectical materialism) is incorrect. Materialist dialectics, for Lenin, was the basis for solving all problems. [p. 36]

The party character of philosophy includes the unity of theory and practice.

...The essential aspect of Lenin's doctrine on dialectics—the deepening of cognition in the inseparable unity of theory and social-historical practice—was completely unknown to the Deborin faction. Lenin's thought concerning the party character of our philosophy, which is more thoroughgoing than any philosophy, contains the inseparable unity of theoretical activity and practical activity subordinated to a single aim—this thought was distorted by the idealists tinged with Menshevism. Separating theory from socialist practice, this matter reached, from another direction, the same place as mechanism. Namely, practice lost its philosophical basis and became vulgar money-worship serving the class enemy. Thus, the mechanists and the idealists tinged with Menshevism joined together, reproducing at this point the crude empiricism of "facts" combined with the empty dogmas extracted from content—a combination characteristic of the typical features of the ideology of the Second International. It is just that this aspect of the opportunism of idealism theoretically tinged with Menshevism is further embellished and covered up with Marxist-Leninist phraseology... [pp. 36–37]

Chapter One: Materialism and Idealism

I. The Two Lines in Philosophy

Throughout the entire historical process, the social roots of the existence of these two irreconcilable philosophical lines should be sought in the class-based, contradictory social structure. The initial emergence of idealism was the product of the ignorance and benightedness of primitive savages. Thereafter, the continuous development of the productive forces impelled the development of scientific knowledge; as science became increasingly flourishing, materialism should have been able to achieve complete victory and eliminate all idealist thought. Yet from primitive society to the present day, idealism has not only not been eliminated but has continued to develop. What is the reason for this? Its basic cause lies in: society has class divisions; capitalist society is ruled by the bourgeoisie, which, for its own interests, strives with all its might to consolidate its idealist theories and doctrines.

Idealism, in its historical development process, represents the ideology of the exploiting groups and often plays a reactionary role. The development of materialism is the expression of the rising world outlook of the revolutionary class; within class society, it must carve out its own path through constant struggle against reactionary philosophy—idealism. Naturally, we cannot here prescribe a rigid historical chart, assuming that revolutionaries always believe in materialism and conservatives always stand on the side of idealism. We know that there are often occasions when immature socialist classes use the language of idealism (for example, German idealism at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the theory of natural rights, and a part of utopian socialism are instances of this) to express their new revolutionary demands. On the other hand, we see that the militant materialism of eighteenth-century France was indeed the ideology of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie;

The earliest idealism arose from the ignorance of primitive people; the development of idealism in later ages was due to the needs of the ruling class.

The theory of natural rights arose in France in the eighteenth century.

yet the materialism of the seventeenth century, according to Engels' indication, was of aristocratic "origin" (...). Similarly, materialism at a historical stage of development, if it is vulgar materialism or mechanical materialism, can, under present conditions, also play a reactionary role. However, generally speaking, idealism is always the most convenient weapon utilized by conservative social classes. [pp. 40–41]

In class society, there is only class science. It always performs its functions in adaptation to definite class tasks and class interests. When the consciousness of the ruling class and its interests demand a truthful understanding of reality in order to achieve the aim of developing the productive forces, science contains elements of materialism; ... But when the conditions of social life of the exploiting class do not permit them to faithfully understand reality, when their conditions of life distort and limit their views, when the understanding of truth is sufficient to endanger their class interests, their science becomes idealist. Whoever does not understand this will not understand everything in the philosophical struggle. Whoever does not agree with the class nature of science and philosophy proves that he is attempting to conceal the class nature of his own philosophy. [pp. 41–42]

The materialists, on the contrary, affirm that the unity of the universe lies in its materiality. Consciousness, thought, is one of the properties of matter; this property arises only when matter develops to a certain high stage... [p. 43]

Therefore, our struggle against idealism, our struggle against the mystical theories that have ruled for so long in history, requires not only that we ourselves discard the entire theoretical content of the old idealist philosophy, but also that we conquer idealism by means of criticism. We must expose the class roots of idealism; at the same time, we cannot set aside the various questions raised by idealist philosophy without pondering them. We expose the internal logic of this or that idealist system, and subject it to Marxist criticism, while simultaneously clarifying the one-sidedness of idealism's answers to questions, its subjective blindness, and its idealist exaggeration of one fragment or one aspect of phenomena. [p. 49]

