The reporter has several questions to put to Mr. Mao, whose remarks of September were published today in the Xin Zhonghua Daily.
Some points have already been touched upon; others still require your elucidation.
The questions are divided into three parts, as set forth on this sheet; I would be grateful if you could address them one by one.
Note: You may proceed according to the list of questions submitted by the gentlemen.
Mr. Mao: With regard to the question raised by the gentlemen concerning whether we have entered the stage of strategic stalemate in the War of Resistance, I believe that, under certain conditions, such a stage has indeed arrived.
Namely, in the light of the new international situation—Japan’s mounting difficulties and China’s unwavering resolve not to compromise—we have reached that point.
This does not preclude the possibility of major Japanese offensives, such as attacks on Beihai, Changsha, or even Xi’an; all remain feasible.
To say that the enemy’s large-scale strategic offensive and our corresponding strategic retreat have, under specific circumstances, essentially come to a halt is not to assert that every form of advance or withdrawal has been rendered impossible.
As for the concrete features of this new phase, they consist in preparing for the counteroffensive—a concept that encompasses all related activities.
In other words, during the period of stalemate, China must marshal and ready every available resource in preparation for a future general counteroffensive.
By “preparing for the counteroffensive,” I do not mean launching it immediately; without the requisite conditions, no counterattack can be undertaken.
Moreover, what I am referring to here is strategy, not tactics.
At the tactical level, counterattacks—such as those aimed at repelling the enemy’s military “sweeps” in southeastern Shanxi—are not only possible but indispensable.
However, the time for a full-scale strategic counteroffensive has not yet arrived; we are presently in a phase of active preparation for it.
During this period, we must also continue to repel any potential offensive operations launched by the enemy along the front lines.
If we consider the tasks of this new stage separately, then behind enemy lines it remains imperative to persist in guerrilla warfare, to crush the enemy’s “sweeping” campaigns, and to undermine its economic aggression.
On the main front, the priority is to consolidate our military defenses and to repel any further enemy offensives.
Meanwhile, in the deep rear areas, the chief task is to carry forward vigorous political reforms.
All of these constitute concrete measures preparatory to the counteroffensive.
The importance of reforming domestic politics lies in the fact that, at this stage, the enemy’s primary mode of attack is political; accordingly, we must markedly intensify our political resistance.
This means that the issue of democratic governance should be resolved expeditiously, so as to strengthen our political resilience and to lay the groundwork for building up our military strength.
The Chinese War of Resistance relies fundamentally on self-reliance.
While self-reliance has always been emphasized, in the current international context it has assumed even greater significance.
And the core of self-reliance is precisely democratic governance.
Reporter: Earlier, Mr. Mao stated that democratic governance is essential for achieving victory through self-reliance.
Given the present circumstances, by what means can such a system be established?
Mr. Mao: The division of political development into three stages—military rule, tutelage, and constitutional government—was originally proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
However, in his final northern expedition speech, Dr. Sun no longer spoke of these three phases; instead, he called for the immediate convening of a National Assembly.
This demonstrates that even within his own thought, Dr. Sun had, in response to changing conditions, already revised his earlier framework.
Now, in the grave situation posed by the war, in order to avert national annihilation and drive out the invaders, it is imperative to promptly assemble the National Assembly and institute democratic governance.
There are, of course, differing views on this matter.
Some contend that the common people lack the necessary education to participate in democratic governance.
This view is untenable.
During the course of the war, the populace has made rapid progress, and with proper leadership and clear policy guidance, democratic governance can certainly be implemented.
For example, in North China, democratic institutions have already been put in place, and in some cases quite thoroughly.
District and township chiefs, as well as heads of baojia units, are largely elected by the people.
Even county magistrates are, in certain instances, chosen through popular election; many progressive intellectuals and educated young men have been selected for this post.
Such issues ought to be brought before public discussion.
Among the first set of questions posed by the gentlemen was one concerning the so-called “suppression of dissent”—that is, the ongoing friction between various factions.
The gentlemen’s concern in this regard is entirely justified.
Although the situation has improved somewhat recently, the fundamental problem remains unchanged.
Reporter: Has the Communist Party ever formally communicated its position on this matter to the central government?
Mr. Mao: We have indeed lodged protests.
Reporter: Through what channels were these protests conveyed?
Mr. Mao: In July, Comrade Zhou Enlai, representing our Party, wrote a letter to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek.
On August 1, various circles in Yan’an again sent a telegram to Chairman Chiang and the National Government, demanding the abolition of the secret directive known as the “Suppression of Dissident Parties,” which has become the root cause of inter-factional strife.
Reporter: Did the central government respond?
Mr. Mao: No formal reply was received.
However, I understand that Chairman Chiang did not formally approve the measure, and that within the Kuomintang itself there was considerable opposition to it.
Many members recognize that forces fighting together against Japan should be regarded as friendly rather than “dissident”; similarly, political parties united in the struggle against Japan are likewise allies, not “dissidents.”
There are numerous parties engaged in the War of Resistance, varying in strength, but all share the common goal of resisting the enemy and should therefore unite rather than engage in mutual “suppression.”
