INAUGURAL STATEMENT OF THE 8TH ROUTE ARMY MILITARY-POLITICAL JOURNAL
2 January 1939

[Text] As the war of resistance against Japan is proceeding toward a new
stage of development, the colleagues of the 8th Route Army are publishing
this "Military-Political Journal." Its significance is obvious: for enhancing
the strength of the 8th Route Army in the war against Japan and, at the same
time, for providing our friendly forces and people engaged in the war of
resistance with the experience of the 8th Route Army.

During the 1 and one-half year war of resistance against Japan, the 8th Route
Army, under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the commanding officers of our war zone, under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief
Chu Teh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng Te-huai, officers of various departments at various levels, and in cooperation with friendly armed forces, conducted a heroic war of resistance, executed the correct strategy of fighting
"basically a guerrilla war without giving up the opportunity of fighting a
mobile war under favorable conditions," persisted in and developed the guerrilla
warfare in North China, established many anti-Japanese bases behind enemy
lines, reduced the territory occupied by the enemy, tied down a large number
of enemy troops, coordinated the war of resistance waged by the main forces
at the front, thwarted the enemy advance toward northwest China, boosted the
morale of the people all over the country, broke up the wrong concept of those
national defeatists and pessimists who said that "it is impossible to persist
in fighting the war of resistance behind the enemy," and exposed the shameless
rumors spread by China's Trotskyite reactionaries, the pro-Japanese Wang
Ching-wei faction, and certain conservative, stubborn elements in the country.

In addition, the rear guard units, as a part of the 8th Route Army, defended
the dikes along the Yellow River, and are preparing, in coordination with its
friendly forces in Northwest China, to check the enemy advance in North China.
All these accomplishments of the 8th Route Army are unanimously recognized
and visible to everyone who has eyes to see, except those Trotskyite reactionaries,
pro-Japanese Wang Ching-wei faction, and certain conservative stubborn elements.
This is fully demonstrated by the fact that the enemy who not only dares not
take the 8th Route Army lightly, but has developed an increasing fear of the
8th Route Army. The sincerity of the 8th Route Army in its sacrifice and

struggle for the defense of the motherland and its indomitability are plainly
laid before the eyes of all the people in the entire country and the entire
world. These facts are undeniable by anybody, except the reactionaries,
pro-Japanese and certain stubborn elements. Numerous serialized stories and
sketchy reports have been written by Chinese and foreign correspondents,
observers and travellers. It is not accidental that unbiased people are
willing to study the experience of the 8th Route Army. If anybody raises
the question as to whether the existence and development of the 8th Route
Army, which has Chinese Communist Party members as its backbone, is advantageous or disadvantageous to the Chinese nation, then we can reply in one
sentence: those who say "disadvantageous" are in fact unwilling to win the
war of resistance, and their allegation is nothing but absurdity which gives
direct aid and comfort to the enemy.

From where do these accomplishments of the 8th Route Army come? They came
from the correctness of their leadership, the heroism of their commanding
officers, the support of the people, and the assistance of their friendly
forces. These are the four reasons for the accomplishments of the 8th Route
Army. Among these four reasons, the importance of the assistance of our
friendly forces is obvious. Without the heroic resistance put up by the main
forces in the front, there will be no way to conduct guerrilla warfare smoothly
behind the enemy line. Without the coordination of friendly forces located
behind the enemy, it is also impossible to score such a great accomplishment.
The officers and men of the 8th Route Army ought to thank their friendly
forces which have directly or indirectly coordinated with their war effort.
Especially, they should thank the officers and men of their friendly forces
who have given them different kinds of bona-fide assistance and sincere,
enthusiastic encouragement. In front of the common enemy of the nation, the
Chinese armed forces forgot their old grudges against each other and
became intimate friends helping each other. This is the basic reason why
China as a nation is not going to perish. People used to say that those who
read Ko's "Chu Shih Piao" without shedding tear are not loyal, and those who
read Li Mi's "Ch'en Ch'ing Piao" without shedding tears are not pious to
their parents. Today we may say: those who see or hear that the Chinese armed
units have forgotten their old mutual hatred and are helping each other and
closely united but do not feel touched must be unpatriotic. Those who are
engaged in profiteering and living off friction should do some introspection.