II. Mechanical Materialism

The historical limitations of old materialism are manifested in the following three major basic characteristics: the mechanical view, metaphysics, and the inability to apply materialism to the domain of social life. The task of the new materialism lies in overcoming these three shortcomings; this new materialism grew up on another stage of social relations and on a new level of scientific development. [p. 61]

...The mechanical materialists of today... they cannot understand the complex dialectics of the material world of reality, cannot understand the importance of its contradictions, transformations, and interactions, its qualitative multiplicity and the particularity of its various domains. They reduce the laws of higher, qualitatively specific levels (for example, social laws, biological laws, etc.)

etc.), to purely quantitative laws copied from mechanics, to the principle of equilibrium theory and the principle of the intersection of two opposing forces. They also lump together qualitatively different forms of motion and reduce them all to the system of mechanical motion of spatial displacement... [pp. 62–63]

Chapter Two: Dialectical Materialism

II. The Materiality of the World and the Forms of the Existence of Matter

Dialectical materialism does not recognize absolute rest. But it certainly recognizes relative rest, relative equilibrium, which is one of the elements of motion, a special case of motion. Dialectical materialism recognizes that "the possibility of relative rest of bodies, the possibility of temporary states of equilibrium, is the most important condition for the differentiation of matter, and hence for the differentiation of life."[1] (See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 13) [p. 172]

IV. Objective, Absolute, and Relative Truth

[1] See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*. (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 3, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition, p. 563)

To arrive at every relative truth is to arrive at a part of absolute truth. Apart from relative truth, there is no absolute truth; similarly, apart from absolute truth, there is no relative truth.

Deborin himself also said: "All existing truths are not absolute, but relative truths... Absolute truth itself, however, we can never grasp. We only approach it in the process of our cognition and action." (See Deborin's *Lenin as a Thinker*, p. 27) We only approach absolute truth but can never grasp it—this is Deborin's viewpoint, which completely contradicts Lenin's view we mentioned earlier.

V. Social Practice as the Criterion of Cognition

According to Lenin's formulation, "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality." (See *Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 261) Humanity's theoretical knowledge of the external world and the processes occurring in it reveals the laws and tendencies of historical development; but only social practice provides thorough confirmation of theory, grasping objects in their historical concreteness. Lenin said: "Theoretical cognition should give us the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, and in its contradictory movement of 'in-itself' and 'for-itself.' But only when the human concept becomes 'being-for-itself' (i.e., in practice) can this concept 'finally' seize, grasp this objective truth. That is to say, the practice of man and mankind

When theory is applied.

is the proof of the objectivity of cognition, the criterion."[1] (See Lenin, *Once Again on the Trade Unions*) ... [p. 205]

Chapter Three: The Laws of Materialist Dialectics

I. The Law of the Unity of Opposites

As for the dialectical view of development, it is different from the metaphysical view of development. The characteristic of the dialectical view of development is the recognition of the motility and changeability of the world. ... "Therefore, an exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the human mind, can only be achieved by the dialectical method, by constant attention to the universal interaction of coming into being and passing away, of progressive changes and retrogressive changes." Dialectics examines the development of any thing or phenomenon as a transition from one form to another, determined by its internal particularity. In other words, dialectics examines the development of things as the spontaneous development of the things themselves, as the necessary motion inherent in the things themselves, as the self-motion of the things themselves. [p. 223]

Motion is contradiction, is the unity of contradictions. First, taking mechanical motion

[1] The cited source is incorrect. This quotation can be found in Lenin's *Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic*. (*Philosophical Notebooks*, People's Publishing House, 1974 edition, p. 227)

as an example: Mechanical motion is the unity of opposites of action and reaction, motion and rest. ...

Next, physical motion is the unity of positive and negative electricity, positive and negative magnetism; chemical motion is the combination and decomposition of atoms.

Again, turning to the domain of biology. All life phenomena are the unity of life and death. The life process is inseparably linked with the opposing process of death.

Again, proceeding to the social domain. The development of social phenomena, ... the fundamental internal contradiction of social development is the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; the development of class society is the development of class antagonisms.

