ON THE NEW STAGE

12-14 October 1938

The new stage of development in the national war against
Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front--a report made at the sixth enlarged plenum of the Sixth CCP
Central Committee held from 12-14 October 1938.

[Text] Comrades, I am representing the Central Political Bureau to make a
report to the sixth enlarged plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee. What
am I prepared to talk about? What I need to talk about is divided into
several parts as follows: 1) from the fifth to the sixth enlarged plenums
of the Sixth Central Committee; 2) summation of the 15 months of war against
Japan; 3) the new stage of development of the war against Japan and the
Anti-Japanese National United Front; 4) current urgent tasks for the entire
nation; 5) a protracted war and long-term cooperation; 6) China's war against
aggression and the world-wide anti-fascist movement; 7) the Chinese Communist
Party's position in the national war; 8) the Seventh National Party Congress.
These are the questions I wish to address.

Comrades, what tasks are we to carry out by convening the sixth enlarged
plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee in the midst of a situation in which
we hear gunfire echoing all over the country, and find the peril of world
war pressing upon us so urgently? What are our objectives? We definitely
must forever unite with all patriotic parties, factions, and compatriots
throughout the nation, overcome new difficulties, and mobilize new forces
to stop the enemy's attacks for the present, and carry out our counterattacks
in the future, so as to attain the objective of driving out Japanese imperialism
and establish a republic based on the Three People's Principles. We absolutely must have freedom, we definitely will win--these are our objectives,
and it is also the general orientation of my report.

I. From the Fifth to the Sixth Enlarged Plenums of the Sixth CCP Central
Committee.

1. The Convening of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central
Committee.

It has been nearly five years now since the general membership meeting of
our party's Sixth Central Committee held its fifth plenum in Kiangsi Province
in January 1934. We were unable to gather together in one body because the
various Central Committee members were scattered all over the country and
abroad working under various different situations. But, this time, most of
the Central Committee members are attending, with the exception of a few
comrades. Moreover, many comrades who are leaders of various tasks from
various areas throughout the country have also come. This has made this
general membership meeting the one with the greatest number of people attending since the convening of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum. Originally, it was
intended for the Seventh Congress of the CCP Central Committee to be convened
this year, but we had to postpone it until next year because of the urgency
of the war. But the current situation has set before us many problems which
must be clearly resolved in order to achieve victory in the war against
Japan. Therefore, we have convened this enlarged general membership meeting
of the CCP Central Committee.

2. From the Fifth to the Sixth Plenums

In the past 5 years, our party had experienced very many events of great
importance. The transition of a situation in which the various parties,
factions, and classes in the country were opposed to each other to that of
the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and the transformation of the civil
war into a war against Japan, are the biggest and most important events. The
unfortunate disruption of the United Front of the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party in 1927 was the reason that caused the civil war in the past. This
was created by the historical circumstances of that time.

How, then, was the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front formed?
It was formed because of the new historical circumstances. Since the
18 September Incident, Japanese imperialism--the enemy of the Chinese nation--
after carrying out the first step of aggression against the four eastern
provinces is now entering the stage of taking the second step of preparing
to and carrying out the aggression against all of China. This kind of unprecedented historical event has brought about a transformation in domestic
and international situations. First of all, it has transformed, and is
transforming, the mutual relationships of the various classes, parties,
factions, and cliques within the country, and, at the same time, it has
transformed, and is transforming, mutual relationships on the international
scene. In accordance with this unprecedented historical event and the new
relationships both domestically and internationally, our Party, as far back
as 1933, had begun to take a new road on its political standpoint (setting
up agreements, based on the three conditions to fight against the Japanese,
with any elements within the Kuomintang who are willing to cooperate with
us), raising it to the level of a new policy of the Anti-Japanese National
United Front. For this reason the August 1935 proclamation was published,
the December decision was made, the August 1936 letter to the Kuomintang
was written, and the September resolution of the democratic republic was
passed. Furthermore, it was these that enabled us to adhere to the policy of

peaceful resolution of the Sian Incident which occurred in December of that
year, and to forward to the Kuomintang's Third Congress a concrete proposal
to unite against the Japanese in February 1937. In May of last year, a
congress of a temporary nature was convened (it was called a congress of the
Soviet areas attended at that time by representatives from Soviet and nonSoviet areas, as well as from the Red Army). It passed the "Tasks of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front at the Present Stage," and approved the
implementation of the reorganization of the Red Army into the People's Revolutionary Army, and the implementation of a transformation into a democratic
system in the Soviet areas. Thus in reality a transition was made from a
situation of civil war into a new era of a beginning to establish the AntiJapanese National United Front. It was also at that time that the Chinese
Nationalist Party slowly began to change its policy, gradually turning toward
a position of unification against the Japanese. Without such a transition in
the Kuomintang's policy it would not have been possible even if it was desired,
to form the Anti-Japanese National United Front. During that period, many
national salvation groups began to have their own organizations, and other
parties and factions also made demands to oppose the Japanese. The measures
taken by Japanese imperialism to commit aggression against China and destroy
it encountered unprecedented opposition from the entire nation, because of
the change in policies of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the
leadership of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, the support of the military and the people
of the whole country, and the cooperation of other cliques and parties and
factions. Following the Lukouchiao Incident on 7 July last year, all China,
under the unified leadership of the national leader and supreme commander,
Generalissimo Chiang, erupted with sounds of sacred and righteous gunfire.
All China was transformed into an unprecedented massive unity of the great
Anti-Japanese National United Front. In August of last year, 2 months after
the Lukouchiao Incident, our Party announced the Ten Great Policies for AntiJapanese Resistance and National Salvation. At the same time the reorganization of the Eighth Route Army was completed, and it marched to North China
to fight. On 22 September our Party made a public announcement of a proclamation to unite with the Kuomintang, in purest honesty based upon the Three
People's Principles, and face the national peril together. The second day,
Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, the supreme leader of the Kuomintang, the national
government, and the national revolutionary army, published a talk in which
he admitted the legal existence of the Communist Party and to unite with it
to save the nation. Thenceforth, the Anti-Japanese National United Front,
based upon the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, was completely established.
In December our party, in order to consolidate and develop the Anti-Japanese
National Unified Front, again proclaimed its willingness not only to cooperate
with the Kuomintang in opposing the Japanese, but also in national construction. Soon after, the guerrilla units of the Red Army in the South reorganized to form the New Fourth Army and marched to the south of the Yangtze
River to fight against the Japanese. Thereafter, anti-Japanese unity improved
daily.

Comrades, this kind of transition from 10 years of war between the two parties
to a new cooperation between them, and carrying out this transition under
conditions of extreme difficulties, stabilized the initial foundation of longterm cooperation between the two parties. These were accomplished only after

going through a lot of difficulties but it was accomplished finally through
the efforts of the Central Committee and the entire Party. The Comintern
fully approved this new political line our Party had taken (see "New China
Daily's" 9 September report on the Comintern's resolution), and, furthermore,
called upon the proletariat of the world and the communist parties of the
various countries to give aid to China's war against the Japanese.

Comrades, if there had not been such an undertaking, establishment, and adherence to the Anti-Japanese National United Front, based upon the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party, it would have been impossible to launch this great
anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, persevere and win victory. Now,
people all over China and the world understand that the Chinese nation has
stood up! One hundred years of insult, ridicule, aggression, and oppression,
especially the shameful position of a slave after the 18 September Incident,
have been altered. People of all China, with guns in their hands, have
marched onto the battlefields of the war of national self-defense, and the
dawning of hope for freedom and liberation of the Chinese nation has begun.

We knew that this great national war of ours today is different from all
wars in the historical eras of China. Because this war is for the liberation
of the Chinese nation from a semi-colonial position, and from the perils of
losing the nation and destruction of the race. Furthermore, this war is
being fought in the most progressive era of China's history; at the same
time, this war is fought during the period in which our enemy, Japanese imperialism, is seeking a path of self-destruction and collapse. At the same
time, this war is fought in an era in which the progressive mankind of the
world is preparing its forces for struggle on an unprecedentedly enlarged
scale, and unprecedented intensity, in order to oppose and overcome the
evil devils of the German-Italian-Japanese fascists and achieve a bright
future for the world. This kind of unification of factors from three sides--
with the advancement and continuous progress of China as the principal
cornerstone--assures that our war against Japan will surely win final victory,
and a free and liberated new China will emerge with certainty in the Orient
and become an important, integral element in the bright world of the future.
Such a China will give prosperity not only to China's 400 million people,
but also to all mankind.

3. The Tasks of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee.

The sixth enlarged plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee is held at a
crucial moment when the anti-Japanese war is at the point of entering a new
developmental stage, and the sixth enlarged plenum of the Sixth CCP Central
Committee has shouldered a historical task of great importance.

It is absolutely correct that the anti-Japanese war has been courageously
fought for over a year now, and throughout the nation there is great unity
and magnificent progress. It has dealt a severe blow to Japanese imperialism.
Although we have lost much territory, we have won many victories. This is
a fact that cannot be denied. It may also be predicted that final victory

will be ours, and not the enemy's, as the war develops further, mainly because of China's continuous progress, which, at the same time, is coordinated
with the increasing difficulties of Japan and international assistance to
make us stronger. Whoever cannot see the magnificent achievements of the
past and the victorious future will fall into the deep pit of pessimism and
will be unable to extract himself. However, it is not enough to see only
this side of the matter. There is another side to the anti-Japanese war,
the negative side, and this is the problem that faces us. The present situation tells us that all the struggles, unity, progress, and victories in the
past year and more in China, have not been able to stop the enemy's advance,
and we still do not have the strength to go on the counteroffensive. Wuhan
is being threatened by the enemy, and he will also mount attacks against
Canton, Changsha, and areas of the northwest. Therefore, the people of the
entire country expect the Communist Party to make proposals. The new situation
has set forth many problems. Comrades, we must make proposals, we must solve
these problems. It is correct that our Party long ago gave its proposals, and
many of the basic problems have been resolved, too, a long time ago. But the
new situation demands that we make new proposals and solve new problems.

What is the new problem?

How to increase new forces on the present foundation to pass over the difficult phase of the war, stop the enemy's attacks, prepare to mount our counterattacks, and achieve the objective of driving out the enemy--these are the
key questions of the current problem. A countless number of people all over
the country discuss and worry over this problem. Should or should we not
address this problem? Without doubt we should address it.

This problem has developed various aspects and many problems have risen.

For instance, what has the experience of 15 months of resistance war proved.
Has it proved that the war will be a protracted one or a brief one? Is the
strategic policy to be a protracted war so as to overcome the enemy or a
quick one to win victory against the enemy? Is final victory to be China's
or the enemy's? Is the way out through war or through compromise? If the
war should be a protracted one, then what means should be adopted to support
a drawn-out war and win final victory? Can any basis be found in the 15
months of war experience so that a clear answer can be given? All these are
important problems and they belong to one category.

Again, for example, how to develop and transform the entire course of the
war against Japan? What, in actuality, is the nature of this so-called new
stage? Suppose we do not defend Wuhan, what then will be the trend of the
war? Henceforth, in which direction should the efforts of the entire nation
be directed--that is, the current urgent tasks of the Chinese nation? What
effective means do we have to pass through the great difficulties of the
war? These are even more important problems and belong to another category.

Again, for instance, what will happen to the future and the perspective of
the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party? On what

basis does the Communist Party speak of long-term cooperation? What means
does the Communist Party have to improve the relationship between the two
parties? What kind of nation is to be established with regard to the so-called
cooperation not only in the war effort, but also in the national construction?
What are the relationships between the Three People's Principles and communism?
These are also very important questions and they again belong to another
category.

Once more, for example, with the world's political climate in such a state
of emergency, what will its situation become? What advantages or disadvantages
are there in the relationship between the anti-Japanese war of China and the
world movement to oppose fascism? These are also important questions, and
they belong to still another category.

Furthermore, what is the position of the Chinese Communist Party in the
national war? What kind of attitude should a Communist Party member adopt
in his work when he struggles to implement the Party's policitcal policies?
What other effective methods do the Communist Party have in cooperation with
other parties and in liaison with the people to bring about a transition
of the situation from a difficult period to one of smooth sailing? How
are the internal relationships of the Communist Party? Are there any effective
methods to bring about unity in the entire Party so as to enable it to play
its great role in the war against Japan, specially in the current difficult
situation? What is to become of the Seventh Congress of the CCP Central
Committee? These are also important problems and they belong to yet another
category.

All these problems are urgently demanding for solutions within the party and
outside of it. In the recent several months we have constantly encountered
people requesting answers to these questions.

Comrades, our nation is a big and complicated one, and it is now engaged in
a life-or-death struggle with a strong imperialist country. This struggle
is drawing near to a new developmental stage, and it is currently situation
in the transition period. Our sixth enlarged plenum is being held in this
period and its responsibilities are very, very important as we must resolve
many problems.

II. A General Summation of 15 Months of War

1. What Has the Experience of 15 Months Proved?

Let us begin from the experience gained during the 15 months. What have we
gained from the experience of 15 months of war? I hold that in the main
there are three aspects. First, it has proved that the war against Japan
is a protracted, and not a brief one. Therefore, the strategy for the war
of resistance is protracted warfare and not a blitzkrieg type of war.
Second, it has proved that China's war of resistance can win final victory,
and there is no basis for pessimism. Third, it has proved that the only
correct road that will support a protracted war and win final victory is that
of unifying and uniting the entire nation, striving hard for improvement and
relying on the masses, and applying them to overcome difficulties and secure
victory. There is no other way.

2. The War of Resistance Against Japan Is Not a Brief War But a Protracted
One, and the Strategy Is Protracted Warfare, Not a Quick and Decisive Campaign

When the war of resistance first broke out, many people assumed that the war
would soon be over, and the idea of a quick victory prevailed for a while.
This was so because they did not proceed from the basic comparison of the
strength of the enemy and ours, but from some temporary and superficial
phenomena. However, at the Double Ten festival last year, Generalissimo
Chiang clearly pointed out: "This war of resistance will not be over in a
short time. It must go through a period of extreme sufferings and difficulties
before it can achieve final victory." As for us, we pointed out a long time
ago the protracted nature of the anti-Japanese war of resistance, and that
it could not be resolved in a short period of time. "The outcome of the war
is inevitable victory for China and unavoidable defeat for Japan, however,
the sacrifices will be great, and there will be a period of great sufferings"
(16 July 1936 talk between Mao Tse-tung and Snow). "It should be perceived
that this war of resistance is a very difficult, protracted war" (the
15 August 1937 resolution passed by the CCP Central Committee on the current
situation and the Party's tasks). These all pointed out that the anti-Japanese
war of resistance is a protracted war and not a short one, the strategy is
protracted warfare and not a quick, decisive campaign. The experience of the
past 15 months of the war of resistance has completely proved this to be
correct.

What is the reason for this? It is because the enemy is powerful and we are
weak, the enemy is in a superior, and we are in an inferior position, and
the enemy is an imperialist country and we are a semi-colonial nation.

We long ago pointed out that there must be three conditions in order to be
victorious over the enemy: firstly, China must be progressive, and this is the
basic and principal thing; secondly, Japan's difficulties; and thirdly,
international assistance. Let us take a look at these three conditions
during the 15 months of the war of resistance. In short, they already have a
foundation, but it is still a long way from the degree they must attain.

With regard to the first condition (the basic and principal condition for
victory against the enemy), China's progressiveness, a base has been formed
in the past 15 months, but only through continuing progress can we finally
overcome the enemy. What is meant by the progress of China encompasses all
aspects of domestic politics, military affairs, Party tasks, people's movements, and cultural education. In these respects, progress has been very
obvious during the past 15 months. However, we cannot stop the enemy's
attacks with only these and launch our counteroffensive. In order to counterattack there must be a period of preparations. There must be an intensive
and wide-spread mobilization of all new forces in our nation through the
effort of all the people in order to be able to mount a counterattack and
defeat the enemy. Therefore, the theory of quick victory has no basis, because it has forgotten the salient point that the enemy is powerful and we
are weak, that the enemy is in a superior and we are in an inferior position,
that the enemy is an imperialist nation and we are a semi-colonial country.
China has a vast latent potential, and when this potential is mobilized it
is ample enough to turn defeat into victory, weakness into strength, and

basically alter the situation between the enemy and us all by itself. However, it is not an existing fact, and it will require our efforts henceforth.

As for the second condition, Japan's difficulties, it is also the same.
During these 15 months the enemy put into the field a million men, sustained
casualties in the hundreds of thousands, and expended hundreds of millions.
The morale of the troops disintegrates daily, and its finances and economy are
being exhausted daily. International opinions are rising all around to censure
Japan, and it all resulted from the barbaric aggression of Japan and China's
heroic war of resistance. But these existing difficulties of the enemy are
still inadequate to stop the attacks of the enemy and benefit our counteroffensive. We must wait for the day when the enemy has even greater difficulties and we have made even greater progress, and then only will the opportunity
come to counterattack and be victorious over the enemy. Therefore, with regard to the enemy situation, the theory of quick victory does not have a
basis, which has been proved by the experience of 15 months.

On the third condition, international assistance, it is still not the time
of greatest benefit for us. In the past 15 months, we have the support of
broad international opinion. The Soviet Union and other democratic countries,
in accordance with the resolution of the League of Nations, have already given
us a lot of assistance. This proved that we are not alone. However, we must
realize that the international peace front has different situations in different
countries. Among the capitalist countries the people are helping us, but the
governments have adopted to a certain degree a neutral attitude. Their
bourgeoisie is taking advantage of this war to do business, and they are still
transporting large quantities of armaments, and materials for making them,
to Japan. The socialist countries are basically different from the capitalist
countries, and this has already been manifested in a concrete manner on the
question of aid to China. But the international situation currently does not
permit them to provide assistance over and beyond the present degree. Therefore, we, for the time being, must not place too much hope on international
aid. To discard the policy of self-reliance and mainly place our hopes on
assistance from abroad is, beyond doubt, an error of the greatest magnitude.
The experience gained from the past 15 months has proved that relying mainly
upon our own efforts, and at the same time maintaining our efforts to win
assistance from abroad, is the correct path to be taken. In this regard,
past experience has also negated the theory of quick victory.

