October 1938

[This report was made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the Sixth Plenary Session
of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party. The session endorsed the line
of the Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and was a very important
one. In discussing the question of the role of the Chinese Communist Party
in the national war he helped all comrades clearly to understand and
conscientiously to shoulder the Party's great and historic responsibility
of leading the War of Resistance Against Japan. The plenary session decided
on the line of persisting in the anti-Japanese united front, but at the same
time pointed out that there had to be struggle as well as unity within the
united front and that the proposition, "Everything through the united front",
did not suit Chinese conditions. Thus the error of accommodationism in regard
to the united front was criticized; this problem was dealt with by Comrade
Mao Tse-tung in "The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United
Front", which was part of his concluding speech at the same session. Affirming
that it was extremely important for the whole Party to devote itself to
organizing the people's armed struggle against Japan, the session decided
that the war zones and the enemy's rear should be the Party's main fields
of work and repudiated the erroneous ideas of those who pinned their hopes
of victory on the Kuomintang armies and who would have entrusted the fate
of the people to legal struggles under the reactionary Kuomintang rule. This
problem was dealt with by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in "Problems of War and Strategy",
which was also part of his concluding speech at the session.]


Comrades, the prospects ahead of us are bright. Not only is it necessary
for us to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new China, but we are certainly
capable of achieving these aims. However, there is a difficult road ahead
between the present and the bright future. In the struggle for a new China,
the Chinese Communist Party and the whole people must fight the Japanese
aggressors in a planned way and can defeat them only through a long war.
We have already said a good deal about the various problems relating to the
war. We have summed up the experience gained since its outbreak and appraised
the present situation, defined the urgent tasks confronting the whole nation
and explained the reasons for sustaining a long war by means of a long-term
national united front against Japan and the methods for doing so, and we
have analysed the international situation. What problems then remain? Comrades,
there is one more problem, namely, what role the Chinese Communist Party
should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their
own role, strengthen themselves and close their ranks in order to be able
to lead this war to victory and not to defeat.

PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM


Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot?
We hold that he not only can be but must be. The specific content of patriotism
is determined by historical conditions. There is the "patriotism" of the
Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. Communists
must resolutely oppose the "patriotism" of the Japanese aggressors and of
Hitler. The Communists of Japan and Germany are defeatists with regard to
the wars being waged by their countries. To bring about the defeat of the
Japanese aggressors and of Hitler by every possible means is in the interests
of the Japanese and the German people, and the more complete the defeat the
better. This is what the Japanese and German Communists should be doing and
what they are doing. For the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and
Hitler are harming their own people as well as the people of the world. China's
case is different, because she is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists
must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once
internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, "Fight to defend the
motherland against the aggressors." For us defeatism is a crime and to strive
for victory in the War of Resistance is an inescapable duty. For only by
fighting in defence of the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve
national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be
possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own
emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists
will help the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation
patriotism is applied internationalism. For this reason Communists must use
their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battle
front of the war of national liberation and train their guns on the Japanese
aggressors. For this reason, immediately after the Incident of September
18, 1931, our Party issued its call to resist the Japanese aggressors by
a war of national defence, and later proposed a national united front against
Japan, ordered the Red Army to reorganize as part of the anti-Japanese National
Revolutionary Army and to march to the front, and instructed Party members
to take their place in the forefront of the war and defend the motherland
to the last drop of their blood. These are good patriotic actions and, far
from running counter to internationalism, are its application in China. Only
those who are politically muddle-headed or have ulterior motives talk nonsense
about our having made a mistake and abandoned internationalism.

