May 1938

[This series of lectures was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May
26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War of
Resistance Against Japan.]


STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM


1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance
Against Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in resistance and persevering
in the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fighting
the enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentively
following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and
which will go down as a great war in world history too. Every Chinese suffering
from the disasters of the war and fighting for the survival of his nation
daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war?
Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many people are talking about a protracted
war, but why is it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war? Many
people are talking about Final victory, but why will final victory be ours?
How shall we strive for final victory? Not everyone has found answers to
these questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. Therefore
the defeatist exponents of the theory of national subjugation have come forward
to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not
be China's. On the other hand, some impetuous friends have come forward to
tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any
great effort. But are these views correct? We have said all along they are
not. However, most people have not yet grasped what we have been saying.
This is partly because we did not do enough propaganda and explanatory work,
and partly because the development of objective events had not yet fully
and clearly revealed their inherent nature and their features to the people,
who were thus not in a position to foresee the over-all trend and the outcome
and hence to decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now things
are better, the experience of ten months of war has been quite sufficient
to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade
our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances
many people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. All the more so with
regard to protracted war, not only because of the opposing theories of national
subjugation and quick victory but also because of the shallow understanding
of its nature. "Our four hundred million people have been making a concerted
effort since the Lukouchiao Incident, and the final victory will belong to
China." This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct formula but needs
to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in
the united front has been possible because of many factors. Internally, they
comprise all the political parties in the country from the Communist Party
to the Kuomintang, all the people from the workers and peasants to the
bourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas;
internationally, they range from the land of socialism to justice-loving
people in all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range from those
people in Japan who are against the war to those Japanese soldiers at the
front who are against the war. In short, all these forces have contributed
in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every man with a conscience
should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese
political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive
to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.
July 1 this year will be the 17th anniversary of the founding
of the Communist Party of China. A serious study of protracted war is necessary
in order to enable every Communist to play a better and greater part in the
War of Resistance. Therefore my lectures will be devoted to such a study.
I shall try to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted war,
but I cannot possibly go into everything in one series of lectures.

2. All the experience of the ten months of war proves the error both of the
theory of China's inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's quick
victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter
to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem
are subjective and one-sided, or, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national
subjugation. Some said, "China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in
a war." Others said, "If China offers armed resistance, she is sure to become
another Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national
subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too,
still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromise
arises and the advocates of compromise argue that "the continuance of the
war spells subjugation".[1] In a letter from Hunan
a student has written:

  In the countryside everything seems difficult. Doing propaganda work on my
  own, I have to talk to people when and where I find them. The people I have
  talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of
  what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when
  I run into my own relatives, they always say: "China cannot win; she is doomed."
  They make one sick ! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views,
  otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more
  stock in what they say.


Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social
basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China,
and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the
anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until
the end of the war. Now that Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it
will not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theory
of national subjugation.

4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views which are indicative
of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the war
many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even
believing that the Japanese could not get as far as Shansi. Some belittled
the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubted
the proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and
guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare
is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the Eighth
Route Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for
mobile warfare under favourable conditions", which they regarded as a
"mechanical" approach.[2] During the battle of
Shanghai some people said: "If we can fight for just three months, the
international situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound to
send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the future
of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign
aid.[3] After the Taierhchuang
victory,[4] some people maintained that the Hsuchow
campaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the policy
of protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, "This campaign
marks the last desperate struggle of the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanese
warlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day of
Judgement."[5] The victory at Pinghsingkuan turned
some people's heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned more
people's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan.
Many people think "probably not", and many others "definitely not". Such
doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strength
already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our present
strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase
it? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese
National United Front" still correct? Some people may answer negatively,
for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulse
the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our
efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again
the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in
earnest to reform the army system and the system of government, develop the
mass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitors
and Trotskyites, develop war industries and improve the people's livelihood?
Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, of Canton
and of the Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare
in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative.
There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occurs
in the war situation, are prepared to intensify the "friction" between the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to
internal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively
big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the
above can be termed political and military short-sightedness. Such talk,
however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away such
verbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No,
she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly?
The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will
be a protracted war.

6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments on
these questions. On July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident and
twelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in an interview with the American
correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation
with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principles
for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:

Question: Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and
  destroy the forces of Japan?

Answer: Three conditions are required: first, the establishment
  of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an
  international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary
  movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint
  of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important
  of the three conditions.

Question: How long do you think such a war would last?

