November 6, 1938

[This article is part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's concluding speech at the
Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. In his
"Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" and "On Protracted
War", Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already settled the question of the Party's
leading role in the War of Resistance Against Japan. But some comrades,
committing Right opportunist errors, denied that the Party must maintain
its independence and initiative in the united front, and so doubted and even
opposed the Party's line on the war and on strategy.

In order to overcome this Right opportunism, bring the whole Party to
a clearer understanding of the prime importance of the problems of war and
strategy in the Chinese revolution and mobilize it for serious work in this
connection, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again stressed the importance of the subject
at this plenary session, approaching it from the viewpoint of the history
of China's political struggles, and analysed the development of the Party's
military work and the specific changes in its strategy The result was unanimity
of thought in the Party leadership and unanimity of action throughout the
Party.]


## I. CHINA'S CHARACTERISTICS AND REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war,
is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist
principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other
countries.

But while the principle remains the same, its application by the party of
the proletariat finds expression in varying ways according to the varying
conditions. Internally, capitalist countries practice bourgeois democracy
(not feudalism) when they are not fascist or not at war; in their external
relations, they are not oppressed by, but themselves oppress, other nations.
Because of these characteristics, it is the task of the party of the proletariat
in the capitalist countries to educate the workers and build up strength
through a long period of legal struggle, and thus prepare for the final overthrow
of capitalism. In these countries, the question is one of a long legal struggle,
of utilizing parliament as a platform, of economic and political strikes,
of organizing trade unions and educating the workers. There the form of
organization is legal and the form of struggle bloodless (non-military).
On the issue of war, the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries oppose
the imperialist wars waged by their own countries; if such wars occur, the
policy of these Parties is to bring about the defeat of the reactionary
governments of their own countries. The one war they want to fight is the
civil war for which they are preparing.[1] But
this insurrection and war should not be launched until the bourgeoisie becomes
really helpless, until the majority of the proletariat are determined to
rise in arms and fight, and until the rural masses are giving willing help
to the proletariat. And when the time comes to launch such an insurrection
and war, the first step will be to seize the cities, and then advance into
the countryside, and not the other way about. All this has been done by Communist
Parties in capitalist countries, and it has been proved correct by the October
Revolution in Russia.

China is different however. The characteristics of China are that she is
not independent and democratic but semi-colonial and semi-feudal, that internally
she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression and that in her external
relations she has no national independence but is oppressed by imperialism.
It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to
organize the workers to strike. Basically, the task of the Communist Party
here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching
insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy
the countryside, but the reverse.

When imperialism is not making armed attacks on our country, the Chinese
Communist Party either wages civil war jointly with the bourgeoisie against
the warlords (lackeys of imperialism), as in 1924-27 in the wars in Kwangtung
Province [2] and the Northern Expedition, or unites
with the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie to wage civil war against
the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also lackeys of imperialism),
as in the War of Agrarian Revolution of 1927-36. When imperialism launches
armed attacks on China, the Party unites all classes and strata in the country
opposing the foreign aggressors to wage a national war against the foreign
enemy, as it is doing in the present War of Resistance Against Japan.

All this shows the difference between China and the capitalist countries.
In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of
organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are
also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances
to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. Before the outbreak
of a war all organization and struggle are in preparation for the war, as
in the period from the May 4th Movement of 1919 to the May 30th Movement
of 1925. After war breaks out, all organization and struggle are coordinated
with the war either directly or indirectly, as, for instance, in the period
of the Northern Expedition when all organization and struggle in the rear
areas of the revolutionary army were co-ordinated with the war directly,
and those in the Northern warlord areas were co-ordinated with the war
indirectly. Again in the period of the War of Agrarian Revolution all
organization and struggle inside the Red areas were co-ordinated with the
war directly, and outside the Red areas indirectly. Yet again in the present
period, the War of Resistance, all organization and struggle in the rear
areas of the anti-Japanese forces and in the areas occupied by the enemy
are directly or indirectly co-ordinated with the war.

