Foreword to Military and Political Magazine
of the Eighth Route Army
(January 2, 1939)

Our comrades in the Eighth Route Army are publishing this Military and Political
Magazine at a time when the Anti-Japanese War is developing toward the new
stage.¹ Its purpose is clear: to improve the combat capacity of the Eighth Route
Army in the War of Resistance and, at the same time, to provide the friendly forces
and the people participating in the War of Resistance with some reference material
regarding the experience of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance.

In the past year and a half of the War of Resistance, under the leadership of
Chairman Chiang and the commanders on the various fronts, under the leadership
of Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai],
commanders of various units and at various levels, as well as Communist Party
members, the Eighth Route Army, in coordination with all friendly forces, has
waged a valiant War of Resistance. Applying the correct strategic orientation of
"basically fighting a guerrilla war, but not refusing to engage in mobile warfare
under favorable conditions," it has persisted in and further developed guerrilla
warfare in North China, established a number of anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's
rear, and reduced the enemy-occupied areas. It has pinned down a large portion of
the enemy force, supported the main force in the War of Resistance on the front,
and delayed the enemy action in attacking the northwest. It has inspired people
throughout the country with hope and smashed the national defeatists, who believed that "it is impossible to persist in the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear,"
as well as the erroneous views of the pessimists. It has disproved the shameless
rumors spread by China's reactionary Trotskyites, the pro-Japanese elements headed
by Wang Jingwei,² and certain diehards wedded to the past within the country.

Our source for this editorial is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 307-10, which reproduces the text
as published in the first issue of Balujun junzheng zazhi in 1939.
1. The reference is to the "new stage" which Mao had announced in his report of October 1938 to the Sixth Plenum.
2. Wang Jingwei (1883-1944), a former leader of the Guomindang left with whom Mao
had worked closely in 1926 (see Volume II, passim), had been drifting for several years
toward a pro-Japanese position. On December 18, 1938, he defected from Chongqing and
shortly thereafter openly advocated capitulation to Japan. As a result, on January 1, 1939,
he was deprived of his Guomindang membership.

In addition, a part of the Eighth Route Army---our rear detachments---has guarded
the Yellow River and is now ready to counter the enemy attack on the Northwest in
coordination with friendly forces from the Northwest. All these accomplishments
of the Eighth Route Army are there for all to see; they are recognized by all except
the reactionary Trotskyists, the pro-Japanese faction of Wang Jingwei, and certain
diehards wedded to the past. On the side of the enemy, not only do they dare not
look down upon the Eighth Route Army but there is abundant evidence to show
that they are increasingly fearful of the Eighth Route Army. The Eighth Route
Army men are ready to fight to the end and sacrifice their lives for the defense of
our motherland. Evidence of their dedication and their invincibility is visible to the
entire nation and the entire world; no one will dispute this except the reactionaries,
the pro-Japanese elements, and certain diehards. Reports in this regard, both detailed and sketchy, by Chinese and foreign journalists, observers, and travelers have
been published one after another. It is certainly not accidental that all unprejudiced
people are willing to study the experience of the Eighth Route Army. Is the existence and development of the Eighth Route Army, with the Communists as its mainstay, beneficial or harmful to the Chinese nation? If people do raise such a question,
we have only one answer for them: All those who believe that it is "harmful" are
necessarily those who, in fact, do not want to see the War of Resistance triumph
and spread rumors which directly assist the enemy.

What is the source of these achievements of the Eighth Route Army? It lies in
the correct leadership of the upper levels, the valor of the officers and men, the
support from the people, and the coordination with the friendly forces-these are
the four reasons why the Eighth Route Army has been able to record such accomplishments. Among them, the coordination of the allied armies is plain to see.
Without the courageous War of Resistance of the main forces against the enemy
on the front, the successful unfolding of the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear
would have been impossible; without the support from the friendly forces also
stationed in the enemy's rear, such great achievements would also have been impossible. The officers and men of the Eighth Route Army should be grateful to the
friendly forces for their direct and indirect cooperation in fighting, and especially
to those officers and men of the allied armies who have offered us all kinds of
well-intentioned assistance and sincere encouragement. In the face of the common
enemy, the armies of China bear one another no old grudge and have become close
friends who help and support each other. This is the foundation which guarantees
that China absolutely cannot perish. In former times, people said, "He who reads
Zhuge's memorial on his military expedition and fails to shed tears is certainly not
loyal; he who reads Li Mi's appeal to the emperor and fails to shed tears is certainly not filial."3 Today we should say, "He who sees or hears how China's armies,

3. Zhuge Liang (181-234), zi Kongming, was the prime minister of the Shu Han dynasty during the period of the Three Kingdoms (early to mid-third century); the memorial
mentioned here figures in the novel regarding this era, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
Li Mi (222-?) declined appointment as equerry to the heir apparent in a memorial pleading
his duty to his aged grandmother, who had cared for him in his youth.

forgetful of old enmities and mutually supporting one another, have intimately
united and is not moved is certainly not a patriot." Should not those who are "making personal fortunes out of the national disaster, and living off the friction [between parties and factions]" engage in a bit of self-examination at this time?

