• () “Young people should prioritize a firm and correct political orientation. Exemplary youth represent the Chinese common people, and they must represent them their entire lives.”

“Representing them oneself is not enough; one must also teach one’s sons. The Chinese revolution has not yet succeeded; it requires a long-term struggle and perpetual striving.”

**(a) The Historical Development of Japan’s Policy of Inducing Surrender**
1. Japan’s basic policy toward China has been the destruction of China and the establishment of a so-called “New Order in East Asia.” This policy is firm and unchanging, and from the perspective of the Japanese aggressors, it is unalterable.
On January 1 of this year, an editorial in the *Kokumin Shimbun*, the organ of the military authorities in Tokyo, stated: “The substantive task before us now brooks no retreat by even an inch, nor a moment of hesitation. The incident has entered its concluding phase. Should there be any lapse in national control, not only would the fruits of battle be lost, but it would also affect the destiny of the nation. The latter stages of war are several times more difficult than the initial stages. History offers lessons: the unfortunate examples of Germany and Russia during the Great War in Europe must be deeply understood by policymakers and the people alike” (*World Knowledge*, Vol. 9, No. 1, published on January 1).
In a word: the fundamental aggressive policy must be thoroughly carried out; otherwise, there is the danger of a German- or Russian-style revolution. From this, it can be seen that those (such as Chiang Kai-shek and many in the Kuomintang) who believe that Japan can make fundamental concessions and, without a protracted war, return to the pre–Marco Polo Bridge status quo through pressure from Britain and America are merely indulging in fantasies.
2. Its fundamental policy and overall line of “destroying China and establishing a New Order in East Asia” are firm and will not waver on their own. However, the methods or tactics it employs to implement this fundamental policy combine hardness and softness, are flexible, and may involve certain temporary, partial, and superficial concessions, in order to achieve its ultimate objective.
Broadly speaking: before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, political inducement to surrender was primary; from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the fall of Wuhan, military strikes were primary; and from Wuhan to the present, political inducement has once again become primary.
3. To understand both the steadfastness of the enemy’s fundamental policy and its combination of hard and soft tactics, one need only examine the following materials, which show that before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the hard policy was already defined and implemented with the occupation of the three northeastern provinces, while diplomatic inducement to surrender was adopted toward all of China.
- The Tanaka Memorial before the Manchurian Incident—on July 25, 1911 (Shōwa 11), Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi submitted a letter to the Grand Chamberlain, intended as a memorial to the Emperor, stating: “To conquer the world, one must first conquer China.” This laid down the policy of destroying China.
- In 1931, the September 18 Incident led to the occupation of Manchuria.
- On April 17, 1934, the Amau Statement—Amau, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Ministry, declared: “Peace in East Asia is a responsibility shouldered by Japan. We oppose any actions by China that conflict with East Asian peace and oppose any moves by other nations that disrupt East Asian peace.” This openly expressed the policy of destroying China.
- On January 21, 1936, the Hirota Three Principles—Hirota formally announced three principles in the Diet: first, friendly relations with Japan; second, recognition of Manchukuo; third, joint defense against communism.
- In the spring of 1937, a secret memorandum by Matsumuro Takayoshi, head of Japan’s North China Special Service Agency, containing six concluding points, showed the combination of hard and soft implementation methods.
From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the fall of Wuhan, in executing its hard policy, Japan primarily adopted a resolute military offensive approach, supplemented by political inducement to surrender.
- In 1937, a few days after the July 7 Incident, Foreign Minister Hirota announced a non-expansion policy—our Party’s “August Resolution” pointed out that this was a “smokescreen to cover up the offensive.” At the same time, it implied the idea of “surrender to avoid attack.”
- On July 27, 1937, War Minister Sugiyama, in a war speech to the Special Diet, declared: “We resolutely decide to chastise [China]; the Army authorities have already taken important measures.” This indicated a hard approach—fighting—aimed at inducing surrender.
- After the war began, the peace terms proposed by Japan, according to Britain’s *Evening Standard*, were reportedly submitted to Chiang Kai-shek by responsible Japanese government figures. These terms comprised six points: (1) independence for Inner Mongolia; (2) autonomy for North China; (3) the occupied areas of Shanghai to serve as Japanese concessions; (4) fishing rights from Shanhaiguan to the coast of Annam; (5) China’s withdrawal from the League of Nations; (6) prohibition of an air force (*Liberation Daily*, November 13, 1937). The demands made then largely remained within this scope to this day.
- On December 13, 1937, after the occupation of Nanjing, on December 27, Vice Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet, stated: “The Japanese Empire is by no means satisfied with today’s successes, for the road to the final objective remains long. Imperial soldiers, based on the general will of the Empire, hope to achieve a thoroughly progressive goal for the eternal peace of the Orient.” This signaled continued military offensives.
- Hirota’s New Year’s Eve speech (1937): “If friendly nation China could understand the vital importance of Japan’s perspective in striving for peace in East Asia, it could then avoid today’s misery. The Japanese government earnestly hopes to begin a new peace in 1938 and resolve all issues.” This indicated that soft methods could be used—provided China surrendered.
- The famous January 16 Declaration—on January 11, two days before the occupation of Nanjing, a cabinet decision was reached; on January 12, it passed an Imperial Conference; on the 13th, Nanjing fell; on the 17th, Chairman Chiang of China issued a message to the nation; by January 16, the government released this declaration. Its main thrust was: “Hereafter, the National Government will not be regarded as a negotiating counterpart; the establishment of a new government is anticipated. [Japan] respects China’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the rights and interests of other powers in China.” This showed that the policy was hard, and the methods were also hard.
- On January 20, 1938, Ambassador to China Kawagoe Shigeru spoke to reporters, saying: “I have been ordered to return to Japan. Counselor Hidaka will remain in Shanghai, but the purpose of his stay is not to negotiate with the Chinese government but to engage with foreign diplomatic personnel on any incidents that may arise. The door to resuming negotiations with the National Government is shut. Even if the National Government reconsiders its stance in the future, it can only negotiate with the new Chinese organization, not with Japan.” After the January 16 Declaration, the approach was to make war primary and peace secondary—to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and establish a new government. This statement was the most blatant. Yet amid war, there were still peace moves—on January 20, Reuters relayed Hirota’s announcement in the 73rd Diet of four peace terms mediated by Germany: (1) renounce alliance with the Communists and resistance to Japan, and recognize Manchukuo; (2) establish demilitarized zones in certain areas, within which administrative organs would be set up; (3) economic cooperation among Japan, China, and Manchukuo; (4) China to pay reparations. These were the minimum terms for peace negotiations, i.e., the terms Trautmann conveyed to Chiang. Chiang once considered accepting them. Wang Jingwei’s “Citing an Example” refers to this—Chiang, the two Chens, He [Yingqin], plus Sun [Fo], Yu [Youren], and Bai [Chongxi] all participated in discussions about acceptance. Ultimately, Chiang refused, and Hirota then announced the terms in the Diet.
- In late January, during the 73rd Diet: Konoe’s opening speech stated that “the resolution of the war will still require a long time” and that “the current government adopts a resolute policy; hereafter, it will have no dealings with the Chinese Nationalist Government.” Hirota’s speech announced the four terms conveyed by Trautmann (as above). A Constitutional Democrat Party member demanded a government guarantee that it would never again discuss peace terms with the Nationalist Government. Diet member Shimada Toshio questioned why war had not been declared on China. The Japanese government announced four key points of its China policy: (1) absolutely no negotiations with the National Government; (2) to halt arms shipments to China, a declaration of war could still be made; (3) it would serve as guardian of the new regime in North China; (4) absolutely no mediation by third parties would be tolerated. Yet, on January 29, Konoe told the same Diet session: “The matter of declaring war is still under consideration, depending on China’s future attitude.” This reflected the struggle between pro-peace and pro-war factions within the Japanese government. Sugiyama, at that time, published a statement declaring that “it is necessary to prepare for a protracted war” to counter the peace faction.
- Tanimasa Yadani, Japan’s ambassador to the collaborationist government in Shanghai, stated on March 9: “The Chiang Kai-shek regime is on the verge of collapse, but it is still necessary to intensify the war to hasten Chiang’s downfall and cause third countries to abandon their attempts to aid Chiang. If methods other than war, such as making Chiang negotiate peace, could be used, they would be less costly and more effective.”
- On May 2, Konoe’s speech on preparing for a protracted war: “To overthrow the Chiang regime and eradicate the source of calamity in East Asia, we would not regret spending even several years. At the same time, the entire nation should strongly support the pro-Japanese, anti-communist regimes in North and Central China.”
- On May 9, Hirota, speaking at a “Conference of Regional Governors,” advocated cautious handling of the incident: “The China Incident has entered its second stage. The Chiang Kai-shek regime propagates protracted resistance and strives for national unity, but it has not achieved that unity. On the other hand, the importation of military supplies by various countries and the Soviet Union’s aid to China are facts. Therefore, the Imperial Government must take these facts into account and handle this incident with caution. At the time of the seizure of the Jin-Pu Line, the two provisional governments [Provisional and Reformed] should immediately merge. The Imperial Government will give its utmost support to enable their merger and unification, and their smooth and healthy development.” The enemy used both the military and the Foreign Ministry—one representing hardness and the other softness—sometimes hard with a soft edge (the military’s special service agencies) and sometimes soft with a hard core (the Foreign Ministry), playing “good cop, bad cop.”
- After the fall of Xuzhou, the enemy claimed they would strike Kunming. On May 19, Xuzhou fell. On the 22nd, an enemy front-line commander stated: “With the capture of Xuzhou, the war has not ceased. The war has three stages: the first stage is the great battle for Xuzhou; the second is to advance on Hankou; the third is to advance on Chongqing or Kunming.” How hard this was! Overthrow the Chiang regime: “At present, the government’s policy toward China is to overthrow the Chiang regime, aid the new government, construct a new China, and lay the foundation for eternal peace in East Asia. Other policies must also follow this line.”
- During the Zhanggufeng (Changkufeng) Incident, there were rumors that Japan proposed five peace terms to China: “As Japanese-Soviet border disputes intensify and could escalate into large-scale war, peace talk atmospheres between China and Japan are again prevalent in Hong Kong on August 5 this year. The morning *Hong Kong Daily Press* first reported five terms sought by Japan for peace with China; the afternoon editions of various evening papers also carried the story. The five terms are: (1) Japanese troops will withdraw from occupied areas, but China may not station troops there either; (2) recognize Manchukuo; (3) Hongkou, Zhabei, and Jiangwan to be leased to Japan for a term of 99 years; (4) compensation for the losses in this war; (5) joint defense against communism” (*Sing Tao Daily*, Hong Kong Dispatch, August 5, Year 27 [1938]).
- Ugaki’s hardline argument: On July 1, Ugaki stated: “As long as the Chiang regime continues to exist, there is absolutely no possibility of peace between Japan and China. Today, Japan can no longer join hands with Chiang Kai-shek to initiate peace talks.” On July 7, the first anniversary of the incident, Ugaki declared: “No matter how many more years the war lasts, the Empire has only one path to take—to conquer China by military force. Only thus can a hundred years of peace in East Asia be achieved.”
- The establishment of the China Affairs Board, which held overarching authority over the administration of China—under a president, vice president, and five ministers. It exercised jurisdiction not only over occupied areas but also over non-occupied areas.
- On September 29, the military forced Ugaki out. Ugaki, due to policy disagreements with the military over China policy, indignantly resigned.
From Wuhan to the present, tactics shifted from hard to soft. On October 12, Guangzhou was occupied; on October 25, Wuhan was occupied; on October 30, they saw Chiang Kai-shek’s “Message to the Nation” advocating protracted resistance. Consequently, the Japanese government chose November 3—the anniversary of the Meiji Emperor, known as Tenchō-setsu—to issue a major declaration, clearly signaling a change in tactics. Its key points: (1) “The National Government has become a mere local regime. If it continues to resist Japan, military operations will not cease until it is annihilated.” (2) “Japan’s goal is to construct a New Order of enduring peace and stability in East Asia—namely, tripartite cooperation among Japan, China, and Manchukuo, establishing mutually supportive and interconnected relations in politics, economics, culture, and other fields.” (3) “Should others engage in the task of reconstruction and the maintenance of order, the Empire will not refuse.” The policy had changed, announcing the abandonment of the earlier policies of not dealing with the National Government and of having to establish a puppet regime, and declaring that it could deal with the National Government—provided Chiang resigned.
- On December 22, the Konoe Statement—the one that Wang Jingwei publicly endorsed and Chiang Kai-shek’s speech vehemently refuted—had these key points: (1) “Japan, China, and Manchukuo should take as their common goal the construction of a New Order in East Asia, mutually cooperating, maintaining friendly relations, practicing joint defense against communism, and pursuing economic partnership.” (2) “Therefore, China must establish full diplomatic relations with Manchukuo.” (3) “Conclude a Japan-China anti-communist pact, with troops stationed in designated areas for anti-communist purposes; Inner Mongolia to serve as a special anti-communist area.” (4) “Japan-China economic partnership: Imperial subjects shall have the freedom to reside and conduct business in China’s interior; Japan shall be given facilities to develop and utilize resources in North China and Inner Mongolia.” (5) “Japan allows for consideration of the return of concessions and the abolition of extraterritoriality.”

