(November 25, 1938)

We have the following opinions concerning work in the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar area:

1. The Song [Shilun] and Deng [Hua] columns have penetrated deeply into
eastern Hebei for several months of bitter fighting; they have coordinated and
encouraged the eastern Hebei uprising led by the local Party organizations, restored a Chinese régime in eastern Hebei, aroused the masses, and set up the eastern Hebei guerrilla area. They have expanded our army's political influence in the
far rear of the enemy and dealt a blow to the enemy; thus generally speaking they
have registered achievements. But they did not protect and develop this victory to
the full extent possible; they did not unite very well with the local Party organizations and military units; they did not handle the situation there very calmly. This
resulted in withdrawal from the area and rather heavy losses to the army and the
armed units of the masses.

2. Having assessed the military and political circumstances of the Hebei-Rehe-
Chahar area, we believe that area enjoys many favorable conditions, which can
support guerrilla warfare, and make it possible to create guerrilla bases. But there
are also numerous difficulties, and [these goals] can be achieved only through
protracted and arduous struggle. It has therefore been decided to organize a Hebei-
Rehe-Chahar assault force of the Eighth Route Army, to send Comrade Xiao Ke to
take up this work, and to establish a military-political committee exercising unified leadership over the army and over the work of the local Party and government. The military-political committee must have the participation of the leaders
of the local Party and army. The Northern Bureau is to propose a name list after
Xiao Ke and Peng Zhen arrive in the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi [area] and then submit
it to the Center for approval.

3. Xiao will set out from Yan'an in the next few days and go to the Hebei-
Chahar-Shanxi command organ via northwestern Shanxi. He [Long], Xiao [Ke],
and Guan [Xiangying] will be responsible for establishing it [the committee] with
a set of cadres sent from Yan'an.

4. At present, the two detachments should each choose an appropriate location
south of the Ping-Sui road for reorganization, training, and recruitment, the main
tasks being the following:
a. Strengthen political work, boost troop morale, and make a work review, mainly
based on our assessment of Song and Deng's work, the main point being to
review the lessons of our experience.
b. Intensify cadre education, collect some veteran soldiers and have them run
instruction teams, and have cadres among the troops do mobile training classes
or temporary group training.
c. Tighten military and political organization, rectify discipline, and eliminate
the habits of guerrilla warfare.
d. Send political-work staff to carry out recruitment and expansion work in
nearby areas and to purchase weapons, especially ammunition.
e. During this period of rest and reorganization, you should avoid combat when
it is unnecessary or when there is no assurance of victory. If the enemy attacks, use mountainous areas to counterattack when conditions are favorable; if absolutely necessary, you may approach the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi
border.

5. The two detachments should unite as one; when they are close together, there
should be centralized command. They should set up collective leadership so as to
complete the task of rest and reorganization.

6. You must keep in touch with eastern Hebei; if the local cadres of eastern
Hebei cannot deal with this, you must immediately send a unit back there for this
work.

From Mao [Zedong], Wang [Jiaxiang], and Yang [Shangkun] to
Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Nie [Rongzhen], and to be transmitted to Song [Shilun] and Deng [Hua]

Our source for this document is Wenxian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 15.