"In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That
is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese
revolution."[3] This thesis of Comrade Stalin's
is perfectly correct and is equally valid for the Northern Expedition, the
War of Agrarian Revolution, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan.
They are all revolutionary wars; all directed against counter-revolutionaries
and all waged mainly by the revolutionary people, differing only in the sense
that a civil war differs from a national war, and that a war conducted by
the Communist Party differs from a war it conducts jointly with the Kuomintang.
Of course, these differences are important. They indicate the breadth of
the main forces in the war (an alliance of the workers and peasants, or of
the workers, peasants and bourgeoisie) and whether our antagonist in the
war is internal or external (whether the war is against domestic or foreign
foes, and, if domestic, whether against the Northern warlords or against
the Kuomintang); they also indicate that the content of China's revolutionary
war differs at different stages of its history. But all these wars are instances
of armed revolution fighting armed counterrevolution, they are all revolutionary
wars, and all exhibit the specific features and advantages of the Chinese
revolution. The thesis that revolutionary war "is one of the specific features
and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" fits China's conditions
perfectly. The main task of the party of the Chinese proletariat, a task
confronting it almost from its very inception, has been to unite with as
many allies as possible and, according to the circumstances, to organize
armed struggles for national and social liberation against armed
counterrevolution, whether internal or external. Without armed struggle the
proletariat and the Communist Party would have no standing at all in China,
and it would be impossible to accomplish any revolutionary task.

Our Party did not grasp this point fully during the first five or six years
after it was founded, that is, from 1921 to its participation in the Northern
Expedition in 1926. It did not then understand the supreme importance of
armed struggle in China, or seriously prepare for war and organize armed
forces, or apply itself to the study of military strategy and tactics. During
the Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the army but laid one-sided
stress on the mass movement, with the result that the whole mass movement
collapsed the moment the Kuomintang turned reactionary. For a long time after
1927 many comrades continued to make it the Party's central task to prepare
for insurrections in the cities and to work in the White areas. It was only
after our victory in repelling the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression"
campaign in 1931 that some comrades fundamentally changed their attitude
on this question. But this was not true of the whole Party, and there were
other comrades who did not think along the lines presented here.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed
force. An understanding of this point will help us in successfully waging
the War of Resistance Against Japan from now on. The fact that the whole
nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate
a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party,
and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front
at any moment. Moreover, our present session has clearly defined the direction
for our efforts by deciding that the Party's main fields of work are in the
battle zones and in the enemy's rear. This is also an excellent antidote
against the tendency of some Party members to be willing only to work in
Party organizations and in the mass movement but to be unwilling to study
or participate in warfare, and against the failure of some schools to encourage
students to go to the front, and other such phenomena. In most of China,
Party organizational work and mass work are directly linked with armed struggle;
there is not and cannot be, any Party work or mass work that is isolated
and stands by itself. Even in rear areas remote from the battle zones (like
Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan) and in enemy-occupied areas (like Peiping,
Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai), Party organizational work and mass work
are co-ordinated with the war, and should and must exclusively serve the
needs of the front. In a word, the whole Party must pay great attention to
war, study military matters and prepare itself for fighting.


## II. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE KUOMINTANG

It will be useful for us to look at the history of the Kuomintang and see
what attention it pays to war.

From the start, when he organized a small revolutionary group, Sun Yat-sen
staged armed insurrections against the Ching
Dynasty.[4] The period of Tung Meng Hui (the
Chinese Revolutionary League) was replete with armed
insurrections,[5] right up to the armed overthrow
of the Ching Dynasty by the Revolution of 1911. Then, during the period of
the Chinese Revolutionary Party, he carried out a military campaign against
Yuan Shih-kai.[6] Subsequent events such as the
southern movement of the naval units,[7] the northern
expedition from Kweilin [8] and the founding of
the Whampoa Military Academy [9] were also among
Sun Yat-sen's military undertakings.

After Sun Yat-sen came Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the Kuomintang's military
power to its zenith. He values the army as his very life and has had the
experience of three wars, namely, the Northern Expedition, the Civil War
and the War of Resistance Against Japan. For the last ten years Chiang Kai-shek
has been a counter-revolutionary. He has created a huge "Central Army" for
counter-revolutionary purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that
whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect
we ought to learn from him. In this respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek
are our teachers.

Since the Revolution of 1911, all the warlords have clung to their armies
for dear life, setting great store by the principle, "Whoever has an army
has power."

Tan Yen-kai,[10] a clever bureaucrat who had a
chequered career in Hunan, was never a civil governor pure and simple but
always insisted on being both the military governor and the civil governor.
Even when he became President of the National Government first in Canton
and then in Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army.
There are many such warlords who understand this peculiarity of China's.