Reaffirming the fundamental policy of the November 3 declaration, with added specific content.

As long as they surrender to Japan, the National Government and Chiang Kai-shek will be allowed to exist — from that point onward, all can exist. Central and South China can be withdrawn from, North China is desired, but nominal sovereignty may still be waived.

The Hiramuma Cabinet continues this policy unchanged to this day.

Japan is instigating a broad "peace movement" in China, establishing so-called "Peace and Truce Associations," holding rallies everywhere and distributing leaflets.

The establishment of a unified central government has not been mentioned for a long time; though occasionally brought up, it is nothing more than a threat to Chiang. Unless Chiang resists to the bitter end, it is being kept in reserve for him.

A grand conspiracy to sow discord between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and exploit the Three Principles of the People — Japanese Matsumoto Shinichi wrote an article entitled "On the Question of Winning Over the Masses of the Chinese Nation," in which he stated: "The purpose of the Empire's exercise of armed force is, first, to thoroughly strike at the anti-Japanese regime and its military forces; secondly, to bring about cooperation and integration between the Japanese and Chinese nations and the establishment of peace in East Asia. The former serves as the means to achieve the latter. However, in light of the reality of China, these two objectives are in fact contradictory and mutually opposed.

"Observing the course of events since the Incident, although the guiding principles of the anti-Japanese regime are erroneous, the Chiang regime already possesses the character of a national regime and enjoys the support of the majority of the Chinese nation.

The reason the present regime can obtain the fervent support of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Youth Party, the Anti-Japanese United Front, and former military figures is precisely due to this.

Now, on one hand, we wish to destroy the Chiang regime; on the other, we wish to cooperate with the Chinese nation. In actual fact, this is truly like climbing a tree to catch fish.

For attempting to overthrow Chiang only makes the Chinese nation rally behind him ever more.

To overthrow Chiang, we cannot win over the masses; to win over the masses, we cannot overthrow Chiang. Herein lies our nation's fundamental difficulty."

"…the provisional and maintenance governments lack a popular foundation. With a popular foundation, the northern and southern governments would naturally find it easy to merge.

The platform of the new government should take the Kuomintang's Three Principles of the People as its banner. The task of the new government should be the realization of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood.

Some might say: If the enemy's banner is the same as ours, confusion will inevitably arise.

But we can declare that while they call for 'resisting while implementing the Three Principles of the People,' we shall call for 'cooperating with Japan while building the Three Principles of the People.'"

"The cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party forms the backbone of the Anti-Japanese United Front and must be dealt a blow."

"The purpose of the Wuhan operation is to split the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

Thus, the occupation of Wuhan is akin to driving a wedge between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; both strategically and politically, it aims to disperse the forces of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party." (The above text is from the Da Gong Bao, January 23 of this year.)

As early as February 17, the Shanghai Dao Bao pointed out the danger of a Far Eastern Munich: "On one hand, he is pragmatically and diligently striving to strengthen local regimes, organizing something like the Jianghan Government, for example.

On the other hand, he is carrying out a larger-scale conspiracy with international dimensions.

The main aim of this conspiracy is to pressure and deceive Britain and France into convening an international conference to force China — openly or secretly — into a compromise with Japan, even though Japan has declared it is unwilling for third countries to mediate the Sino-Japanese conflict."

It also stated: "It is wrong to think that Wang Jingwei's role is finished and all is well; he can still play a most pernicious role in the future."

The 19 pieces of material I have cited above, illustrating the historical development of Japan's policy of enticing China to surrender, fully prove the following three points:

First, Japan's general policy of annihilating China is extremely firm and absolutely unchanging. Japan is determined to turn China into its colony and to establish the so-called "New Order in East Asia."

Second, its methods of implementation combine hard and soft tactics, with emphasis shifting according to the circumstances. Before the Wuhan campaign, military attack was primary, yet even within the fighting there was peace maneuvering. After the Wuhan campaign, peace maneuvering became primary, though some fighting continued to pressure capitulation.

Third, Japan is also striving to instigate Britain, the United States, and France to convene a Far Eastern peace conference. The danger of a Far Eastern Munich hangs over the heads of the Chinese people.

IV. The preceding three sections: the first points out its fundamental policy is firm and unchanging; the second notes its implementation methods combine hard and soft tactics; the third uses 19 pieces of material to explain the historical development of its methods from hard to soft, proving surrender is the greatest current danger. This fourth section now explains the reasons for its advocacy of peace from the perspectives of its finances, economy, and military.