In general, the experience of the past 15 months proved that, regardless of
whether it is with respect to China, the enemy, or the international [aspects],
the proposal of the theory of quick victory has no basis at all. On the
contrary, it has exposed the protracted and cruel nature of the war.  Therefore, our strategy absolutely must not be for a quick and decisive campaign,
but should be one for protracted warfare. The only correct policy for the
war of resistance against Japan is to prolong the war and win against the
enemy. Those who did not believe this policy in the past have not been
taught a lesson by reality, and they should no longer have any doubts now!

This is the first summation on the 15 months of war of resistance.

3. Final Victory Belongs to China, and Pessimists Have No Basis
Prior to the war of resistance, the theory of weapons only predominated on
a grand scale. The view was that China's weapons were inferior, and we would
be destroyed if we fought and China would become another Abyssinia. After
the war of resistance was launched, this kind of opinion seemed to have disappeared, but it was still circulating in the dark. Whenever the war of resistance reached a critical situation, this kind of opinion would emerge to stir
up trouble. It held that China should stop the war and negotiate for peace as
it was no longer able to continue fighting, and should it continue to do so
it would be inevitably destroyed. We took the opposing stand. We held that
China's weapons were in fact inferior to others, but weapons could be
strengthened through the efforts of man. In war, victory or defeat is mainly
decided by the human factor, not by materials. Based upon the efforts of
the entire nation, the result of a protracted war will be that of China
slowly overcoming its weaknesses and strengthening its forces, transforming
passivity into initiative, and inferiority into superiority. At the same
time, the difficulties on the enemy's side will slowly increase, and international aid to us will slowly grow. When all these factors are combined,
we will, in the end, be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. Long ago,
Generalissimo Chiang clearly indicated that "since the war has already begun,
there is only one way, and that is to go all out with all the strength of
our nation and sacrifice to the end. There will no longer be such a thing
as stopping mid-way and compromising" (in the talk given at Lu Shan last July).
"This war of resistance is a course which the people's revolution must go
through, and it is a war of preservation fought by the victim against the
aggressor. It is totally different from the usual warring nations of matching
strength. Therefore, our reliance is placed not on weapons or military
preparedness but on the powerful, unyielding revolutionary spirit and the
strong, unbending national will" (in the letter to the people published in
December of last year). As for the Chinese Communist Party, it had long ago
pointed out that "the drain on Japan by China's protracted resistance has
brought its economy to near collapse and the morale of its troops to near
disintegration. But for China, its latent power to wage a war of resistance
surges higher and higher daily. When all these factors are combined with
others, it will enable us to mount the attack on all the territory occupied
by Japan in the end, and drive Japan's army of aggression out of China."
(Talk between Mao Tse-tung and Snow). "We believe that through the efforts
of the people throughout the country, the war of resistance that has been
launched will certainly sweep away all obstacles and continue to advance and
develop. Victory is certain for the war of resistance against Japan only
if tens of millions of the masses are truly organized and join the AntiJapanese National United Front." (The August resolution passed by the Chinese
Communist Party last year). All these have been evidenced by the experience
of the past 15 months. It has been proved that such absurd falsehoods as 'the
enemy is too strong to resist,' 'China cannot stand a fight,' and 'compromise
is the only way out' spoken by pessimists and those who held that China will
fall are totally wrong.

What is the reason for this? Because the fact that the enemy is strong and
we are weak is but one side of the coin. The enemy still has its weaknesses,
China still has its strong points.

What are the weaknesses of the enemy? First, it is a smaller country. It
is inadequate in troops and finances, and cannot withstand a prolonged drain.
Because of its shortage of troops it is forced to split them and sustain
attrition in the face of China's strong resistance so that it cannot occupy
the whole of China, with regard to the territories it occupied it consist in
reality only the big cities, highways, and certain areas of the plains. The
rest still belongs to China.

Second, the nature of the war waged by the enemy is imperialistic and very
backward. The contraditions within itself forced the enemy to launch a war
of aggression, and it also compelled the enemy to adopt an extremely barbaric
policy of plunder. Thus, it transformed the enemy's war on the one hand into
a war that places the entire Chinese people in absolute opposition, forcing
them to unite and wage a war of determined resistance regardless of class,
party, or faction.

On the other hand it is also transformed into a war which is in absolute
opposition with its own people. The results of Japanese imperialism's allout measures, with regard to manpower and finances in order to meet the needs
of war, have begun to create much discontent among the people in its own
country, and among the troops on the front lines. As the war develops it
will without doubt force its people and soldiers to lean, en masse, in the
direction of using resolute methods to oppose the war itself. These have
already surfaced during the 15 months. This is the most important basis
existing on the enemy's side which will inevitably bring about defeat to it.
Third, precisely because the war the enemy is waging is imperialistic by nature,
in other words, selfishness, it will compel the enemy to place all countries
whose interests are contrary to its own in the opposition camp. With the
exception of two or three fascist countries, all other countries, specially
the masses of people of these countries, do not approve Japan's war of aggression.
Thus Japan is forced to narrow gradually its sphere of international activities,
and daily becomes more and more isolated. This also has already begun to be
evident during the 15 months.

Therefore, the comparative smallness of the country of Japan affected its
troop strength, and its finances are insufficient; the backward nature of
Japan's war; and Japan's international isolation--all these are combined
at the same time, and it becomes Japan's innate weaknesses and difficulties,
and also these weaknesses and difficulties are growing daily. Those who
hold that the nation will fall and the pessimists are completely blind and
can see only one thing, that the enemy is strong and we are weak. Therefore,
with respect to the enemy situation, there is no basis for pessimism or to
holding the view that the nation will fall, so their policy of compromise
can only be a policy for the downfall of the nation. We are theoreticians
of final victory, and our view has ample basis with respect to the enemy
situation. This has also begun to be evident during the 15 months.

What are our superior points? Firstly, we are a big country with a vast
territory, rich resources, many people, and many soldiers. Regardless of
the fact that the enemy has occupied our principal big cities and communications lines, we still have a large tract of land left to form a base for our
protracted war and wrest final victory. As for the enemy occupied areas, we
still have many bases for guerrilla warfare. This characteristic is basically
different from such small countries as Czechoslovakia and Belgium. This is
our first superior point. Secondly, our present anti-Japanese war of resistance is different from any of the wars in the history of China. Our war is
a national revolutionary war, a progressive war. Not only is the war itself
progressive by nature, but it is fought upon a progressive foundation never
before seen in China. China in the second decade of the 20th century was
different from the China of any other historical era. We have progressive
people quite different from those of any other historical period, and a
progressive political party and progressive army. The anti-Japanese war of
resistance which is being fought upon such a foundation, encompasses a great
force that can continue to develop this progressiveness. This is what we
have on our side which will enable us to support a protracted war and achieve
final victory. The experience gained from the past 15 months has proved that
the sacred national war carried out on its original base has already impelled
the progress of all China. The old tradition of national corruption is being
destroyed, a new national progressive force is developing, and the developmental stage of the unification and progress of an entire nation is advancing
toward completion. The China after the war of resistance is different from
the China preceding it, and this can be perceived by anyone with eyes. It
also may be predicted that the China of the first stage of the war of resistance
(this stage has not ended yet) will be different from the China in the later
stages. Thirdly, our anti-Japanese war of resistance is not isolated. China's
anti-Japanese war of resistance and the world's struggle against aggression
and fascism are inseparably bound together, regardless of whether capitalist
countries still preserve their many contradicting policies and regardless of
whether the international situation may temporarily affect the degree of aid
given by the various countries to us. It is not only the Chinese that are
opposing the Japanese war of aggression, but also Europeans, Americans,
Africans, Australians, and other Asians. The sympathy and aid extended by
the various countries of the world during these 15 months have given us this
sure confidence. That China, which has mainly relied on its own efforts,
can, at the same time, coordinate with world aid, is because today's world
is no longer the world it used to be. Progressive mankind of the entire
world has formed into one body of close association. The enemy's plan to
isolate us will not avail.

In this respect, ours is a very big country, our war is progressive, and we
also have international assistance. These three factors are combined at the
same time. These are all conditions favorable to us. They not only already
exist, they grow daily. Here, the pessimists and the subjugationists are
both blind, unable to see anything at all. All they can see is that we are
a weak country, our position is inferior, and we are a semi-colonial country.
They mumble such nonsense as "the nation will surely fall if we wage a war

of resistance," and, "if we carry on with the war, the nation will inevitably
fall." The evil fellows among them covertly carry out their scheme to surrender
and compromise upon the basis of such nonsensical talk. We, on the contrary,
point out, based on the experience of the past 15 months, the strong points
and weaknesses of our country and of our war, to the entire Party and the
entire country the conditions that are favorable to us and those that are
not, and also point out clearly the superior position these strong points
and favorable conditions hold with regard to the war as a whole. We shall call
upon the entire nation to put its effort into the struggle, give rein to our
own strong points, strengthen our own favorable conditions, overcome our own
weaknesses and unfavorable conditions, and struggle to win final victory.
To whom will final victory belong? We answer decisively: China. Our policies
are decided upon this basis: resolutely resist or vacillate and compromise?
We answer with decision: there absolutely cannot be any vacillation and compromise. The only way out is through resolutely waging a war of resistance.
The loss of the four eastern provinces, the annihilation of Austria, and the
carving up of Czechoslovakia, are the result of no resistance. This is quite
obvious to all. It is the same now. With all the superior conditions in
China, the war of resistance will inevitably thrive. But if the road of
compromise is taken, destruction cannot be avoided. Therefore, the only
policy is to resolutely oppose compromise-ism and pessimism, and rouse the
entire nation to fight courageously to the end.

In general, this contradicting comparison--the enemy strength and our weakness--
has decided the protracted nature of the war, and the strategic policy of
protracted warfare. We hold the theory of victory over the enemy through
prolongation and not the theory of quick victory. The enemy is small and
we are big; the enemy's war is a backward one and ours is progressive; the
enemy's position on the international scene is comparatively isolated while
ours can get outside assistance. These contradictory comparisons again
decide that final victory of the war belongs to us, and not to the enemy.
This is the second summation of the experience of 15 months.

4. The Only Way To Support a Protracted War and In Final Victory Lies in
Unifying and Uniting the Entire Nation, Striving for Progress, and Relying
Upon the Masses

The anti-Japanese war of resistance is a protracted one, and final victory
belongs to China--these two basic questions have already been proved by the
experience gained from 15 months of the war of resistance. But what about
a concrete program for supporting a protracted war and winning final victory?
In the past, people in the country did not have a uniform opinion. Many
people held that it would be sufficient to carry on as in the past. They
did not pay attention to uniting the whole country, nor did they pay attention
to military affairs, politics, culture, party tasks, and people's movements
and their improvement. They even went so far as to increase friction and
obstruct progress. We have never approved of such opinions, and we hold
that only through unified unity of the entire nation, striving for progress,
and reliance upon the masses can we support a protracted war and win final
victory. Otherwise, we will not be able to do so. The Chinese Nationalist
Party pointed out clearly in its program for the war of resistance and

national construction that "if we are seeking certain victory in the war of
resistance and certain success in national construction, we must surely rely
upon the efforts of our Party's comrades, especially if the people of the
entire country are to unite and shoulder this task together." Likewise, the
Chinese Communist Party pointed out long ago that "The most central task in
the war of resistance is that of mobilizing all available forces to attain
victory, and the key to winning victory is to develop the war of resistance
that has already been launched into a total war with the entire nation participating. Only this total war can bring final victory in the war of resistance."
(The Chinese Communist Party's resolution passed last August.) The experience
of the past 15 months has already proved that these are entirely correct.

Since the war of resistance began, the various classes, parties and factions,
and cliques which had been in opposition to each other, have united, and the
various different areas and armies have been unified under the command of the
Military Affairs Commission of the government of the Kuomintang. Without
this unity it would have been impossible to persist in the war of resistance
for 15 months. It is also because of the war of resistance that the unity
of the various sides was made possible. This kind of unity is the AntiJapanese National United Front. However, the experience of the past 15 months
also made it evident to us the gravity of the enemy's schemes to sabotage
and the inadequate consolidation of the unity within our ranks. Besides
objective causes, the most important reason why the war of resistance has
encountered so many set-backs and why we still cannot stop the enemy's attacks
and carry out our counteroffensive is that the United Front is inadequate in
strength, and it has not had the necessary expansion and consolidation it
must have. It can be seen from this that the only way possible to support
a protracted war and achieve final victory is to further unify and unite the
entire nation, and consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United
Front. This is the first.

Second, the 15 months of the war of resistance has given impetus to the unification of the entire nation, but it has also shown its inadequacy. It has
impelled the progress of military affairs, politics, culture, party tasks,
and people's movements and, at the same time, it has again exposed the insufficiency of this progress. All viable forces among all class strata throughout the nation must be mobilized in order to support a protracted war and win
final victory, and to achieve this objective efforts must be made so that
there will be progress in all the fields of military affairs, politics, culture, party tasks, and people's movements. If there is no greater progress
made in all these respects, it will not be possible to mobilize all new forces
throughout the nation and further unify and unite the entire nation.

Third, the 15 months of the war of resistance has also proved how powerful
the people's assistance to the war of resistance can be. At the same time
it has also proved that the people's forces are now beginning to be mobilzied,
therefore, it has caused the war of resistance to suffer many set-backs because
it was unable to receive the massive assistance of the people. From this, a
lesson has been learned. The people must further understand this basic
problem of the war of resistance being dependent upon the masses. By relying

upon the masses, all difficulties can be overcome and any powerful enemy
can be defeated, but if we become separated from the masses, not a single
thing can be accomplished. Hereafter, the further progress of China must
be fully manifested with respect to the mobilization of the people's forces.

In general, the only correct path to support a protracted war and wrest final
victory is in consolidating and expanding the unity of the entire nation, in
striving for progress so as to mobilize the new forces of the entire nation,
and in relying upon the masses to overcome difficulties. This forms our third
summation.

Comrades, the basic lesson learned from the 15 months of the war of resistance
is that we must persist in the war of resistance, adhere to protracted warfare,
and strive for unity and progress. This the general policy of the war of
resistance henceforth. We can defeat the enemy if we and the entire nation
adhere to this general policy and put forth massive and protracted efforts.
The anti-Japanese war of resistance is now developing toward a new stage, and
there will be many new tasks, but this general program remains unchanged.
The 15-month experience forms the basis for our observation of the new situation and it has set forth new tasks.

III. The New Stage of Development of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance and
the Anti-Japanese National United Front

1. Policy Is Decided on the Basis of Studying the Laws Governing the War and
the United Front

Comrades, after summing up past experiences, the important question will be
to view the trends of the current situation. How will the anti-Japanese war
of resistance and the Anti-Japanese National United Front proceed to transform and develop upon the basis of the past? This is a question we want to
answer now, as it has important significance with regard to our solving the
current problems. Because, if there is no general estimate made on the course
of transformation and development of the entire anti-Japanese war of resistance,
we will only be able to go around in circles with the war, permitting it to
shackle us and making it impossible to place it under our own control to
adjust and remold to create the necessary conditions for the war, lead it
toward where we want it to go, and win final victory. Therefore, it is necessary to know the laws governing the war of resistance against Japan in order
to be able to implement the guidance of the war, and decide upon the strategies,
tactics, policies, and plans which serve the purpose of the war. It is the
same with the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We will be able to effectively
propel the United Front onto the course of consolidation and development only
by studying and understanding the laws governing its nature, and thereby permitting it to play the role of supporting pillar for victory in the war.

Let us first talk about the problem of war.

2. The Specifically Determined Historical Conditions and the Superiority of
Subjective Capability Decide the Developmental Course of the War

Historically, wars ended after going through one stage. For example, in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905 there were only the advance of the Japanese troops
and the defeat and retreat of the Russians, and thereafter it ended. It was
also the same with the Italo-Abyssinian war. There were only the Italian
advance and the defeat and rout of the Abyssinians before it ended. It was
also the same with China's war against the Peiyang warlords. This is one
type of situation stemming from, on the one hand, the inequality of the two
sides, and on the other hand, from the difference between superior and inferior leadership which resulted in defeat. This is one type of war. The
second type went through two stages and ended after that. For instance,
the Franco-Russian war. Napoleon went from the offensive into retreat, and
the Russian from retreat to the counteroffensive. There were two stages to
both sides. It was the same with the Ch'ih Pi [6375 1084] campaign of the
war between Wu [0702] and Wei [7614], and the Fei Shui [3224 3055] campaign
between Ch'in [4440] and Chin [2516] of ancient China. Although the comparative strength of the two armies was not equal, the weaker one went on the
counteroffensive after retreating and defeated the enemy by being skillful
in utilizing other favorable conditions and giving them correct direction.
But there is a third type of war, like the Seven Years' War, the Eight
Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, and the Hundred Years' War of foreign
countries, including the 4-year great war in Europe 20 years ago (manifested
specially on the Western Front), and all have three stages. In the first
stage A attacked and B retreated. In the second stage, a long period of indecisive warfare. The third stage was with B counterattacking, and A retreating. There were also many such wars in the history of China. The characteristic of this type of war is that there is a comparatively long, or very
long period of confrontation. This also stemmed from the specifically determined historical setting and the specific nature of the cliques directing
the wars.

To which of these types does the Sino-Japanese war belong? I hold that it
belongs to the third type of war. This stemmed from the different historical
conditions and the specific situations of the cliques directing the war.

3. The Protracted Nature of the Sino-Japanese War Is Manifested in the
Three Stages of the War

The protracted nature of the Sino-Japanese war will be manifested in the
three stages of the enemy's attack, holding-on and retreat, and in our defense,
holding-on and counterattack. The first stage of the enemy's advance and
our defense emerges because of the enemy being strong and our being weak
(the enemy is in a superior position and we in the inferior, the enemy is
an imperialist country and we are a semi-colonial country). Calling it defense instead of retreat is to say that the retreat is manifested through
strategic mobil defense, that is, resisting at every step, and not an
immediate pull-out. But also because of these very special conditions of
the enemy being a small country, backward, and with little help, and our

being a big country, progressive, and with much support, and also because of
our courageous resistance which has inflicted losses on the enemy in his
attacks, through the difficulties and attrition brought about by the dispersion of his troops, the enemy has been compelled to end its strategic
attacks at a definite period, and shift over to the stage of militarily defending the territories it has occupied, and attacking us politically and
through economic blockade. In this period, although the enemy has been
drained, it has not yet reach the degree which would cause it to turn into
defeat; and although we have resolutely resisted in the war and made progress
in many respects, we cannot, for the time being, progress to the point where
it would be enough to shift over to the stage of counterattacking and driving
the enemy out of the country. Due to these factors, the second stage, or
the middle stage, of stalemate is formed. It will be possible to bring
about a gradual transformation in which the original state of the enemy
being strong and us weak, and the enemy in a superior position and us in an
inferior one shifts to a situation which, viewed on the whole, daily becomes
unfavorable to the enemy and favorable to us because of the continuing growth
of the enemy's difficulties and our progress in the second stage. At first,
balance will be reached which will turn into a superior position for us and
an inferior position for the enemy. At this time, it will be possible to
enter the third stage in which we counterattack and the enemy retreats.