What has been stated above are the fundamental laws of objective dialectics. This objective dialectics of the material world, reflected in human thought, becomes subjective dialectics, becomes the dialectics of concepts. All conceptual contradictions—necessity and contingency, absolute and relative, abstract and concrete, general and particular—are reflections of the objective contradictions of the material world. Conceptual contradictions impel the movement of concepts. And the movement of concepts corresponds to the movement of objective objects. [pp. 224–225]

[1] The phrase "phenomenon and essence" appears twice in the marginal notes of this section.

II. The Law of Transformation from Quantity to Quality and from Quality to Quantity

However, in order to fully express the qualitative determinacy of a thing's process, we must first proceed from the simplest judgment. For example, a planet is an element of the solar system, capitalism is a form of society, etc.—these are the simplest judgments. We proceed from this simplest judgment, that is, from the judgment that "the individual is the general." Every quality, by virtue of its particularity, its inherent nature, becomes a part of the general and contains the general. Every thing has its qualitative inherent nature, and within its qualitative inherent nature manifests the whole. Hence, the individual contains the general. A planet, in its particular motion, manifests the general connections of the solar system; capitalism, in its particular determinacy, manifests the general laws of social development, manifests the contradictory unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. [p. 238]

The quality of each individual thing, precisely because it contains contradictions, internal incompleteness, cannot exist in isolation; it must presuppose other opposing qualitative determinacies and can only exist in unity with its opposite. A planet exists as a planet only because there is the sun. Beasts of prey can only exist where herbivorous animals exist. Therefore, an individual thing possessing a definite quality does not exist in absolute isolation. Every thing has points in common with all other things, and always has definite kinds of objective connections with other things. When we expose the qualitative determinacy of each individual thing, we must expose the mutual penetration and mutual connection between carnivorous animals and herbivorous animals, the mutual dependence and mutual complementarity of one quality and another.

The profound connections between one thing and other things prove the relativity of various qualities and their mutual penetration. [p. 239]

The objective world is in a process of perpetual development. Not only are individual things changing, transitional, but the changes in their mutual relations are also linked with the changes in the things themselves. Not only do individual animals come into being and pass away, but entire species of animals also come into being and pass away. In the social sphere, changes in social formations all occur through changes in human beings and their mutual relations. Therefore, the process of forming new connections, the transformation of individual things in the process of forming a new generality, is simultaneously a process of destroying old connections, of destroying the old generality. Understanding the internal contradiction in the development of the individual and the general is the key to understanding qualitative change, changes in the mutual relations of qualities, and the interconnection between the two. [p. 240]

The attributes of a thing are manifested in the motion of the thing. The various attributes unfolded by a thing in its developmental process express the various aspects of the thing. We cognize the quality of a thing through its attributes. We certainly cannot unconditionally and completely cognize all the attributes, all the aspects of a thing; sensation can only reflect certain attributes. We can cognize many attributes only by relying on practice. Qualitative determinacy.

Quality and attributes are a unity. But this unity is a dialectical unity, a fluid unity full of contradictions. A thing possessing a definite

quality, in the process of its development, passes through various different stages. In each stage, it unfolds various attributes. This definite quality must manifest itself in various attributes and can only develop through various attributes. This definite quality manifested in the attributes unfolded at each stage possesses various different degrees, revealing various differences. But quality is inseparably combined with the existence of the thing. Within the limits of the existence of this thing, within the limits before the developmental process of this thing is concluded, although this definite quality manifests various differences at each developmental stage, the thing still exists as that thing, i.e., the definite quality still exists. ... After explaining the relationship between quality and attributes, let us discuss the question of the limits of quality. As stated above, every thing possessing a definite quality has internal contradictions. From one aspect, this thing possesses the nature of the whole of things, i.e., the individual contains the general; from another aspect, this thing is limited in its particularity. Precisely because of this contradiction, a specific thing combines with other things, enters into relations with other things. But the external connections of a specific thing with other things do not resolve its internal contradictions. On the contrary, quality develops through its connections with other things, thereby fully exposing its own finitude. ... [pp. 241–242]

III. The Law of the Negation of the Negation

Positing

Unfolding

Resolution

Reading Notes on *Selected Philosophical Works* Compiled by Ai Siqi

...Therefore, affirmation, negation, and the negation of the negation must be examined as the forms and stages of the development and resolution of the contradictions of the actual process. The first stage is the stage where the essential contradiction of the thing is posited, the stage where affirmation harbors the germ of negation; the second stage is the stage of the development of the thing's contradiction, the stage that negates affirmation and harbors re-negation; the third stage is the stage of re-sublating negation, the stage of the relative resolution of the contradiction prepared by the development of the preceding stages, the stage where the new thing emerges and becomes the starting point for the development of the new thing. ... [p. 265]