Japan is already in tremendous difficulty: its finances (three years: 11.1 billion yen; first year 2.55 billion yen, second year 4.85 billion yen, third year 4.65 billion yen); its economy, with imports soaring, exports plummeting, military industry crushing peacetime industry, prices skyrocketing, people's livelihoods worsening, cash reserves exhausted, foreign exchange unstable; its military, with insufficient troop strength, forces overextended. It also needs to prepare for a possible international war. Therefore, it is vigorously instigating China's surrender, splitting the anti-Japanese front, exploiting Wang Jingwei, inducing Chiang Kai-shek, and preparing to exploit the Three Principles of the People and the Kuomintang. This conspiracy of theirs is extremely malicious.

The enemy's war is not fearful, but peace is extremely dangerous. The Da Gong Bao once called it "a peace of the hanging ghost," meaning that if it comes to this, China will perish without obvious cause.

V. To demonstrate the sincerity of peace to the Kuomintang and to Britain and America, Japan is using great force to "mop up" the Eighth Route Army (15 regiments in North China), and is now attempting to attack northern Shaanxi, as a step to promote the Kuomintang's capitulation to Japan and opposition to the Communist Party.

The above concerns Japan's policy of enticing surrender.

(B) Pressure from Britain, the United States, and France

The second factor making the danger of China's capitulation the greatest current peril is the pressure exerted by capitulationists in Britain, the United States, and France upon the Chinese government.

The laissez-faire policy adopted by non-aggressor nations like Britain, the United States, and France towards the war of aggression waged by the aggressor nations, as Stalin pointed out, stems not from their insufficient strength, nor simply from their fear of revolution, but from their conspiratorial scheme of "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight," namely the so-called policy of neutrality or non-intervention.

From the very beginning, they encouraged Japan to wage war, saying things like "China can be defeated in three months."

They then evacuated Shanghai, allowing the war to penetrate deep into the interior.

They would rather let Hong Kong be encircled, allowing Japan to occupy Guangzhou and Hainan Island.

They supplied Japan with vast quantities of munitions, enabling Japan to wage a war of attrition.

They also proclaimed their "assistance to China," and have even provided some aid — lending small sums of money, supplying some military materials — enabling China, too, to wage a war of attrition against Japan.

They loudly touted "China's inevitable victory" to bolster China's courage in this war of attrition.

The central purpose of all this is to exhaust both sides in the war, so that when both are utterly drained, they themselves, with "sound bodies," can step forward to command both sides to cease fire, and make both sides listen to them.

Their accommodation of Germany's and Italy's acts of aggression in the West serves the same purpose.

They hope Germany will fight the Soviet Union, while they watch from the sidelines and then, exploiting their mutual exhaustion, plunder them both.

This is why they have never endorsed the universal security plan proposed by the Soviet Union.

This is why they were unwilling to guarantee the security of the three Baltic states (opening a gap there to facilitate a German attack on the Soviet Union).

While the one-sidedness of the war (a war of aggression) harms the interests of Britain, the United States, and France, the reason they adopt a spectator's attitude lies precisely here.

The snipe and the clam grapple, and the fisherman reaps the benefit — this is the current policy of the British, American, and French imperialists.

Deep contradictions exist between these non-aggressor countries and the aggressor countries, but they will not abandon their "fisherman" policy until a certain point is reached.

Molotov stated: "Britain and France have made progress, but this so-called progress is superficial and insubstantial."

Stalin said: "Do not let yourselves be exploited," meaning that Britain and France have not abandoned their fisherman's policy — do not be deceived.

There is a possibility of concluding a Britain-France-Soviet pact, but for now, optimism remains difficult. Even if concluded, there is again the possibility of its rupture; the danger of a new Munich has not disappeared.

The Sixth Plenary Session pointed out that the governments of Britain, the United States, and France are unreliable; only their peoples can be relied upon. Anti-war and anti-fascist forces among the peoples of Britain, the United States, and France are gradually growing; only these forces are ultimately reliable. The Soviet Union has declared it will continue to aid China and absolutely disapproves of China's capitulation.

The Far Eastern Munich instigated by Britain, the United States, and France is now approaching a critical juncture. They seem to be entertaining this notion: to hope that China will fight for another half-year, so both sides will be a little more exhausted, and then the time for the curtain to rise on the Far Eastern Munich will have arrived. The second factor in China's danger of capitulation lies in this international situation.

(C) The Vacillation of China's Landlord-Bourgeois Class

1. The inevitability of bourgeois betrayal: In April 1936, the Congress of the Soviet Area pointed out: "In certain historical circumstances, the Chinese bourgeoisie (specifically, the national bourgeoisie), which can participate in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle, will, due to its political and economic weakness, waver and betray under different historical circumstances. This law has been proven in Chinese history. Therefore, history has decreed that the task of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism cannot be accomplished under bourgeois leadership, but must be achieved under the leadership of the proletariat."

B. The Central Committee's decision of August 15, 1937, stated: "Because serious weaknesses still exist in the current War of Resistance, unfavorable situations such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, and temporary and partial compromises may arise during the future course of the War. The loss of Beiping and Tianjin is the most serious lesson after the loss of the four northeastern provinces. Therefore, it should be seen that this War of Resistance is a arduous and protracted war."

C. The Sixth Plenary Session pointed out the serious existence of the crisis of compromise and placed opposition to capitulation and compromise as the top priority. It pointed out that the Kuomintang has a bright future, but simultaneously noted that there are still obstacles on that path; if not overcome, there will be no bright future.

"It is very clear: the statement that all parties have a bright future under the major premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and the United Front includes the effort to overcome conservative tendencies within each party. If conservative tendencies detrimental to the War of Resistance and the United Front are allowed to develop unchecked, the same applies — whether it is the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, or any other party."

The Kuomintang is a party with the bourgeoisie as its backbone, operating under bourgeois guidance.

(2) The Kuomintang after the Fifth Plenary Session:

A. The Fifth Plenary Session still took alliance with the Communists and resistance to Japan as its main direction, but simultaneously contained factors of anti-Communism and capitulation to Japan. 1. It decided on the policy of relying on international pressure for a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Japanese issue. 2. It decided on a policy of preventing and opposing Communism (but not through war) and established an "Anti-Communist Committee."

An atmosphere advocating peace prevailed for a time: opposition to the Far Eastern Munich was prohibited. A recent issue of the Chongqing-published "Wen Zhai" (Digest), which arrived lately, had an article titled "Will Britain Create a Munich in the Far East?" deleted.

Many publications carried articles advocating reliance on Britain and the United States to adjudicate Japan, implying the convening of an international mediation conference to solve the problem.

Many within the government and the party headquarters advocate peace, and such individuals also exist in the military.

"The possibility of the Kuomintang's capitulation" has existed all along, but today it has become the greatest danger. If not overcome, China's War of Resistance will suffer immense setbacks.

The Kuomintang is already undertaking its main preparatory work for capitulation, namely anti-Communism. Anti-Communism is the most crucial component of the preparations for capitulation: In the past six months, anti-Communist activities have been particularly fierce in North China, Central China, the South, and the Northwest.

In North China: The Eighth Route Army recovers lost territory from the Japanese; the Kuomintang "recovers lost territory" from the Communist Party.

In the Northwest: The Communist Party has not exceeded the Border Region by an inch of land, yet the Kuomintang has used military force to invade many places within the Border Region (Zhenning, Ningxian, Xunyi, Jingbian, Wayaobao).

The reason lies in the fact that the Communist Party is the greatest obstacle to capitulation; if not opposed, capitulation cannot be achieved.

Everything else is a pretext; carrying out the preparations for capitulation is the reality.

Countless forged documents have been concocted.

The above three factors, three causes, have placed the current situation in the midst of a serious struggle between the capitulationist faction and the resistance faction. Capitulation has become the greatest danger at present, and anti-Communism is precisely an inevitable step in preparing for that capitulation. Of the three causes, the vacillation of China's landlord-bourgeois class is the primary one. Without this self-wavering, the enemy's policy of enticing surrender would have no target to act upon, and international pressure urging surrender would have no use.

This situation is different from the time of the Sixth Plenary Session. At that time, the War of Resistance was still at a high tide, as evidenced by Chiang's declaration on October 30 and his refutation of Konoe's speech on December 26.

Now, the enemy is adopting a policy primarily aimed at enticing surrender, which has already taken effect; Britain and the United States are intensifying their instigation of capitulation; and this follows the Kuomintang's Fifth Plenary Session's decision to rely on Britain and America and implement an anti-Communist policy. Therefore, although opposing capitulation was listed as the top priority back then, the actual situation was not as grave as it is now.

In the past eight months, the situation has evolved to a point where anti-Communism and capitulation are at their most serious. Thus, a new, specific task has now been added: to oppose capitulation with all our strength.