The observations made on the above three stages have not yet become facts,
but are possible. It is a kind of estimate made on the entire course of the
war based upon the concrete conditions of the mutually contradicting comparisons which are now in existence and those which will possibly occur in the
future between the enemy and ourselves. The possible situation can be transformed into fact only if we rely upon our subjective efforts to create the
conditions necessary for such possible situations to occur. However, such
possible situations can be transformed into fact based upon existing conditions
plus conducting a correct direction and the massive and resolute efforts of
the entire nation.

4. Those Advocating Quick Victory and Those Who Hold That the Nation Will
Fall Oppose Such Estimates

Those advocating a quick victory oppose the theory of three stages. They
hold the view that it is not necessary to have a middle stage for us to be
able to go quickly onto the counteroffensive. This is wrong. The war
against Japan is faced with many existing difficulties, and to overcome these
difficulties require a definite period of time. It is not possible to go
quickly into the counteroffensive. It is because they have, on the one hand,
overly underestimated the enemy's strength, and, on the hand over-estimated
our own strength, that they oppose the three stages. Those who hold the
view that the nation will fall also oppose this. They believe that it is
impossible for both withstanding the enemy and going into the counteroffensive,
and that China is but another Abyssinia. This is incorrect. They are opposite
to the advocates of quick victory, over-estimating the enemy's strength and
under-estimating our own. Before them, there is only darkness. They admit
that the enemy can destroy all of China, and our resistance and efforts will
not avail. It is impossible to achieve the capability to withstand the enemy,
let alone going into the counteroffensive and defeating the enemy. For

this reason, we must, on the one hand oppose the quick victory theory and
on the other hand oppose the theory that the nation will fall. Only thus can
we adhere to our three stage theory. Under present circumstances, it is more
important to oppose the theory that the nation will fall than quick victory-ism.
There are some others who, on the surface, approve of protracted warfare,
but disapprove of three stage theory. This is also incorrect. Where can
the so-called protracted warfare and drawn out war be manifested? In the
three stages of the war.
If you accept protracted warfare and drawn out war,
and yet do not approve of the three stages, then the so-called protracted
and drawn out war are entirely abstract things without an iota of essence
and practicality. Therefore, it will not be possible to implement any true,
strategic direction, nor any factual strategic policy. In reality, this kind
of opinion still belongs to that of the quick victory theory, except that it
has put on a mantle of "protracted warfare."

5. The Relationship Between the Theory of Three Stages and the International
Situation

When the Chang Kao-feng [1728 7559 1496] incident occurred, part of the
opinion within the country was highly enthusiastic. It held that if war
broke out between Japan and Russia, China could go over to the counteroffensive,
and a protracted war would not be necessary. Before such a viewpoint, the
theory of the three stages naturally becomes untenable, and our estimate is
wrong. This is mainly due to the idea of relying upon outside aid, and it is
another form of the idea of quick victory. However, the international
situation did not develop according to the subjective wishes of these friends,
but in accordance to its own laws. The important center of the world is
located in Europe, and the Orient is an important part that surrounds it.
The principal countries of the peace front in the world and the main fascist
countries are in an uproar in the West over the question of the perils of
war in Europe. Regardless of whether it is on the eve of a war, or war
has broken out between the big countries, the big and small nations of the
West will then place the question of Europe at the head of their agenda and
are reluctantly compelled to place the question of the Orient in second
place. Viewing China under such circumstances, the two stage theory of going
quickly onto the counteroffensive is unreasonable. We must mainly rely upon
ourselves. We are not afraid of the three stages, but is in the process of
creating the three stages. The three stages form the law governing the SinoJapanese war. It has basis not only in the comparison of enemy strength and
ours, but also in the international situation.

6. The Stalmate Stage Is the Pivot of the War

The principal characteristic of the three stages is the inclusion of an
interim transitional stage. That is to say, first, our war of resistance
must be carried out with concerted effort to stop the enemy's offensive.
If the enemy's offensive cannot be stopped at a given area and at a definite
time, there will be no such thing as three different stages. Second, it will
be necessary to go all out in making preparations for all the conditions

needed to go on the offensive when the holding on stage emerges. If this is
not done, then it will not be possible to enter the counteroffensive stage.
It will be holding on forever, and the three stages become immaterial. At
this point, we positively say to those who hold the view of quick victory
that we must pass through a period of preparations before we can unite the
entire nation, overcome difficulties, develop new forces, and, at the same
time, coordinate these with the enemy's difficulties and international aid,
and then carry out the counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of the country.
Otherwise, this will not be possible. When problems are viewed from the
standpoint of chiefly relying on our own efforts, this conclusion becomes unavoidable. We positively say to pessimists and those who hold the view
that the nation will be lost: It is only this transitional period that is
the pivotal point of the whole war. Whether China becomes a colony or achieves
liberation will be decided not by the loss of big urban areas and communications lines, but by the degree of effort put out by the entire nation in the
second stage. Such losses are unfortunate, as they strengthen the enemy's
forces and weaken ours, but there are still many things left which can be
capitalized upon to defeat the enemy. It will be of no avail to moan and
groan over the loss of precious things. The territories preserved during the
first stage and the new, viable forces, especially the progressiveness already
achieved in military affairs, politics, culture, party tasks, and people's
movements, are the most valuable of all, as they form the base for the continuation of progress and preparation for the counteroffensive in the second stage.
However, these form only a base, and not a decisive factor, for counteroffensive. The decisive factor is the force that is added on in the second stage.
Without the increase in this great, new force, counteroffensive will just
be empty words.

7. The Characteristics of the Three Stages, the First Stage

There is a need to give a summarized explanation of the characteristics of
the three stages which have already emerged, and those which can be estimated,
of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. They have important ramifications
with regard to the directing of the war and deciding policies.

What special traits or landmarks are there in the first stage? There are
three aspects, which are as follows:

First, with regard to China, they are the formation of the National United
Front, the bitter fighting of the entire nation's troops, the resoluteness
of the war of resistance, the proclamation of the Kuomintang's program of
carrying out the war of resistance and national construction, the convening
of the People's Political Council, the legal status achieved by the
Communist Party and other parties and factions, the advent of guerrilla warfare, the progress of all the troops in the country, and the development of
people's movements. These are all major events manifesting the progress made
by China. However, there are, at the same time, many unfavorable events and
adverse phenomena. For example, the loss of major cities, communications
lines, and principal commerce and industry, the loss of territories and
populations, the uneven progress of the entire country (with some areas

progressing very slowly), the political system, in general, is just beginning
to become democraticized, the continuing existence of obdurate conservatives
and the phenomenon of corruption, the upsurge of the trend to compromise,
etc.

Second, with regard to the enemy: The drain on their military and financial
resources, the censure of world opinion, the deterioration of military
discipline, the corresponding weakening of the combat effectiveness of the
troops, the increase of dissatisfaction among the people in its country and
among the front-line troops, the failure of Chang Kao-feng's war, the difficulty of raising Chinese renegade troops and the ineffectiveness of those
that have been organized. These are major events manifesting the enemy's
difficulties. But, at the same time, there are things which show the capability of the enemy. They are the determined nature of their offensive,
the stubborn strength of its forces, the vastness of the territory it has
occupied, the strength of its political organizations, and the effectiveness
of its conspiratorial agencies.

Third, with regard to the international scene: The growth of the movement to
aid China, and the growth of the Soviet Union's strength and its aid to
China. All these are favorable to China but there are still other things:
the brewing of a great war in Europe, the tendency toward compromise to a
certain degree between Britain and Japan, the assistance given to the enemy
by various countries in the form of materials for manufacturing armaments--all
these are unfavorable to China.

The many things mentioned above with regard to China, Japan, and the international scene are all characteristics manifested in the 15 months of the
first stage of the war of resistance. These characteristics will effect the
new stage of the future.

8.  The Second Stage

Assuming that Wuhan is not to be defended, under this situation many new
things will emerge from the state of the war. Although Wuhan is occupied
by the enemy, it does not mean that the old stage has ended and a new stage
is beginning. The period of time between the continuing ability of the enemy
to attack and it is finally forced to stop its offensive is still the transitional period of the old stage into the new. Although this may be so, after
Wuhan is abandoned, many new situations will appear.

After Wuhan is abandoned, as well as the greater part of the new stage, the
predictable situation will be that of even more difficulties on the one
hand, and even greater progress on the other. This is the basic characteristic
of the new stage.

The increasing difficulties will be manifested as follows: 1) Because of
the loss of major cities and communications lines, the nation's political
power and battle lines are carved up, terrain wise, and many new problems will
arise from this effect; 2) extreme difficulties in finance and economy;

3) the tendency toward a certain degree of compromise between Britian and
Japan (or, on the contrary, the possibility of further conflict between
Britain and Japan under the condition of Japan's persistance in monopolizing
and threatening southeast Asia); 4) if the enemy attacks Canton, it can be
anticipated that China's sea communications routes will be cut, and international aid will temporarily drop off; 5) there is the possibility of the
formation of a puppet political power on a national scale and its effect on
the anti-Japanese front; 6) the possibility of rebellion in parts of the
anti-Japanese front, and the upsurge of compromise atmosphere; and 7) the
growth of pessimism and divided opinions, etc. These are matters which can
happen and burden the anti-Japanese war with new difficulties. Only when
these difficulties are taken into consideration can we overcome them in a
prepared and planned manner.

Further progress will be manifested in various aspects as follows:
1) Generalissimo Chiang's and the Kuomintang's policy of resolutely waging
a war of resistance and the further progressiveness, politically; 2) improved relationships between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the
consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front;
3) the progressiveness of the work to reform the armies; 4) the widening
development of guerrilla warfare; 5) the progress of democraticizing the
nation; 6) the even bigger development of people's movements; 7) the implementation of new, wartime fiscal and economic policies; 8) the elevation of
cultural education of the war of resistance; 9) the continuation and
possible increase of aid from the Soviet Union, and the even more closer
relationship between China and the Soviet Union, etc.

The entire second stage is that of stalemate. It is the stage in which
China prepares to go on the counteroffensive. The duration of this period
will be decided by the degrees of transformation in the strength of the
enemy and ourselves, and what the international situation is. But we should
prepare for a long war. After passing through this difficult course, we will
arrive upon the smooth road to victory.

Although there is stalemate, strategically, in the second stage, there is
still large-scale warfare. This is manifested mainly by the main forces in
frontal positions standing on the defensive, while wide-spread guerrilla warfare breaks out behind the enemy's lines. At that time, in many important
strategic areas, the guerrilla warfare will be fought with great difficulty,
and we should begin now to make preparations to handle these difficulties.

9. The Third Stage

Concrete situations cannot be predicted. But that must be the time when we
have completed preparing the conditions for our counteroffensive and, at the
same time, the degree of the enemy's difficulties has greatly increased and
the international situation is also very much favorable to us. At that time
the war situation will no longer be strategic defense or strategic stalemate,
but a strategic counteroffensive, not a strategic inner line, but a strategic

outer line. Great progress must be made politically in country at that time,
and there must be new military technology. It will otherwise be unable to
launch the counteroffensive.

10. Defending Wuhan Is a Question of Buying Time, and Not One of Defending It
to the Last Man

The objective of the struggle to defend Wuhan is to drain the enemy on the
one hand, and to buy time to enable progress of the work throughout China on
the other. And it is not to hold a position to the last man. When the battle
situation truly proves that it has become unfavorable to us and to pull out
will, on the contrary, be favorable, we should follow the principle of giving
up territory to conserve our military strength. Therefore, a big, decisive
battle which will be unfavorable to us must be avoided. There should be no
strategically decisive campaigns in either the first or second stages. They
are enough to impede the persistance in the war of resistance and the preparations
for the counteroffensive, and must be avoided. Avoiding strategically decisive
battles and going all-out to fight decisive combats in battles and wage campaigns under conditions favorable to us should become part of the policy for
protracted warfare. Giving up certain cities which can no longer be defended
when it becomes necessary, and under definite conditions, is not only something that is forced upon us, but also a policy of luring the enemy to penetrate deeply, dispersing his forces, draining them, and sapping the enemy's
enthusiasm. Under the logical premise of not compromising and surrender but
to resolutely wage a war of resistance, giving up certain points when it
becomes necessary is permitted within the policy of protracted warfare, and
it is not something to be frightened about.

11. Moving From the Current Stage to That of Stalemate

Stopping the enemy's offensive is the only way to benefit our preparations
for the counteroffensive. It still is necessary to make a big effort in order
to achieve this objective. Therefore, in transiting from the current stage
to that of forcing the enemy to stop its offensive and go into defending the
territories it has occupied, and the entire stage of stalemate has emerged,
is still but a course of struggle, and many difficulties must be overcome in
order to attain it. This is because the enemy will not immediately conclude
its offensive after Wuhan falls. It definitely will still want to attack
Sian, Ich'ang, Changsha, Hengchow, Wuchow, Peihai, Nanch'ang, Swatow, Fuchow
and adjacent areas. We must focus on this kind of plans the enemy has and
continue to use strategic mobile defense warfare if we want to stop the enemy's
offensive. We must go all out to fight resolute battles so as to drain the
enemy on an even larger scale, and yet avoid being tricked by the enemy,
forcing the enemy to stop its offensive, bring about a transition of the war
situation to that of the enemy and ourselves into the favorable situation of
stalemate.

12. The State of Stalemate Is Imminent

After the enemy occupies Wuhan, its weaknesses in troop strength and their
dispersion will become even more pronounced. If it still wants to attack

Sian, Ich'ang, Changsha, Nanch'ang, Wuchow, Fuchow, and other areas planning
to occupy them, the great difficulties it has from its weakness of inadequate troop strength and its dispersion will develop to the highest degree
in its offensive stage. This is the extreme difficulty added to the enemy's
phenomenon of inadequate troop strength (it cannot possibly be adequate),
and the dispersion of its troops (it is compelled to spread out) brought about
by the stubborn, frontal resistance put up by our main forces and the threat
of guerrilla warfare in the vast areas behind the enemy's lines. This
situation--the enemy's inadequacy in troop strength and its dispersion, and
our frontal defense and threat to the enemy's rear areas--is most unfavorable
to the enemy but most favorable to us. In an overall comparison of strength
between the enemy and ourselves, of course the basic situation of the enemy
is strong, we are weak, and the enemy is in a superior position and we in a
weak one, remains unchanged. This change can come about only through a great
effort put out by the entire nation in coordination with conditions abroad
during the stage of a mutual stalemate-off. However, in the offensive
campaign against Wuhan the enemy's powerful strength is further displayed.
Naturally this inflicts losses on us, but, at the same time, it creates
difficulties for the enemy. This is so because the powerful forces of the
enemy (it is, at the same time, inadequate and scattered), after giving further
rein to its power, will deteriorate in strength, thereby compelling its overall strategic offensive to near its climax. We admit that the enemy's offensive still has remnants of power, and it is best, and most suitable, to estimate
that this remnant power is still considerably strong. Therefore, there is
still the possibility that the enemy will want to attack and occupy Sian,
Ich'ang, Changsha, Nanch'ang, Wuchow, Fuchow, and adjacent areas, and we must
even be prepared for its offensive against the entire Canton-Hankow line and
the Sian-Lanchow highway. But, from the overall strength of the enemy, it is
but a small remnant power. From the overall national strength of Japan, it
must guard against the Soviet Union in the north, the United States in the
East, and the British and French in the South, while suppressing the people
domestically. It has only so much strength, and that part which can be used
in China has about reached its limits.

Furthermore, in its frontal positions and in its occupied territories, the
wide-spread warfare it must handle still exist. The contradictions between
Japan and the United States, Britain, and France are growing, and the contradictions between the government and the people internally, between officers
and men on the front lines, and between massive expenditures and the drying
up of its finances are continuing to intensify. All these make the enemy
worry quite a bit. We, and all the people in the country, must be able to
see these, and not let the loss of major cities and communications lines to
scare us. We must approve of the support the government in rearranging the
fighting all over the country, make preparations in a planned manner to give
battle along the Lunghai line, the Sian-Lanchow highway and other strategic
areas, wage large-scale guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, seize
upon the weakness of the enemy in its inadequacy in troops and their dispersion in order to drain it even more and bring about even greater dispersion,
and cause the war to move surely and victoriously into the new stage of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. This is the current urgent task for
the entire nation.