Answer: That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united
  front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan. That
  is to say, apart from China's own strength, which is the main thing,
  international help to China and the help rendered by the revolution in Japan
  are also important. If China's anti-Japanese united front is greatly expanded
  and effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the necessary help
  is given to China by those governments and peoples which recognize the Japanese
  imperialist menace to their own interests and if revolution comes quickly
  in Japan, the war will speedily be brought to an end and China will speedily
  win victory. If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be
  prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated
  and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great
  and there will be a very painful period.

Question: What is your opinion of the probable course of development
  of such a war, politically and militarily?

Answer: Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and those who
  think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan
  at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights are indulging
  in mere fantasy. We definitely know that the lower Yangtse valley and our
  southern seaports are already included in the continental programme of Japanese
  imperialism. Moreover, Japan wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China,
  the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries
  from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime
  policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult
  position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties
  can be overcome; only the rich in the big port cities are defeatists because
  they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be
  impossible for China to continue the war, once her coastline is blockaded
  by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only cite the war history
  of the Red Army. In the present War of Resistance Against Japan, China's
  position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China
  is a vast country, and even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section
  of China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far
  from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan,
  while the Japanese would have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout
  the war. The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy are
  rather advantageous in the war of resistance. For example, to sever Shanghai
  from the rest of China would definitely not be as disastrous to China as
  would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even
  if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for her to blockade
  China's Northwest, Southwest and West. Thus, once more the central point
  of the problem is the unity of the entire Chinese people and the building
  up of a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This is what we have long been
  advocating.

Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not
  completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of
  a peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern China?

Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist
  Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and
  tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"?

Answer: Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate
  over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops
  must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive
  battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations
  and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional
  warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high
  fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does not mean the
  abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by
  positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be
  mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically it
  is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast
  that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In
  the face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have
  to be cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited
  efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive
  war of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography
  and economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia. In the
  early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and must
  first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat
  effectiveness of the enemy troops.

  Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize
  great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants. One should know that
  the anti-Japanese volunteer units in the three northeastern provinces are
  only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be
  mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have
  very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the
  Japanese army busy twenty-four hours a day and worry it to death. It must
  be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese
  army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be
  forced to move in all its provisions and guard them, it must use large numbers
  of troops to protect its lines of communications and constantly guard against
  attacks and it needs large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well.

  In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers
  and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself; at the same
  time China will win foreign aid to reinforce the equipment of her troops
  gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in
  the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied
  areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long
  resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial
  of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent
  power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers
  of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for
  their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable
  us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases
  in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression
  out of China.


The above views have been proved correct in the light of the experience of
the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

7. As far back as August 25, 1937, less than two months after the Lukouchiao
Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed
out in its "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

  The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their
  occupation of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of their
  large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already
  begun their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have
  "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smokescreen for further
  attacks.

  The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting point of China's
  national War of Resistance.

  Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of
  actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the
  present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for
  victory in the War of Resistance.

  The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that
  has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only
  through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won.

  The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to
  many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial
  compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that
  the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that,
  through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already
  started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.


The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in the light of the experience
of the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

8. Epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies
in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with such
tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their approach to problems. They
either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves
upon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar
subjectivity into the whole of the problem. But there are two categories
of erroneous views, one comprising fundamental, and therefore consistent,
errors which are hard to correct, and the other comprising accidental, and
therefore temporary, errors which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong,
both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic
tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of
war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM


9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will
the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically a
war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist
Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the basis of the whole
problem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will
be considered in turn below.

10. The Japanese side. First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country,
which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational
power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the
world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The
inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China
are due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic and
political-organizational power. Secondly, however, the imperialist character
of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war,
a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, the
internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven
her not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also
to approach her final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is
no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought
by her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.
This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this
reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese
imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All
of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the
antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism
between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and
barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her
inevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her
great military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the same
time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic
and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate.
Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military,
financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan's
rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again
they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war
they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it
and even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japan
can get international support from the fascist countries, the international
opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international
support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel
out the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law that
an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of the
very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great
capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous
nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources,
and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics on
the Japanese side.

11. The Chinese side. First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal
country. The Opium War, [6] the Taiping Revolution,
[7] the Reform Movement of 1898,
[8] the Revolution of 1911
[9] and the Northern Expedition
[10]--the revolutionary or reform movements which
aimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state--all
met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal
country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy
in military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again one
can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility
of quick victory for China. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement,
with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different
from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces
opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered
the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily,
economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in China
more progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Party
of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors.
It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation
can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese
imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning
sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is
a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the
sympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countries
in the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very
big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty
of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly,
there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive
and just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of the
meagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage
lies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive
and just character of her war, her great size and her abundant international
support. These are China's characteristics.