What, after all, constitutes a “dissident party”?
The traitorous regime of Wang Jingwei, acting as a puppet of Japan, qualifies as such, because it has absolutely no common ground with the anti-Japanese forces.
Such entities warrant suppression.
By contrast, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party do share a fundamental political commonality: their commitment to resisting Japan and to establishing a democratic republic.
Thus, the pressing issue today is how to concentrate our efforts on combating Japan and suppressing Wang Jingwei, rather than on opposing the Communists.
Our slogan must reflect this reality.
Wang Jingwei currently advances three slogans: oppose Chiang, oppose the Communists, and align with Japan.
Clearly, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, together with the entire Chinese nation, face a common enemy.
The Communist Party is by no means an enemy of the Kuomintang, nor vice versa; rather than engaging in mutual antagonism or “suppression,” the two parties should unite and cooperate.
Our slogan must distinctly differentiate itself from Wang Jingwei’s, standing in direct opposition to his rhetoric, and never blending in with it.
When he calls for opposition to Chiang, we will rally around Chiang; when he denounces the Communists, we will affirm our solidarity with them.
Likewise, whatever the enemy champions, we shall oppose.
Nowadays, a classical maxim is frequently cited in many writings: “In undertaking any enterprise, one should avoid actions that please one’s close associates while provoking the ire of one’s adversaries.”
This saying, originating in the Eastern Han dynasty, was penned by General Zhu Zhi, a high-ranking official serving under Emperor Guangwu, in a letter addressed to Peng Yu, the governor of Yuyang Commandery.
It articulates a clear political principle that we must never forget.
The gentlemen’s questionnaire also inquired about the Communist Party’s stance on inter-factional friction.
I can state frankly that we fundamentally oppose any form of mutual undermining among the anti-Japanese forces.
That said, if provocations persist, if injustice reaches intolerable proportions, or if oppression is imposed, the Communist Party must adopt a firm and principled attitude.
This attitude may be summarized as follows: “If others do not offend me, I shall not offend them; but if they do, I shall retaliate.”
This echoes the ancient Chinese sage’s dictum: “Courtesy should be reciprocated; to receive without giving is improper, and to give without receiving is equally so.”
Yet, in exercising strict self-defense, no Communist Party member may exceed the bounds of legitimate defense.
This is a point that speaks for itself and requires no further elaboration.
Reporter: How is the situation regarding inter-factional friction in North China?
Mr. Mao: Zhang Yinwu in Hebei and Qin Qirong in Shandong are veritable specialists in fomenting discord.
Their conduct is virtually lawless, with little distinction drawn between lawful and unlawful behavior.
They rarely target the enemy directly, but are all too eager to harass the Eighth Route Army.
We possess ample irrefutable evidence—such as Zhang Yinwu’s orders directing his subordinates to attack the Eighth Route Army—which we have already transmitted to Chairman Chiang.
Reporter: Are there similar frictions involving the New Fourth Army?
Mr. Mao: Yes, particularly in the case of the Pingjiang Incident, which caused a nationwide uproar.
Reporter: Some argue that the United Front is crucial, yet that, in accordance with its principles, the border-region governments ought to be abolished.
What is your view on this matter?
Mr. Mao: Nonsense abounds—claims to abolish the border regions being just one example.
The Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region serves as a democratic base area for the War of Resistance and is, politically speaking, the most progressive region in the country.
On what grounds could it possibly be dismantled?
Moreover, the very existence of the border region was officially recognized by Chairman Chiang long ago, and its establishment was formally approved by the Executive Yuan as early as the winter of 1936.
China does indeed need unification, but such unification must be grounded in the spirit of the War of Resistance, in unity, and in progress.
Attempting to achieve unification along other lines would only lead to the nation’s ruin.
Reporter: Given the divergent interpretations of the United Front, is there a risk of a split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party?
Mr. Mao: From a purely theoretical standpoint, two scenarios are conceivable.
Whether such a split actually occurs will depend primarily on the attitudes of the broader populace, as well as on the respective stances of the two parties.
As for our side, the Communist Party has long articulated a policy of cooperation, expressing not only a desire for sustained collaboration but also a determination to realize it.
I have heard that during Chiang Kai-shek’s tenure as chairman of the Central Executive Committee, prominent figures repeatedly urged him to establish lasting political guarantees for cooperation with the Communists, lest internal divisions arise once he was no longer in office.
Indeed, securing such political assurances prior to Chiang’s departure would have effectively precluded the possibility of a schism.
Only by persevering to the bitter end in the War of Resistance and by instituting democratic governance could we hope to maintain unity and avoid fragmentation.
Should we succeed in doing so, we shall be able to continue to stand united and forestall a split—a goal that can be achieved only through the concerted efforts of both parties and of the Chinese people as a whole.
“Resist to the End Against Surrender,” “Uphold Unity Against Division,” and “Advance, Not Regress”—these are the three principal political slogans we enunciated in this year’s July 7th Manifesto.
We firmly believe that only by adhering to these principles can China avoid national collapse and drive out the invaders.
Beyond this, there is no other viable path.
Omitted.
Editor