(October 2, 1938)

Nie [Rongzhen] and for transmittal to the Provincial Committee; Zuo [Quan],
[Liu] Bocheng, Zhou [Shidi], and Gan [Siqi]:

1. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region has already become one of the
bases in North China and is, for the masses in territory occupied by the enemy, a
guiding light for the struggle of resistance to Japan. It has also made it difficult for
puppet régimes to establish their authority in an extensive or stable way. Militarily, it not only threatens important cities such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Zhangyuan¹
but also jeopardizes rail lines such as the [Bei]ping-Han[kou], Zheng-Tai
[Shijiazhang-Taiyuan], and [Bei]ping-Sui[yuan] lines, and also the major transportation routes of Tongpu.² Consequently, it has drawn the enemy's serious attention and unceasing attacks, but this campaign of encirclement and attack is
better planned and more sustained than any previous one.

2. We estimate that, because of the widespread development of guerrilla warfare in North China, assisted by the War of Resistance throughout the country, the
enemy will not at the moment be able to gather a force of absolute superiority or to
carry out a well-planned attack. Therefore, we should mobilize our forces on every hand to strive to overcome the enemy's encirclement and attack. There is,
however, the possibility that Wutai, Fuping, Lingqiu, and Laiyuan, as well as some
large towns, might be occupied by the enemy for a period of time. Consequently:
a. The core of all our work is to carry out a thorough campaign of political
mobilization in our Party, government, and military, as well as among the
people, in order to build up confidence in a victory through a protracted War
of Resistance; to strive to endure; and to be prepared for an arduous struggle.

b. Mobilize the masses to take part in the war; oppose the possible occurrence
of phenomena such as wavering, compromise, and surrender; eliminate traitors and enemy agents; carry out the clearing of fields and emptying of houses;
and bury grain and tools.
c. The army should attend to providing cover for the autumn harvest.

3. Based on the enemy's points of strength and weakness such as its building up
of strongholds, its pushing forward step by step, its squeezing of the border region,
its tenacity, and its lack of adequate force strength, we make the following suggestions on fighting tactics; please apply them flexibly as opportunities permit:
a. Concentrate our main force to a large extent in places where all conditions
favor us (the enemy is weak, the topography favors us), and wait for the right
opportunity.
b. Use small units to fight extremely irregular skirmishes against the enemy in
order to delay, obstruct, and exhaust the enemy. Move relatively strong forces
to the communication lines at the enemy's rear, and attack the enemy's transportation.
c. If the enemy has no weaknesses that we can take advantage of, and at times
when it is not suitable for our main forces to concentrate together and strike
or wipe out the enemy, wait until the enemy is enmeshed in a devastating
cycle, and then move the main force behind the enemy. Gradually and on
different routes use small units to lure the enemy in deep, thus rendering the
enemy exhausted, careless, and frustrated. When the enemy changes direction or retreats, suddenly attack or pursue him.

4. [Liu] Bocheng should order the Zheng-Tai Railway Line Corps, as well as
other corps nearby, to carry out the destruction of this railway line in a planned
manner and then, when the opportunity arises, to send an appropriate number of
troops across the railway line to proceed north along different routes and attack
the enemy from behind. Zhou Shidi should immediately order all the corps along
the Yanmenguan-Taiyuan line vigorously to attract the enemy troops in Yuanping,
Xinkou, and Guancheng, and when the opportunity arises to cross the railway line
and proceed east in order to attack from behind the enemy force that is advancing
eastward.

Mao [Zedong]
Peng [Dehuai]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]
Zhu [De]
Wang [Jiaxiang]
Peng [Zhen]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 369-71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. Now Zhangjiakou.
2. The reference is to the area served by the Tongpu railway line, on which see, above,
the note to the text of September 26, 1938.