COMMUNISTS SHOULD SET AN EXAMPLE IN THE NATIONAL WAR


For the above reasons Communists should show a high degree of initiative
in the national war, and show it concretely, that is, they should play an
exemplary vanguard role in every sphere. Our war is being waged under adverse
circumstances. National consciousness, national self-respect and national
self-confidence are not sufficiently developed among the broad masses, the
majority of the people are unorganized, China's military power is weak, the
economy is backward, the political system is undemocratic, corruption and
pessimism exist, and a lack of unity and solidarity is to be found within
the united front; these are among the adverse circumstances. Therefore,
Communists must consciously shoulder the great responsibility of uniting
the entire nation so as to put an end to all such undesirable phenomena.
Here the exemplary vanguard role of the Communists is of vital importance.
Communists in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should set an example
in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political
work and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with
friendly parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand of unity
for resistance to Japan, uphold the programme of the united front and set
an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance; they should be true in
word and resolute in deed, free from arrogance and sincere in consulting
and co-operating with the friendly parties and armies, and they should be
models in inter-party relations within the united front. Every Communist
engaged in government work should set an example of absolute integrity, of
freedom from favouritism in making appointments and of hard work for little
remuneration. Every Communist working among the masses should be their friend
and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic
politician. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his
personal interests first; he should subordinate them to the interests of
the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking
the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working
with all one's energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard
work will command respect. Communists should work in harmony with all
progressives outside the Party and endeavour to unite the entire people to
do away with whatever is undesirable. It must be realized that Communists
form only a small section of the nation, and that there are large numbers
of progressives and activists outside the Party with whom we must work. It
is entirely wrong to think that we alone are good and no one else is any
good. As for people who are politically backward, Communists should not slight
or despise them, but should befriend them, unite with them, convince them
and encourage them to go forward. The attitude of Communists towards any
person who has made mistakes in his work should be one of persuasion in order
to help him change and start afresh and not one of exclusion, unless he is
incorrigible. Communists should set an example in being practical as well
as far-sighted. For only by being practical can they fulfil the appointed
tasks, and only far-sightedness can prevent them from losing their bearings
in the march forward. Communists should therefore set an example in study;
at all times they should learn from the masses as well as teach them. Only
by learning from the people, from actual circumstances and from the friendly
parties and armies, and by knowing them well, can we be practical in our
work and far-sighted as to the future. In a long war and in adverse
circumstances, the dynamic energy of the whole nation can be mobilized in
the struggle to overcome difficulties, defeat the enemy and build a new China
only if the Communists play an exemplary vanguard role to the best of their
ability together with all the advanced elements among the friendly parties
and armies and among the masses.

UNITE THE WHOLE NATION AND COMBAT ENEMY AGENTS IN ITS
  MIDST


The one and only policy for overcoming difficulties, defeating the enemy
and building a new China is to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National
United Front and mobilize the dynamic energy of the whole nation. However,
there are already enemy agents playing a disruptive role within our national
united front, namely, the traitors, Trotskyites and pro-Japanese elements.
Communists must always be on the look-out for them, expose their criminal
activities with factual evidence and warn the people not to be duped by them.
Communists must sharpen their political vigilance towards these enemy agents.
They must understand that the expansion and consolidation of the national
united front is inseparable from the exposure and weeding out of enemy agents.
It is entirely wrong to pay attention only to the one side and forget the
other.

EXPAND THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREVENT INFILTRATION BY ENEMY
  AGENTS


To overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build a new China, the
Communist Party must expand its organization and become a great mass party
by opening its doors to the masses of workers, peasants and young activists
who are truly devoted to the revolution, who believe in the Party's principles,
support its policies and are willing to observe its discipline and work hard.
Here no tendency towards closed-doorism should be tolerated. But at the same
time, there must be no slackening of vigilance against infiltration by enemy
agents. The Japanese imperialist secret services are ceaselessly trying to
disrupt our Party and to smuggle undercover traitors, Trotskyites, pro-Japanese
elements, degenerates and careerists into its ranks in the guise of activists.
Not for a moment must we relax our vigilance and our strict precautions against
such persons. We must not close our doors for fear of enemy agents, our set
policy being boldly to expand our Party. But while boldly enlarging our
membership, we must not relax our vigilance against enemy agents and careerists
who will avail themselves of this opportunity to sneak in. We shall make
mistakes if we only pay attention to the one side and forget the other. The
only correct policy is: "Expand the Party boldly but do not let a single
undesirable in."

MAINTAIN BOTH THE UNITED FRONT AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
  PARTY


It is only by firmly maintaining the national united front that the difficulties
can be overcome, the enemy defeated and a new China built. This is beyond
all doubt. At the same time, every party and group in the united front must
preserve its ideological, political and organizational independence; this
holds good for the Kuomintang, the Communist Party or any other party
or group. In inter-party relations, the Principle of Democracy in the Three
People's Principles permits both the union of all parties and groups and
the independent existence of each. To speak of unity alone while-denying
independence is to abandon the Principle of Democracy, and to this neither
the Communist Party nor any other party would agree. There is no doubt that
independence within the united front is relative and not absolute, and that
to regard it as absolute would undermine the general policy of unity against
the enemy. But this relative independence must not be denied; ideologically,
politically and organizationally, each party must have its relative independence,
that is, relative freedom. Also, the general policy of unity against the
enemy would be undermined if this relative freedom were denied or voluntarily
abandoned. This should be clearly understood by all members of the Communist
Party as well as of the friendly parties.