12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic and
political-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous,
her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourable
position internationally. China, on the contrary, has less military, economic
and political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, her
war is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor which
enables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by most
countries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics
of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the
political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides;
they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the
war and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to China
and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They
will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and
from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively
and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements
of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major and
minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not
matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying
the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of his
ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be
proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics
we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION


13. The theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast
between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "Resistance will
mean subjugation," and now they are saying, "The continuance of the war spells
subjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that
Japan, though strong; is small, while China, though weak, is large. They
can adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Sung Dynasty
by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Ching, to prove
that small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover,
that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events
occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British
subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country
can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have to
produce other grounds before we can silence and convince all the subjugationists,
and supply everyone engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to persuade
those who are still confused or irresolute and so strengthen their faith
in the War of Resistance.

14. What then are the grounds we should advance? The characteristics of the
epoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression
and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is not just any war, it is specifically a war between China and
Japan fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Our enemy, Japan, is first of all
a moribund imperialist power; she is already in her era of decline and is
not only different from Britain at the time of the subjugation of India,
when British capitalism was still in the era of its ascendancy, but also
different from what she herself was at the time of World War I twenty years
ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world
imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason
the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which is in the nature of a
last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it
will not be China but the ruling circles of Japanese imperialism which will
be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this
war at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiled
in war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous
aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries
and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan
has aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China
of any other historical period. She is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society,
and she is consequently considered a weak country. But at the same time,
China is historically in her era of progress; this is the primary reason
for her ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance Against
Japan is progressive we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general
sense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war against
Italy, or the Taiping Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive,
we mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what
way is the China of today progressive? She is progressive because she is
no longer a completely feudal country and because we already have some capitalism
in China, we have a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, we have vast numbers of
people who have awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party, we
have a politically progressive army--the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist
Party--and we have the tradition and the experience of many decades of
revolution, and especially the experience of the seventeen years since the
founding of the Chinese Communist Party. This experience has schooled the
people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the
present unity against Japan. If it is said that without the experience of
1905 the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can
also say that without the experience of the last seventeen years it would
be impossible to win our War of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.

In the existing international situation, China is not isolated in the war,
and this fact too is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars,
and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we
meet with world-wide popular movements, extraordinary in breadth and depth,
which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russian
Revolution of 1917 also received international support, and thus the Russian
workers and peasants won; but that support was not so broad in scale and
deep in nature as ours today. The popular movements in the world today are
developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. The existence
of the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international
politics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest
enthusiasm; there was nothing like this twenty years ago. All these factors
have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's
final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come
only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these
are the factors enabling her to protract the war and to promote as well as
await international help.

17. There is the additional factor that while Japan is a small country with
a small territory, few resources, a small population and a limited number
of soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources,
a large population and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrast
between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country,
retrogression and meagre support and a big country, progress and abundant
support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. It follows
from the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride roughshod
over China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China must
unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance
will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, it
follows from the other contrast--a small country, retrogression and meagre
support versus a big country, progress and abundant support--that Japan cannot
ride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat,
while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.

18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, she was not only weak but also small.
Second, she was not as progressive as China; she was an old country passing
from the slave to the serf system, a country without any capitalism or bourgeois
political parties, let alone a Communist Party, and with no army such as
the Chinese army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, she was
unable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fight
her war in isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there were mistakes
in the direction of her war against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated.
But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which,
if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their country when
the world situation changes.

19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberation
movements in modern China to prove their assertions first that "resistance
will mean subjugation", and then that "the continuance of the war spells
subjugation", here again our answer is, "Times are different." China herself,
the internal situation in Japan and the international environment are all
different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before
while China in her unchanged semi-colonial and semi-feudal position is still
fairly weak. It is also a fact that for the time being Japan can still control
her people at home and exploit international contradictions in order to invade
China. But during a long war, these things are bound to change in the opposite
direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will become
so in future. The subjugationists dismiss this point. As for China, we already
have new people, a new political party, a new army and a new policy of resistance
to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, and
what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true
that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks with
the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present
War of Resistance--this is a very painful historical lesson, and never again
should we destroy any of our revolutionary forces. Yet even on the present
basis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually and
increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should converge
on the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for international support,
though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the
making, the international situation being fundamentally different from before.
The countless failures in the liberation movement of modern China had their
subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different.
Today, although there are many difficulties which make the War of Resistance
arduous--such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that
his difficulties are just starting, while our own progress is far from
sufficient--nevertheless many favourable conditions exist for defeating the
enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome
the difficulties and win through to victory. These are favourable conditions
such as never existed before in any period of our history, and that is why
the War of Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the
past, will not end in failure.