13. The Enemy's Strength Is Gradually Ebbing, Our Strength Is Gradually
Growing

Has the enemy's strength increased? From the original strength it has, there
has not been much increase. On the contrary, it has been greatly weakened.
The enemy's original military and economic strength has been drained massively.
In the 15 months of warfare it has sustained casualties of several hundred
thousand troops, used up a huge quantity of weapons and ammunition, as well
as military supplies, over a hundred warships and several hundred planes have
been destroyed, and it has expended several hundred million yen. This drain
is unprecedented in the history of Japan. Until it has been forced to stop
its strategic offensive, a great part of its strength will be drained.
Its
ally, Hitler, has been greatly worried over this for a long time. But is
there no increase at all in the enemy's strength? There is, and this is so
because of its occupation of China's principal cities, communications lines,
and part of the rural areas. It has seized the market from the various
countries and from Chinese national capital, raw material sources and tools
of production from China, and much manpower. These constitute the only objective of Japan's war, and it has been increased in such things temporarily.
But the question is can these things withstand the drain of war? They cannot.
The entire "investment" of the war has been drained off and will remain so.
If it seeks returns, it must put in new production investments. Again, the
question is can it get returns to make up for the drain of war from its production investments, disregarding the ineffectiveness of its investments and
assuming that they are effective? Again no. Because in its rear a widespread war still exists, and the daily drain continues. So long as there is
a wide-spread guerrilla war in the enemy's rear, such as the guerrilla warfare in North China, it will be very difficult for the enemy to get anything
out of it. Because of the continuous warfare, not only will it be impossible
to get returns from its old investments, it will have to put in new ones.
If we only persist in this war of resistance the pitiful fate of Japan is
certain. We have said that in the second strategic stage, that is, the stalemate stage, Japan will gradually change from strength to weakness, from a
superior to an inferior position. This kind of continuous drain is the deciding
factor. We will now talk with respect to China. Has China's strength been
weakened, or has it been increased? Our answer is that it has been weakened
and it has increased. What has decreased is the quality and quantity of its
original strength. This is manifested in the drain on weapons and personnel
of the troops, in the loss of population, industry, territory, and natural
resources. This is an important aspect of what is making us feel difficult.
However, it is not that there has been no increase. What has increased is
the new quality and quantity. This is manifested in the unity of the entire
nation, the improvements made in military forces, politics, and culture, and
in the enhancement of the degree of consciousness among the people and their
organization. Although the main force has retreated, guerrilla warfare has
advanced. Although a part of the territory has been lost, another part has
improved. The question is that the degree of increase attained today is not
enough to stop the enemy's offensive, and, later, it will even be more inadequate to carry out our counteroffensive.

Therefore, it has created the problem of the necessity to apply a massive,
prolonged effort to increase new strength. This kind of increase--that is, the
mobilization on an even greater scale of the new and viable forces among the
various stratum of the people of the nation and the even greater improvement
in the various fields of party, politics, military, and civilians--to be based
upon a wide-spread and prolonged effort hereafter is entirely possible.
In mainly relying upon the forces produced by ourselves, and in coordination
with the increased difficulties of the enemy and the strengthening of international aid to us, it will enable the transformation of the situation between
the enemy and ourselves to take place. To go from the present situation of
the enemy being in a superior and our being in inferior position first to
that of equal balance, and then to our being in a superior, and the enemy in
an inferior position. This is the basic problem in the protracted mutually
holding-off stage which must be, and can be, resolved.

14. The Enemy Holds the Cities, We the Rural Areas, Therefore the War Is a
Long, Drawn-out One. But the Rural Areas Can Eventually Overcome the Cities

Therefore, the problem is: after the enemy occupied China's major cities and
communications lines, it holds the cities to deal with us while we hold the
rural areas to deal with them, and can the rural areas be victorious over
the cities? The answer is: there will be difficulties, but it is possible.

The protracted nature of the anti-Japanese war of resistance is brought about
not only because we are a semi-colonial country and the enemy is an imperialist
nation, but also because this imperialism also occupied our cities, and we
have to retreat to the rural areas to resist the enemy. On this point, the
theory of quick victory has no basis at all. But the problem of China's
cities and rural areas is distinct in nature from those of the foreign
capitalist countries. In the capitalist countries the cities in form and
in practicality dominate the rural areas. When the head--the cities--is
lopped off, the limbs--the rural areas--cannot survive. It is inconceivable
that in countries like Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Japan,
and Italy a long, rural peasant war against the cities is possible. It is
also impossible in small, semi-colonial countries. Several decades ago, it
would also be very difficult for a big, semi-colonial country like China.
But today, this possibility has developed in a big, semi-colonial country
like China. In this it is obvious that there are the 3 three-in-one conditions.

First is the semi-colonial condition. In a semi-colonial country, the cities,
although essentially in a leading position, cannot completely control the
rural areas. This is because the cities are too small and the rural areas
too vast, and the large supply of manpower and material is in the rural areas,
not in the cities.

Second is the condition of a big country. A part of it is lost but another
part remains. The enemy encounters a big country with few troops. When our
strong and resolute resistance is added to this, it forces the creation of
the difficulties of inadequate troops and their dispersion. In this way it

has not only given us a general base for resisting Japan--that is the vast
rear areas like Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan and other areas--it has made it
impossible for the enemy to occupy; also, a vast area for guerrilla activities
has been provided us behind the enemy's lines, such as North, Central, and South
China and other areas, thereby making it impossible for the enemy to occupy
all of the territories.

Third is the condition of today. If China had been occupied by a big imperialist country by force of arms, as in the case of Britain's occupation
of India, several decades ago, it would be difficult to avoid becoming a
colony. But today it is different. Today, of primary importance is that
China has progressed. It has a new political party, army, and people, and
these form the basic strength for defeating the enemy. Next is that the enemy
has retrogressed. The developmental course of imperialist Japan's social
economy has reached the stage of senility. The growth of capitalism in
Japan has created, and is creating, conditions that will send it to its own
grave. In addition, the international situation has changed. The old world
is nearing death and annihilation and a new world is dawning. I have spoken
in detail on these reasons in my article "On Protracted War." In brief,
in today's semi-colonial big country like China, there exist many conditions
which are favorable to our organizing a resolutely fought, protracted and
large-scale war to oppose the enemy occupying the cities. Surrounding and
isolating the cities with interlocking warfare, gradually fostering the
growth of our own forces in a protracted war, transforming the situation between the enemy and ourselves, and coordinating with the changes in the world,
will enable us to drive out the enemy and recover the cities. It is beyond
doubt that in today's China it is also difficult for the rural areas to oppose
the cities because the cities are always concentrated while the rural areas
are dispersed. After the enemy occupied our major cities, our administrative areas and battle lines were carved up topographically, thereby bringing
many difficulties upon us. This decided the protracted and merciless nature
of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. However, it is necessary for us to
say that for the rural areas to be able to defeat the cities, it is because
it has the above mentioned three-in-one conditions. Under conditions of
civil war, a very small portion of the rural areas supported a long war of
opposition against the cities, and that was at a time when the imperialist
countries were as one in opposition to communism. Who can say that under
the condition pf national war, and also in a period when the imperialist camp
is split, China, with its greater part of the rural areas, cannot support a
protracted war to oppose the enemy in the cities? There is no doubt that
it is possible. Furthermore, the present so-called rural areas are greatly
different from that of the civil war period. Its territory is not only huge,
but in the vast rear areas of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan provinces, there
still are many cities and industries open to the outside, and still can
carry out construction. On the basis of the preservation of the broad, rear
areas and establishing guerrilla warfare bases behind enemy lines, and fostering the growth of our forces and weakening the enemy's, which, together with
future favorable conditions on the international scene, will enable us to
launch our counteroffensive and recover the cities. In his letter to the

people last December, Generalissimo Chiang pointed out: "The core of achieving
final victory in China's protracted war does not lie in Nanking, nor in the
various big cities. In reality, it is dependent upon the rural areas of the
entire country and the powerful and stubborn will of the people." This is
entirely correct. Although the war is difficult, a victorious future still
exists.

15. The Peril of Compromise Exists Overpoweringly, But It Can Be Overcome

Long ago, we said that part of those inflicted with the disease of fearing
the Japanese often attempted to shake the government's determination to wage
a war of resistance. They proposed the so-called peaceful compromise, and
this was seen in the past after Nanking fell. Now, it is again fomenting.
This is a reflection of the enemy's plots within the anti-Japanese front.
This kind of peril exist in serious preponderance, and the people must give
full attention to it so that the pro-Japanese faction will not be able to
get its traitorous way. The plans of the pro-Japanese faction and that of
the enemy is in accord. It will surely concentrate on opposition to Chiang
and the Communist Party, and foist its treachery under false orders. This
will cause the future of the war of resistance become doubtful. Therefore,
the entire country has been aroused and is aware of the fact that the enemy's
schemes and the sowing of discontent within our ranks are frightening. They
must take the initiative to consciously strive to oppose this kind of plot
without slackening its effort for the least bit. Is this kind of peril
possible to be overcome? It is. After the Kuomintang and the Communist Party
have become united as one with all patriots and put out the necessary effort,
it is not only imperative, but also completely possible to overcome this peril
of compromise, drive out and eliminate the devils who openly aided the enemy,
and persist in the war of resistance. This is because the pro-Japanese,
after all, does not have too much power, while that of the anti-Japanese faction
is greater than the pro-Japanese.

16. The New State of the Guerrilla Warfare in the Stalemate Stage

In the new stage, the frontal defense is the main force, and the guerrilla
warfare behind the enemy's lines will become, for a while, the principal form
of warfare. But the guerrilla war in the enemy's rear during the stalemate
stage will adopt a type of new state to develop. What is this new state of
the guerrilla warfare? It is, firstly, the ability to develop extensively in
the vast areas. This is because the territory is huge on our side, while on
the enemy side its troops are inadequate and dispersed. If only we can adhere
to the policy of expanding the guerrilla war and give it correct leadership,
it will be impossible for the enemy to completely stop our expansion. Secondly,
in some important strategic areas, such as North China and the lower basin
of the Yangtze River, we will encounter ruthless enemy attacks and it will
become impossible to maintain big army corps in the plains areas. The mountain
areas will become the main bases, and guerrilla troops in some areas will
possibly have to cut back in numbers. We must prepare now for the coming of
this state of affairs. Currently, in order to coordinate with the fighting
of the main forces and prepare for the transition to a new stage, we should,

in general, separate the guerrilla warfare behind the enemy's lines into two
types of areas. One type is the areas where guerrilla warfare has been fully
expanded, such as North China. The principal policy here is to consolidate
the foundation already established, so as to make preparations which will enable us to defeat the enemy's ruthless offensives in the new stage and hold on
to our bases. Another type is the areas where guerrilla warfare has not been
fully expanded, or are now beginning to be expanded, such as in the areas of
central China. The principal policy here is to rapidly develop guerrilla
warfare in order to avoid having difficulties with the expansion of guerrilla
warfare with the return of the enemy's troops. In the future, in order to
coordinate with the main force manning the frontal defenses so that it will
have an opportunity to rest and regroup, and to develop forces in preparation
for the counteroffensive, we must put all our efforts into the guerrilla war
resolutely defending the bases. In the protracted period of persistance,
train the guerrilla troops into a new force to enmesh the enemy and aid the
frontal positions. Generally speaking, the guerrilla warfare behind the enemy's
lines in the new stage will be much more difficult than in the preceding stage.
We must foresee such difficulties and accept them. We must not become confused just because it was easy to expand in the preceding stage, because the
enemy will definitely turn around to attack the guerrilla war. However, it
is still possible to persist in it, and all leaders of the work being done
behind the enemy's rear must have this confidence. This is because the
guerrilla warfare in the national war of resistance, regardless of how powerful
the enemy is, is much superior than under the condition of civil war. To
win over and collapse the puppet forces so as to isolate the Japanese, is, at
this point, an extremely important task.

17. The New Stage of Development of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance Is,
At the Same Time, the New Stage of Development of the Anti-Japanese National
United Front

The above are problems all concerned with the state of affairs of the antiJapanese war of resistance, and the following will concern the state of affairs
of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The time when the anti-Japanese war of resistance has developed into a new
stage is the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front has done the
same. Because there will be even more difficulties to be encountered in the
new stage, the Anti-Japanese National United Front, in accordance with this
kind of situation, should display its might in the struggle against difficulties and overcome any kind of difficulties against which it is pitted.
So that the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front can display that it
has the power to overcome difficulties, and not its inability, in the current
transitional stage and upon entering the new stage in the future, it must
earnestly consolidate and expand the United Front. A long-term war can be
supported only by a long-term united front. The protracted nature of the
war and that of the National United Front are inseparable.

18. The Kuomintang Has a Bright Future

The Anti-Japanese National United Front has the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party for its base, and of these two the Kuomintang is the first big party.
The development and adherence to the war of resistance cannot be imagined
separate from the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang has its glorious history. Of
primary importance is the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty, the founding of a
republic, the opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai, the establishment of a policy of
unification with the Soviet Union, with the Communist Party, as well as a
worker-peasant policy, and the carrying out of the great revolution of the
15th and 16th year after the founding of the republic. Today, it is again
leading the great war of resistance against Japan. It has a historical
tradition of the Three People's Principles, it has two great leaders, Dr Sun
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, one following the other, and it has a broad mass
of loyal and patriotic party members. All these must not be ignored by the
people. All these are the results of the development of China's history.
In the course of carrying out the war of resistance against Japan and in the
forming of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Kuomintang stood in
the position of leadership.

In the past 15 months, the various anti-Japanese parties and factions have
seen improvement, and the progress of the Kuomintang was very clear. It
convened the provisional congress, proclaimed the program for the war of
resistance, convened the People's Political Council, began the organization
of the Three People's Principles Youth League, accepted the legal existence
of the various parties and factions to resist Japan and carry out national
construction together, implemented to a certain degree democratic power,
carried out reforms in the military and in political organizations, made
foreign policy compatible with the demands of opposition against Japan, and
others, all of which are major events of historical significance. Based solely
on the premise of persisting in the war of resistance and in the United Front,
it can be predicted that the Kuomintang's future will be bright.

However, up to now, there are still quite a few people harboring an incorrect
observation of the Kuomintang, and they doubt its future. The doubt they
hold is the problem of whether it can continue to wage the war of resistance,
whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become an ally for
opposing Japan and national construction. Furthermore, these problems are
mutually connected and inseparable. What is our opinion on this? We hold
that the Kuomintang has a bright future. On the basis of various subjective
and objective conditions, it is able to continue with the war of resistance,
continue to progress, and become an ally for opposing Japan and national
construction.

Because of the determined nature of the enemy's offensive, the severe blows
dealt by the enemy to the various class strata of China and its plunder,
the anger of the troops throughout China against the enemy and their courageous
war of resistance, the upsurge of the anti-Japanese movement throughout China,
the existence of a favorable state of affairs on the international scene--all
these facts have basically decided the political direction of the Kuomintang and

the entire country. First, any party or faction, including the Kuomintang,
the Communist Party, and other anti-Japanese political parties and organizations, must continue to wage the war of resistance. Whoever does not do so
has only one way out, and that is to become a traitor. There is no other
way. Second, any party or faction, if it only continues to wage the war of
resistance, must progress. It is beyond doubt that the progress of domestic
politics is not rapid and not on a general scale, therefore, it brought about
the damage wrought by war. But it is also because of such loss that will
compel it to seek progress in politics, military affairs, culture, party
tasks, and people's movements so as to enable it to resist the enemy and recover lost territory. Regardless of whether it is the Kuomintang that is in
power, or any other party or faction, they must all continue to make progress.
Third, an important link in the progress made domestically is the democraticization of the organizational form of the Kuomintang. It has caused itself
to become an alliance for resisting Japan and for national construction, and
the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
Is there such a possibility? I believe there is. If the Kuomintang does
not, in accordance with the trend of the situation of the war of resistance,
open its doors to the masses and hold in one great organization the patriotic
parties and factions and patriots of the entire nation, it will be impossible
for it to shoulder the difficult task of continuing the war of resistance and
defeat the enemy. In its 50-year history, the Kuomintang, whenever it encountered a great revolutionary struggle, always transformed itself into an
alliance of national revolution. There were two occasions when this happened
which were most prominent and had historical significance. The first time
was from the formation of the T'ung-meng Hui [0681 4147 2585] to the Hsin
Hai [6580 0075] revolution. With the objective to oppose the Ch'ing dynasty
and establish a republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed an alliance with all revolutionary parties and factions (from the Kuang-fu Hui--[0342 1788 2585] to the
Kelau Hui [0766 5071 2585]. During this period, annals of heroic struggles
filled the party roster. It went from victory to victory, enriched with vigor
and, therefore, was successful in its Hsin Hai revolution. The second time
was from the 13th to the 16th years after the founding of the republic. With
opposition to imperialism and the warlords as the objective, an alliance was
made, domestically, with the workers, peasants, and the Communist Party, and,
abroad, it formed an alliance with the socialist country of the Soviet Union,
and established the famous "Three Great Policies." Because of this, the
Whampoa Military Academy was established, a party army was formed, and victory
was won in the Northern Expedition. All these not only manifested the development of the Kuomintang's United Front, but also that of the Three People's
Principles. Today is the moment for the Kuomintang to become a revolutionary
national alliance for the third time in its history. It is not only possible
but imperative, for it to transform itself into a national alliance for
opposing Japan and national construction for the purpose of opposing imperialist
Japan and establishing a republic based upon the Three People's Principles.
This great movement is already beginning to unfold. By accepting the legal
status of the Communist Party and other parties and factions, by accepting the
Eighth Route Army into the people's revolutionary army system, by its clear
announcement in its program for war of resistance and national construction
in which it declared "if we are seeking certain victory in the war of resistance and certain success in national construction, we must rely upon the

efforts of our Party's comrades and the people of the entire country to
unite and shoulder this task together," as well as the convening of the
People's Political Council and the organization of the Three People's Principles
Youth League, the Kuomintang has indicated the beginning of a transformation
of itself into a national alliance for opposing Japan and national construction. The current problem is: what kind of attitude should the Communist
Party take with regard to this movement of the Kuomintang to expand its organization? Should we approve or oppose? We say we approve the Kuomintang's
expansion and development of itself into a national revolutionary alliance
at any time. When the Kuomintang reorganized in the 13th year after the
founding of the republic, we adopted an attitude of approval. We shall go
all out to approve and support it today when the national peril is extremely
grave. The reason is that the bigger the anti-Japanese allied armies are,
the better it will be. It is not enough to beat back imperialist Japan with
only the development and progress of the Communist Party. Although the second
place Communist Party of China has initiated and adhered to the United Front
of all parties, factions, and armies, as well as opening the doors of its
own organization to the broad masses of revolutionary comrades in a drive to
achieve victory in opposing Japan, it will be extremely harmful to the United
Front and the war of resistance if the first place Kuomintang continues to
preserve the old state of affairs. The war of resistance cannot be won, the
entire nation will be in peril, and the Communist Party and the proletariat
will not be able to escape this kind of danger. Therefore, not only does
the Communist Party not oppose, but also very much hope for and resolutely
approve and support the Kuomintang's expanding and consolidating its organization, implementing democraticization within its party, and bring about its own
transformation into a revolutionary national alliance to benefit the continuation of the war of resistance and winning final victory.