All sorts of pretexts are being prepared for capitulation: The first pretext is that the Communist Party is causing trouble. This is incorrect. Forged documents. The attacks on the Border Region. The withholding of pay and supplies from the Eighth Route Army.

The nationwide implementation of a sound united front policy, supporting Chiang Kai-shek and the government, the absence of agrarian revolution across the country, the heroic combat of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army—the first pretext of a Soviet conspiracy is incorrect.

In 1917, it helped the Chinese revolution.

Over the past two years, it has provided the greatest assistance to China’s war of resistance.

It has never conspired to invade any country; many nations have established friendly ties and alliances with it.

The third pretext of financial and economic difficulties is incorrect.

As long as the new policies of the Sixth Plenary Session are adopted, any difficulties can be overcome.

The experience of the Red Army and the Eighth Route Army in overcoming difficulties is clear proof.

The fourth pretext of popular war-weariness is incorrect.

Japan is precisely spreading such propaganda, and saying this is tantamount to echoing Japanese propaganda.

The people’s dissatisfaction with the conscription law stems from resentment over improper methods, not from resentment against the war of resistance.

There is also extreme suppression of the mass movement.

The fifth pretext—military war-weariness—is incorrect.

It slanders the anti-Japanese forces.

The majority of officers and soldiers fight for national liberation.

The majority of officers and soldiers detest civil war.

The sixth pretext—lack of international support—is incorrect.

The war of resistance relies mainly on ourselves, not on others.

There is strong assistance from the Soviet Union, sympathy from the peoples of various countries; the governments of Britain, the United States, and France were never reliable to begin with.

The seventh pretext—the enemy is too strong—is incorrect.

The enemy has already been greatly depleted, needing 110 million yuan over three years, with insufficient and dispersed troops.

Our terrain is favorable, and morale is high.

There are still many other pretexts.

1. The prospects of the war of resistance (a rough estimate, not to be viewed rigidly). However, the war of resistance must be persisted in to the end; the Anti-Japanese National United Front and KMT-Communist cooperation must be consolidated and developed; the banner of the Three Principles of the People and the slogan of the Republic of the Three Principles of the People must be upheld—these are the Party’s fundamental tasks.

The possibility of KMT capitulation and the possibility of continued resistance are two possibilities.

There are those who capitulate and those who resist, which are two states of affairs.

"Setbacks, retreats, internal divisions and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises may occur"—this is one aspect.

"But we believe that the already-initiated war of resistance will, through the efforts of the entire nation, break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop."

"As long as millions of people are truly organized into the Anti-Japanese National United Front, victory in the war of resistance is beyond doubt"—this is another aspect (both from the "August Decision").

The war of resistance may have two prospects: the first prospect—the majority resists, a minority capitulates; the second prospect—the majority capitulates, a minority resists.

The protracted and tortuous nature of the Chinese revolution: the first prospect is also protracted and tortuous; the second prospect is even more protracted and tortuous.

We have never envisioned the war of resistance as a theory of quick victory or a straight-line theory (one-character theory), but have always advocated a protracted theory and a curved-line theory (the zigzag theory).

We have never advocated that without mobilizing the entire people and implementing national democratization, capitulation can be overcome and victory achieved.

Overcoming capitulation and achieving victory requires the majority of the people to take action, and requires all patriotic and progressive elements from all parties and groups to take action.

It cannot be imagined that the KMT would capitulate in a neat and tidy manner, with not a single person remaining.

During the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the entire KMT capitulated to imperialism and launched the anti-communist war.

But the circumstances at that time were: (1) No imperialist power had invaded China. (2) All imperialist powers supported Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-communist efforts, under a temporary state of stability among the powers. (3) The KMT had not yet suffered the bitterness of the anti-communist war and could mobilize its army. (4) The people of the entire nation had not tasted the bitterness of the anti-communist war, had not received painful lessons, and had no experience of being deceived. (5) The Communist Party lacked experience during the failure of the united front, lacked armed strength (all had failed), and most importantly, lacked war experience. (6) The world was not in a period of revolution and war, but in a reactionary period. (7) The Soviet Union was not as strong as it is today.

Yet there were still figures like Song Qingling, He Xiangning, and Deng Yanda who persisted in revolution without betraying.

After the September 18th Incident, there were Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, Zhao Bosheng, Dong Zhentang, Ji Zhentong, Ji Hongchang, Ren Yingqi, Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, Chen Jitang, and Sun Ke.

How much more so today, with two years of history in the war of resistance.

Even if there were a Miaja and a Hacha—China is neither Spain nor Czechoslovakia.

A. There will be capitulators (this is inevitable; there was already Wang Jingwei, and there will be Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei), and there will also be those who oppose capitulation.

B. There will be those who resolutely capitulate, never to return, and also those who temporarily capitulate, ready to fight again.

C. There will be those who capitulate first and fight later (some people need to become traitors for a time before they can turn good), and also those who capitulate first, fight later, and capitulate again.

D. The people and officers may initially be deceived, then later awaken and resist.

Deceptions such as "the Communist Party is creating trouble," "the Eighth Route Army has mutinied," "the international situation is unfavorable," "finances are extremely difficult," "the Soviet Union wants to communize China," and "temporarily submit, then plan to resist later" are bound to arise.

E. The enemy will not allow a unified nationwide capitulationist group free from interference to exist; they will inevitably adopt a divide-and-rule policy. At that time, many puppet regimes may exist simultaneously to facilitate their rule.

Civil war may break out among various armed capitulationist groups—China is the country most prone to civil war (due to its vast territory and dispersed economy) and with the most experience in it.

F. The enemy may first make concessions, then interfere. When they make concessions—capitulation is possible; when they interfere—a rupture may again occur.

G. Franco did not take in Miaja, nor did Hitler take in Hacha. Japan will ultimately only take in people like Wang Jingwei.

H. What if everyone learns from the experience of the people and army in Manchuria?

The Chinese army cannot be annihilated—this is certain; if disarmed, it will fight—this is also certain.

In short, it will inevitably be a chaotic situation, not a unified one.

At that time, the Communist Party will become the savior of the entire nation, and people across the country will look to the Communist Party as they look forward to a good harvest.

At that time, the Chinese people’s hopes for the Soviet Union will inevitably increase.

At that time, the international situation will be one of war and revolution.

At that time, conflicts between Japan and Britain, the United States, and France are possible.

If such a scenario emerges, it will precisely reflect the protracted and tortuous nature of the Chinese revolution.

It cannot be imagined that an undemocratic government, such as the current one, can "resist to the end."

It cannot be imagined that such a government can achieve final victory—we have never hoped for or said as much.

Only a government willing to mobilize the entire nation, a government that includes the Communist Party, can be the government that achieves victory in the war of resistance.

The transformation of old things undergoes a process of betrayal and overcoming.

At that time, a government of the Anti-Japanese National United Front (including the Communist Party) may emerge.

At that time, Chinese governments may have three natures: Japan’s puppet government, semi-puppet government, and anti-Japanese government.

The struggle among these types of governments will constitute the so-called stalemate phase.

The so-called stalemate phase may well be a phase of such a situation.

The impossibility of a quick victory also stems from this situation.

That the nation will not perish also stems from this situation.

The future situation of the war of resistance will be no more than two paths, as stated earlier: (1) The majority resists, a minority capitulates; (2) The majority capitulates, a minority resists.

If it is the second prospect, the possible situation is as described above.

But the first prospect is not yet without hope.

The reasons lie: Domestically—A. Many military personnel support the war of resistance; B. The pro-resistance faction within the KMT; C. The Communist Party’s opposition to capitulation; D. The people’s opposition to capitulation.

Internationally—A. Soviet assistance; B. The lessons of Spain and Czechoslovakia; C. Public opinion among the people of Europe and America.

In Japan—financial, economic, and military difficulties.

But this can only be achieved by consolidating and expanding the united front.

If the first prospect (note: based on context and earlier logic, this likely refers to the second prospect of majority capitulation, as the text seems to contain an inconsistency here) emerges: then it will not only be a split in the government, but also a split in the Three Principles of the People and the KMT: Japan’s Three Principles of the People and KMT—already being implemented, via Wang Jingwei; this is a false Three Principles of the People and a false KMT.

An intermediate Three Principles of the People and KMT—already budding, now rapidly advancing; this is a half-true, half-false Three Principles of the People and KMT.

The Chinese people’s Three Principles of the People and KMT—already emerging, now developing; this is the genuine Three Principles of the People and the genuine KMT.

Whether the Three Principles of the People and the KMT can avoid the aforementioned split (a split is inevitable) depends on the efforts of the KMT, the Communist Party, and the entire nation.

Therefore, the possible situations in the stalemate phase are several:

(A) A stalemate phase where the majority resists and a minority capitulates—that is, overcoming the possibility of capitulation, achieving majority resistance, continuing the fight, and, besides undermining Japan’s political schemes, also halting its military offensives. This is the stalemate phase of the first scenario; this is the most ideal and hoped-for.