The same is true of the relationship between the class struggle and the national
struggle. It is an established principle that in the War of Resistance everything
must be subordinated to the interests of resistance. Therefore, the interests
of the class struggle must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with,
the interests of the War of Resistance. But classes and the class struggle
are facts, and those people who deny the fact of class struggle are wrong.
The theory which attempts to deny this fact is utterly wrong. We do not deny
the class struggle, we adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual
concessions which we advocate is applicable not only to party relations but
also to class relations. Unity against Japan requires an appropriate policy
of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the labouring
people without political and material safeguards but also gives consideration
to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the demands of solidarity against
the enemy. It is bad for the War of Resistance to pay attention only to the
one side and neglect the other.

CONSIDER THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE, THINK IN TERMS OF THE
  MAJORITY, AND WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES


In leading the masses in struggle against the enemy, Communists must consider
the situation as a whole, think in terms of the majority of the people and
work together with their allies. They must grasp the principle of subordinating
the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible
for a partial situation but not for the situation as a whole, then the part
must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for
the part but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again
the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering
the situation as a whole. Communists must never separate themselves from
the majority of the people or neglect them by leading only a few progressive
contingents in an isolated and rash advance, but must forge close links between
the progressive elements and the broad masses. This is what is meant by thinking
in terms of the majority. Wherever there are democratic parties or individuals
willing to co-operate with us, the proper attitude for Communists is to talk
things over with them and work together with them. It is wrong to indulge
in arbitrary decisions and peremptory actions and to ignore our allies. A
good Communist must be good at considering the situation as a whole, good
at thinking in terms of the majority and good at working with his allies.
We have had serious shortcomings in this respect, and we must still give
the matter attention.

CADRES POLICY


The Chinese Communist Party is a party leading a great revolutionary struggle
in a nation several hundred million strong, and it cannot fulfil its historic
task without a large number of leading cadres who combine ability with political
integrity. In the last seventeen years our Party has trained a good many
competent leaders, so that we have a framework of cadres in military, political,
cultural, Party and mass work; all honour is due to the Party and to the
nation for this achievement. But the present framework is not yet strong
enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and it is still necessary
to train capable people on a large scale. Many activists have come forward,
and are continuing to come forward, in the great struggle of the Chinese
people. We have the responsibility for organizing and training them and for
taking good care and making proper use of them. Cadres are a decisive factor,
once the political line is determined.[1] Therefore,
it is our fighting task to train large numbers of new cadres in a planned
way.

Our concern should extend to non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres.
There are many capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore.
The duty of every Communist is to rid himself of aloofness and arrogance
and to work well with non-Party cadres, give them sincere help, have a warm,
comradely attitude towards them and enlist their initiative in the great
cause of resisting Japan and reconstructing the nation.

We must know how to judge cadres. We must not confine our judgement to a
short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should consider
his life and work as a whole. This is the principal method of judging cadres.

We must know how to use cadres well. In the final analysis, leadership involves
two main responsibilities: to work out ideas, and to use cadres well. Such
things as drawing up plans, making decisions, and giving orders and directives,
are all in the category of "working out ideas". To put the ideas into practice,
we must weld the cadres together and encourage them to go into action; this
comes into the category of "using the cadres well". Throughout our national
history there have been two sharply contrasting lines on the subject of the
use of cadres, one being to "appoint people on their merit", and the other
to "appoint people by favouritism". The former is the honest and the latter
the dishonest way. The criterion the Communist Party should apply in its
cadres policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party
line, keeps to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the
ability to find his bearings independently, and is active, hard-working and
unselfish. This is what "appointing people on their merit" means. The cadres
policy of Chang Kuo-tao was the exact opposite. Following the line of "appointing
people by favouritism," he gathered personal favourites round himself to
form a small clique, and in the end he turned traitor to the Party and decamped.
This is an important lesson for us. Taking warning from it and from similar
historical lessons, the Central Committee and the leaders at all levels must
make it their major responsibility to adhere to the honest and fair way in
cadres policy and reject the dishonest and unfair way, and so consolidate
the unity of the Party.

