• We plan to dispatch two telegrams this time: one addressed directly to He Yingqin, demanding an immediate explanation for the suspension of military pay. This telegram was sent straight to He yesterday, and we are also forwarding it to you and issuing a general circular to the entire country. Please inform us upon receipt. The other telegram is addressed directly to Chiang Kai-shek. After two days of deliberation and having received your views, we have decided to send it today as well—again, direct to Chiang, with a copy to you to be circulated later. This time, Chiang, He, and Bai are colluding; their use of the “Hao Telegram,” troop movements, the withholding of pay to create a tense atmosphere, and threats against our offices—all these measures are purely intended to intimidate us and serve no other purpose. Li Renchao’s assessment is entirely accurate: as we have consistently maintained, there remains the possibility that Chiang will neither surrender nor launch a full-scale campaign against the Communists. His only tactic is intimidation—against Japan, against us, and against everyone else. Beyond this thuggish approach, he is at his wit’s end.

Chiang’s current situation is characterized by profound internal and external instability. Under his rule, the military, politics, economy, culture, and public morale are all in a state of flux. The crisis he faces is unprecedented in his history. Internally, he lacks any solid foundation; externally, he has no defenses whatsoever against either enemies or ourselves. To avert this crisis and shore up both internal and external defenses, he seeks to forge an alliance among himself, Guangxi, and He Yingqin—a united front of the big bourgeoisie against the Communists. However, He and Bai harbor ulterior motives. The central strategy of this alliance is “offensive defense”: employing offensive means to achieve defensive ends. It is by no means a full-scale offensive strategy, for that would be impossible. All of Chiang’s intimidating maneuvers toward us, as well as any potential localized offensives, constitute forms of offensive action. Meanwhile, by constructing fortified lines along the Jing River, Wei River, Yellow River, Huai River, and the Huainan Road, he aims to consolidate his external defenses, stoke an anti-Communist climate, and restrict our operational space. At the same time, he intends to organize an anti-Communist coalition—built on the basis of the Chiang–Guangxi–He alliance—in order to strengthen his internal defenses. These are the two objectives he believes he can realistically attain, both ultimately serving the broader goal of defense.

Essentially, Chiang’s policy remains unchanged from the past: a dual-track approach of resisting Japan while simultaneously combating the Communists. Against Japan, his stance is one of absolute defense—with no offensive initiatives; against us, however, it is offensive defense. Therefore: (1) overall instability; (2) a dual-track policy; and (3) offensive defense. These three elements constitute the fundamental nature of Chiang’s current position. In light of this, our guiding principle is to maintain a façade of moderation while mounting genuine resistance—combining flexibility with firmness, meeting force with force. Moderation is employed to win over the masses; resistance, to safeguard ourselves; a flexible approach, to preserve Chiang’s face; and decisive firmness, to strike fear into him. As for actual military deployments, only two regiments of the 115th Division are being moved; all other units remain stationary. Nevertheless, localities must continue to prepare vigorously. Beyond countering any localized attacks, we stand ready to deploy over seventy thousand elite troops at a moment’s notice to deliver a crushing blow to anyone who dares launch a large-scale invasion. For the more thoroughly we are prepared, the less likely our adversaries will be to attack—a testament to the wisdom of being forewarned.

In practical terms, the scale of this anti-Communist campaign will not exceed that of the previous one; in fact, it will likely be smaller, since we have grown stronger while they have grown weaker. We will not communicate this point downward, however, for fear of inducing complacency among our ranks. Feng Yuxiang’s assessment is incorrect. The notion that if pushed too far, Chiang will abandon all pretense and resort to indiscriminate violence is simply a product of being intimidated by his thuggish behavior. In reality, Chiang is a calculating and shrewd operator; his bullying tactics are designed solely to intimidate others, not to dictate policy. o()