Does the Eighth Route Army have shortcomings? Yes, it does, and not a few.
First, it is poor in equipment and technology in comparison with the enemy and
also with some of the friendly forces. This is a fundamental defect of the Eighth
Route Army and of China's armies in general. Consequently, how to improve its
technology and equipment in order to defeat the enemy has become a serious task
for the Eighth Route Army in the new phase of the War of Resistance. Second, the
Eighth Route Army is well known for its guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, but
some cadres do not know enough about the strategy and tactics for resisting Japan.
Ordinary cadres, especially those recently promoted, have not yet made an initial
study of the management and command of the new-style modern armies. Some
cadres of worker and peasant origin have not yet solved the problem of raising
their cultural level to the necessary extent. To solve these problems has become the
number two task for the Eighth Route Army. Third, to consolidate and enlarge the
national united front is the overall orientation for achieving victory in the War of
Resistance and in building up the country, and the cadres of the Eighth Route
Army have achieved great success in this, but some cadres, especially the new
cadres, are lacking in an understanding of the united front, and, in some areas,
they have done poorly in working together with the friendly parties and armies,
and in adjusting the relationships between different social strata for the benefit of
the War of Resistance. As a result, strengthening our education in the policy of the
united front has become an important task. Fourth, the Eighth Route Army has
long made it one of the three main tasks of its political work to win over the enemy
and puppet soldiers and has achieved remarkable results in this. Nevertheless, a lot
remains to be done in teaching spoken and written Japanese to soldiers and cadres
in general, and in developing various methods to make them better able to do
propaganda among the enemy rank and file and the lower-level officers about
opposition to the war of aggression and about the united front. The successes in
winning over the Mongolian puppet troops have been relatively great, but there is
still room for improvement. Here, it is extremely important to collect and study all
possible information about the enemy and puppet troops, but what has been achieved
has not been as much as required. Fifth, one of the most difficult problems in a
long-term War of Resistance will be the problem of finance and the economy. This
is a difficult problem for the War of Resistance in the whole country, as well as for
the Eighth Route Army, and we must raise our level of understanding of it. This
problem has already attracted the attention of certain sectors of the Eighth Route
Army, but not of the Eighth Route Army as a whole. In each and every antiJapanese base area, not only must we see that correct local financial and economic
policies are carried out as we have done before, but we must put forth the task for
the army to take part in actual production, on condition that it does not interfere
with military operations. In more or less consolidated base areas, the combat forces

will take care of the fighting, while the personnel of rear units will be in charge of
production. When combat circumstances permit, the fighting forces may also make
use of the opportunity and get the soldiers to make their own shoes, socks, gloves,
and so on. In consolidated base areas, noncombat forces can be mobilized to grow
vegetables, raise pigs, chop firewood, and, in particular, run cooperatives. By so
doing, on the one hand, the livelihood of the army will be improved and provisions
supplemented; on the other hand, the morale of the army will be stimulated and
combat capacity increased.

The issues discussed above-namely, improvements in equipment and technology, thorough study of strategy and tactics, correctly applying the policy of the
united front, extensive efforts to win over the enemy and puppet troops, and the
movement for participation by the army itself in production-all represent important problems to which the Eighth Route Army must pay greater attention during
provement on these important issues.

It is the task of all the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, and also of
the Military and Political Magazine, to enhance our achievements and overcome
our shortcomings. The War of Resistance will be long and cruel; it is urgently
necessary to enhance the achievements of the Eighth Route Army and overcome
its shortcomings, first for the sake of expanding the fighting capacity of the Eighth
Route Army, and, second, in order to offer the experience of the Eighth Route
Army to the people and allied troops who are also fighting Japan. The Military and
Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army should work hard toward this end.

To He Ganzhi¹
(January 17, 1939)

Comrade Ganzhi:

I read your letter with great pleasure. There are not many among our comrades as
yet who are interested in Chinese history and resolved to study it. There is Comrade Chen Boda² in Yan'an, who is doing research in this field, and now you are
also planning to study our national history. This is very good; I hope you will work
on it conscientiously. To do so has also been an unfulfilled ambition of mine. I
wanted to collect materials on China's military history, but to this day I have never
got started doing it. My tools are inadequate, and this year I have still been able to
study only the tools, that is, to study philosophy, economics, and Leninism, mainly
philosophy. In the future I plan to study modern history. Your advice in this respect
would be most welcome.

I think you are right in your three approaches to the study of our national history, especially the second one. It will be of great help in the present anti-Japanese
war if you can demonstrate in your book which of the two lines of national resistance and national capitulation is correct and which is erroneous, bitterly denouncing
the national capitulationists and praising those in favor of national resistance from
the Northern and Southern dynasties [420-581], the Southern Song dynasty [11271278], the last years of the Ming dynasty [1368-1644], and the last years of the
Qing dynasty. There is, however, one thing that should have your attention, that is,
the policy of aggression, aiming at "achievement and success" and the conquest of
the nations of "the weak and the ignorant" (which has occurred in our history)

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 136-37, where it is reproduced
from the manuscript.
1. He Ganzhi (1906–1969), a historian, was born in Taishan, Guangdong Province. In
1929 he went to Japan to study, returning to China after the September 18 incident in 1931.
He joined the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1934 and went to Yan'an in 1937.
At this time, he was a professor at the North Shaanxi Public School and chairman of the
Section for Teaching and Research on China.
2. Chen Boda (1904-1989) was a native of Fujian. He joined the Chinese Communist
Party in 1927, studied at Sun Yatsen University in Moscow, and returned to China in 1929.
In 1937 he went to Yan'an, where he became Mao Zedong's political secretary. At this time,
he was also working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.