We must know how to take good care of cadres. There are several ways of doing
so.

  First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free hand in their
  work so that they have the courage to assume responsibility and, at the same
  time, giving them timely instructions so that, guided by the Party's political
  line, they are able to make full use of their initiative.

  Second, raise their level. This means educating them by giving them the
  opportunity to study so that they can enhance their theoretical understanding
  and their working ability.

  Third, check up on their work, and help them sum up their experience, carry
  forward their achievements and correct their mistakes. To assign work without
  checking up and to take notice only when serious mistakes are made--that
  is not the way to take care of cadres.

  Fourth, in general, use the method of persuasion with cadres who have made
  mistakes, and help them correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should
  be confined to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to
  accept guidance. Here patience is essential. It is wrong lightly to label
  people "opportunists" or lightly to begin "waging struggles" against them.

  Fifth, help them with their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as
  a result of illness, straitened means or domestic or other troubles, we must
  be sure to give them as much care as possible.


This is how to take good care of cadres.

PARTY DISCIPLINE


In view of Chang Kuo-tao's serious violations of discipline, we must affirm
anew the discipline of the Party, namely:

  (1) the individual is subordinate to the organization;

  (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority;

  (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and

  (4) the entire membership is subordinate to the central Committee.


Whoever violates these articles of discipline disrupts Party unity. Experience
proves that some people violate Party discipline through not knowing what
it is, while others, like Chang Kuo-tao, violate it knowingly and take advantage
of many Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence
it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline so that the rank and
file will not only observe discipline themselves, but will exercise supervision
over the leaders so that they, too, observe it, thus preventing the recurrence
of cases like Chang Kuo-tao's. If we are to ensure the development of inner-Party
relations along the right lines, besides the four most important articles
of discipline mentioned above we must work out a set of fairly detailed Party
rules which will serve to unify the actions of the leading bodies at all
levels.

PARTY DEMOCRACY


In the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all
its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest
expression to their initiative, which alone can ensure victory. This initiative
must be demonstrated concretely in the ability of the leading bodies, the
cadres and the Party rank and file to work creatively, in their readiness
to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigour they show in their work,
in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions and criticize
defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading
bodies and the leading cadres. Otherwise, "initiative" will be an empty thing.
But the exercise of such initiative depends on the spread of democracy in
Party life. It cannot be brought into play if there is not enough democracy
in Party life. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able
people be brought forward. Ours is a country in which small-scale production
and the patriarchal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole there
is as yet no democratic life; consequently this state of affairs is reflected
in our Party by insufficient democracy in Party life. This phenomenon hinders
the entire party from exercising its initiative to the full. Similarly, it
has led to insufficient democracy in the united front and in the mass movements.
For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on within the Party
so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the meaning
of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which
democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we
really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid
ultra-democracy and the laissez-faire which destroys discipline.

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the
army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members
and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, there cannot
be as much democracy in the Party organizations in the army as in the local
Party organizations. Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party
democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness,
not to weaken them.

The extension of democracy in the Party should be seen as an essential step
in its consolidation and development, and as an important weapon enabling
it to be most active in the great struggle, to prove equal to its tasks,
create fresh strength and surmount the difficulties of the war.

OUR PARTY HAS CONSOLIDATED ITSELF AND GROWN STRONG THROUGH
  THE STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS


Broadly speaking, in the last seventeen years our Party has learned to use
the Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle against incorrect ideas
within the Party on two fronts--against Right opportunism and against "Left"
opportunism.

Before the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee,
[2] our Party fought Chen Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism
and Comrade Li Li-san's "Left" opportunism. It made great progress thanks
to the victories achieved in these two inner-Party struggles. After the Fifth
Plenary Session there were two further historic inner-Party struggles, namely,
the struggles at the Tsunyi Meeting and in connection with the expulsion
of Chang Kuo-tao.

The Tsunyi Meeting corrected serious errors of a "Left" opportunist
character--errors of principle committed in the fight against the enemy's
fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign--and united the Party and the
Red Army; it enabled the Central Committee of the Party and the main forces
of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion, to advance
to a forward position in the resistance to Japan and to carry out the new
policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. By combating Chang Kuo-tao
Right opportunism, the Pasi and Yenan Meetings (the fight against the Chang
Kuo-tao line began at the Pasi Meeting [3] and
ended at the Yenan Meeting [4]) succeeded in bringing
all the Red forces together and in strengthening the unity of the whole Party
for the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes
arose during the revolutionary civil war, and their characteristic was that
they were errors related to the war.

