I. In accordance with the Central Committee’s instructions of November 7 regarding the current situation, and in line with the political stance adopted in the joint reply telegram from Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang to He Yingqin dated Jia day, we have decided to adopt a policy of concession toward Chiang Kai-shek’s present anti-Communist offensive in southern Anhui—namely, to effect a northward relocation of our forces there—and a policy of self-defense in central China. At the national level, we will launch a large-scale campaign against surrender and civil war, with the aim of winning over the intermediate forces, thwarting the conspiratorial provocations of He Yingqin’s pro-Japanese faction, moderating Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist drive, prolonging the Anti-Japanese War and Sino-Communist cooperation, and securing for ourselves a just and advantageous position throughout the country.

II. Chiang has already resolved to press hard in central China; therefore, we must actively prepare for self-defense. However, his offensive faces several difficulties: First, our conciliatory attitude deprives He Yingqin of any pretext for instigation (though some excuses still remain), and both Chiang Kai-shek and Bai Chongxi must take into account the stance of the intermediate forces. Accordingly, we should widely publicize the contents of the Jia-day telegram, thereby stripping Chiang, He, and Bai of their political capital. Second, Chiang Kai-shek greatly fears the southward advance of the Eighth Route Army, particularly our breakout from Xi’an. We should therefore propagate the message that if they attack the New Fourth Army, the Eighth Route Army will not stand by idly; we should demand that they halt the movement of nineteen divisions, warning that otherwise the Eighth Route Army will not permit the New Fourth Army to be beaten. This line of argument should be disseminated appropriately everywhere, mounting a sustained offensive against the die-hard elements so as to make them apprehensive and deter them from reckless action. Third, Chiang Kai-shek is concerned that our forces in southern Anhui will remain stationary, thereby disrupting his rear areas. Consequently, while we must earnestly prepare for the northward relocation of these troops as a bargaining chip to be offered when he seeks to ease the pressure, we should also require him to guarantee that all units in central China cease hostilities, to serve as a counterpart to our withdrawal of the southern Anhui force. Fourth, both Chiang Kai-shek and Gu Zhutong fear that we may eliminate Han Deqin. Therefore, we should circulate the following message in various localities: roughly, that with regard to the North Jiangsu incident we have complied with orders to reach a settlement and will not pursue past grievances; however, should Tang, Li, Huo (Shouyi), and Mo (Deming) fail to stop their offensive, we shall have no choice but to deal with Han Deqin. Such propaganda should be directed primarily at Han himself and at Gu Zhutong, making it clear that we are willing to preserve Han Deqin, provided that Tang, Li, Huo, and Mo cease their attacks in exchange. Fifth, another difficulty confronting Chiang’s offensive lies in the fact that, until he has truly negotiated terms with the Japanese (for should such an agreement be reached, the entire strategic situation would undergo a profound transformation), his anti-Communist front is highly inconvenient. His eastern expeditionary force would find it exceedingly difficult to penetrate the two Japanese blockade lines along the Huai River Road and the Jinpu Railway, while his northern force would likewise struggle to pass through the fortified positions along the Wo River and the strongholds beyond. Moreover, if Chiang were to rely solely on small detachments like those under Huo and Mo, our guerrilla units would be more than sufficient to contain them. Accordingly, with respect to all approaching formations—Huo, Mo, He (Zhuguo), Sun (Tongxuan), Ma (Biao), and others—we should emphasize the principle that, with a common external enemy looming, civil war is unwarranted, while intensifying united-front work. When these smaller units do launch attacks—for example, Huo and Mo—we should simply employ numerous guerrilla bands to harass and encircle them (these guerrillas serving primarily as propaganda teams), avoiding direct, full-scale engagements so as not to offend the Guangxi clique or the Northeastern Army, thus reserving room for future negotiations. Meanwhile, in eastern Anhui we should reiterate that this region was designated as a defensive zone for the New Fourth Army by the late Chairman Liao, whereas in northeastern Anhui we should point out that it has been recognized by Minister Wei as a guerrilla area belonging to Peng’s command. In short, in these areas we must ensure that all our military personnel and civilians are able to articulate their position firmly and convincingly, leaving any aggressor speechless and without legal justification.

III. If we handle matters properly on all fronts, it should be possible to repel this latest wave of anti-Communist repression. Nevertheless, we must never assume that Chiang will abandon his policy of oppression against us—such an outcome is entirely out of the question—and we should continue to prepare for the most dire scenario of being caught in a pincer movement by the surrenderists. The above views are submitted for your consideration and appropriate implementation. ().•