19. But There Still Are Obstacles Ahead for the Kuomintang, and Strong Efforts
Must Be Made To Overcome Them Before the Kuomintang Can Develop

A bright future for the Kuomintang exists, and its progress and development
are possible. Chiang Kai-shek and the majority of the Kuomintang are leading
and propelling the Kuomintang forward. But, it is known to every one that
there are some conservatives still in the Kuomintang, impeding the speed and
degree of the Kuomintang's progress. Because of their existence, and their
union with many conservatives in society, they form a counter-current in the
flood of the national revolutionary war, stubbornly resisting the ship of
progress. It has, with considerable strength, hindered the democraticization
of the country, the implementation of all progressive enterprises necessary
to the war of resistance, the carrying out of the many good policies and
methods contained in the repeated proclamations, talks, speeches, and orders
of Chiang Kai-shek, the implementation of the Kuomintang's program of war
of resistance and national construction and the Kuomintang's orders for national
salvation, and the development of mass movements. These are all facts, and
they are important reasons for the Kuomintang's progress being slow and not
wide-spread, and for the harm inflicted upon the war of resistance. They
oppose the progress and development of the Kuomintang, and even went to the
extent of proposing compromise. If these fellows were to get the upper hand,
then China's national liberation enterprise would receive great setbacks.

Therefore, it is worth paying great attention to them. However, we firmly
believe that such conservative influence cannot exist forever. It will be
difficult for it to get the upper hand although it has not, and they are
not the main stream, but an adverse current. Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang, and with the endeavors of the majority of the Kuomintang and the
approval and support of the people of the entire nation, this kind of conservative trend can be overcome. The Communist Party resolutely support the
progress of the Kuomintang, and hope that the conservatives, who are obstructing progress, will turn over a new leaf and seek progress together. We hope
that these people will change. "A gentleman's impropriety are like the
eclipses," everything will be all right if they reform. In reality we have
seen many conservatives making progress in the course of the war of resistance,
and, henceforth, there inevitably will be many people attaining consciousness
through the lessons learned from the war of resistance and make progress
together with the masses. This is the reformable nature of the conservatives
in the anti-Japanese war. But there also is the possibility that some may
become even worse, willingly allowing themselves to be swept away by the huge
wave of the war of resistance. And this is another side of the changeable
nature. With regard to this kind of people it is of no loss to us.

20. Other Parties and Factions Also Have a Bright Future
All the parties and factions participating in the anti-Japanese war and the
Anti-Japanese National United Front, based upon the premise of persisting
in the war of resistance and the United Front, all have a future for development. We are willing to establish long-term cooperation with them, and also
give them all possible approval and support. This is the same for all regardless of whether it is a third party, the national youth party, national
socialist party, national salvation association faction, or any other groups,
parties, or factions. It is very obvious that the so-called bright future
for all parties and factions on the premise of persisting in the war of resistance and adhering to the United Front encompasses the efforts made within
the parties of the trend toward conservatism. If there is such a trend which
will be harmful to the war of resistance and the United Front, and it is
allowed to develop unchecked, there will then be the danger of destroying
its bright future. Regardless of whether it is the Kuomintang, the Communist
Party, or other parties and factions, it will be the same for all, and full
attention must be given to this problem.

21. The Characteristics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front of China
Because of China's historical causes, it has made today's Anti-Japanese
National United Front of China different from any united fronts of foreign
countries, like the popular front, nor is it like the united fronts in China's
history, such as the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party. This is the reason why there is the special characteristics of today's
China. Recognizing these characteristics has great significance with regard
to the consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

What are these characteristics? The conclusion is that there are eight
characteristics. They are those of national opposition against Japan, of
the protracted nature, of imbalance, of the armies, of the experience gained
from the 15 months, of the majority of the people still lacking organization,
of the Three People's Principles, and of the new international situation.

First of all, it is that of the opposition against Japan by the entire nation.
This characteristic has defined the basic nature of our United Front. On the
one hand it is for the purpose of opposing imperialist Japan, a foreign
nation which has invaded our nation's territory, that our United Front was
formed and developed. On the other hand, the organizational elements include
the various different parties and factions of the entire nation, different
classes, different armies, and different nationalities, forming into one of
the largest groups. The organizational elements can be so big because it
is for the purpose of opposing the aggression of a foreign nation. Because
of its colossal size, this United Front has immense power. But at the same
time, many mutual frictions within the United Front are difficult to avoid,
and they must suitably be adjusted. Only thus can the objective of uniting
to oppose the outsiders be attained. This kind of most basic characteristics
of our United Front--the political objective of opposing aggression by a
foreign nation and the extreme massiveness of the organizational elements--
are different from the popular fronts of France and Spain. It is also
different from the national front of the first great revolution period (the
cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party). It has brought
about the production of many specific contents and specific results in the
United Front of today. This is the first characteristic and strong point of
today's United Front, although, at the same time, it is unavoidable to have
weaknesses with respect to the complexity of its organization.

Second is its long-term nature. This characteristic is an outcropping of the
first. Because this United Front utilizes national warfare to oppose Japanese
imperialism, and Japanese imperialism is a powerful imperialism, it therefore,
gave birth to the long-term nature of the anti-Japanese war and, in its turn,
produces the long-term nature of the United Front. This will be brought up
in the 5th part of my report. It is the starting point for all policies.
In this regard it is also different from the first cooperation between the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

The third is imbalance. Because of historical causes, it has brought about
an imbalance in the political power of the various parties, factions, and
classes. At the same time, this kind of imbalance is also manifested in the
distribution of areas. The Kuomintang is the first big party with real
power, the Communist Party is second, and the others follow behind. This
situation has brought forth many specific things.

The fourth is the nature of the armies. The Kuomintang and the Communist
Party both have armies--this result of specific historical conditions is not
a weakness, but a strong point. Because of the armies of the two parties,
they have been able to discharge all of the best responsibilities of division
of labor in the course of the war against Japan, and the benefits of mutual

emulation and encouragement also became more numerous. In this respect, it
is similar to that of Spain, but different from that of France as well as
the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This
is also one of the factors which made long-term cooperation between the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party possible.

Fifth is that of the 15 months' experience. The period from 1924 to 1927
is the 4 years of the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party. The period from 1927 to 1936 is the 9 years of division
between them. Now, the new-cooperation between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party has lasted for 2 years. The experience of the cooperationdivision-new-cooperation of the past 15 years has taught a most profound
lesson to the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, as well as to other parties
and factions, and to the people of the entire nation. The conclusion is that
there only should be cooperation, not division. This is also one of the
foundations for long-term cooperation. This valuable experience is not available
to other countries of the world, and it was also unavailable during the first
cooperation between the two parties.

Sixth is that of the majority of the masses being without an organization.
This is a characteristic of China, and the various foreign countries are
different from this. Therefore, it is a shortcoming which made the United
Front lacking an existing and organized people's base. But at the same time,
the various parties can divide the labor among themselves to organize the
masses. It is not necessary for them to crowd together in one place in
perpetual friction, because you can find everywhere masses without organizations and are waiting to be organized to meet the urgent need of the war of
resistance.

Seventh is that of the Three People's Principles. The Anti-Japanese National
United Front has the Three People's Principles for its base. It is a base
not only for cooperating to oppose Japan, but also for cooperation in national
construction. The nationalism of the Three People's Principles will lead
this cooperation to wresting national liberation, people's power will lead
this cooperation to thoroughly establish a democratic country, and the people's
livelihood will, even more possibly, lead this cooperation into a very longterm affair. The political program and political ideology of the Three
People's Principles ensures the long-term nature of the United Front.

Eighth is that of being in a new, international situation. The political
and economic conditions of today's world is different from both periods of
the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and
the subsequent division. Today, only a portion of the imperialist countries
like Germany, Italy, and Japan oppose Kuomintang-Communist Party cooperation
and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Another portion of the imperialist countries, because of the contradictions between them and Japan, also do
not oppose our United Front for the present, but, on the contrary, they take
a stand of approval. All of the progressive people of all the countries
support us. The Soviet Union supports us sincerely. This kind of a new
international situation has very important impact upon our long-term cooperation.

It will be possible to adopt a suitable policy politically and in the attitude
toward work only through intense study and understanding of the aforesaid
characteristics. Political problems and work problems cannot be handled in
the manner of treating the symptoms and not the cause, but problems should
be resolved correctly on the basis of a scientific foundation. The victory
in the anti-Japanese war and the consolidation and expansion of the AntiJapanese National United Front require this type of scientific foundation.

22. The New Situation of the United Front

The Anti-Japanese National United Front must appear with a new posture in
the new stage of the war against Japan so as to be able to handle the new
situation of the war. This new posture is the wide-scale development and
high degree of consolidation of the United Front. The lesson of the 15 months
of unity and war of resistance will stimulate various parties to understand
the necessity for this kind of consolidation and development. With regard
to development, it is the enlargement of the Party's organization and the
expansion of people's organizations. As for consolidation, the various
parties are to adopt new policies and new work, diminish mutual friction, and
achieve a truly sincere unity to meet the national peril. There are many
difficulties in the new stage of the war of resistance. It is only through
the large-scale development of the organizations of the various parties in
the United Front and consolidation to a high degree the inner relationships of
the various parties, as well as the relationships between the various parties,
that the new political tasks can be carried out with vigor, difficulties
overcome and the objective of stopping the enemy's offensive and preparing
for our counteroffensive attained. This is the new state of affairs of the
United Front in the new state of the anti-Japanese war. Through the concerted
effort of the various parties and the enthusiastic support of the people
throughout the country, it will be entirely possible for this kind of new
state to emerge.

IV. The Current Urgent Task for the Entire Nation

In accordance with the summation made in the past on the war of resistance
and the estimates of the development of a new stage in the United Front, what
should be the current, urgent task for the entire nation? What differences
should there be with that of the past?

In general, the task should be persisting in the war of resistance and in
protracted warfare, consolidating and expanding the United Front so as to
overcome difficulties, stop the enemy's offensive, prepare our forces, carry
out our counteroffensive, and achieved the objective of finally driving out
the enemy.

Specifically speaking, there are the following concrete tasks. All organizational elements of the Anti-Japanese National United Front should support the
government. Furthermore, they must, under the leadership of the government
carry out the mobilization of the entire nation. Communist Party members
should be models in the implementation of these tasks.

1. Rouse To a High Degree National Self-Respect and Confidence, Persist to
the End With the War of Resistance, and Oppose Attempts at Compromise
It is estimated that there will develop and grow, among part of the people,
a mood of pessimism and hopelessness regarding the future of the war of
resistance, because of the loss of major cities and communications, difficulties in finance and economy, and the untimeliness of international aid.
The Japanese, traitors, and pro-Japanese factions will definitely take advantage of this mood to vigorously fan up an atmosphere of compromise in an
attempt to shake our determination to wage the war of resistance. Therefore,
the first task of the entire nation is to rouse to a high degree national
self-respect and confidence, overcome the pessimistic mood of some of the
people, resolutely support the government in continuing with the policy of
resistance, oppose any plans to surrender and compromise, and persist to the
end with the war of resistance. This task has become more important than
in any other periods of the past.

With this as the objective, we must mobilize newspapers, periodicals, schools,
propaganda groups, culture and arts groups, military and political organizations, people's organizations, and all other possible forces and carry out
wide-spread propaganda and encouragement among the officers and men on the
front lines, rear echelon troops on guard, the people of the lost territories,
and the masses of the entire country. We must carry out this policy in a
resolute and planned manner, advocate waging the war of resistance to the
end, oppose surrender and compromise, and purge the mood of despair. We must
repeatedly point out the possibility and inevitability of final victory,
that compromise means death, and the way out lies only in the war of resistance. We must call upon the entire nation to unite and not to fear difficulties, nor sacrifices. We definitely will have freedom, we definitely will
win. We must utilize these to achieve the objective of the entire country
continuing with the war of resistance in one accord.

For this purpose, all propaganda and encouragement must take the following
aspects under consideration. In one respect we must utilize national revolutionary models which have emerged and are in the process of emerging (such
as courageous resistance in the war and sacrificing oneself for the country,
P'inghsingkuan, T'aierchuang, the 800 heroes, the advance of guerrilla warfare, the generous contribution of money, the patriotism of the overseas
Chinese, and others) and propagate widely to the front lines and the rear
areas, domestically and internationally. In another respect we must expose,
purge, and eliminate the negative factors that exist, and are growing, in
the national front (compromise tendencies, moods of despair, phenomena of
corruption, and others). In still another respect we must announce to the
entire country concrete facts concerning all of the enemy's cruel and inhuman
acts and make accusations to the world in order to achieve the objective of
enhancing national consciousness and rousing national self-respect and selfconfidence. We must know that the inadequacy of such consciousness and
self-confidence is greatly hampering the tasks of overcoming difficulties
and preparing for the counteroffensive.

2. Support Generalissimo Chiang, the Nationalist Government, and the Cooperation Between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and Oppose Separation
and Division and Any Puppet Governments
In the new situation the enemy's policy will inevitably concentrate upon
opposing Chiang and the Communist Party, and establishing a puppet government on a national scale in an attempt to topple Generalissimo Chiang and
the nationalist government, and sabotage the cooperation and unity of the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party. With the focus on this enemy policy,
the second task for the entire nation will be to call upon the whole country
to act in complete accord and sincerely support Generalissimo Chiang, the
nationalist government, the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party, and the unification of the whole country, and oppose any
enemy action which will be harmful to them and any puppet government ruling
China.
For this purpose we must adjust the relationship between the Kuomintang and
the Communist Party, between the central government and the local areas,
between the various armies participating in the war of resistance, and
between the government and the people. In these relationships, advocate a
fair and reasonable spirit of mutual love and cooperation, reduce friction
and divided opinions, and oppose action which utilizes difficulties to
create trouble for the government. We must call upon the entire country to
give serious attention to the enemy's, traitors', and pro-Japanese factions'
evil plot to sow dissension in our ranks and create dissatisfaction and division.
We must prevent any unfavorable impact upon the prestige of Generalissimo
Chiang and the nationalist government; we must create an ever-growing intimacy
in the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the
unity of the entire nation, and establish a solid core of continuing to wage
the war of resistance in difficult circumstances, and we must use them to
oppose the enemy and the puppet government, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counteroffensive.
3. Strengthen the Combat Effectiveness of the Main Force, Defend Central,
Southern, and Southwest China, and Halt the Enemy's Offensive
Focusing on the enemy's current attack on Wuhan and his plans to continue its
attack on southern and southwest China, the third task for the nation is to
heighten the combat effectiveness of the main force, reorganize existing
troops, and increase organization of new troops for the purpose of defending
central, southern, and southwest China and stopping the enemy's offensives.
With respect to the Chinese main force, it must, for this purpose, first
develop a high level of mobile warfare. At the same time support it with
necessary and possible line defense, oppose the enemy at every step and drain
its effective strength. Second, it must establish in the vast rear areas
those military factories that are possible to construct, and also enhance
their manufacturing capability to support the front lines with weapons and
ammunition. Third, it must carry out the national revolutionary political
work conscientiously among its troops, the education in politics, culture,
and entertainment, and enhance the spirit of courageous struggle and prolonged and arduous combat throughout its forces. Fourth, it must improve the

life of the enlisted men on the basis of materials on hand, organize economic
committees in the companies, and let the soldiers control the food. Fifth,
it must promote conscious discipline, abolish the system of cursing and striking,
and advocate friendliness and unity between the officers and men in order to
improve their relationship. Sixth, it must implement selling and buying
publicly, treat people with friendliness, abstain from coercive levy of food
grains and conscripting transportation labor and soldiers by force, and change
to the method of political mobilization to resolve the problems of transportation labor and new soldiers so as to improve relations between the military
and the civilians. Seventh, enhance the spirit of friendliness and mutual
aid between the various armies on the front lines and between the front line
armies and the rear area armies, aiding each other in battle and emulating
each other in work, and eliminate the bad phenomena of watching each other
and be envious of each other so as to improve the relationship between the
various armies. Eighth, reorganize existing troops and make up for the shortages while, at the same time, organizing additional new troops and intensifying their education and training in order to put them in an advantageous
position for prolonged combat. Utilize all these methods to enhance the
combat effectiveness of the main force for fighting in defense of central,
southern, and southwest China and for struggling to stop the enemy's offensives and prepare for our counteroffensive.

4. Expand on a Large Scale Guerrilla Warfare Behind the Enemy, Establish and
Consolidate Our Bases, Constrict Enemy-Occupied Territories, and Coordinate
With the Main Force in Battle

With the focus on the enemy's objective, which is to carry on with their
offensive against us, and, also, to pull out some troops to attack the
guerrilla war at a determined period of time, in an attempt to consolidate
the territories it has occupied and make it difficult for China to counterattack, the fourth task of the entire nation is to develop on a massive scale
the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear. Establish many bases, consolidate
them, and use them to decrease the size of the enemy's occupied territories.
Fight in coordination with the main force to stop the enemy's advance at
present and, later, to carry out the counteroffensive. An important characteristic of the anti-Japanese national war of the semi-colonial country of
China is the wide-scale and protracted nature of the guerrilla war. Without
it, it would be impossible to tie up large numbers of enemy troops and give
strong support in battle to the regular troops and stop the enemy's offensive;
it would not be possible to restrict the enemy's occupied territories to
limited areas and prevent the enemy from occupying all of it; nor would it
be possible to erect many anti-Japanese bastions behind the enemy's lines,
persist in guerrilla warfare, and prepare to coordinate with the regular
troops to mount the strategic counteroffensive in the future. Therefore,
first, guerrilla warfare must be developed widely in all the areas behind
enemy lines, a vast number of bases for guerrilla warfare must be set up,
and those that have already been set up must be consolidated. Second, we must
follow the example of North China and retain or dispatch an ample number of
regular troops to the various strategic areas in the enemy's rear to form
the mainstay of the protracted guerrilla war. These troops must learn

guerrilla tactics gradually, strengthen their political work, develop mass
movements, set up bases, and help the people's guerrilla units and the
guerrilla warfare they are waging to become regular troops and wage a regular
war. Third, the zeal of all men and women in all the war areas and behind
the enemy lines to defend the country and protect their villages must be
mobilized. Besides mobilizing them in large numbers to participate in the
guerrilla units separated from production work and filling the ranks of the
regular troops left behind the enemy lines, organize them into quasi-military
anti-Japanese people's defense units. The organization of anti-Japanese
people's defense units should become a regular and wide-spread system in all
the war areas and behind the enemy lines. They must not become divorced
from production. Fourth, the people must be helped in organizing guerrilla
units on a wide-scale. These units are divorced from production, and all
counties and areas should have them so that they will become tiny units for
attacking the enemy and defending the area. Fifth, to enhance their combat
effectiveness, political work must be established in these guerrilla units,
education in military affairs, politics, culture, and recreation must be
strengthened. Sixth, correct systems in military affairs and political
matters must be established in the guerrilla units, equal treatment of officers
and men implemented, and economic matters handled openly. Seventh, reform
the bandit bands and make them take the road of resistance against Japan,
and wipe out bandit bands that are behind our lines and those being utilized
by the enemy. Eighth, the supply of ammunition for guerrilla warfare is a
very important question. On the one hand, the vast rear areas should supply
them as much as they possibly can, and, on the other, every guerrilla warfare
base should by all possible means set up small ordinance factories, so that
they will be able to manufacture on their own ammunition, rifles, and hand
grenades so that there will be no worry with regard to the lack of ammunition
for the guerrilla war. Ninth, in accordance with the enemy situation and our
strategic needs, re-delimit the war areas and administrative areas behind the
enemy lines, and make them compatible with the new war situation. Tenth, in
accordance with strategic needs, the leadership of the various units and administrative areas behind the enemy lines must be unified in order to concentrate forces to resist the enemy, eliminate contradictions within; but warlord
like behavior of swallowing each other up must be opposed.