COMPROMISE OR RESISTANCE? CORRUPTION OR PROGRESS?


20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation
is groundless. But there are many people who do not subscribe to this theory;
they are honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present
situation. Two things are worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japan
and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing
questions are being widely discussed and no key has been found to their solution.
Let us now examine them.

21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots,
and as long as these roots exist the question is bound to arise. But compromise
will not avail. To prove the point, again we need only look for substantiation
to Japan, China, and the international situation. First take Japan. At the
very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would
come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words,
that after occupying northern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan would probably
resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate. True enough, she did
resort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that the
enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practiced naked plunder.
Had China capitulated, every Chinese would have become a slave without a
country. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of subjugating China, has
two aspects, the material and the spiritual, both of which are being applied
universally to all Chinese, not only to the people of the lower strata but
also to members of the upper strata; of course the latter are treated a little
more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not of principle.
In the main the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the same
old measures he adopted in the three northeastern provinces. Materially,
he is robbing the common people even of their food and clothing, making them
cry out in hunger and cold; he is plundering the means of production, thus
ruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he is working
to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flag
of the "Rising Sun" all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts
of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit.
This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China.
Japan with her voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was
inevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese cabinet's statement of January
16, 1938 [11] is still being obstinately carried
out, which has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. This rage is engendered
by the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war--"there is no escape
from fate", and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized. It is to be
expected that on some future occasion the enemy will once again resort to
the scheme of inducing China to capitulate and that certain subjugationists
will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements
(to be found in Britain, the United States and France, and specially among
the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend
of events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and peculiarly barbarous
character of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the question.

22. Second, let us take China. There are three factors contributing to China's
perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place the Communist Party,
which is the reliable force leading the people to resist Japan. Next, the
Kuomintang, which depends on Britain and the United States and hence will
not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other political
parties and groups, most of which oppose compromise and support the War of
Resistance. With unity among these three, whoever compromises will be standing
with the traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All those
unwilling to be traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War
of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can hardly succeed.

23. Third, take the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certain
elements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries, the whole world
is in favour of resistance, and not of compromise by China. This factor
reinforces China's hopes. Today the people throughout the country cherish
the hope that international forces will gradually give China increasing help.
It is not a vain hope; the existence of the Soviet Union in particular encourages
China in her War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong as
never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. In direct contrast
to all the members of the upper strata in the capitalist countries who seek
nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its duty to help all weak
nations and all revolutionary wars. That China is not fighting her war in
isolation has its basis not only in international support in general but
in Soviet support in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in close
geographical proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's
War of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan increases the difficulties
of China's resistance. Proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand,
is a favourable condition for the War of Resistance.

24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can be
overcome. Even if the enemy can modify his policy to some extent, he cannot
alter it fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present,
but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, also,
some forces favour compromise but the main forces favour resistance. The
combination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the danger
of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and
perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political
progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere
in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything
depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena
in various herds under the Kuomintang regime are very serious, and the
accumulation of these undesirable factors over the years has caused great
anxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there is
no ground for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already
proved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last ten
months as in many years in the past. Although the cumulative effects of long
years of corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the people's strength
to resist Japan, thus reducing the extent of our victories and causing us
losses in the war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and in the
world is such that the Chinese people cannot but make progress. This progress
will be slow because of the factor of corruption, which impedes progress.
Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present
situation, and the second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war, which
is a source of great concern to patriots. But we are in the midst of a
revolutionary war, and revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only
eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. Every
just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power, which can transform
many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese
war will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the
War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be
transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people
and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and
after the war. It is proper for us to regard the anti-Japanese war and our
national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also be
transformed is to say that the war of aggression by her rulers will end in
defeat and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph
of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed.
All this is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospect
we should take into account.