Does the 8th Route Army have any weakness? Yes, it does, lots of them.
First of all, it is inferior to the enemy and some friendly armed units in
technical equipment. This is the basic weakness of the 8th Route Army. It
is also the general weakness of the Chinese armed units. Therefore, how to
strengthen our technical equipment in order to defeat the enemy has become
a serious task of the 8th Route Army during this new stage of war of resistance. Second, the 8th Route Army is famous for its ability to conduct
guerrilla and mobile warfare, but some cadres still do not have enough
understanding about the strategy and tactics for the war against Japan and
their application. Up to now, the cadres in general, especially the newly
promoted cadres, still lack a preliminary study about the management and

command of a modern army. Many cadres with worker or peasant background have
not yet elevated their cultural standard to a necessary level. To resolve
these problems is the second task of the 8th Route Army. Third, consolidation and broadening of the National United Front is the general policy to
attain the goal of winning the war and rebuilding the country. The 8th Route
Army has scored great achievements in this respect, but many cadres, especially
the new cadres, do not have enough understanding about the United Front.
In some respects, they have performed poorly in working together with friendly
political parties and friendly armed units and in adjusting the relationship
between different classes of society with a view to turning these relations
beneficial to the war effort. Therefore, strengthening the education about
United Front has become an important task. Fourth, wooing the enemy and
puppet troops has long been one of the three main goals of the 8th Route Army's
political work. Achievements have been made in this respect, but the Japanese
language study program among our warriors and cadres and the study of various
techniques for conducting propaganda among enemy soldiers and lower level
officers for an anti-aggression united front are very inadequate. We had some
success in wooing the Mongolian puppet troops, but further steps should be
taken. Collection and study of information about the enemy and puppet forces
are very important, but our achievements in this respect have not yet reached
the desired degree. Fifth, one of the most difficult problems for a protracted
war of resistance is the economic and financial problem. This is a difficult
problem for the entire country as well as a difficult problem for the 8th Route
Army. Our awareness of this problem should be elevated to a high degree.
This problem has aroused the attention of certain units of the 8th Route Army,
but it has not yet aroused general attention. In each anti-Japanese base,
we should pay attention not only to implementing local financial and economic
policies such as those we have carried out in the past, but also to possible
participation of armed units in production without hampering their combat
function. In relatively stabilized bases, the combat units take up the responsibility of combat, while government workers in the rear perform the duties
of production. Whenever circumstances permit, combat units may also utilize
opportunities to mobilize soldiers and masses to make clothes, shoes, gloves,
etc. In stabilized bases, the non-combat personnel may be utilized to plant
vegetables, raise pigs, gather firewood and run cooperatives. By so doing,
they will, on the one hand, improve the livelihood of the troops and supplement their insufficient provisions and, on the other hand, lift the morale
of the armed forces and enhance their combat strength.

The aforementioned increase of technical equipment, intensive study of strategy
and tactics, correct application of the United Front policy, broadened effort
at wooing the enemy and puppet armed personnel, and the participation of armed
units in production movements are the important problems to which the 8th
Route Army should pay attention during this new stage. The defects existing
in other tasks will be conquered as improvements are made in regard to these
important problems.

To further develop what has been achieved and to correct defects are the tasks
of all officers and men of the 8th Route Army as well as the tasks of the

Military-Political Journal. The war of resistance is a long and cruel war.
Further development of the achievements of the 8th Route Army and correction
of the defects of the 8th Route Army are urgently needed to enhance the combat
strength of the 8th Route Army. At the same time, it is also necessary to
offer our experience to the people and our friendly forces engaged in the
war of resistance. The "8th Route Army Military-Political Journal" should
exert its effort for this purpose.

"Eighth Route Army Military-Political Journal," Political Dept.,
8th Route Army, National Revolutionary Army, 15 January 1939.