5. Enhance Military Techniques, Establish Mechanized Corps, and Make Ready
the Strength for the Counterroffensive

The chief reason the enemy is able to penetrate deeply step by step despite
its inferiority in numbers is, besides our political situation, that of our
being inferior in techniques. Focusing on the enemy's strong points and our
shortcomings, the fifth task for the entire nation is the enhancement of
military techniques, increasing the number of planes, artillery pieces, tanks,
and skills for handling them, and prepare our strength to carry out the
counteroffensive. For this purpose, it is necessary, on the one hand, to
utilize the manufacturing capability we have now, and those that can possibly
grow, to begin manufacturing partially, and carry out this work in earnest.
On the other hand, use many methods to import new weapons from abroad for
gradual improvement of military equipment, and to establish a truly modernized mechanized corps. Without doubt we should view problems in the light

of reality. In fact, large number of inferior weapons are being used in
battles. Therefore, we should call upon the troops and civilians of the
entire nation to arm themselves. We believe that inferior weapons can also
defeat the enemy. We must enhance the political spirit, improve battle methods,
develop guerrilla warfare to make up for the inadequacy in modern weapons.
If we do not concentrate our efforts in this respect, we are ignoring the
current and real problems, and it will not be possible to overcome the present
difficulties. In order to prepare for the strategic counteroffensive, we
must, in the future, enhance new technics and establish new types of troops.
We should know that troops in sufficient strength, but lacking in modern,
new techniques and equipment, will find it impossible to carry out the counteroffensive and recover lost territory. If we do not heighten our attention
in this respect, and begin working on it as circumstances permit, we will
be only looking at the present and forgetting the future, and it will not
be possible to overcome difficulties. In China, where man and material power
are plentiful, it is definitely not an impossibility to gradually improve
technical equipment, if only the political conditions and mobilization
methods make progress, plus the fact that there is international aid.

6. Implement Democratic Politics Under Unified Leadership, Make the Relationship Between the Government and the People More Intimate, and Give Play
to the Utmost the Massive Strength of the Anti-Japanese Political Power

The enemy is taking advantage of our shortcomings, not only in the military,
but also in the political field--our political system is not being democratized and cannot establish close relationship with the broad masses of people.
In order to make up for these shortcomings, the sixth task for the entire
nation will be in implementing a democratic system under concentrated leadership. If there is no such reform, to win final victory over the Japanese will
also be impossible. Democratic politics is the prime mover for mobilizing
all new forces of the entire nation. With this system, the anti-Japanese
zeal of the people throughout the country will be mobilized to an immeasurable
degree, and become an inexhaustible well-spring. The accomplishment of great
course of uniting the whole nation thoroughly is also dependent solely upon
the establishment of a democratic system. On this point, we must plan and
execute on the basis of facts regarding all its aspects. First, the convening
of the Kuomintang political council has started the democratization of the
nation on its first step. Henceforth, we should effect the open and smooth
progress of the work of the council, implement all of the resolutions made
by it, and in accordance with the programs already passed by the council,
conscientiously carry out the establishment of local political councils at
various levels and in various provinces to implement democratic politics.
Second, we must ensure that the freedom of speech, publications, gathering,
association, and belief set forth in the program of the war of resistance and
national construction will be fully implemented within the boundaries of the
entire nation. These freedoms are encompassed within the war of resistance
and national construction, and only by fully guaranteeing them will it be
beneficial to the rousing of the anti-Japanese, national construction forces
on a general scale. The problem here is to ensure that the laws and decrees
of the central government will be carried out and not restricted at will

locally. What should be restricted is the type of freedom which will not be
beneficial to the war of resistance and national construction, that is, the
freedom of traitors and pro-Japanese factions, and the others should not be
put on the restriction list. Third, many democratic systems should be begun
from the war areas and the enemy's rear. For example, local governments to
be elected by the people, and the higher level placing them in office. The
various levels of government in the war areas should adopt the committee
system of democratic concentrated power, and also establish various organizations of people's representatives. The government in the war areas should
increase certain necessary work departments. It should change the style of
official documents, purge corrupt, decadent, and inefficient elements, and
absorb anti-Japanese activists. It should lower salaries and promote a
spartan life so as to be compatible with the arduous, complicated, and fluid
circumstances of the war areas. Under the unified leadership of the Central
Government, the local governments of the war areas have the power to proclaim laws and decrees for the locality only. With the exception of traitors,
the male and female citizens of the war areas all have the right to elect
and be elected, and the freedom to speak, publish, gather, associate, and
arm themselves to resist Japan. All anti-Japanese parties and factions in
the war areas have publicly recognized legal status, etc. If there are no
such political reforms in the war areas, specially in the enemy's rear,
it will be impossible to support a long and difficult war against Japan. The
methods mentioned above are all geared to binding closer the relationship
between the government and the people, increasing the effective strength of
the government so that it will play an enormous role in the war against Japan.
There is no question that any local governments throughout the country should
be concentrated under the leadership of the Central Government, and there
should not be any kind of disrespect shown to the leadership of the Central
Government because the administrative area has been carved up by the enemy
topographically. The entire nation should implement the democratic system
in accordance with the laws and decrees of the Central Government, but it
should be unified unted the Central Government.

7. Expand the Unified People's Movements and Give All-Out Support to the War

The seventh task for the entire nation is to expand various people's movements
and unify them to give full support to the war. The long and difficult war
against Japan is entirely dependent upon the people. It will not be possible
to wage a protracted war without general development and nation-wide unification of the people's movements. This is especially so in the war areas and
behind the enemy lines. The war against Japan is now beset with new difficulties. These difficulties can be overcome successfully only by mobilizing
the people. The following must be carried out throughout the nation, especially in the war areas and behind the enemy lines: First, guarantee the
freedom of all anti-Japanese groups and people's movements, clearly establish
the legal status of people's groups. Second, help the people's organizations
materially and respect their independence. Third, diligently establish
various national salvation associations which have the participation of the
broad masses of workers, peasants, youths, women, businessmen, independent

entreprenures, people in the field of culture and children, and established
a unified organization based upon the two principles of fields of enterprise
and areas. Fourth, mobilize the masses to take active part in the various
aspects of the war and actively support the government and the troops. Speed
is essential especially in the war areas.

8. Improve the Well-Being of the Masses, and Rouse the Enthusiasm of the
Masses for the War of Resistance and For Production

In the past, the problem of improving the well-being of the masses has been
carried out without much strength. Therefore it was unable to rouse the zeal
of the broad masses of working people for the war of resistance and for production, and this was extremely unfavorable for persisting in protracted
warfare. For this reason, the eighth task of the entire nation, henceforth,
is in the following policies to be carried out to improve the well-being of
the masses. First, preferential treatment is to be given to families of antiJapanese soldiers and disabled fighters. Second, give aid to the refugees and
disaster victims of the war areas. Third, initiate suitable cut back in rent
and interest behind the enemy lines. Fourth, make equitable arrangement of
food grains and important daily necessary items. Fifth, increase wages in a
suitable manner and im prove the treatment of workers and staff. Sixth, agree
to the group contracting right of workers and peasants with employers and
landlords. Seventh, prohibit employers, landlords, master craftsmen, and
foremen to illtreat, beat, and abuse workers and apprentices. By implementing
these preliminary steps toward improving the well-being of the people, it
will later cause an inevitable enhancement in the activism of the workers,
peasants, and masses of poor people to support the government and participate
in the war and in production. Not only all of the mobilized help the war
needs will be greatly changed, but the quantity and quality of industrial and
agricultural production and flow of commerce will be greatly increased and
enhanced, and the nation's economy will also be resolved satisfactorily on
the basis of the new agriculture, industry, and commerce.

9. Implement the New Wartime Economic Policy To Pass Over the Difficult
Obstacle of War

After the loss of the major cities and the communication lines, great difficulties will appear in the nation's finances and economy. It will be impossible
to pass over the period of war without new and effective methods. However,
we need only to implement the new policies and mobilize the forces of the
people to be able to overcome any difficulties. Therefore, the ninth task
for the entire nation is to carry out new wartime financial and economic
policies. The main points are as follows: First, the objective of the new
policy is to ensure the supply of necessary things to the anti-Japanese
armed troops, meet the demands of the people for necessary commodities, and
fight against the enemy's economic blockade and economic sabotage. Second,
reconstruct national defense industries in the rear areas in a planned
manner. Begin on a small scale in the areas of urgent need and gradually
expand and improve. Absorb capital from the government, the people, and
from abroad, and mobilize workers politically, ensuring a minimum in material

compensation, improve the administrative system of factories so as to increase
production ratio. All these are not only necessary, but also possible.
Third, coordinating political mobilization and government laws and decrees,
develop the growth of agriculture and handicraft production throughout the
country, organize spring plowing and autumn harvesting movements so that the
agricultural and handicraft industries throughout the country will develop
under the new posture. Give attention to protecting agricultural implements,
livestock, and handicraft workshops in the war areas so as to ensure that the
areas that have been cut off will be self-sufficient economically. Fourth,
protect the free enterprise of private industry and business, and, at the
same time, pay attention to cooperative enterprises. Fifth, on the principle
of paying in accordance with one's ability to pay, alter and regulate various
old taxes into a unified escalating tax, abolishing excessive taxation and
levies and the system of allocation, so as to lighten the people's burden
and benefit revenue gathering. Sixth, utilizing political mobilization in
coordination with government laws and decrees exact collections of national
bonds and national salvation public rations, and mobilize the people to
voluntarily donate money and food grains to supply the fighting troops and
to have adequate financial receipts. Seventh, carry out a planned struggle
against the counterfeit notes issued by the enemy and its policy to sabotage
our currency. Those areas that have been cut off must be permitted to set up
their own banks and issue local currency. Eighth, launch a drive for honesty
and change to a new wage system on a generally equal basis in accordance with
the minimum standard of living. Ninth, the national banks will make low
interest loans to help the development of production enterprises and the flow
of commodities. Tenth, resume and develop postal and telecommunications in
the war areas. The above is but a general account. There must be a determination to earnestly reform the old system and to implement the new, and to
apply it as a resolute strength, in order to eliminate the new difficulties.
To persist in the protracted war, the core of the matter lies in organizing
the productive activism of the broad masses of people to supply and serve
the war. The Chinese war of resistance is fought under a special situation,
the principal and big cities and communications lines have been occupied, and
it is mainly dependent upon the peasants and the rural areas for fighting
the war of resistance. The peasants have great power to support the war,
but it requires necessary reforms both politically and economically. The
new policies mentioned here are set forth in accordance with this kind of
special situations.

10. Implement the Educational Policy on the War of Resistance, and Make This
Education Serve the Protracted War

Under the principle of all for the war, all cultural education work must
be made to meet the needs of the war. Therefore, the tenth task for the
entire nation lies in carrying out the following various cultural education
policies. First, amend the school system, doing away with subjects that
are not necessary or in urgent need, and change the administrative system
to teach the subjects necessary to the war and give play to the enthusiasm
of the student to study as the principle. Second, establish, expand, and

strengthen various types of cadre schools to foster large numbers of antiJapanese cadres. Third, develop mass education on a wide scale, organize all
sorts of supplementary schooling, literacy movements, theatrical plays, singing,
and sports. Establish local popular newspapers of all kinds in front of the
enemy lines and behind them so as to enhance the people's national culture
and national consciousness. Fourth, operate compulsory elementary schools
so as to inculcate the new generation with the national spirit. It is also
necessary to mobilize the people politically and in coordination with government laws and decrees to effect all these. But, mainly, it is dependent
upon mobilizing the people to educate themselves, with the government providing suitable leadership and adjustment, and giving it what possible material
aid there is. It is not sufficient to accomplish the great task of enhancing
national cultural and national consciousness by solely dependent upon the
government. using limited financial resources to run a few schools and newspapers. Since the war began the educational system has already begun to change,
and there has been very obvious progress made in the war areas. But, up to
now, the entire system has not changed to meet the needs of the war, and this
situation is not good. The great war of resistance must be combined with a
great war of resistance educational movement, and the situation of non-combination of the two must be eliminated.

11. Strive To Obtain International Aid and Concentrate Our Efforts On Opposing
Japanese Imperialism
Proceeding from the principle of protracted warfare and concentrated opposition
against Japanese imperialism, we cannot ignore the organization of all possible
aid from abroad. Therefore, the current eleventh task is in, first, opposing
the advocacy of some people on taking the road of Germany and Italy, because
this is in reality a measure taken in preparation to surrendering to the
enemy. Second, strive all out to increase the aid given us by the various
democratic countries and the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, exert all
efforts to bring about a League of Nations sanction against Japan by various
countries. Third, set up a permanent organization to systematically collect
the facts of enemy brutalities and compile a factual record to report and
spread throughout the world to focus the world's attention and rouse it to
punish the Japanese fascists. Fourth, select representatives from various
parties and factions, as well as various people's organizations and organize
them into an international propaganda group which will visit all countries to
evoke the sympathy of the peoples and governments of the various countries
in coordination with the diplomacy of our government. Fifth, protect the
foreign residents of China who are sympathetic to us and those who are peacefully engaged in business or missionary work. Sixth, give attention to protecting the interests of overseas Chinese, and, through the efforts of these
overseas Chinese, propel forward the movements in various countries to oppose
Japan and help China. In these respects, without regard to whether the aid
from various countries has not changed in degree or can possibly decrease in
part, and the League of Nations' resolution being fine rhetoric, we should
still strive to do our best. In accordance with the protracted nature of
the war, the foreign policy should also be geared for long-term and not for
immediate benefits. Its emphasis must be in future aid, and this kind of foresight is necessary.

12. Establish An Anti-Aggression Front Between China, the Soldiers and
Civilians of Japan, and the Oppressed Nationalities of Korea and Taiwan,
and Oppose Japanese Imperialism Together

The Japanese imperialist war of aggression not only endangers China, at the
same time it endangers all the soldiers and civilians of Japan and the
oppressed nationalities of Korea and Taiwan. To defeat Japan's war of aggression
there must be a massive and determined striving together of the soldiers and
civilian masses of the two big nations of China and Japan, and the oppressed
nationalities of Korea and Taiwan, and a common united front to oppose
aggression must be established.

For this purpose, the twelfth task for the entire nation is, first, propose
to the masses of soldiers and people of the two countries of Japan and China,
and the Korean and Taiwanese nationalities this policy of a united front
against aggression, and call upon them to struggle for this. Second, the
government is to issue orders to all officers and men of the anti-Japanese
and guerrilla units to learn a sufficient Japanese vocabulary. High-level
political departments must prepare to dispatch Japanese instructors to the
various troops and carry this out. Beginning with a few words until conversations can be held with Japanese officers and soldiers. Educate all the
officers and men fighting the Japanese to orally propagandize the enemy's
soldiers and low-ranking officers and, at the same time, use written words
and illustrations to convert them gradually, requesting their assent to set
up a united front against aggression together, and turning the more than
1 million Japanese troops into a friendly force which will withdraw from
China and overthrow the Japanese fascists. Third, respect and treat well
enemy prisoners of war and educate them so that they will influence others
and efforts will be made to establish a united front against aggression.
Fourth, try to organize the people in the field of culture in Japan who are
opposed to aggression and bring them to China to participate in this struggle.
Fifth, protect the Japanese residents in China who are sincerely loyal.
Sixth, educate the military and people masses of our country to, on the one
hand, enhance national self-respect and, on the other, to correct the wrong
ideas that exist between the military and the people, to distinguish Japanese
imperialism from the Japanese people, the enemy officers and their soldiers,
and also distinguish high-ranking officers from the low-ranking ones. By
implementing the above policies and methods, and together with the massive
and determined efforts, this anti-aggression united front can be formed.
China's victory is dependent mainly upon the increase of its own strength,
but we must seize upon the coordination of the enemy's difficulties and
international aid. With regard to the enemy's difficulties, besides the fact
of the gradual attrition inflicted on the enemy through our protracted warfare and our strenuous diplomatic efforts to isolate Japan, it is indispensable
to have the policy of establishing a common anti-aggression front with the
Japanese soldiers and civilians, and the oppressed nationalities of Korea
and Taiwan. The longer the Japanese war of aggression goes on, the better
the possibility will be for laying the foundation of this united front.

