In order to achieve the goal of defeating a powerful enemy, we need not only our own development and victory but also the victory and development of all united forces. The slogan of our united front is: “All parties and all classes shall unite under the banner of resisting Japan and saving the nation.” Therefore, we hold that it would be wrong to put forward in the united front the slogan of overthrowing any particular class or any particular party. …

… Since the War of Resistance Against Japan is bound to be a protracted one, the entire national united front for resistance must also be a long-term arrangement…

By “long-term cooperation,” we mean cooperation not only during the war but also after it. The War of Resistance is indeed a prolonged struggle, and cooperation throughout the war can already be regarded as long-term; yet this is still insufficient. We hope—and we must—continue to cooperate even after the war ends. There is no doubt that cooperation during the war will necessarily involve input from various social classes, while postwar cooperation will bring still newer elements into the picture. Nevertheless, the nature of our collaboration during the war will determine whether we can maintain such cooperation afterward; this is by no means an unfounded prediction.

… We are convinced that if, in the interest of resisting Japan and saving the nation, we set aside all mutual animosities, practice mutual forbearance and respect, then the national united front can successfully accomplish its mission and secure a broad and bright future. The extent to which the united front grows and strengthens will enable us not only to defeat Japanese imperialism and the traitors who serve it, but also, through the united-front movement, to free the Chinese nation from the shackles of all imperialist powers and to realize genuine democratic unification throughout China. For these reasons, we regard the united front as by no means a short-lived, temporary phenomenon. Of course, at different stages of the united front, there may be individuals who waver, defect, or abandon it; however, this must never be taken as evidence of the united front’s collapse.

Today, the united front has clearer premises and a more solid foundation than it did in 1927, because the national crisis is now a hundredfold more acute than it was then. In 1927, the united front was primarily directed against internal enemies—the Beiyang warlords—whereas now it is aimed at an external foe. Back then, those who broke away from the united front could still establish quasi-independent governments. But today, anyone who seeks to leave the united front or refuses to join it will no longer be able to set up such a government, nor will they find support among the various strata of the Chinese people. … In pursuing the cause of the united front, we are not afraid of being exploited by other political parties, for we have firmly adhered to a resolute anti-Japanese platform. We are willing to cooperate to the very end with all political organizations that stand for resisting Japan and combating the aggressors.

However, what is most dangerous at present is the illusion held by some that military force alone can bring about national unification. … Unfortunately, certain elements remain passive in the face of this policy, while others even attempt to counterpose and undermine the Chinese people’s united front by establishing another so-called “concentrated front.” This has become one of the principal obstacles hindering the smooth development of the united front.

(“On the United Front for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation,” published in 1938, pp. 47–51)