There have also been parties in China, notably the Progressive
Party,[11] which did not want to have an army;
yet even this party recognized that it could not get government positions
without some warlord backing. Among its successive patrons have been Yuan
Shih-kai,[12] Tuan
Chi-jui[13] and Chiang Kai-shek (to whom the Political
Science Group,[14] formed out of a section of
the Progressive Party, has attached itself).

A few small political parties with a short history, e.g., the Youth
Party,[15] have no army, and so have not been
able to get anywhere.

In other countries there is no need for each of the bourgeois parties to
have an armed force under its direct command. But things are different in
China, where, because of the feudal division of the country, those landlord
or bourgeois groupings or parties which have guns have power, and those which
have more guns have more power. Placed in such an environment, the party
of the proletariat should see clearly to the heart of the matter.

Communists do not fight for personal military power (they must in no
circumstances do that, and let no one ever again follow the example of Chang
Kuo-tao), but they must fight for military power for the Party, for military
power for the people. As a national war of resistance is going on, we must
also fight for military power for the nation. Where there is naivety on the
question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved. It is very
difficult for the labouring people, who have been deceived and intimidated
by the reactionary ruling classes for thousands of years, to awaken to the
importance of having guns in their own hands. Now that Japanese imperialist
oppression and the nation-wide resistance to it have pushed our labouring
people into the arena of war, Communists should prove themselves the most
politically conscious leaders in this war. Every Communist must grasp the
truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle
is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to
command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as
witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has
created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create
culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been created by having
guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist
theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever
wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people
ridicule us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war". Yes, we are advocates
of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist.
The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create
a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism
teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class
and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords;
in this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed.
We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can
only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary
to take up the gun.

## III. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY


Our Party failed to grasp the importance of engaging itself directly in
preparations for war and in the organization of armed forces for a period
of three or four years, that is; from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party
was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Kuomintang
was held), and it still lacked adequate understanding of this issue in the
1924-27 period and even later; nevertheless, after 1924, when it began to
participate in the Whampoa Military Academy, it entered a new stage and began
to see the importance of military affairs. Through helping the Kuomintang
in the wars in Kwangtung Province and participating in the Northern Expedition,
the Party gained leadership over some armed
forces.[16] Then, having learned a bitter lesson
from the failure of the revolution, the Party organized the Nanchang
Uprising, [17] the Autumn Harvest Uprising
[18] and the Canton Uprising, and entered on a
new period, the founding of the Red Army. That was the crucial period in
which our Party arrived at a thorough understanding of the importance of
the army. Had there been no Red Army and no war fought by the Red Army in
this period, that is, had the Communist Party adopted Chen Tu-hsiu's
liquidationism, the present War of Resistance would have been inconceivable
or could not have been sustained for long.

At its emergency meeting held on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of
the Party combated Right opportunism in the political sphere, thus enabling
the Party to take a big stride forward. At its fourth plenary session in
January 1931, the Sixth Central Committee nominally combated "Left" opportunism
in the political sphere, but in fact itself committed the error of "Left"
opportunism anew. The two meetings differed in their content and historical
role, but neither of them dealt seriously with the problems of war and strategy,
a fact which showed that war had not yet been made the centre of gravity
in the Party's work. After the central leadership of the Party moved into
the Red areas in 1933, this situation underwent a radical change, but mistakes
in principle were again committed on the problem of war (and all other major
problems), bringing serious losses to the revolutionary war. The Tsunyi Meeting
of 1935, on the other hand, was mainly a fight against opportunism in the
military sphere and gave top priority to the question of war, and this was
a reflection of the war conditions of the time. Today we can say with confidence
that in the struggles of the past seventeen years the Chinese Communist Party
has forged not only a firm Marxist political line but also a firm Marxist
military line. We have been able to apply Marxism in solving not only political
but also military problems; we have trained not only a large core of cadres
capable of running the Party and the state, but also a large core of cadres
capable of running the army. These achievements are the flower of the revolution,
watered by the blood of countless martyrs, a glory that belongs not only
to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also to the Communist
Parties and the peoples of the whole world. There are only three armies in
the whole world which belong to the proletariat and the labouring people,
the armies led by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, of China and
of Spain, and as yet Communist Parties in other countries have had no military
experience; hence our army and our military experience are all the more precious.

In order to carry the present War of Resistance Against Japan to victory,
it is extremely important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army,
the New Fourth Army and all the guerrilla forces led by our Party. Acting
on this principle, the Party should dispatch a sufficient number of its best
members and cadres to the front. Everything must serve victory at the front,
and the organizational task must be subordinated to the political task.