(B) A stalemate phase where the majority capitulates and a minority resists (the Communist Party and all who are unwilling to capitulate will continue the war of resistance, even if a minority)—even if the majority capitulates, leaving a minority to resist, as long as the minority can be consolidated and the resistance base areas strengthened, it can still achieve a stalemate with the enemy, just as in the past when a small Red Army held base areas in a stalemate with the enemy. The difference: in the past it was civil war, in the future it will be against Japan and traitors, not civil war. In terms of standing firm and no longer retreating continuously, and in terms of being the nation’s sole anti-Japanese force, this is also a kind of stalemate situation. This is the second stalemate situation.

(C) A stalemate phase that moves from a minority back to a majority—this is the third stalemate phase. Because the minority persists in the war of resistance, persists in the united front, persists in protracted war, persists in KMT-Communist cooperation, and persists in the Three Principles of the People, the positions held by the capitulationists are divided and won over, gradually rallying the majority to resist again. At that time, if a counteroffensive against the enemy is still not possible, it will still be a stalemate phase.

We strive with utmost effort for the first stalemate scenario. Only as a last resort do we accept the second. And its future still holds the possibility of the third.

Danger exists. But the overall future is bright.

Those who despair in dangerous circumstances, those who see no light in the darkness, are merely cowards and opportunists.

As early as 1937, the Soviet Area Representative Conference pointed out the inevitability of the bourgeoisie’s betrayal. As early as August 1937, the Central Committee further pointed out that "the war of resistance is a bitter and protracted war," and that "many setbacks, retreats, internal divisions, and betrayals may occur." In November, it pointed out the dangers of national capitulationism and class capitulationism.

These were all foreseen by us; their occurrence is not sudden.

The future of the war of resistance has no more than two paths: good and bad. We strive for the good future while preparing that even if the worst occurs, we will have a way.

The overall future is bright, but it must pass through prolonged and tortuous struggle.

Short-term and straight-line victories do not exist.

We have always opposed the theories of quick victory and national subjugation, and this remains true today.

To think that the betrayal of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie means national subjugation is to overlook the existence of: A. The Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army; B. The anti-Japanese sentiment among friendly anti-Japanese forces; C. The pro-resistance faction within the KMT; D. Those within the bourgeoisie who are currently unwilling to capitulate; E. The bourgeoisie in occupied areas still subjected to oppression; F. The broad petty bourgeoisie and peasants; G. Soviet assistance.

Not seeing these growing forces, but only the capitulation of the landlord class and bourgeoisie, and then concluding that the whole world is dark, leading to panic, wavering, and flight—this is entirely wrong.

The Sixth Plenary Session stated that the stalemate phase will necessarily be one of "greater difficulty, yet also greater progress."

Greater difficulty means, besides the enemy, there will be added capitulation and betrayal.

Greater progress means that through various forms of struggle (including warfare), the anti-Japanese KMT continues to cooperate with the Communist Party, and the KMT can thereby make greater progress.

A part betrays, the majority resists—this is the situation we hope for. We hoped for this in the past, and we still hope for it now; we must strive for it with all our might.

The majority betrays (manifesting as the whole body), a minority resists—this situation is not what we hope for but is possible. If it arises, we must reverse it, which is also possible; we must also strive for this.

3. Current Tasks. Taking into account the two possible scenarios, good and bad, listed above, especially the possible bad scenario, what are the Party’s tasks?

(A) The entire Party must exert effort, preparing itself ideologically and organizationally, and preparing public opinion and the masses so that at any moment it can deal with incidents—various unexpected attacks, and various incidents large and small.

(B) The entire Party must exert effort, forging close unity with all patriotic and progressive elements, all patriotic and progressive KMT personnel (among the upper, middle, and lower ranks and the masses), and working together with them (in KMT-ruled areas, it must be together with them, not by ourselves alone) to mobilize the masses, carry out the struggle against capitulation, and openly expose the essence of anti-communism as preparation for capitulation, in order to isolate the capitulationists and anti-communist elements, so as to continue the war of resistance.

Here, the work and personnel of the united front must be strengthened.

(C) Regardless of the circumstances, the Party’s basic task is to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese national united front, uphold the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and adhere to the Three People’s Principles. This policy must be upheld without any wavering.

Such is the general task of the Party.

Based on the above tasks, the Party should pay attention to the understanding, interpretation, and necessary work on the following issues: (1) The issue of whether the policy of the Sixth Plenary Session is consistent with the current policy. The policy of the Sixth Plenary Session was correct, and the session had a significant influence nationwide.

Our policy of actively uniting the whole nation to strive for victory in the War of Resistance has become even more deeply rooted in people’s hearts due to the release of the Sixth Plenary Session documents.

Our united front work and Party organization efforts have further developed nationwide as a result of the Sixth Plenary Session’s directives.

At present, the danger of capitulation and the conspiracy against communism have become the primary dangers. Therefore, it is necessary to point out this new situation (in the past, it was not yet a fact and could only be generally indicated; now, since it may become a fact, it must be specifically pointed out) in order to overcome the danger of capitulation and prepare timely and necessary countermeasures should capitulation turn from a possibility into a reality. However, the fundamental policy remains that of the Sixth Plenary Session, and with proper guidance, it may elevate the actual content of the War of Resistance to a higher stage.

(1) Why must we now prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, as well as prepare public opinion and the masses? Here, we must understand the lessons from the failure of the Great Revolution of 1925–1927.

At that time, the lack of mental preparation was the main reason for the failure. Now, we must be prepared.

Back then, the national front could no longer be maintained, but we also took some overly absolute positions. Now, we must persist in a long-term national front.

At that time, it was a complete failure of the revolution, and the Party’s line was to retreat and then attack. Now, there is no issue of retreat in the line; rather, it is a matter of temporarily adopting conservative or concealed tactics locally during a continued advance, while preparing to launch offensives (if capitulation becomes a reality).

At that time, because the reactionary period arrived and the Party was unprepared and inexperienced, the ranks fell into disorder, and steps were mistaken (such as blind actionism). Now, in enemy-occupied areas, and in preparation for regions occupied by capitulators, orderly defensive retreats (some temporary, some prolonged) or counterattacks should be carried out, while in other areas, the policy of continued advance is maintained.

At that time, large numbers of new Party members abandoned or betrayed the Party. Now, under certain circumstances, similar incidents may occur, so prior preparation is necessary.

Historical experience teaches that at turning points in the revolution (even temporary, partial turning points), it is inevitable that some "dregs" will fall away, and this is not a bad thing. However, care must be taken to properly guide new Party members, especially the large numbers of young students, for they will be useful in the future.

At that time, both domestic and international conditions were dark. Now, they are fundamentally bright.

At that time, the Central Committee was dominated by opportunism, and even the reformed Central Committee lacked experience. Now, such a situation no longer exists.

Seventy: At that time, a large backbone of cadres had yet to be cultivated. Now, they have been cultivated.

Above, I have made eight comparisons.

Nevertheless, it is still necessary to prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so as to victoriously overcome difficulties and advance the War of Resistance and the Chinese Revolution to a higher stage, while avoiding potential failure.

(3) Why, even if capitulation becomes a reality, must we still uphold the national front, KMT-CPC cooperation, and the Three People’s Principles?
The main reasons have already been explained in discussing the prospects of the War of Resistance. Here, only the following points are added:
1. Throughout the entire process of resistance against Japan, a national united front must be maintained. Although, due to betrayal, many landlords and members of the bourgeoisie have left and become enemies, the betrayal of the landlord and bourgeois classes is gradual, not simultaneous. The remaining elements must be cooperated with. Neglecting this point will inevitably lead to grave mistakes. Therefore, throughout the War of Resistance, the united front should still be a front of all parties, classes, ethnic groups, collectives, and armies.
2. The same applies to KMT-CPC cooperation. Some KMT members may leave and become enemies, but those who remain should still be cooperated with. We must use the genuine Kuomintang to oppose the fake Kuomintang and win over the centrist Kuomintang. The prospect of an equal alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party still exists. KMT-CPC cooperation is the organizational foundation of the united front; neglecting this point will also lead to grave mistakes.
3. The same applies to the Three People’s Principles. They are the political foundation of the united front and the principles and policies applicable throughout the War of Resistance. We must use the genuine Three People’s Principles to oppose the fake Three People’s Principles and win over the centrist Three People’s Principles. This is the policy that should be adopted given the existence of multiple versions of the Three People’s Principles. Even during the War of Resistance, there are differences between the Three People’s Principles and communism. However, during the War of Resistance, there is a point of convergence between the two: when the Three People’s Principles are interpreted as they were at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, the two do not fundamentally conflict in the political program of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Therefore, it is incorrect for many people inside and outside the Party to disdain the Three People’s Principles, viewing them as fundamentally reactionary, deceptive, empty ideas or dogmas. Such thinking stems from failing to distinguish between the genuine Three People’s Principles and the fake or semi–Three People’s Principles.
4. Regarding ideological struggle: Over the past two years, especially in the last half year, those writing articles on behalf of the Kuomintang—including the Trotskyite Ye Qing and others—have published numerous “confused, erroneous, and disordered ideas” that not only oppose communism but also oppose the genuine Three People’s Principles. These are, in fact, the ideas of the fake or semi–Three People’s Principles and must be rigorously refuted. Among these, the most rampant are the arbitrary clamor of the so-called "national conditions" theory and the "unity" theory. In reality, their claim that only the Three People’s Principles and the Kuomintang suit China’s national conditions refers to the most unsuitable fake Three People’s Principles and a fake Kuomintang, whereas communism and the Communist Party are entirely suited to China's national conditions. Their assertion that the Border Region and the Eighth Route Army are not unified, and their desire to abolish them to achieve their so-called unity, is in fact a false unity that is anti-national, anti-democratic, and anti-livelihood, completely contrary to the interests of the War of Resistance. It is an arbitrary, empty phrase that utterly defies the socio-historical reality of unity amidst diversity or struggle within unity. Before the old-style semi-feudal regime is transformed into a genuine revolutionary democratic regime, the Border Region and the Eighth Route Army must exist. Only when a revolutionary democratic regime is established and the danger of anti-communism disappears can they abandon their current particularities. Otherwise, such demands are nothing but counterrevolutionary clamor.