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION IS WRONG AND THE THEORY
  OF QUICK VICTORY IS LIKEWISE WRONG


26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the
basic contradictory characteristics, such as relative strength, relative
size, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of support, we have already
refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise
is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress
the contradiction between strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomes
the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting all the other
contradictions. Their preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows their
one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into
the whole shows their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a
whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on and are wrong.
As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but
who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they
are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy
at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country,
we should point out to them that their approach also tends to be one-sided
and subjective. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once they
are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their errors only momentary.

27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Either they completely
forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, remembering only
the other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's advantages beyond all
semblance of reality and beyond recognition, or they presumptuously take
the balance of forces at one time and place for the whole situation, as in
the old saying, "A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tail" In a word, they
lack the courage to admit that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They
often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Nor
do they have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, and
thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make
mistakes, big and small, and here again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness
that are doing the mischief. These friends have their hearts in the right
place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen aspirations
are indeed lofty", their views are wrong, and to act according to them would
certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform
to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act notwithstanding
would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result
would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory of quick victory
will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize
that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that
the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to
avert subjugation. The conditions for liberation are China's progress, which
is basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ
from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and all-sided view, we recognize
the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, stress that
liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its
achievement, and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other
hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility,
that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation, and
still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to
secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency to compromise and
the corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate,
will gradually prevail and are already in violent conflict with the former;
in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for the healthy tendencies
and phenomena to prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromise
and to change the state of corruption. Therefore, contrary to the pessimists,
we are not at all down-hearted.

29. Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favour
of driving the "devils" out overnight. But we point out that, in the absence
of certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists only
in one's mind and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion,
a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal
of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point
out that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war,
and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we
must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory,
and the more fully and the earlier these conditions are secured, the surer
we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that only
in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory
of quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get things on
the cheap.

WHY A PROTRACTED WAR?


30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to
the question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basis
of all the fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For instance, if
we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a
weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling into
the theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practice
can a struggle become protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong.
Nor can it become protracted by simply pitting the big against the small,
the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagre
support. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big country
by a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive
country which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, and
the same holds for everything that is progressive but not strong. Abundant
or meagre support is an important but a subsidiary factor, and the degree
of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. Therefore
when we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war,
our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work
on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation
is there. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have
advantages. The enemy's advantage can be reduced and his shortcomings aggravated
by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our
shortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and
avert subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated and will be
unable to avert the collapse of his whole imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but shortcomings in
all others and we have shortcomings in only one respect but advantages in
all others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on the contrary, a
superior position for him and an inferior position for us at the present
time? Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way.
The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is
now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the
time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to offset his strength,
while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop,
to a degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness. Therefore there can
as yet be no balance, only imbalance.

32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the
united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as
against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change.
Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy will
be victorious and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that in this stage
the enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely restricted in degree
and cannot be transcended by complete victory or complete defeat? The reason
is that, first, from the very beginning the enemy's strength and our weakness
have been relative and not absolute, and that, second, our efforts in persevering
in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuated
this relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is
still strong, but unfavourable factors have reduced his strength, although
not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy his superiority, and similarly
we are still weak, but favourable factors have compensated for our weakness,
although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus
it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak,
that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior
position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority,
have never been absolute, and besides, our efforts in persevering in resistance
to Japan and in the united front during the war have brought about further
changes in the original balance of forces between us and the enemy. Therefore,
in this stage the enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely restricted
in degree, and hence the war becomes protracted.

33. But circumstances are continually changing. In the course of the war,
provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes
of principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China's
advantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result
that there will be a continual change in the difference in comparative strength
and hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stage
is reached, a great change will take place in the balance of forces, resulting
in the enemies defeat and our victory.

34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit his strength, and our
War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened him. The insufficiency
in his manpower and material resources is not yet such as to prevent his
offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain his offensive to a certain
extent. The reactionary and barbarous nature of his war, a factor which
intensifies both class antagonisms within Japan and the resistance of the
Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation which radically impedes
his advance. The enemy's international isolation is increasing but is not
yet complete. In many countries which have indicated they will help us, the
capitalists dealing in munitions and war materials and bent solely on profit
are still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war supplies,
[12] and their governments
[13] are still reluctant to join the Soviet Union
in practical sanctions against Japan. From all this it follows that our War
of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As
for China, although there has been some improvement with regard to her weakness
in the military, economic, political and cultural spheres in the ten months
of resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to prevent the
enemy's offensive and prepare our counteroffensive. Moreover, quantitatively
speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors
favourable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient
to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counter-offensive unless
we make an immense effort. Neither the abolition of corruption and the
acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces
and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished
facts. From all this it follows that our war cannot be won quickly but can
only be a protracted war.