## IV. CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL
  WAR AND THE NATIONAL WAR


The changes in our Party's military strategy are worth studying. Let us deal
separately with the two processes, the civil war and the national war.

The civil war can be roughly divided into two strategic periods. Guerrilla
warfare was primary in the first period and regular warfare in the second.
But this regular warfare was of the Chinese type, regular only in its
concentration of forces for mobile warfare and in a certain degree of
centralization and planning in command and organization; in other respects
it retained a guerrilla character and, as regular warfare, was on a low level
and not comparable with the regular warfare of foreign armies or, in some
ways, even with that of the Kuomintang army. Thus, in a sense, this type
of regular warfare was only guerrilla warfare raised to a higher level.

The War of Resistance Against Japan can also be roughly divided into two
strategic periods, so far as our Party's military tasks are concerned. In
the first period (comprising the stages of the strategic defensive and strategic
stalemate) it is guerrilla warfare which is primary, while in the second
(the stage of the strategic counteroffensive) it is regular warfare which
will be primary. However, the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the
War of Resistance differs considerably in content from that of the first
period of the civil war, because the dispersed guerrilla tasks are being
carried out by the regular (i.e., regular to a certain degree) Eighth
Route Army. Likewise, the regular warfare of the second period of the War
of Resistance will be different from that of the second period of the civil
war because we can assume that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change
will take place both in the army and in its operations. Our army will then
attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations
will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high degree of
regularity; what is now on a low level will then be raised to a higher level,
and the Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general type.
That will be our task in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive.

Thus we see that the two processes, the civil war and the War of Resistance
Against Japan, and their four strategic periods, contain three changes in
strategy. The first was the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare
in the civil war. The second was the change from regular warfare in the civil
war to guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance. And the third will be
the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the War of Resistance.

The first of the three changes encountered great difficulties. It involved
a twofold task. On the one hand, we had to combat the Right tendency of localism
and guerrilla-ism, which consisted in clinging to guerrilla habits and refusing
to make the turn to regularization, a tendency which arose because our cadres
underestimated the changes in the enemy's situation and our own tasks. In
the Central Red Area it was only after much painstaking education that this
tendency was gradually corrected. On the other hand, we also had to combat
the "Left" tendency of over-centralization and adventurism which put undue
stress on regularization, a tendency which arose because some of the leading
cadres overestimated the enemy, set the tasks too high and mechanically applied
foreign experience regardless of the actual conditions. For three long years
(before the Tsunyi Meeting) this tendency imposed enormous sacrifices on
the Central Red Area, and it was corrected only after we had learned lessons
for which we paid in blood. Its correction was the achievement of the Tsunyi
Meeting.

The second change in strategy took place in the autumn of 1937 (after the
Lukouchiao Incident), at the juncture of the two different wars. We faced
a new enemy, Japanese imperialism, and had as our ally our former enemy,
the Kuomintang (which was still hostile to us), and the theatre of war was
the vast expanse of northern China (which was temporarily our army's front
but would soon be the enemy's rear and would remain so for a long time).
In this special situation, our change in strategy was an extremely serious
one. In this special situation we had to transform the regular army of the
past into a guerrilla army (in respect to its dispersed operations, and not
to its sense of organization or to its discipline), and transform the mobile
warfare of the past into guerrilla warfare, so that we could adapt ourselves
to the kind of enemy facing us and to the tasks before us. But this change
was, to all appearances, a step backward and therefore necessarily very
difficult. Both underestimation and morbid fear of Japan, tendencies likely
to occur at such a time, did actually occur among the Kuomintang. When the
Kuomintang changed over from civil war to national war, it suffered many
needless losses mainly because of its underestimation of the enemy, but also
because of its morbid fear of Japan (as exemplified by Han Fu-chu and Liu
Chih [19]). On the other hand, we have effected
the change fairly smoothly and, instead of suffering losses, have won big
victories. The reason is that the great majority of our cadres accepted the
correct guidance of the Central Committee in good time and skilfully sized
up the actual situation; even though there were serious arguments between
the Central Committee and some of the army cadres. The extreme importance
of this change for persevering in, developing and winning the War of Resistance
as a whole, as well as for the future of the Communist Party of China, can
be seen immediately if we think of the historic significance of anti-Japanese
guerrilla warfare in determining the fate of the national liberation struggle
in China. In its extraordinary breadth and protractedness, China's anti-Japanese
guerrilla war is without precedent, not only in the East but perhaps in the
whole history of mankind.