(4) The issue of supporting Chiang Kai-shek
The slogan of supporting Generalissimo Chiang was correct in the past and remains correct now. As long as Chiang continues to lead the War of Resistance, we will still support him (naturally, with resistance as the condition) and must not show any sign of disrespect toward Chiang. However, the possibility exists that under certain circumstances, Chiang may be unable to persist in the War of Resistance. Even then, how we express ourselves must be carefully considered. Of course, at that time, some expression will be unavoidable, but it must be appropriate, guided by the principle of benefiting the unity of the majority in resisting Japan and the continued cooperation between the KMT and the CPC. We must not casually and rashly revive the slogan of “opposing Chiang.” Chiang harbors hostility toward the Communist Party—this is a fact he himself has demonstrated—and we must vigilantly guard against him and his subordinates undermining our Party; there is no doubt about this. Actively assisting Chiang and urging him to move in the right direction remains our policy. Externally, we should not speak of “the Kuomintang capitulating” but rather of “the capitulationist faction of the landlord and bourgeois classes.”

(5) The issue of opposing Wang Jingwei
The view that “it is incorrect to think Wang Jingwei is finished; Wang can still play a significant role” is entirely correct. There is no doubt that Wang’s traitorous clique is more harmful to China than other traitors. Wang has his followers and sympathizers within the government, party headquarters, and a portion of the military. Linking the struggle against capitulation to the struggle against Wang makes it more convenient and more practical.

(6) The issue of resisting Japan and eliminating traitors
In the event of a serious betrayal, the Party must pay the utmost attention to handling the situation appropriately, with the principle of not isolating itself from the majority of the Kuomintang. At such a time, the slogan of resisting Japan and eliminating traitors will be necessary, and a war of resisting Japan and eliminating traitors (simultaneously resisting Japan and rooting out traitors) will be unavoidable. However, we must never act rashly and alienate the majority of the Kuomintang. The war to eliminate traitors can only (and must) be launched when it is understood and demanded by the majority. For example, the current campaign against Wang Jingwei conforms to this principle.

(7) The issues of democracy and people's livelihood
Without a revolutionary democratic government, achieving victory in the War of Resistance is impossible. The broad masses across the nation yearn for a government that resists Japan, grants freedoms to the people, and is a democratic, centralized, and incorruptible government as eagerly as they long for rain in a drought. Therefore, the “struggle for democracy” must be linked to the subsequent movement of “opposing capitulation and continuing the War of Resistance.” Similarly, “improving people’s livelihood” must also be connected with it. However, only through resistance against Japan can democracy be realized; only through resistance and democracy can people’s livelihood be improved. This is the practical reality of the current political situation and must be clearly understood.

(8) The issue of friction
Following the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, the destructive and capitulationist frictions and armed conflicts instigated in Hebei, Shandong, and especially in the Border Region must be firmly resisted. Such resistance is useful. However, we must strictly maintain a self-defensive stance and must not exceed this limit, lest we give provocateurs a pretext to rupture the united front. The purpose of this self-defensive, protective struggle against friction is to consolidate KMT-CPC cooperation. To this end, under certain conditions, moderation and concessions are also necessary. Never forget struggle amidst unity, nor unity amidst struggle; neither aspect should be neglected, but unity should take precedence. “Friction without rupture.” Vigilantly guard against provocations; do not be deceived.

(9) The issue of not expanding Party organizations in friendly forces and withdrawing Party organizations from certain armies
Experience over the past six months has shown that the decision of the Sixth Plenary Session not to expand the Party within anti-Japanese armies that are cooperating with us is fundamentally correct. In general, developing the Communist Party within Chinese armies should be limited to traitor armies and those preparing to become traitor armies, with the aim of destroying them; it should not be carried out in others. For any army that has turned into a traitor army or is directly preparing to become one, a resolute policy of destruction must be adopted. In certain anti-Japanese armies where problems hindering cooperation have already arisen due to Party organizational issues, we should openly express our withdrawal in order to continue cooperation.

(10) The issue of assisting friendly parties
Anti-capitulationist outline
1. Do our utmost to assist progressive elements, but the degree of assistance should vary according to their level.
2. Refuse to assist retrogressive elements or hopeless elements, lest they turn against us once their strength grows. Many lessons have been learned in this regard in the past. In short, do not provide unconditional assistance.
3. Vigorously strengthen work with all patriotic and progressive elements, pushing them to oppose capitulation. This requires a large number of capable cadres to carry it out without slackening for a moment. Work with centrist elements must also be intensified.

(11) The work of the Central Committee departments since the Sixth Plenary Session
Over the past three years, especially since the Sixth Plenary Session, various central work departments have gradually been restored and established. Apart from the Military Commission, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Enemy Area Work Department, and the Youth Committee, which were established earlier, the following are newly established: the United Front Work Department, the Women’s Committee, the Workers’ Committee, the Finance and Economics Department, the Cadre Education Department, the General Political Department, the Party Newspaper Committee, the North China and Central China Committees, the Northwest Committee, and the Southern Committee. The Secretariat has also improved its organization. Altogether, there are 16 organs. The restoration and establishment of these central work departments is a major achievement and a great source of satisfaction after the severe destruction during the Long March.

(12) Central organizational issues
1. Politburo meetings will now be held weekly.
2. The Secretariat will handle day-to-day affairs.
3. For notifications, major matters shall be issued under the name of the Central Committee; minor matters, under the Secretariat.
4. Personnel assignments will follow the principle of ensuring the soundness of central leadership while strengthening local leadership.
5. All central departments shall be both streamlined and strengthened.

(13) Cadre education
Over the past two years, under the direct guidance of the Central Committee, 17 schools have been established, including the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, Shaanbei Public School, Party School, Marxism-Leninism Institute, Lu Xun Academy of Arts, Youth Training Class, Women’s University, Workers’ School, Health School, Communications School, Organization Department Training Class, Administrative Personnel Training Class, Border Region Party School, Lu Xun Normal School, Border Region Middle School, Lu Xun Primary School, and the Children’s Nursery. Some schools have over 10,000 students, while others range from several hundred to just a few dozen. Several thousand cadres are engaged in educational work, and more than 30,000 students have either completed their studies or are still enrolled—a tremendous achievement unseen in the past 18 years. The significant work results of these students are not yet visible, but they will become apparent in a few years. This policy should continue in the future. Due to material constraints and enemy conditions, schools will be divided between the Border Region and North China. Those going to North China will remain under the central leadership but will be supervised by the Northern Bureau.

(14) The study campaign
1. The study campaign for all Party cadres, initiated by the Central Committee after the Sixth Plenary Session to enhance the theoretical and cultural level of all Party cadres, is of primary importance.
2. All incumbent cadres in Party, government, military, civilian, and academic institutions should both work and study.
3. Depending on their level, they should balance culture and theory or emphasize one more.
4. This is like a long-term, large-scale university.

5. A one-hour daily study system.

6. Work, production, and study all at once.

7. Equal emphasis on voluntary and compulsory measures, with theory aligned with learning.

8. Reward the diligent scholars, punish the indolent.

9. Establish organs and personnel for cadre education leadership in all levels of organs, schools, and military units.

(15) The Production Movement
In all possible places, at all possible times, and of all possible kinds, we must develop agricultural, industrial, and cooperative movements among the people and in organs, schools, and military units. By using our own hands, we shall solve all or part of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and daily necessities, overcome difficulties, and thereby benefit the War of Resistance.
This year’s production movement in the Border Region has been carried out earnestly.
It is necessary to continue summarizing experiences to achieve the goal of overcoming difficulties.