V. Necessity and Contingency, Actuality and Possibility, Law and Causality

Cause and effect, on the basis of interaction, form a unity of opposites. In interaction, cause becomes effect, and effect in turn becomes cause; the two transform into each other, exchange positions. For example, if we abstract any phenomenon from any process of material motion and trace its causality, we know that this phenomenon is the effect[1] of the preceding phenomenon, and the cause[2] of the succeeding phenomenon; at the same time, we also know that the phenomenon which is the cause has its own cause, and the phenomenon which is the effect further produces effects. ... [p. 311]

[1] Mao Zedong changed the word "cause" (原因) to "effect" (结果).
[2] Mao Zedong changed the word "effect" (结果) to "cause" (原因).

Possibility is also objective reality. When the conditions for the existence of a certain thing exist, but its existence cannot be asserted as a necessity, it is called possibility. ... [pp. 316–317]

Chapter Four: The Process of Cognition

I. Empirical Cognition, Sensation

At that time, humans were still merely natural beings. Later, when production developed, sociality was added.

If, at the earliest stage of human development, nature beyond their narrow field of vision was, on the one hand, antagonistic and unapproachable to them; and on the other hand, they had not yet separated themselves from nature, then it can also be said that the development of material production is precisely to gradually abolish this estrangement of nature and this direct natural connection between humans and the world. The material unity between historical humanity and nature, its true basis, is social, material, practical activity (i.e., labor). Agriculture, industry, the development of material productive forces, the development and differentiation of production, the combination of differentiated branches of production, the emergence of new means of production and means of consumption—herein lies the basis for the development of the human sensory field. ... [p. 332]

...It is not wrong for old materialism to take sensation as the starting point of cognition. Idealism precisely "forgets" this beginning, and therefore, although it has expressed valuable thoughts regarding the "final" concepts (especially Hegelian idealism), its entire orientation is fundamentally

"What begins as simple will eventually become huge."[1] incorrect, fundamentally contains errors, and it inevitably falls into the quagmire of clericalism. ... [pp. 337–338] A miss is as good as a mile.[2] ... Humanity is the subject of practical activity. And human social consciousness usually always lags behind human existence, arises after human material conditions, after human practice. It is not consciousness that determines existence, but social existence that determines social consciousness. ... [p. 339]

If it arises "before," then consciousness would determine existence.

III. Concepts

Human beings have the capacity, in principle, to reflect objective reality (as well as the motion and contradictions of objective reality); in fact, only after universalizing the reflected representations or even sensations can they obtain concepts such as the growth of organisms, the concept of capitalist exploitation, the concept of the infinity of matter, the concept of the differential, etc. Human beings use the form of sensations or representations to obtain images of objectively real objects, but this still does not penetrate into their essence at all. Only by using the form of thought can human beings cognize objects in their internal, necessary, law-governed connections. ... [pp. 345–346]

Correct, quality is invisible.

In the metaphysical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concepts

[1] See *Zhuangzi, The Human World*. The original text reads: "What begins as simple will eventually become huge." "钜" is the same as "巨" (huge).
[2] Also said as "A miss of a hair's breadth leads to an error of a thousand miles," or "A hair's breadth, a thousand miles." See *The Book of Rites, Explanation of the Classics*. The original text reads: "The *Yi* says: 'The superior man is cautious at the beginning; if there is a miss as slight as a hair's breadth, the error will be a thousand miles.'"

were no longer subjectively empty things like the "common names" of nominalism; on the contrary, metaphysical materialism gave universal concepts an absolute, necessary, universal, objective significance. But its concepts were by no means dialectical. First, its concepts were merely regarded as universal things, yet were by no means precisely such things. The metaphysical materialists excessively universalized phenomena, attributes, and relations that in objective reality possess only one-sided significance, or that only occur in certain parts. For example, impenetrability, mechanical inertia, mass—all these attributes "are merely relative properties inherent in certain states of matter"[1] (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*).

Precisely because they forcibly imposed all these attributes onto the totality of the material world, they inevitably had to assume a purely external, formal character. Second, what was reflected in the concepts of metaphysical materialism were the attributes of matter (which were the usual, commonly known objects