The third change, from guerrilla to regular warfare against Japan, belongs
to the future development of the war, which will presumably give rise to
new circumstances and new difficulties. We need not discuss it now.

## V. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST
  JAPAN


In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla
warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome
of the war. Of the three strategic stages (the defensive, the stalemate and
the counter-offensive) in the entire process of the war in the country as
a whole, the first and last are stages in which regular warfare is
primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. In the intermediate stage guerrilla
warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the
enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing
for the counter-offensive but will not yet be ready to launch it. Though
this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three
stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular
warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand
this, unless we recognize that regular warfare will decide the final outcome
of the war, and unless we pay attention to building a regular army and to
studying and directing regular warfare, we shall be unable to defeat Japan.
This is one aspect of the matter.

All the same, guerrilla warfare has its important strategic place throughout
the war. Without guerrilla warfare and without due attention to building
guerrilla units and guerrilla armies and to studying and directing guerrilla
warfare, we shall likewise be unable to defeat Japan. The reason is that,
since the greater part of China will be converted into the enemy's rear,
in the absence of the most extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare the
enemy will entrench himself securely without any fear of attacks from behind,
will inflict heavy losses on our main forces fighting at the front and will
launch increasingly fierce offensives; thus it will be difficult for us to
bring about a stalemate, and the very continuation of the War of Resistance
may be jeopardized. But even if things do not turn out that way, other
unfavourable circumstances will ensue, such as the inadequate building up
of strength for our counter-offensive, the absence of supporting actions
during the counter-offensive, and the possibility that the enemy will be
able to replace his losses. If these circumstances arise and are not overcome
by the timely development of extensive and persistent guerrilla warfare,
it will likewise be impossible to defeat Japan. Hence, though guerrilla warfare
occupies a supplementary place in the war as a whole, it does have an extremely
important place in strategy. In waging the War of Resistance Against Japan
it is undoubtedly a grave error to neglect guerrilla warfare. This is the
other aspect of the matter.

Given a big country, guerrilla warfare is possible; hence there was guerrilla
warfare in the past too. But guerrilla warfare can be persevered in only
when led by the Communist Party. That is why guerrilla warfare generally
failed in the past and why it can be victorious only in modern times and
only in big countries in which Communist Parties have emerged, as in the
Soviet Union during its civil war and in China at present. Considering the
present circumstances and the general situation with respect to the war,
the division of labour between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in
the anti-Japanese war, in which the former carries on frontal regular warfare
and the latter carries on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, is both
necessary and proper, and is a matter of mutual need, mutual co-ordination
and mutual assistance.

It can thus be understood how important and necessary it was for our Party
to change its military strategy from the regular warfare of the latter period
of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare of the first period of the War
of Resistance. The favourable effects of this change can be summed up in
the following eighteen points:

  (1) reduction of the areas occupied by the enemy forces;

  (2) expansion of the base areas of our own forces;

  (3) in the stage of the defensive, co-ordination with operations at the regular
  front, so as to pin down the enemy;

  (4) in the stage of stalemate, maintenance of a firm hold on the base areas
  behind the enemy lines, so as to facilitate the training and reorganization
  of troops at the regular front;

  (5) in the stage of the counter-offensive, co-ordination with the regular
  front in recovering lost territory;

  (6) the quickest and most effective expansion of our forces;

  (7) the widest expansion of the Communist Party, so that a Party branch may
  be organized in every village;

  (8) the broadest development of the mass movements, so that all the people
  behind the enemy lines, except for those in his strongholds, may be organized;

  (9) the most extensive establishment of organs of anti-Japanese democratic
  political power;

  (10) the widest development of anti-Japanese cultural and educational work;

  (11) the most extensive improvement of the people's livelihood;

  (12) the most effective disintegration of the enemy troops;

  (13) the most extensive and enduring impact on popular feeling and stimulation
  of morale throughout the country;

  (14) the most extensive impetus to progress in the friendly armies and parties;

  (15) adaptation to the situation in which the enemy is strong and we are
  weak, so that we suffer fewer losses and win more victories;

  (16) adaptation to the fact that China is large and Japan small, so as to
  make the enemy suffer more losses and win fewer victories;

  (17) the quickest and most effective training of large numbers of cadres
  for leadership; and

  (18) the most effective solution of the problem of provisions.