THE THREE STAGES OF THE PROTRACTED WAR


35. Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one and final victory will
belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will
pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy's
strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be
the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for
the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic
counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to
predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends
in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The objective
course of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with many twists and
turns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war; nevertheless
it is necessary for the strategic direction of the war to make a rough sketch
of its trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord with the subsequent
facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make it in order
to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy Canton,
Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim
the enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a half
million men, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than
ten thousand million yen. In penetrating so deeply, he will encounter immense
difficulties, with consequences disastrous beyond imagination. As for attempting
to occupy the entire length of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-Lanchow
Railway, he will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully
accomplish his design. But in drawing up our operational plan we should base
ourselves on the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and
even certain additional areas, as well as link them up, and we should make
dispositions for a protracted war, so that even if he does so, we shall be
able to cope with him. In this stage the form of fighting we should adopt
is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare.
Through the subjective errors of the Kuomintang military authorities, positional
warfare was assigned the primary role in the first phase of this stage, but
it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a
whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and
achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue
to use base and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in the attempt
to realize his plan for a quick decision and to conquer the whole country
without much effort, he has failed so far, nor is he likely to succeed in
the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will make
considerable progress, which will become the main basis for her continued
resistance in the second stage. In the present stage the Soviet Union has
already given substantial aid to China. On the enemy side, there are already
signs of flagging morale, and his army's momentum of attack is less in the
middle phase of this stage than it was in the initial phase, and it will
diminish still further in the concluding phase. Signs of exhaustion are beginning
to appear in his finances and economy; war-weariness is beginning to set
in among his people and troops and within the clique at the helm of the war,
"war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism about
the prospects of the war is growing.

37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail
end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal
points to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and our
firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive
and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage,
the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them his
own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plundering
the Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be confronted with stubborn
guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is
unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage,
and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's
consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will
still be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will be
primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still
retain a large regular army, but she will find it difficult to launch
the strategic counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand, the
enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and
along the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other
hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for the
troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched
in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions,
and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy
and co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch
extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping
the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile
warfare, as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting in the second
stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation.
But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conducted
the enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory,
with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great
defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied
territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base
areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla
areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on
the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and
on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should
be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather
its hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problems
will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors.
The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the traitor
organizations in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called "unified
government". Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war,
vacillating elements within our ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimism
will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole
people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance,
to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and
ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new wartime
policies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will have
to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government,
we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques,
reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for the
counter-offensive. The international situation will become still more
unfavourable to Japan and the main international forces will incline towards
giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of "realism" of
the Chamberlain type which accommodates itself to faits accomplis.
Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and Siberia will become greater, and
there may even be another war. As regards Japan, scores of her divisions
will be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and
the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down this big Japanese force,
greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale by stimulating the
growth of homesickness, war-weariness and even anti-war sentiment. Though
it would be wrong to say that Japan will achieve no results at all in her
plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare,
she cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. This second stage
will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most trying
period but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country
or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss
of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole
nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance,
in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gain
the power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second act
in the three-act drama of China's War of Resistance. And through the efforts
of the entire cast it will become possible to perform a most brilliant last
act.

38. The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover
our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength
which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to
grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient,
and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and
on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not
be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and
diplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic
defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself
in strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategically
interior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines.
Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over.
The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talk
of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through
this stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare,
but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defence
cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing
circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third
stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task.
In the third stage guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support
by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary
form as in the second stage.

39. It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthless
in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China but
will be able to occupy many places for a considerable time. China will not
be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of her territory
will remain in her hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win,
but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and
ruthless war. The political parties taking part in the war will also be steeled
and tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in
the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in
the united front and in the war can we win final victory. Only thus can all
difficulties be overcome. After travelling the hard stretch of road we shall
reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

41. In the three stages the changes in relative strength will proceed along
the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are
inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority we must reckon on changes
of two different kinds from the eve of the War of Resistance to the end of
this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original
inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory,
population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions.
Towards the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable,
especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people
as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise.
But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted.
It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress made by the armed
forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development
of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase
in international support, etc. What is on the downgrade in the first stage
is the old quantity and the old quality, the manifestations being mainly
quantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new quantity and the new quality,
the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change
that provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final
victory.

