Telegram to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and Others[1]

(July 17, 1938)

Chen Changjie's[2] army of over ten thousand men, in this operation most of them fled, leaving only a few thousand with no combat effectiveness. Wang Jingguo's[3] army is in much the same condition. To rely on these troops to consolidate the various counties in the Lüliang Mountains is utterly hopeless. The part of Wei's[4] force at Xiangning is also living from hand to mouth. Our own 115th Division’s Chen Brigade[5], rushing back and forth between east and west, has failed to fight a single good battle. I ask you to immediately consider moving the Xu Brigade[6] westward to return to its organic unit, and the question of having either Zhu or Peng move west to take command of that division. In my view, we should propose to Chiang, Bai, Yan, and Wei that in order to secure the Lüliang Mountains in our hands and protect certain crossing points, nothing short of moving the Xu Brigade westward and having either Zhu or Peng take command and fight several good battles can solve the problem; otherwise, the overall situation will be compromised.

[1] This is the main content of Mao Zedong’s telegram to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, with Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, on the issue of consolidating the Lüliang Mountains area.

[2] Chen Changjie, then commander of the 61st Army of the Kuomintang’s Second War Zone.

[3] Wang Jingguo, then commander of the 19th Army of the Kuomintang’s Second War Zone.

[4] Wei refers to Wei Lihuang.

[5] Chen Brigade refers to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Chen Guang as brigade commander.

[6] Xu Brigade refers to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Xu Haidong as brigade commander.