It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle the guerrilla
units and guerrilla warfare will not remain as they are but will develop
to a higher stage and evolve gradually into regular units and regular warfare.
Through guerrilla warfare, we shall build up our strength and turn ourselves
into a decisive element in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.

## VI. PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO THE STUDY OF MILITARY
  MATTERS


All the issues between two hostile armies depend on war for their solution,
and China's survival or extinction depends on her victory or defeat in the
present war. Hence our study of military theory, of strategy and tactics
and of army political work brooks not a moment's delay. Though our study
of tactics is still inadequate, our comrades who are engaged in military
work have achieved a great deal in the last ten years and, on the
basis of Chinese conditions, have brought forth much that is new; the shortcoming
here is that there has been no general summing-up. But so far only a few
people have taken up the study of the problems of strategy and the theory
of war. First-rate results have been achieved in the study of our political
work, which, in wealth of experience and in the number and quality of its
innovations, ranks second only to that of the Soviet Union; here too the
shortcoming is insufficient synthesis and systematization. The popularization
of military knowledge is an urgent task for the Party and the whole
country. We must now pay great attention to all these things, but most of
all to the theory of war and strategy. I deem it imperative that we arouse
interest in the study of military theory and direct the attention of the
whole membership to the study of military matters.

## Notes


[1] See V. I. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy"
(Collected Works, Eng. ed., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, Vol.
XXI, pp. 27-34), "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad" (ibid.,
pp. 158-64), "The Defeat of One's own Government in the Imperialist
War" (ibid., pp. 275-80), "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary
Crisis" (ibid., pp. 378-82). These articles, written in 1914-15,
deal Specifically with the imperialist war of that time. See also History
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course,
Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1951, pp. 258-67.

[2] In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist
Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the "Merchants'
Corps", an armed force of the compradors and landlords which engaged in
counter-revolutionary activities in Canton in collaboration with the British
imperialists. The revolutionary army, which had been founded on the basis
of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, set out from
Canton early in 1925, fought the Eastern Campaign and, with the support of
the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chen Chiung-ming. It then
returned to Canton and overthrew the Yunnan and Kwangsi warlords who had
entrenched themselves there. That autumn it conducted the Second Eastern
Campaign and finally wiped out Chen Chiung-ming's forces. These campaigns,
in which members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League fought
heroically in the van, brought about the political unification of Kwangtung
Province and paved the way for the Northern Expedition.

[3] J. V. Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China",
Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Vol. VIII, p. 379.

[4] In 1894, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a small revolutionary
organization in Honolulu called the Hsing Chung Hui (Society for
China's Regeneration). With the support of the secret societies among the
people, he staged two armed insurrections in Kwangtung Province against the
Ching government after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, one at
Canton in 1895 and the other at Huichow in 1900.

[5] Tang Meng Hui, or the Chinese Revolutionary
League (a united front organization of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie
and a section of the landed gentry opposed to the Ching government), was
formed in 1905 through the merging of the Hsing Chung Hui (see note
above) and two other groups, the Hua Hsing Hui (Society for China's
Regeneration) and the Kuang Fu Hui (Society for Breaking the Foreign
Yoke). It put forward a programme of bourgeois revolution advocating "the
expulsion of the Tartars (Manchus), the recovery of China, the establishment
of a republic and the equalization of landownership". In the period of the
Chinese Revolutionary League, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, allying himself with the secret
societies and a part of the New Army of the Ching government, launched a
number of armed insurrections against the Ching regime, notably those at
Pinghsiang (Kiangsi Province), Liuyang and Liling (Hunan Province) in 1906,
at Huangkang, Chaochow and Chinchow (Kwangtung Province), and at Chennankuan
(Kwangsi Province) in 1907, at Hokou (Yunnan Province) in 1908 and at Canton
in 1911. The last was followed in the same year by the Wuchang Uprising which
resulted in the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty.