What are the lessons which have been derived from these two inner-Party
struggles? They are:

  (1) The tendency to "Left" impetuosity, which disregards both the subjective
  and the objective factors, is extremely harmful to a revolutionary war and,
  for that matter, to any revolutionary movement--it was among the serious
  errors of principle which were manifested in the struggle against the enemy's
  fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, and which arose from ignorance
  of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war.

  (2) The opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao, however, was Right opportunism in the
  revolutionary war and was a combination of a retreatist line, warlordism
  and anti-Party activity. It was only with the overcoming of this brand of
  opportunism that large numbers of cadres and Party members in the Fourth
  Front Army of the Red Army, men of intrinsically fine quality and with a
  long record of heroic struggle, were able to free themselves from its toils
  and return to the correct line of the Central Committee.

  (3) Striking results were achieved in the great organizational work of the
  ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War--in army building, government
  work, mass work and Party building. Had it not been for the support rendered
  by such organizational work to the heroic fighting at the front, we could
  not have kept up the bitter struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. However, in
  the latter part of that period serious errors of principle were made in the
  Party's policy concerning cadres and organization, errors which showed themselves
  in the tendency towards sectarianism, in punitiveness and in the policy of
  ideological struggle carried to excess. They were due both to our failure
  to eliminate the vestiges of the former Li Li-san line and to the political
  mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too,
  were corrected at the Tsunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make
  the turn to a correct cadres policy and to correct organizational principles.
  As for Chang Kuo-tao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles,
  disrupted Party discipline and carried factional activity to the point of
  opposition to the Party, the Central Committee and the Communist International.
  The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Chang Kuo-tao's
  iniquitous and erroneous line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and
  also tried to save Chang Kuo-tao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to
  correct his mistakes and resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even
  betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Kuomintang, the
  Party had to take firm measures and expel him. This disciplinary action won
  the support not only of all Party members but of all people loyal to the
  cause of national liberation. The Communist International also endorsed the
  decision and denounced Chang Kuo-tao as a deserter and renegade.


These lessons, these achievements, have furnished us with the prerequisites
for uniting the whole Party, for strengthening its ideological, political
and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance.
Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on
the two fronts.

THE PRESENT STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS


From now on, it is of paramount importance to wage a political struggle against
Rightist pessimism in the War of Resistance, although it is still necessary
to keep an eye on "Left" impetuosity. On questions of the united front and
of Party and mass organization, we must continue the fight against the "Left"
tendency towards closed-doorism if we are to achieve co-operation with the
various other anti-Japanese parties and groups, expand the Communist Party
and broaden the mass movement. At the same time, we must take care to combat
the Right opportunist tendency towards co-operation and expansion which are
unconditional in character, or otherwise they will both be hindered and be
turned into capitulationist co-operation and unprincipled expansion.

Ideological struggle on the two fronts must suit the concrete circumstances
of each case, and we must never approach a problem subjectively or permit
the bad old habit of "sticking labels" on people to continue.

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing
double-faced behaviour. As Chang Kuo-tao's career shows, the greatest danger
of such behaviour is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply
in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things
to a person's face but play tricks behind his back--these are all forms of
double-dealing. Only by sharpening the vigilance of cadres and Party members
against such behaviour can we strengthen Party discipline.

STUDY


Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who can do so should study
the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, study our national history
and study current movements and trends; moreover, they should help to educate
members with less schooling. The cadres in particular should study these
subjects carefully, while members of the Central Committee and senior cadres
should give them even more attention. No political party can possibly lead
a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary
theory and a knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical
movement.

The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is universally applicable. We
should regard it not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. Studying it is
not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning
Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of
understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin
from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but
of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems.
Our Party's mastery of Marxism-Leninism is now rather better than it used
to be, but is still far from being extensive or deep. Ours is the task of
leading a great nation of several hundred million in a great and unprecedented
struggle. For us, therefore, the spreading and deepening of the study of
Marxism-Leninism present a big problem demanding an early solution which
is possible only through concentrated effort. Following on this plenary session
of the Central Committee, I hope to see an all-Party emulation in study which
will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and
learned better. So far as shouldering the main responsibility of leadership
is concerned, our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our
task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished
if there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism-Leninism
which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow.

Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist
method to sum it up critically. Our national history goes back several thousand
years and has its own characteristics and innumerable treasures. But in these
matters we are mere schoolboys. Contemporary China has grown out of the China
of the past; we are Marxist in our historical approach and must not lop off
our history. We should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and
take over this valuable legacy. This is important for guiding the great movement
of today. Being Marxists, Communists are internationalists, but we can put
Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific
characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form. The
great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with
the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist
Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism
to the specific circumstances of China. For the Chinese Communists who are
part of the great Chinese nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood,
any talk about Marxism in isolation from China's characteristics is merely
Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum. Hence to apply Marxism concretely
in China so that its every manifestation has an indubitably Chinese character,
i.e., to apply Marxism in the light of China's specific characteristics,
becomes a problem which it is urgent for the whole Party to understand and
solve. Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing
of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest, they must be
replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which the common people
of China love. To separate internationalist content from national form is
the practice of those who do not understand the first thing about
internationalism. We, on the contrary, must link the two closely. In this
matter there are serious errors in our ranks which should be conscientiously
overcome.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws?
How is it to be directed? These are all practical questions. To this day
we do not yet understand everything about Japanese imperialism, or about
China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they
are emerging in an endless stream. To study this movement in its entirety
and in its development is a great task claiming our constant attention. Whoever
refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully is no Marxist.

Complacency is the enemy of study. We cannot really learn anything until
we rid ourselves of complacency. Our attitude towards ourselves should be
"to be insatiable in learning" and towards others "to be tireless in teaching".

UNITY AND VICTORY


Unity within the Chinese Communist Party is the fundamental prerequisite
for uniting the whole nation to win the War of Resistance and build a new
China. Seventeen years of tempering have taught the Chinese Communist Party
many ways of attaining internal unity, and ours is now a much more seasoned
Party. Thus we are able to form a powerful nucleus for the whole people in
the struggle to win victory in the War of Resistance and to build a new China.
Comrades, so long as we are united, we can certainly reach this goal.

NOTES


1. In his report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
in January 1934, Stalin said: ". . . after the correct political line has
been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate
of the political line itself, its success or failure." (See Problems
of Leninism, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, p. 644.) He also dealt with
the question of "proper selection of personnel". In his address in May 1935
delivered in the Kremlin Palace to the graduates from the Red Army Academies,
Stalin put forward and explained the slogan: "Cadres decide everything."
(Ibid., 661-62.) In his report to the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U,(B)
in March 1939, Stalin said: "After a correct political line has been worked
out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in
the leadership exercised by the Party and the state." (Ibid., p.
784.)

2. The period referred to was that from the emergency meeting
of the Political Bureau of the Fifth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party in August 1927 to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee
in January 1934.

3. The Pasi Meeting was called by the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee in August 1935 at Pasi, northwest of the county
town of Sungpan, on the borders of northwestern Szechuan and southeastern
Kansu. Chang Kuo-tao, leading a section of the Red Army, had broken away
from the Central Committee, and was challenging its orders and attempting
to undermine it. At this meeting the Central Committee decided to leave the
danger zone for northern Shensi with those forces of the Red Army which obeyed
its orders. However, Chang Kuo-tao led the Red Army units he had deceived
southward to the area of Tienchuan, Lushan, the Big and Small Chinchuan and
Ahpa, where he established a bogus central committee and came out publicly
against the Party.

4. The Yenan Meeting was the enlarged meeting of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party held in Yenan in April 1937.
Prior to this meeting large numbers of cadres and soldiers in the Red Army
units under Chang Kuo-tao who had already become aware of his deception marched
northward towards the Shensi-Kansu border area. On their way, however, some
units acted on mistaken orders and switched westward to the area of Kanchow,
Liangchow and Suchow, all in Kansu Province. Most of these were wiped out
by the enemy and the rest made their way to Sinkiang and only later returned
to the Shensi-Kansu border area. The other units had long since reached the
Shensi-Kansu border area and joined forces with the Central Red Army. Chang
Kuo-tao himself also turned up in northern Shensi and attended the Yenan
Meeting. The meeting systematically and conclusively condemned his opportunism
and rebellion against the Party. He feigned acquiescence but actually made
preparations for his final betrayal of the Party.


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.