(16) The Youth Movement
Since the Sixth Plenary Session, achievements have been made.
It is correct for the Youth Committee and the Joint Office of Youth Affairs to centrally guide the youth movement.
The policy for the youth movement: Persist in the youth united front and continue to adopt the attitude expressed in the "May Fourth Letter to the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps," in order to win over the majority of youth, under the banners of continuing the War of Resistance and a democratic republic.

(17) The Women’s Movement
The Central Committee has issued the guidelines for the women’s movement, begun establishing the work of the Women’s Committee, and local guiding organs for women’s work are gradually being set up.
Historically, our greatest shortage of cadres has been in women cadres, and experiences in the women’s movement have not been summarized—this shortcoming must be remedied.
Without a group of capable and full-time women work cadres, it will be impossible to develop the women’s movement.

(18) The Workers’ Movement
Guidelines for workers’ movement work have been issued, a Workers’ Committee has been initially established, and a workers’ school has been opened.
The workers’ movement is relatively weak among the mass movements, and the proportion of workers in the Party’s composition is also too small. Progress should be made in both these areas going forward.

(19) Counter-Espionage Work
Under the new circumstances, the enemy’s schemes to sabotage our Party, our army, and the Border Region government are gradually becoming more serious and will surely become even more so in the future, greatly increasing the gravity of our counter-espionage struggle.
Therefore, the entire Party must pay greater attention to this area and must dispatch and train a necessary number of capable cadres to this sector.
As a rule, when members of the Kuomintang are arrested or captured for conducting espionage work or armed attacks against us, the principle is generally not to execute them and not to force their surrender (not forcing them to write confessions or to renounce their beliefs), so as to win over the majority of the Kuomintang.

(110) Issues Concerning Party Organization
1. Guiding principle—It is no longer the time for widespread expansion; generally, expansion should cease, with the principle of being lean and capable as the focus.
2. Tighten organization.
3. Eliminate saboteurs and safeguard the Party.
4. Class education, Marxism-Leninism.
5. Strictly implement secret instructions.

(2) Self-Reliance
The Party, the army, everything.
Prepare to cope with the worst possible circumstances.

(111) The North China Issue
The situation in North China has the potential to become extremely grave; the enemy’s main forces may attack North China. Therefore, the Eighth Route Army and the North China Party must strictly heed the possible arrival of such a situation and make preparations across military, political, financial, Party organizational, and united front dimensions, guided by the principle of adapting to sustained guerrilla warfare and coping with the greatest difficulties.
The North China Party has the responsibility to supply the Central Committee with necessary funds, for the political significance of such funds is immense.

(12) The Central China Issue
We must greatly expand Party and guerrilla warfare work in Central China, establishing our own base areas in this complex environment to serve as the pivotal zone for the nationwide prolonged War of Resistance.
Better united front work is necessary, linked to the development and progress of the New Fourth Army’s work.
The principle is to primarily send cadres from the Border Region to Central China.

(14) Defending the Border Region
1. The Border Region is the fundamental base area—the seat of the Central Committee and a place of prestige nationwide; we must resolutely defend it.
2. An enemy attack on the Border Region is a step toward promoting China’s capitulation.
3. The enemy may possibly attack Yan’an.
4. Even if Yan’an is lost, we must still hold fast in the Border Region. Everyone must prepare for a life of guerrilla warfare—the hardest yet most vibrant life.
5. Food is the number one issue; rely on self-reliance to overcome difficulties.
6. Large numbers of students and staff go to the front lines.
7. Properly protect and educate young students, new cadres, and new Party members.
8. Preserve a leadership group, an education group, and a military group. Relying on favorable terrain and excellent popular support, there will surely be a way.

(25) Mobilize Large Numbers of Students and Staff to Go to the Front Lines
1. Strengthen education; reinforce frontline work.
2. After graduation, they should still go to the front—the sooner they go, the better.
3. Because of the enemy situation.
4. Because of funding.
5. A decision is made to send 100,000 people.
6. Carry out good political and organizational mobilization.
7. The rear facilitates leadership, education, and guerrilla warfare, but personnel numbers are still considerable.
8. Cadres must be appropriately distributed.
9. A certain number of students must be deliberately kept in the rear.
10. The name of the school must be preserved, equally at the front and in the rear.

(26) The Seventh Congress
1. Elections to be completed before August 1st.
2. Convene in October.
3. Strive to unite the entire Party against capitulation.
4. Those who can come and can hold it.

(27) Struggle on Two Fronts
1. Oppose the Right: Failing to see the danger of capitulation and anti-communism; yielding to Kuomintang pressure; seeing no way out for the current situation (losing sight of the future); lacking a class standpoint; being fearful and despondent in the face of arduous struggle.
2. Oppose the "Left": A dark China, a dark world, a dark Border Region, a dark self. Preparing to sabotage the united front, denying KMT-CPC cooperation, rejecting the Three People’s Principles, isolating oneself, and acting recklessly.
3. Veteran cadres should serve as the backbone, leading the vast number of new Party members and new cadres as we advance toward a higher stage of the War of Resistance and attack the strongholds of difficulty.

(118) Unity Conquers All
1. We must be even more united: As long as the Central Committee and senior cadres are united, the entire Party can certainly be united. As long as the Communist Party is united, nothing is impregnable. The savior of the people nationwide is the Communist Party.
2. We must be even more centralized: Reduce unnecessary democracy. The individual submits to the organization, the minority submits to the majority, the lower level submits to the higher level, and the entire Party submits to the Central Committee.
3. With the entire Party united and under centralized command, conquer all.

Conclusion (June 13)
1. The Issue of the Current Situation
(1) Among the factors of capitulation, the vacillation of China’s landlord and bourgeois classes is the primary one—this is correct.
(2) We must overcome two types of capitulation—(A) overcome minor capitulation, (B) overcome major capitulation.
A. Is current, under circumstances where the majority resist Japan.
B. Is future, under circumstances where the majority have capitulated.
But doing the present work facilitates doing the future work—the two are indivisibly unified.