[6] In 1912, the Chinese Revolutionary League was reorganized
into the Kuomintang and made a compromise with the Northern warlord regime
headed by Yuan Shih-kai. In 1913 Yuan's troops marched southward to suppress
the forces which had emerged in the provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kwangtung
in the course of the 1911 revolution. Armed resistance was organized by Dr.
Sun Yat-sen but it was soon crushed. In 1914, realizing the error of the
Kuomintang's policy of compromise, Dr. Sun formed the Chung Hua Ke Ming
Tang (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in Tokyo, Japan, in order to distinguish
his organization from the Kuomintang of the time. The new Party was actually
an alliance of the political representatives of a section of the petty
bourgeoisie and a section of the bourgeoisie against Yuan Shih-kai. Through
this alliance, Dr. Sun Yat-sen staged a minor insurrection in Shanghai in
1914. In 1915 when Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself emperor, Tsai Ngo and
others set out from Yunnan to take action against him, and Dr. Sun was also
very active in advocating and promoting armed opposition to Yuan Shih-kai.

[7] In 1917 Dr. Sun Yat-sen went from Shanghai to Canton
at the head of a naval force which was under his influence. Using Kwangtung
as a base and co-operating with the Southwestern warlords who were opposed
to the Northern warlord Tuan Chi-jui, he set up a military government opposed
to Tuan Chi-jui.

[8] In 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen planned a northern expedition
from Kweilin, Kwangsi Province. But his plan was frustrated by the mutiny
of his subordinate, Chen Chiung-ming, who was in league with the Northern
warlords.

[9] The Whampoa Military Academy, located at Whampoa near
Canton, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 after the reorganization
of the Kuomintang with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet
Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy
was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Comrades Chou
En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai-ying, Hsiao Chu-nu and others held responsible
posts in the academy at one time or another. Many of the cadets were members
of the Communist Party or the Communist Youth League, and they formed the
revolutionary core of the academy.

[10] Tan Yen-kai was a native of Hunan who had been a
Henlin, a member of the highest official scholastic body under the
Ching Dynasty. He was a careerist who first advocated a constitutional monarchy
and then took part in the Revolution of 1911. His later adherence to the
Kuomintang reflected the contradiction between the Hunan landlords and the
Northern warlords.

[11] The Progressive Party was organized by Liang Chi-chao
and others under the aegis of Yuan Shih-kai during the first years of the
Republic.

[12] Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords
in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown
by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and
organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented
the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on
counter-revolutionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists
and by taking advantage of the conciliationist character of the bourgeoisie,
which was then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself
emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the
Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control
of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption
of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won nation-wide
response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Peking in June 1916.

[13] Tuan Chi-jui was an old subordinate of Yuan Shih-kai
and head of the Anhwei clique of Northern warlords. After Yuan's death he
more than once controlled the Peking government.

[14] The extremely right-wing Political Science Group was
formed in 1916 by a section of the Progressive Party and a section of the
Kuomintang. It gambled now on the Southern, now on the Northern, warlords
in order to grab government posts. During the Northern Expedition of 1926-27,
its pro-Japanese members, such as Huang Fu, Chang Chun and Yang Yung-tai,
began to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek and, using their reactionary political
experience, helped him build up a counter revolutionary regime.

[15] The Youth Party, also called the Chinese Youth Party
or the Etatiste Party, was formed by a handful of unscrupulous fascist
politicians. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing
the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and received subsidies from the
various groups of reactionaries in power and from the imperialists.

[16] Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring mainly to the
independent regiment commanded by General Yeh Ting, a Communist, during the
Northern Expedition. See "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", Note
Vol. I, p. 104.

[17] Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province, was the scene
of the famous uprising on August 1, 1927 led by the Communist Party of China
in order to combat the counterrevolution of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei
and to continue the revolution of 1924-27. More than thirty thousand troops
took part in the uprising which was led by Comrades Chou En-lai, Chu Teh,
Ho Lung and Yeh Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on
August 1 as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaochow and
Swatow in Kwangtung Province. Led by Comrades Chu Teh and Chen Yi, part of
the troops later fought their way to the Chingkang Mountains and joined forces
with the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary
Army under Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

[18] The famous Autumn Harvest Uprising under the leadership
of Comrade Mao Tse-tung was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed
forces of Hsiushui Pinghsiang, Pingkiang and Liuyang Counties on the
Hunan-Kiangsi border, who formed the First Division of the First Workers'
and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Comrade Mao Tse-tung led this force to
the Chingkang Mountains where a revolutionary base was established.

[19] Han Fu-chu was a Kuomintang warlord in Shantung Province.
Liu Chih another warlord, who commanded Chiang Kai-shek's personal troops
in Honan Province, was responsible for the defence of the Paoting area in
Hopei after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Both of
them fled before the Japanese without firing a shot.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.