13. Unite All the Nationalities in China In Opposition to the Japanese
Our Anti-Japanese National United Front is not only of the various parties
and factions and classes of the country, but also of all the nationalities in
the nation. Focusing on the enemy's evil schemes which have already been
set in motion to split our minority nationalities within the country, and
which they will intensify, the thirteenth task is to unite all nationalities
as one to confront the enemy together. For this purpose, it is necessary
to give attention to the following points: First, the Meng, Hui, Tsang,
Miao, Yao, I, and Fan minorities must be allowed to have equal rights with
the Han people. Under the principle of common struggle against Japan, they
have the right to control their own affairs, and, at the same time, unite
with the Han people to establish a unified country. Second, in areas where
minority nationalities and the Han people are intermingled, the local government should organize a committee composed of local minority nationals to form
a part of the provincial or county government. It will administer affairs
concerning them, adjust relationships among the various nationalities, and
there should be a seat in the provincial or county government committees.
Third, respect the culture, religion, and customs of the minority nationalities. Not only should they not be forced to learn Chinese and speak it, but
they should be helped to develop the culture education of using their own
spoken and written language. Fourth, correct the big Han chauvinism that
still exists, and promote equal treatment of minority nationalities by the
Han people so as to bring relationships closer together. At the same time it
is prohibited to use slighting or insulting remarks, written words, or actions
toward them. The various minority nationalities should unite together and
strive for the implementation of the above mentioned policies. On the one
hand the government should implement it on its own initiative. Only thus can
the relationships between the various nationalities in the country be truly
improved and achieved, in reality, a unity against outsiders. The old
method of patronizing is no longer viable.

14. Launch the Movement To Root Out Traitors and Consolidate the Front Lines
and Rear Areas
Under the new situation, traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and pro-Japanese
factions will become even more rampant than before, vigorously engaging in
their schemes to create rumor, slander, division, and sabotage. Therefore,
the current fourteenth task is in carrying out the following methods--the
launching of a campaign to root out traitors. First, rouse the alertness of
all of the military and the civilians in the front lines and the rear areas
to keep tight surveillance on traitors, enemy spies, Trotskyites, and proJapanese factions and their activities, and mercilessly suppress them in
accordance with the government's laws. Second, pay attention to protecting
state secrets. Renegades who leak such secrets should be punished as traitors
to the country. Third, add a course on rooting out traitors in school books
so as to carry out an education to heighten alertness. In the military, set
up work departments at various levels for rooting out traitors.
Small
groups to root out traitors are to be set up in mass organizations and
people's defense units, and stepped-up education in rooting out traitors

should be given to the state police so that these traitors will have no place
to hide under such concentrated surveillance. Since the war of resistance
began, the number of times we have suffered at the hands of these traitors
cannot be counted. Long ago, fighters on the front lines were in general
concensus on the frightening numbers of traitors and the magnitude they wrought
on the war. In the rear areas, just the two events of leaking state secrets
and leading enemy planes to a devastating raid are deeply imprinted with hate
in the minds of all. If renegades are not eliminated in the protracted war,
there can be no thought of victory in the war. Mobilizing the national
revolutionary alertness of the broad masses, and executing the aforementioned
rooting out of traitors, as well as making this a massive movement, is a
grave task indispensable to achieving victory. It should be pointed out that
in rooting out traitors distinction must be made between the leaders and the
followers, those who consciously take part and those who were deceived, the
determined ones and the vacillating ones. They must be treated differently.
Heavy punishment should be given and the latter should be treated leniently.
They must not be treated all alike. Attention must be given to factual
evidence, no torture must be used in questioning, and false accusations must
be strictly guarded against. The objective of rooting out traitors is to
eliminate real renegades, and this objective can be achieved only by using
correct policies and methods.

15. Develop the Strong and Consolidated United Front of the Kuomintang and
the Communist Party, As Well As Other Parties and Factions, To Support the
Protracted War

All of the urgent tasks set forth above must wait for the various parties
and factions in the Anti-Japanese National United Front against Japan to
motivate the entire nation, and, under the unified leadership of Generalissimo
Chiang, resolutely implement them. In order to achieve this objective, the
organizational strength of the various parties and factions in the United
Front must be developed. The present strength, regardless of which party,
is too inadequate, and they all must be developed. And especially the development of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is the current urgent task.
In this task of development, the various parties concerned should approve
of the development of others. They should not become envious of each other
and impede each other's progress. We must know that if it is an anti-Japanese
party its development will be beneficial to the war against Japan. There
is no doubt that the United Front has the Kuomintang and the Communist Party
for its base, and the Kuomintang is the main pillar of these two. We admit
to this fact. Therefore, we resolutely support Generalissimo Chiang and
the Nationalist Government and Kuomintang under his leadership, and we call
upon the entire nation to give them support. Admitting and supporting this
mainstay and, at the same time, develop the various parties, are mutually
related and not mutually conflicting.

In numbers, I believe the Kuomintang should develop to over 5 million men,
the Communist Party and the other parties should develop to over a million.
In a big nation of 450 million to absorb several million superior elements

to participate in the anti-Japanese parties and factions in an era of a great
war of resistance is not only necessary but completely possible. If this can
be done, the Anti-Japanese National United Front will be expanded, and along
with it it will become even more consolidated. It fully ensures the implementation of all tasks aimed at defeating the enemy. The support of the protracted war and the long-term cooperation, and the basic objective of driving
out the Japanese and establishing a new China based upon the three principles
will be ours.

V. Protracted Warfare and Long-Term Cooperation

Let us now discuss specifically on the protracted nature of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front and give a complete answer to the many problems that
have occurred to those people who are extremely concerned about the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This has important significance with regard to the consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front, the consolidation and expansion of the cooperation
between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the smooth implementation
of the current urgent tasks to pass over the difficult obstacle of war.

The problems are as follows: the protracted nature of the war determines the
long-term nature of the cooperation, the cooperation in the war determines
the cooperation after the war, the context of the long-term cooperation and
its chief conditions--the Three People's Principles and communism--the
organizational form of the long-term cooperation, the policy of mutual aid
and concession in the long-term cooperation, and the problem of a democratic
republic. Many people are concerned about these and we should give clear-cut
answers.

1. The Protracted Nature of the Struggle Determines the Long-Term Nature of
the Cooperation

Due to the fact that the war of resistance against Japan is a protracted one,
the entire Anti-Japanese National United Front can and will have to be a
long one, and the cooperation between the two principal parties--the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party--can, and also will have to be, a long-term one.
This is the point from which all policies proceed. Therefore, our policy
must, at all cost, have a long-term national united front, a long-term cooperation. We must, at all cost, together preserve a unified government, oppose
division and splits, and thus benefit the passing over of the difficulties
of war, oppose enemy sabotage, beat back Japanese imperialism, and accomplish
the task of establishing a new China after the war. This is quite different
from the Kuomintang-Communist Party cooperation from 1924 to 1927. That
was only for a short period, but this is a long-term affair.

2. Cooperation in the War Determines Cooperation After the War

The so-called long-term cooperation applies not only to during the war, but
also after it. The war against Japan is a protracted one, and the cooperation

in the war can be said to be a long-term one. But that is not enough, we
hope to continue cooperating and are determined to do so. What guarantee is
there to it? The guarantee lies in the cooperation during the war determines
the cooperation after the war. The principal parties of the Kuomintang and
the Communist Party in the Anti-Japanese National United Front must face
difficulties together, exist or become extinct together. They must strive
to attain progress, and only through prolonged efforts can they beat back
Japanese imperialism. Otherwise, it will not be possible to do so. With
two progressive parties that have faced difficulties during such a long period
of time after the war is over, they will then form a foundation for continuing
cooperation. At that time, conditions domestically and internationally will
be even more conducive to cooperation, and this can be estimated now. There
is no doubt that the contexts of the various stages of the cooperation in
the war will exist, and there will be even more new contents in the cooperation
after the war. But the cooperation in the war will determine that there can
be cooperation after the war. This is not an estimation made without basis.

3. The Content of Long-Term Cooperation and Its Principal Condition

The so-called long-term cooperation is the long-term national united front.
All classes, from capitalists to the workers, all political parties, from
the Kuomintang to the Communist Party, all nationalities, from the Han to the
Miao and Yao minority nationalities, all the troops, from the Nationalist
armies to the Eighth Route Army, and all the governments, from the Nationalist
government, to the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government, are all
included, with the exception of national renegades. Furthermore, they will
be in the United Front for a long time. There are some people who cannot
endure the arduous struggle of the protracted war. When that time comes they
are apt to place their individual interests over that of the national
interests and become national renegades. Therefore, the National United
Front must continuously weed out these national renegades. But these weeding
out still leaves the National United Front as it is. The reason is that the
main condition for long-term cooperation is, first of all, the brutality of
the enemy's war and its protracted nature. Because the enemy is waging a barbaric
war it gravely endangers the very existence of the various class strata of
the entire nation. Accordingly, it compelled the higher class strata to
oppose the Japanese together with the other classes. It is inevitable that
a part of the higher class level will withdraw from the anti-Japanese front.
But the other parts are generally in the same position as the other classes.
They are oppressed and there is no way out except through resistance. Also,
because this barbaric war is a long one, it determines the long-term nature
of the cooperation. All these concerns the aspects determining the cooperation to be a long-term affair. But there is another aspect. It requires
the various cooperating parties, mainly the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,
must adopt a correct policy and carry out work that is necessary. What
kind of policy and work should they be? They should be policy and work set
forth and carried out on the basis of protracted war and long-term cooperation.
It should be a policy and work that will take care of the present and the
future, this class and that class, this party and that party, this army and
that army, and this nationality and that nationality. Otherwise the policy

will be incorrect and the work cannot be carried out, thereby creating confusion and will make it difficult for the cooperation to last long. Due
to the fact that, on the one hand, the enemy's war is barbaric in nature,
and, on the other, because of the correct policy and the necessary work to
be done in the United Front, the Chinese National United Front should, and
can be, a protracted one. It is a national front and not a people's front.
It includes the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party
during and after the war, and it is not a cooperation planned to split into
civil war after the war has ended.

4. The Three People's Principles and Communism

The Three People's Principles is the political foundation for the Anti-Japanese
National United Front and the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party. But what is the relationship between the Three People's
Principles and the Communist Party? What attitude should Communist Party
members adopt toward it? Up to now there are still some people who are not
clear on this point, and, therefore, it will be necessary to explain it once
more.

In the provisional congress of our party held in May 1936, it passed the following document on "resolutely implement the Three People's Principles."

"Is the Communist Party in agreement with the Three People's Principles? Our
answer is, yes. The Three People's Principles has its historical changes.
The revolutionary Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen gained the
trust of the people through cooperation with the Communist Party and by resolute implementation. It launched the victorious great revolution of 1925 to
1927. And because it drove out the communists (the movement to purge the
Party) and carry out a contrary policy, it lost the trust of the people and
brought about the failure of the revolution. Because the national and social
peril are now extremely grave, there is an urgent request for cooperation
between the two parties from the people of the nation and patriotic elements
in the Kuomintang. Therefore, the spirit of the Three People's Principles has
been reorganized. Under the principles of nationalism with independence and
liberation internationally, the people's powerism of democratic freedom domestically, and the increase of the people's happiness under the principle of
people's livelihood, the two parties came into cooperation again and led the
people in resolutely carrying these principles out. This completely meets
the historical needs of the Chinese revolution, and each party member should
understand and recognize it. The Communist Party will never discard its
ideals of socialism and communism. They must go through the stage of bourgeois
democratic revolution in order to reach the stage of socialism and communism.
The Communist Party has its own party and political programs. The Party
program is socialism and communism, and it is different from the Three People's
Principles. Its democratic revolutionary political program is more thorough
than any other parties' or factions', but basically, it is not in conflict
with the Three People's Principles program proclaimed by the first and second
congress of the Kuomintang. Therefore, we not only do not reject the Three
People's Princples, but are willing to resolutely implement it. We, furthermore, requested the Kuomintang to join us in implementing the Three People's

Principles, and also called upon the people of the whole country to implement
the Three People's Principles so as to enable the Kuomintang, the Communist
Party, and the people of the whole country to struggle together for the three
great objectives of national independence, freedom of people's powers, and
happiness in the lives of the people." (The task of the Chinese Anti-Japanese
National United Front in its current stage, p 11)

On 22 September of last year, our Party Central Committee, in the announcement
proclaiming the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,
emphasized: "The Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen is necessary
today. Our Party is willing to struggle for its thorough implementation."

Why did such a political party as the Communist Party adopt this attitude?
It is quite obvious that national independence, freedom of people's rights,
and the happiness of people's livelihood are the general objective that the
Communist Party seeks to realize in the national democratic revolutionary
stage. It is also the general objective sought by the people of the nation,
and it is not a thing sought by a certain party on its own. Understanding
will come if you only look at the documents since the founding of the
Communist Party and its political program. Therefore, in the past, not only
during the first period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party from 1924 to 1927, our Party members had resolutely implemented the
Three People's Principles. Even after the unfortunate disruption of the two
party cooperation in 1927, all our actions did not contravene the Three
People's Principles. At that time we resolutely opposed imperialism, and
this is in conformity with nationalism. We implemented the political system
of people's congresses, and this is in conformity with the principle of
people's rights; we also initiated the land system of farmers having their
own land to cultivate, and this conforms with the principle of people's
livelihood. All our methods did not exceed the basic category of the system
of private property of the bourgeoisie and the democratic revolution. The
current stage of the war of resistance and the stage to thoroughly establish
a democratic republic are, by nature, the stages of the Three People's
Principles and the bourgeois democratic revolution. In order to thoroughly
carry out this task of the democratic stage, all Communist Party members,
undoubtedly, should sincerely implement the Three People's Principles in
accordance with the general revolutionary policy they always have, as well
as their own resolution and announcement, and work together with the Kuomintang,
the other parties, and the broad masses pf the people throughout the country.
Whoever is not loyal to the beliefs of the Three People's Principles and
implementing it, he is a hypocrite, not a loyal Marxist. In China, anybody
loyal to Marxism, has two responsibilities at the same time, one is the current
actual task, and the other is the far reaching ideals of the future. It
must be understood that only by completing as much as possible the current
task can there be a basis and a foundation to develop into the far-reaching
and great ideal is communism, and it is the most perfect social system for
all mankind. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had also considered the necessity of implementing
it in order to resolve future social problems. The so-called real task of
the present is the Three People's Principles. This is the task of the present
stage to "achieve equal status internationally, politically, and economically,"
and it is a demand made by the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the people
of the entire country. Therefore, Communist Party members should study the

Three People's Principles as carefully as they did with communism, and apply
the viewpoint of Marxism to study the theories of the Three People's Principles
in order to find out how the Three People's Principles can be implemented in
a concrete manner, and how to use the correct ideas of the Three People's
Principles to educated the masses so as to bring about a transformation from
understanding to action, and struggle to beat back Japanese imperialism and
construct a new China based upon the Three People's Principles.

5. The Organizational Form for Long-Term Cooperation

In order to ensure long-term cooperation, it will still be necessary to resolve
the problem of the organizational form for cooperation. We have already rejected the idea of one-party-ism. Whether it is in respect to past history,
with respect to the current task, and with respect to the natural qualities
of Chinese society, there is no basis at all for one-party-ism. It cannot
be achieved, nor can it be implemented. It betrays the major objective of
uniting all to oppose Japan and construct the nation, and is thoroughly
harmful. Then, is there a need for a kind of unified and common organization
for the various parties to co-exist and form a national united front against
Japan? Yes, and it is necessary. Without such a unified and common organization for all, it will not help with the effort to unite and oppose Japan,
and it is even more harmful to long-term cooperation. Therefore, the various
parties should earnestly study and find a unified and common organizational form
which will be most suitable for long-term cooperation. Let us take this
under study now.

Due to the historical characteristics of the various parties and China's
politics and economy, today's view presents three kinds of organizational
forms as follows.

First, the Kuomintang itself is transformed into a national alliance, with
the various parties participating in the Kuomintang but retaining their independent nature. But this will be different from the first cooperation between
the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. If the Kuomintang agrees to our
participation, what attitude shall we adopt? First, we approve of this
method, because this is one of the best kinds of united organizational for
the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and it will be beneficial to national
construction. It is not only the Communist Party, but all other
parties as well which can participate in the Kuomintang. As long as the
Kuomintang agrees to it, we will definitely not oppose it. If it is done
this way, we can then apply the method differently from the 13 years of
cooperation. That is, first, all Communist Party members will openly participate in the Kuomintang, and a list of such party members will be provided
to the Kuomintang's leading organization. Second, we will not enlist any
Kuomintang members to join the Communist Party. Those that want to join
will be counselled not to do so in order to preserve the general situation.
Third, if our young party members have been approved by the Kuomintang to
participate in the Three People's Principles Youth League, it shall be the
same. There will be no organization of secret party or groups, and we shall

not accept non-communist members to enter our Party. The use of this method
there will be peaceful assurrance for everybody, and it will be beneficial
to all and without harmful effects. This is the first type of organizational
form for the United Front.

The second kind is for the various parties to organize a national alliance
and support Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme leader of this alliance. The
various parties, on the basis of equality, dispatch representatives to organize
a committee of all parties concerned from the Central Government to the various
levels of local governments to work for the implementation of the common program and administer common matters. This is also a good form, and we also
approve it. We proposed such a form long ago, but unfortunately, it was not
implemented.

The third kind is the present method. There are no formulated documents, no
need for set sites, and when problems arise, consultations will be held between
the two parties to resolve them. But this form of organization is too loose,
and many problems cannot be resolved satisfactorily and in a timely manner.
For instance, the implementation of major political policies and the adjustment
of friction in lower echelons have been neglected because there was no fixed
organization to handle them. Therefore, this method is not beneficial toward
long-term cooperation. However, if the first and second methods are inapplicable,
this method can temporarily remain as it is.

6. The Policy of Mutual Aid and Mutual Concession in the Long-Term Cooperation

It has been said before that a protracted war requires a long-term united
front, and this is the proceeding point for all policies. Therefore, Communist
Party members must keep in mind this long-term nature in their work and in
their relationships with friendly parties. He should carry out with determination all those that are beneficial to this long-term cooperation, and should
absolutely refrain from doing those that will be harmful to it.

Herein occurs the problem of mutual aid and mutual concession among the various
parties. With regard to mutual aid, for example, the various parties must
develop and consolidate. Any party, besides attending to its own expansion and
consolidation, should also adopt an approving attitude toward the development
and consolidation of a friendly party. What kind of attitude should a Communist
Party member adopt toward the expansion and consolidation of the Kuomintang?
In a word, approve. The reason is that the expansion and consolidation of
the Kuomintang will be beneficial to the war against Japan and to the entire
nation. Thus, it is also beneficial to the working people and the Communist
Party. I have discussed this before.

