(November 10, 1938)

To Xiang [Ying], and to be forwarded to Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Bai Chongxi has allowed Comrade Zhang Yunyi¹ of the New Fourth Army
to lead a battalion to the north of the Yangzi River to operate within Anhui. Has he
been sent out or not?
2. Central Anhui is now most convenient for our army's operations. Could the
New Fourth Army send two or three battalions to join with Comrade Zhang Yunyi
and cross the river under his command? From now on, which unit will provide for
the expenses of the third and fourth detachments and the Eighth Regiment? How
will the money be delivered to them? Under which unit's command will they be?
What will their relationship with the Central Plains Bureau² be?
We look forward to your response by telegraph to the above points.

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Persist in Long-Term Guerrilla Warfare in the
Daqing Mountains

(November 24, 1938)

To Zhou [Shidi] and Gan [Siqi], and for transmittal to Li Jingquan:

1. The Daqing mountain range is not far from Outer Mongolia to the north, and
the enemy regards it as important.¹ Since guerrilla warfare has yet to commence in
Chahar and Rehe, it is also isolated. We would like to establish a base area of the
Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi type there, and although this is not possible today, if we
persist in long-term guerrilla warfare, it will become entirely possible to establish
a guerrilla base area, and, moreover, this is a central task.
2. Therefore, every policy there should take as its starting point the characteristics of long-term guerrilla warfare.
a. In organizing defections of puppet-régime troops, we should avoid scattered
outbursts that are too early or unnecessary. Only when it is estimated that
sentiment in favor of defection is irrepressible, or when it has already broken
out, or in case of military necessity, should you resolutely proceed. In general, though, work should conform to the principle of long-term thinking.
b. Before and after troops defect, you should make them aware of the difficulty
of material conditions as well as the arduous nature of the struggle. After
troops defect, generally strive to bring them nominally under the command
of the Eighth Route Army, and then transform or reorganize them during a
process of struggle. It is best to strive to bring them close to northwestern
Shanxi or the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, but do not insist. Doing
favors for others will end up increasing our difficulties in the future.
c. Toward large groups of bandits or spontaneous anti-Japanese armed troops
of a semibandit nature, you should adopt the approach of having high-level
contacts and influencing, motivating, and helping them to progress. Do not
create antagonisms and thus increase the difficulties of the guerrilla teams

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 434-35, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. Zhang Yunyi was at this time chief of staff of the New Fourth Army, and commander
of the Third Detachment.
2. The Central Plains Bureau was established on November 9, 1938, with Liu Shaoqi as
its secretary.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 436-38, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. The Daqing mountain range is roughly a hundred miles south of Outer Mongolia, but
to the Japanese that no doubt appeared close in strategic terms.