•.()—As long as Chiang Kai-shek has not compromised with Japan, a large-scale campaign to annihilate the Communists is out of the question. All his actions are meant to intimidate us into making concessions: the issuance of the “Hao Telegram” was intimidation; He Yingqin’s Memorial Week speech was intimidation; Tang Shizhou and Li Zongren’s advance eastward were intimidation; Hu Zongnan’s concentration of four divisions to strike at Guanzhong was intimidation; even his order to Li Kenong to dissolve the representative office was intimidation. He may yet resort to other intimidating measures. Apart from intimidation, his other chief weapon is blockade; there are no other reliable means at his disposal (though an attack on Zhang Yunyi and Peng Xuefeng remains possible). Many members of the middle forces have been cowed by him and are clamoring for us to yield. We must craft our arguments carefully to reassure them. With the exception of the “Jia Telegram,” in which I adopted a conciliatory tone and made a minor concession regarding southern Anhui—though in fact I had already intended to move north, I am now deliberately delaying this step by another month or two—on all other issues we will not yield an inch. Any aggressor will be utterly crushed. We have already prepared an iron hammer; once the political conditions are ripe, we shall bring it down with full force. At present, all our propaganda articles are aimed at ripening those political conditions.  (2) Aside from He Yingqin’s ulterior motives—sowing discord and provoking civil war—Chiang must have secretly informed Bai Chongxi of his own stratagem: intimidating the Communists into submission. Hence Bai’s feigned seriousness. In reality, Bai has no desire to fight; he dreads the prospect of actual combat. We, however, should exploit this weakness to intimidate Bai in turn. As for everyone else who seeks to browbeat us, we should counter their intimidation with our own—by highlighting the deep indignation among the rank-and-file officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, their fervent appeals to be redeployed southward, the fact that we have gone fourteen months without receiving any ammunition, the acute food shortages in North China, the likelihood that Tang and Li’s eastern advance will spark a major conflict and shatter peace in northern Jiangsu, the severe famine gripping northern Shaanxi this year, with starving peasants demanding permission to relocate in search of sustenance, and so forth. Such n t j b political offensives should also be directed at the more naïve elements of the middle forces, stirring their anxiety and thereby exerting pressure on that incorrigible rascal Chiang Kai-shek.  (3) Hu Zongnan has already issued orders to the 118th, 114th, Preparatory Third, and Eighth Divisions to launch an offensive against the narrow, gourd-shaped corridor between Yijun, Chunhua, and Zhengning. A surprise attack is likely within the next week or ten days. Commander-in-Chief Zhu has telegraphed Hu Zongnan, urging him to desist while simultaneously preparing a portion of our forces to strike back. As soon as Hu initiates his assault, we will launch a limited engagement in northern Jiangsu in retaliation. Our objective is to sever the link between Han Deqin and Hu Zongtan across Anhui and Jiangsu by seizing a strip of territory between Qinyang and Baoying. If successful, Hu’s position will be strengthened, and Han will be compelled to fall into line. The immediate justification for this move is that Hu Shouyi attacked my unit under Peng Mingzhi, while Mo Dehong assaulted Zhang Yunyi’s detachment. This rationale should be widely publicized.  (4) Only by combining firmness with flexibility—employing both hard and soft tactics simultaneously—can we foil Chiang Kai-shek’s schemes, thwart He Yingqin’s capitulationist designs, and win over the middle forces to our side. Relying solely on either a hard or a soft approach will fail to achieve our aims.