The Kuomintang is presently organizing the Three People's Principles Youth
League. What kind of attitude should a Communist Party member adopt? Without doubt he should adopt an attitude of approval. We hope that the Youth
League will develop massively. If the Youth League is carried out in accordance

with Chiang Kai-shek's declaration, there is a bright future for its development. Because we approve and support it, we hope that revisions will be made
in certain items of the methods presently implemented in the League. Otherwise a good cause will not bring forth good results. The Three People's
Principles Youth League should become a united organization for the broad
masses of youths and people of China to unite and save the nation. It should
absorb various parties and factions, youths of various circles, and individual
young mens' and youth organizations to become a massive group in which the
entire generation of youths will collectively receive national revolutionary
education and training. Therefore, it should be organizationally democraticized, and the spirit of initiative and consciousness of the organization
members should be given play politically to rouse the enthusiasm of the masses
of youths. This is our attitude and our proposals to the Three People's
Principles Youth League.

Mutual aid is not mutual despoilation, benefiting oneself from another's loss.
As an individual it is morally wrong, and it is even more so with regard to
national morals. Therefore, unreasonable frictions, even to the extent of
arresting and killing people, just cannot be done. Communist Party members
absolutely should not treat friendly parties in this manner, but should he be
treated in this manner, we definitely will not let it go at that. All unreasonable matters must be treated sternly, and this is the correct way to
treat others and oneself. Mutual counselling is a virtue among friends,
and it is also an attitude that should be promoted among the political
parties.

What kind of mutual concessions are there to be made in the United Front?
There are such concessions. We had made political concessions, stopping the
confiscation of land, reorganizing the Red Army, changing the system of the
Soviet areas. This is a type of political concession, and a necessary
measure to establish the United Front and unite the people of the nation to
fight the enemy together. Our friendly Party has also made concessions by
admitting the legal status of the Communist Party, etc. The policy of mutual
concession for uniting against the enemy and for long-term cooperation is a
very good and correct one. It is only the politically confused, or those with
covert ideas, will say that the Communist Party has surrendered to the
Kuomintang, or vice versa.

We now again advocate that all the parties in the United Front should not
enroll members of the other parties, organize branch parties, and engage
in secret activities. We hold that such a policy is necessary. Of course,
today is different from the past. In the civil war of the past, besides
open warfare between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, secret methods
were used on both sides to sabotage the activities of the other side. After
cooperation, there naturally should not be motives and actions for sabotaging
each other. But the method of secretly recruiting party members from the
other's ranks to form party branches should also stop so that both sides will
be assurred. Only thus can it become compatible with the objective of longterm cooperation in a protracted war. We officially announce to the comrades
of the Kuomintang that we have stopped our activities to recruit party members

from your ranks to organize party branches. Regardless of what kind of
common organizational form is adopted for the United Front, we will abide by
our decision. But at the same time, we hope you will reciprocate. After
such an agreement has been arrived at, and a lower-level party member should
renege, then the higher level of the renegade should be responsible for
handling this matter.

Besides, when comrades of both sides meet, the attitude to be adopted should be
one of friendliness, respect, and consultation, and not one of arrogance,
contempt, and arbitrariness in order to improve mutual relationships, and
this is also necessary.

Communist Party members should first put into effect all that we have said,
regardless of whether some of the personnel on the other side have not applied
the same policy, method, and attitude in treating us. We shall still do it
this way, and, in the long run, some of those who are not clear about this
will come around to an understanding.

A Communist Party member should adhere to his own standpoint in matters
concerning the nation and the people, and march toward the direction of
defeating the Japanese and constructing a new China without the slightest
deviation. Whoever betrays this standpoint and this direction will lose his
qualifications to be a Communist Party member. But the Communist Party member
must have the spirit of mutual aid and mutual concession. They must have
the spirit of respecting friendly parties and to resolve problems through
friendly, consultative attitude. Wherever there are comrades of friendly
parties present, they should be consulted to resolve related matters, and
it must not be done arbitrarily. Without such a spirit there would be no
consolidated unified unity, and the objective of defeating the enemy and
constructing a new China, and the so-called enterprises for the nation and
for the people cannot be attained. Therefore, the necessary policy of mutual
concession absolutely must not be translated into negativism. Not only is
mutual aid activism, but so is mutual concession, because necessary concessions is an indispensable condition to consolidating the cooperation of
the two parties to attain even better unity and greater progress.

7. On the Problem of a Democratic Republic

Although our party, in September 1936, announced the resolution on constructing
a democratic republic, and comrades of the Central Committee have explained
this question, there are many outside our circle who do not understand our
proposals. This is a problem concerned with the future of the war of resistance. What will be the result of the war of resistance? With regard to
the so-called war of resistance and national construction, what kind of a
nation should be established in accordance with the Communist Party's ideas?
This is a problem that is with us, and to explain it once more will be beneficial to the consolidation of the confidence of various parties and factions
in the long-term cooperation.

What kind of a nation should be established? The answer in a word is the
establishment of a republic based upon the Three People's Principles. The
democratic republic as we called it is the republic of the Three People's
Principles and its nature is that of the Three People's Principles. According to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, it is one that "seeks equal status internationally,
an equal political status, and equality in the economic status." First, it
is a country of nationalism. It is an independent nation and will not be
subjected to any interference from any country and, at the same time, it
will not interfere with any foreign nations. That is to say that the original
semi-colonial status of China has been changed, and it has become independent.
At the same time, regardless of how powerful it becomes, it absolutely will
not turn itself into an imperialist country, but have peaceful intercourse
and co-exist in friendship in the spirit of equality with all the friendly
countries that respect China's independence. Equal rights will be given
to the various nationalities in the country and, under the principle of their
own volition, to unite and establish a unified government. Second, this
country will be a nation based upon the rights of the people. The people in
the country will all have equal political status, officials at various grades
will be elected by the people, and the political system will be that of democratic centralization. National and local assemblies of people's representatives will be established, and citizens over the age of 18, with the exception
of criminals, will all have the right to elect and be elected, regardless of
class, sex, nationalities, beliefs, and education. The nation will give the
people the freedom of speech, publications, gathering, association, beliefs,
residence and change of residence, and to protect them politically and materially.
Third, it is a country based upon the people's livelihood. It does not deny
the system of private ownership, but it requires that workers will have jobs
and their working conditions are to be improved. Farmers will have land to
cultivate, and excessive taxation and exorbitant rentals and usurious interest
rates are to be abolished. The students will be able to continue with their
education, but it also guarantees that the poor will be able to attend school.
The other fields will be occupied with tasks and they can give full rein to
their geniuses. In short, it is to enable every one to have clothing and
food, schooling and jobs. The democratic republic we envisaged is precisely
such a nation, a China truly based upon the Three People's Principles. It
is not a Soviet, nor is it socialism.

With whom must we struggle to transform China into such a country? We must
struggle against Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism deprived us of
our independence, and we must get it back from them. Japanese imperialism
considered us as slaves, and we must demand from them our freedom. Japanese
imperialism brought hunger and cold upon us, and we must demand food from
them. How are these to be done? Demand it at gunpoint. In brief, driving
away Japanese imperialism will give us an independent, free, and prosperous
new China based upon the Three People's Principles.

VI. China's War Against Aggression and the Anti-Fascist Movement of the World

1. China Cannot Be Separated From the World

China is closely bound to the world, and the Sino-Japanese war is part of
the world war. The victory of China's war of resistance against Japan
cannot be isolated from the rest of the world. In the new situation of the
war of resistance it is possible that part of the foreign aid will decrease,
thereby making China's self-reliance efforts even more significant. China
should, at all times, rely upon self-reliance as the basic standpoint. But
China is not, and cannot be, isolated. The fact of China's close ties with
the world is also our standpoint, and should be our standpoint. We are not
and cannot have a closed-door policy. China could not do this a long time
ago, and now an imperialism of a world-wide nature has penetrated into China
with war. All Chinese are concerned about China's relation with the world,
especially the current changes in the situation in Europe. Therefore, it
will be a significant thing to analyze the current international situation.

2. World War II To Carve Up the World Again Has Already Begun

The basic nature of capitalist imperialism is not only in contradiction with
its own people, but it is also in contradiction with colonial and semicolonial countries, with socialist countries, and between the various imperialist
countries. The most intense expression of this last type of contradiction
was in the world war of 20 years ago. The result of that war between two
groups of imperialist countries created a new international situation. The
new development of the world's politics and economy after the war resulted in
the world again approaching a new great war. The aggression of Japan against
the four eastern provinces in the Orient and the coming on stage of Hitler
launched the new world war to re-divide the world. It is quite true that
"fascism is war." Under this situation, Japan, Germany, and Italy, on the
one hand, organized an aggression front to carry out large-scale aggression,
and, on the other hand, the various democratic countries prepared for war
in order to defend the benefits they already hold and in the name of preserving peace. But up to now, they are still unwilling to use actual force to
stop the aggressors, especially the British policy of compromise, in actuality,
is helping the aggressors. Under such circumstances, China's four eastern
provinces were the first to be sacrificed and, subsequently, Abyssinia was
lost to the Italians. In Spain it infused the rebel army with vigor, China
was subjected to a new massive aggression by Japan, and, recently, Austria
and Czechoslovakia were sacrificed to Hitler. Six hundred million people of
the world are in a state of war, and its sphere covers the three continents
of Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is the current situation of the new world
war.

3. The Characteristics of the Current World War

Due to the determination of Japan, Germany, and Italy to commit aggression
on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the various democratic to use their

power to restrain them on the other--especially with regard to the compromise
policy of the British--there is a difference in characteristics displayed by
the current situation of the new world from that of the World War I.
This
characteristic is the aggression of countries in between first, and the adoption of various different forms of war. China, Abyssinia, Austria, and
Czechoslovakia are all semi-independent or small countries, and Japan, Germany,
and Italy selected them first for swallowing up. In launching their aggression
against these in-between countries, the aggressors adopted three specific forms
of warfare. The first kind is the war launched by Japan against China, and
by Italy against Abyssinia. These are large-scale wars conducted openly but
carried out without a formal declaration of war, and it opens up a new era
in the history of wars. The objective in adopting this policy of undeclared
war is to take advantage of the unwillingness of the various democratic
countries to restrain them--especially Britain's policy of compromise--to
temporary avoid coming into direct conflict with them and facilitate their
moves to first seize the in-between countries. The second type is the form
of aggression adopted by Germany and Italy against Spain. They adopted the
method of giving assistance to the rebel army. This is but a replay of an old
method abundantly found in history. The third type is Hitler's aggression
in Austria and Czechoslovakia. On the surface there is no war (no actual
fighting), but the essence of war is there. A powerful force of troops was
moved in to occupy all of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia and to place the
rest of Czechoslovakia under its rule. This is a most ingenious method of
seizing another country without fighting.

The utilization of these three forms of war, on the one hand, is because the
strength of the aggressor countries themselves is not adequate and is temporarily
unable to engage the various big countreis in direct warfare. Therefore,
this ingenious method was adopted in an attempt to first strengthen themselves
and, at the same time, to weaken the various big countries and then engage
them in war. On the other hand, because of the unwillingness of the various
democratic countries to restrain the aggressors, and specifically as a result
of Britain's cowardly policy of compromise, it, in reality, aided the enemy
and it made it easy for them to commit aggression against the countries in
the middle.

4.
Britain's Policy of Compromise Will Lead the Various Fascist Countries
To Launch a War on an Even Greater Scale

The conservative cabinet of Britain headed by Chamberlain is carrying out
step by step the so-called policy of cooperation among the four powers.
After the Munich agreement it is possible taht the political situation in
Europe will take a turn for the worse. The major part of Britain's conservative
party's policy, in principle, has all along rejected the Soviet Union and
sought compromise with Germany and Italy. Because of its fear of the Soviet
Union becoming strong, of becoming involved in a war too early, of the people's
movements in its own country and the movement for independence in the
colonies, it has very early decided to sacrifice Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia and formed its plan to reject the Soviet Union and Seek compromise
with Germany and Italy. In the past, it was not successful because of the

division within the conservative party, the active policy of the popular
front in France, and the censure received domestically and from abroad.
But now, they took advantage of the anti-war physcology of the British and
European people, and the rightist tendency of (Flandin's party of France to
set up the Munich agreement under the threat of Hitler. This agreement is
the result of Britain's policy of compromise, and if it does not change its
policy it definitely will induce the various fascist countries to mount an
even more massive war of adventurism. Although it is still possible that,
for the time being, war will not break out among the big countries, and
temporarily it will be limited to the continuation of agresson of the
countries in the middle, but, in the end, it will be inevitable that the
various big countries will be dragged into a war of unprecedented ruthlessness. This will be a future certainty. The inevitable result of Chamberlain's
policy will be like "lifting a lock only to drop it on one's own toes."

5. The Majority of Mankind in the World Are on the Move to Mobilization

With respect to the various capitalist countries, they have come to a dead
end because of the economic crisis, the war involving 600 million people has
its impact on the whole world, and a new and even more massive war threatens
mankind. All is bright and well with the socialist countries, and they are
advanced and strong. Under the comparison of these two opposite things,
the majority of the people throughout the world are gradually finding the
direction how to defend and liberate themselves, and they are uniting and
preparing for war on an unprecedented massive scale and intensity. World
War I, the growing power of the socialist countries in the past 20 years,
the weakening of the capitalist countries, the war of aggression waged by
the fascist countries in the past 6 or 7 years, China's glorious war of resistance against Japan, the people's war of Spain, and the compromise policy
of Chamberlain have taught the people of the world and of Britain and France
to understand that the only way out is to organize and put up a struggle.
There can be a way out only by uniting as one all mankind in the world who
seek liberation, and the formation of a united front of the people of the
world and all oppressed nationalities. The glorious process of wakening the
consciousness of the people throughout the world, their organization and
struggle, and the formation of the united front is progressing in its development, but it will require arduous efforts before it can be completed. The
future of the fascist threat of war and Chamberlain's policy of compromise
is certain to meet with massive opposition in the end, and it is also an
inevitable result of the fascist war and Chamberlain's policy.

6. The Coordination of China's War Against Aggression and the Anti-Fascist
World Movement

It is common knowledge that in the past the various democratic countries all
gave assistance to China in varying degrees, mainly in the sympathy expressed
by their people for China. The aid from the Soviet Union was even more
positive. Now, because of the deeper penetration of the Japanese offensive,
it has intensified the contradictions between Japan and Britain, the United
States, France, and the Soviet Union. Although it is possible that Britain

may use its policy of compromise in the West and apply it to the Orient,
and compromise to a certain degree with Japan in the hope of preserving some
of its commercial enterprises in the occupied areas, and in dreaming to
lessen Japan's threat to southeast Asia, it will find that a basic compromise
will be difficult. At least for the time being it will be difficult because
of Japan's policy to solely occupy China. Under current concrete conditions,
there are differences of a certain degree between the problems of the East
and that of the West. The deeper penetration of Japan's offensive against
China has further intensified the contradiction between Japan and the United
States. The friendship between China and the Soviet Union has grown, and
there is the possibility of increased friendship between China, the United
States, and the Soviet Union. But first of all, we must not forget the distinction between the capitalist and socialist countries, secondly, the distinction between a capitalist government and its people, and, thirdly, we must
keep in mind even more firmly the distinction between the present and the
future. We must not place too great a hope on the former, but should exert
ourselves to gain all possible aid from the former. To a certain degree it
is not only possible but also practical. But to maintain too high a hope
is not suitable.

The coordination between China's liberation movement and foreign aid is mainly
the coordination in the future with progressive countries and the world-wide
massive anti-fascist movement of the people, and it should be based principally
upon the policy of self-reliance and at the same time, not to slacken our
efforts to obtain foreign aid.

VII. The Communist Party's Position in the National War

(This chapter's contents are similar to another essay--pp 241-264--and it is
deleted here in order to avoid repetition.)

VIII. The Convening of the Party's Seventh National Congress

I will now talk about the last problem, the problem of convening the Seventh
Congress

Comrades, the National Congress of our Party has not been convened since the
sixth one was held in 1928. Due to circumstances, it has been 10 years since
we held a congress. Last December, the political bureau meeting decided to
make preparations for convening the Seventh Congress. Due to incompletion of
the preparatory work it will be difficult to hold it this year. This enlarged
general membership meeting should discuss the question of stepping up the
preparatory work and decide on convening the congress in the near future.
The political significance of this congress will be very important. It
will sum up past experiences, mainly that of the war of resistance throughout
the nation and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the
political situations domestically and internationally. It will discuss how
to further unite the entire nation, unite the Kuomintang, the Communist Party,
and other parties and factions, and further consolidate and expand the AntiJapanese National United Front. Policy, methods, and plans on how to win

final victory in the war of resistance in the course of a protracted war
and long-term cooperation will also be discussed.  We must discuss how to
mobilize the working class and laboring people throughout the nation to take
an even more active part in the war of resistance.  How the Party can further
its own unity and strengthen itself under the new situation should also
be discussed so as to consolidate the relationship between itself and the
Kuomintang and as well as the other parties and factions and the people
throughout the nation in order to smoothly implement the general policy of
the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

Besides these problems of politics and organizations, the Seventh National
Congress should elect a new Central Committee, selecting many of the comrades
in the entire Party with the most prestige and authority to become part of
the committee in order to strengthen the leadership of the entire Party's
work.  Comrades, since this congress has such great significance, all comrades,
upon returning to their various areas to work after the closing of the sixth
enlarged meeting of the general membership of the Party, should, on the basis
of expanding and consolidating the Party's foundation carry out elections in
a timely manner and in accordance with democratic methods so as to enable
the best cadres who have the greatest trust and confidence of the Party
members to have the opportunity to be elected as representatives to the congress,
thereby bringing together under one roof the best representatives to the
Seventh National Congress and ensure that the congress will be a success.
We believe that this National Congress will definitely be successful.  It
will provide the most serious and powerful reply to the Japanese imperialist's
war of aggression, make imperialist Japan tremble in fear in the face of our
National Congress, and throw them back into the eastern sea.  The Chinese
nation will be victorious.

My report ends here.

Chia Fang, Vol 7, 25 November 1938
HSIN HUA DAILY (Chungking) December 1938

On the New Stage--Fourth series in the theory of leadership in the Chinese
revolutionary war--The New Democracy Publishing House (Hong Kong) April 1948

Literary Volumes 3 and 4 Feng Yu House of Books, December 1938, January
1939 Documents of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party
Chungking HSIN HUA DAILY, 1939

# Source: en:JPRS-CW