Outline Against Capitulation
(3) According to the definition of the Sixth Plenary Session, the stalemate stage only arrives when enemy and our forces are balanced. Thus, not only can we not speak of a stalemate stage now, but if a Li Jingwei emerges, it means the enemy has formed (and is actively organizing) his strategic reserve army and is using it to outflank the rear of our resistance front (national counter-revolutionaries are undoubtedly strategic allies of imperialism). At such a time, it is even less a stalemate between enemy and us; rather, we have suffered another major defeat. Under those circumstances, we would be fighting Japanese imperialism plus Li Jingwei (China’s Franco), making things far graver than the earlier strategic retreat, not a stalemate stage at all.
(4) Japanese imperialism is organizing two strategic allied armies: one is the international capitulationists, the other the Chinese capitulationists. The former is used to encircle China externally, the latter to outflank China internally. Our direction of effort is to mobilize the anti-capitulation forces both internationally and domestically to beat back these two enemy strategic allied armies. Until they are beaten back, there is no stalemate stage.
(5) The frontal enemy (the main force of Japanese imperialism) may still launch military offensives. It is incorrect to say such offensives are no longer possible. Although facing difficulties in finance, economy, manpower, and military strength, based on actual strength and time, they still have the capability for military offensives. Therefore, not only must we defeat the enemy attacking from the flank, but we must also prepare to continue defeating the enemy attacking from the front, in order to achieve balance between enemy and ourselves and bring about the arrival of the stalemate stage.
(6) But this does not mean we must wait until the strength of these frontal and flank enemies equals that of our anti-Japanese forces in every respect before a stalemate stage can appear. Stalemate does not mean equality of strength; rather: Our strength + enemy weaknesses + international constraints = stalemate stage.
(7) Consequently, the stalemate stage can emerge under three sets of circumstances:
1. Large territory, large population, and a consolidated front create an enemy-us stalemate. For example: the middle period of Russia’s civil war, the middle period of the European War. In China during the War of Resistance up to now, the territory is large and the population large, but the front is not consolidated (political corruption, troublemaking by capitulators), so there is still no stalemate stage. If we can strive to overcome the danger of capitulation and, in the course of that struggle, reform politics and consolidate the front, the stalemate stage will come. This is the first circumstance.
2. Small territory (meaning the immediate base area is small, but the country is large) and a small population, but with a consolidated front, a stalemate can also be achieved. For example: the ten-year Red Army war, to some extent the Northeast Volunteer Armies during a certain period. In the future, assuming a large-scale defection occurs, the remaining small part could still create a stalemate, so long as they can continuously break encirclement campaigns; then this stalemate situation will exist. The current situation in North China can be seen as a temporary, small-scale stalemate; if it is prolonged, it will become a long-term, small-scale stalemate.
3. From the aforementioned small-scale stalemate, transition again to a large-scale stalemate, achieved through the expansion of the united front and victory in the anti-encirclement struggle. If a strategic counter-offensive cannot yet be mounted at that point (still being in the period of campaign counter-offensives), it remains a stalemate stage.
(8) If a large-scale defection unavoidably occurs in the course of the War of Resistance, then perhaps the process of the war will structure the entire stalemate stage according to the following formula: a temporary large-scale stalemate after Wuhan (the current situation can, in a sense, be called a stalemate, but because the front is not consolidated, it can only be temporary) → a small-scale stalemate after a certain point → another large-scale stalemate after a further point.
The main characteristic of this change is moving from an unconsolidated front to a consolidated one. To have a long-term stalemate, the front must be consolidated; with this condition, even a small one can achieve stalemate; without it, even a large one cannot. So we must strive for quantitative magnitude (many people, large territory), but the main effort should be on qualitative strength. The so-called consolidated front means the consolidation of anti-Japanese base areas plus the consolidation of the united front.
(9) In North China, a stalemate situation indeed exists, but it is still temporary. When we put forward "persist in guerrilla warfare in North China," we aim to turn the temporary into the long-term. If everywhere else falls into darkness, leaving only North China (likewise, the New Fourth Army and the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region), then although it is partial in territory and population, because there are no other anti-Japanese forces left, it becomes the sole anti-Japanese force and thereby assumes the significance of a strategic stalemate. This would be a difficult situation, but we must also prepare for it. If more than half the sky turns dark and only the Communist Party remains resisting Japan, we shall continue the struggle—and we can continue. Doing so for three to five years, awakening the people, attracting friendly forces, and gradually forming a new and large anti-Japanese front, we shall then become the core and leading force in anti-Japanese national salvation. Therefore, no matter what, our future is bright, though the path is arduous.
(10) At present, we are precisely at the moment when the relationship between enemy and ourselves (enemy and our forces) is being reshuffled. It depends on who wins the majority, and even more on whose quality is better, to determine who prevails in victory or defeat. This question—who wins, who loses—is currently undecided; both sides are once again preparing the conditions.
The front will inevitably be reshuffled, and must be reshuffled. A part of our allied army (a part of the landlord and bourgeois classes) is changing into an allied army of the enemy, but we must absolutely not let all of them switch sides; we must win over a part of them, and it is possible to do so.
We still have vast allied forces yet to be mobilized—the Chinese peasantry, Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers, the international proletariat, the strength of the Soviet Union. Once mobilized, they can deal a death blow to the enemy.
The enemy is counter-revolutionary, we are revolutionary; this qualitative difference determines who will ultimately triumph. Yet the strategy for directing the war especially decides who will prevail in victory or defeat. Without the latter, relying solely on an intrinsically good nature, victory still cannot be won.

The Issue of Transition
(1) We say prepare ourselves to cope with new possible circumstances, to deal with a possible Munich, and this is under the general line of the Sixth Plenary Session. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenary Session, we prepare to deal with a possible Munich (or a Khazai) and to adopt a temporary policy of retreat in areas that a possible Munich might occupy. Up to this point, one cannot imagine making a 180-degree turn away from the Sixth Plenary Session. It is not a shift in the line, but a local, temporary shift in tactics or strategy to guard against unexpected attacks. This point must first be made clear. We must uphold the past general line.

(1) The central task at present, which must be striven for with the full strength of the Party, is to overcome the possibility of capitulation, win over the majority for resistance against Japan, and support, assist, supervise, and criticize the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, so that they can overcome the tendency toward capitulation through the anti-Wang Jingwei struggle and future developments. This is the current central task.

(3) Therefore, emphasis should be placed on unity, on solidarity, and on long-term cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, rather than on other matters.

Only by emphasizing these can we overcome the crisis of capitulation, and only by emphasizing these can we better prepare ourselves to deal with possible incidents.

Everything is aimed at isolating capitulation rather than isolating ourselves.

Several Strategic Issues — (1) The issue of consolidating the Party (organizational retrenchment policy). After the meeting in March last year decided to greatly expand the Party, the Party has undergone large-scale growth nationwide. The current task is to consolidate it. Therefore, development must be temporarily and generally halted. Of course, this does not mean no one is allowed to join the Party; in some places, development should still continue. Halting development is meant to facilitate screening, eliminating traitors, and education; development will resume in the future.

(2) The Party must properly protect new Party members and new cadres. The primary responsibility rests on veteran Party members and veteran cadres. Relations between new and veteran members and between new and veteran cadres must be properly handled. If they are not handled well, the veteran members and veteran cadres bear the main responsibility. There are full grounds to forgive new Party members and new cadres, but absolutely no such grounds exist for veteran Party members and veteran cadres. Certain incorrect views on this issue have existed in the past. This matter is roughly similar to the relationship between main force units and local guerrilla units. A large number of cadres must be promoted from among new Party members.

(3) Intensify education within the Party. Unify class education with national education, but at present, emphasis should be placed on class education, while not neglecting united front education. Intermediate textbooks must be compiled. On philosophical issues, emphasis should be placed on the materialist conception of history.

(4) Local cadres must be promoted. Without local cadres — at the intermediate and senior levels — it is impossible to establish consolidated base areas. Oppose the tendency of acting like "imperial envoys," and oppose looking down on "local bumpkins." Abolish the label "local bumpkins."

(5) The Party must protect revolutionary intellectuals. Do not repeat past mistakes. Without revolutionary intellectuals, the revolution cannot achieve victory. The Kuomintang is competing with us for youth and the military. We must definitely recruit large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. We must persuade worker and peasant cadres to accept them, not to fear them. Without the assistance of revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants cannot improve themselves; without intellectuals, the Party, the government, and the military cannot be governed. Revolutionary intellectuals must also be drawn into the government, Party departments, and mass movements.

(6) The issue of halting Party development and withdrawing Party members from friendly parties and friendly armies. From the perspective of the overall situation, halting and withdrawal are beneficial. Otherwise, this matter will hinder the overall situation and rupture the united front. Without winning over the Chinese army, the revolution cannot achieve victory. At present, winning over them is primarily through political means; building Party organizations would hinder political efforts to win them over. Rely on words, not on organization (under temporary circumstances); rely on the upper levels, not the lower levels. While withdrawing Party members, strengthen liaison and agree to a certain degree of independence in united front work. Generally, adopt an organizational sabotage policy only in the military, government, and political parties of those who have truly capitulated; otherwise, generally adopt a political policy of winning over. Certain special departments are exempt from the withdrawal measures.

(7) Do not kill Kuomintang members. This is of great significance. It does not mean not killing traitors, nor does it mean not killing certain renegades, nor does it mean not killing those who endanger the revolution in urgent moments.

(8) Do not overemphasize democracy and people's livelihood. That is inappropriate. At present, emphasis should be on opposing capitulation (emphasizing the war of resistance). There cannot be multiple emphases at the same time. They are linked, not overemphasized. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, democracy and people's livelihood are propaganda slogans, not action slogans. On issues such as conscription, taxes, and production, adopt an attitude of approval with criticism; do not adopt a fundamentally oppositional attitude.

(9) Local strategies. There must be clear local strategies suited to local conditions and various circumstances. The Central Committee must pay attention to providing guidance in the future.

(10) Mass movements must be strengthened. The so-called preparation of the masses refers to this. It is not about lowering the class struggle. Only by correctly waging the class struggle and coordinating it with the united front can we overcome capitulation. A united front alone without struggle is dangerous. The masses are our ultimate reliance and also the ultimate reliance of the war of resistance.

(11) The issue of the Hui people.

(11-a) Launch an internal Party journal; begin it immediately, and local areas must also do so.

(12) Other matters. The overall conclusion is this: Unity overcomes everything.

KK

yy

O Selected Materials on the Southern Anhui Incident, Anhui People's Publishing House, January 1981. 5

Oo Reference Materials for Teaching CPC History (Part II), People's Publishing House, October 1979. 10

# Source: en:auto-trans

--- Notes

**m—.1 Characteristics of the Current Situation**
The characteristic of the current situation is that the possibility of the Kuomintang’s capitulation has become the greatest danger, and its anti-communist activities are steps in preparation for surrender.
The prospect of Kuomintang capitulation has existed since the beginning of the War of Resistance; it did not emerge suddenly today. However, its becoming the greatest danger in the current political situation is a phenomenon particular to the present political landscape.
The Kuomintang’s anti-communist stance has also existed since the establishment of the United Front; it did not arise suddenly today. But making anti-communist actions a direct step in preparation for surrender reflects the current reality.
This current situation has been brought about by three factors: (a) Japan’s policy of inducing surrender, (b) international pressure, and (c) the vacillation of China’s landlord and bourgeois classes.
These are further elaborated below.