42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemies
side. The first kind is a change for the worse and manifests itself in hundreds
of thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration
of troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure
of over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world opinion, etc. This
trend also provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and
win final victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second kind of change
on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, his expansion in
territory, population and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted
nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but
at the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theories
of national subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take into account
the transitory and partial character of this change for the better on the
enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and her
occupation of China's territory is temporary. The vigorous growth of guerrilla
warfare in China will restrict her actual occupation to narrow zones. Moreover,
her occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified contradictions
between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such
occupation involves a considerable period in which Japan will make capital
outlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in the
three northeastern provinces. All of which again gives us a basis for demolishing
the theories of national subjugation and of compromise and for establishing
the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to
develop. While the situation cannot be predicted in detail, on the whole
Japan will continue on the downgrade and China on the
upgrade.[14] For example, Japan's military and
financial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare,
popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of her troops will deteriorate
further, and she will become more isolated internationally. As for China,
she will make further progress in the political, military and cultural spheres
and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further;
there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industries
and the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support will
gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what
it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there
will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising
and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from her inferior position,
and Japan will lose her superior position; first the two countries will become
evenly matched, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon,
China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategic
counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and the
expulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority
to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive
will involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, an
increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support;
it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's
superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.

44. Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development,
the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniform
and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will be
regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage,
the enemy will not relax his divisive tricks to break China's united front,
hence the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still more
important, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counter-offensive
does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period the
international situation will become very favourable to China. China's task
will be to take advantage of it in order to attain complete liberation and
establish an independent democratic state, which at the same time will mean
helping the world anti-fascist movement.

45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan
moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from
the defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan moving
from the offensive to the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat--such
will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend.

46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be
subjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win final
victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly,
and the war must be a protracted one. Are these conclusions correct? I think
they are.

47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise
will again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China needs
a military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to
superiority she will need a military and economic power greater than Japan's.
But this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not correct."

48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decide
everything",[15] which constitutes a mechanical
approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our
view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons
are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people,
not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest
of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale.
Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people. If the great
majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the people of other countries
are on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's military
and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion,
count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively
inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt
that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided she
perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy,
weakened as he will be by the long war and by internal and external
contradictions, his military and economic power is bound to change in the
reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China
cannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yet
count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly
and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not
be able to do so in the future? If Japan's enemy is not just China, if in
future one or more other countries make open use of their considerable military
and economic power defensively or offensively against Japan and openly help
us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country,
her war is reactionary and barbarous, and she will become more and more isolated
internationally; China is a large country, her war is progressive and just,
and she will enjoy more and more support internationally. Is there any reason
why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change
the relative position between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a
contest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place in
the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to
fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation.
Were their ideas to be put into practice, we should inevitably run our heads
into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for their own pleasure
without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr.
Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water over these chatterers,
showing them up as mere windbags who want to get things on the cheap, to
have gains without pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before and
we have it now, though not very much so far; but there may be more as the
war develops into the stage of stalemate and then of counter-offensive. But
in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and
the second stage drags on very long, the theories of national subjugation
and of compromise will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be
directed mainly against them and only secondarily against the idle chatter
about quick victory.

50. That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactly
how many months or years it will last, as this depends entirely upon the
degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten
the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength
and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive to
win more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop guerrilla warfare
to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum, consolidate and expand the
united front to rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new armies
and develop new war industries, promote political, economic and cultural
progress, mobilize the workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals and
other sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces and win over
their soldiers, carry on international propaganda to secure foreign support,
and win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only
by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic
short-cut.

A WAR OF JIG-SAW PATTERN


51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance Against
Japan will write a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. One
of the special features of this war is the interlocking "jig-saw" pattern
which arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and
her shortage of troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China
and the extensiveness of her territory on the other. There have been other
wars of jig-saw pattern in history, the three years' civil war in Russia
after the October Revolution being a case in point. But what distinguishes
this war in China is its especially protracted and extensive character, which
will set a record in history. Its jig-saw pattern manifests itself as follows.

52. Interior and exterior lines. The anti-Japanese war as a whole
is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relation between the
main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior
lines while the latter are on the exterior lines, presenting a remarkable
spectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationship
between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint each guerrilla
area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together
they form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the first
stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines
is withdrawing but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior
lines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the
enemy-- they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage--thereby
presenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.

53. Possession and non-possession of a rear area. The main forces,
which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied
areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla
units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from
the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small
rear of its own, upon which it relies to establish its fluid battle lines.
The case is different with the guerrilla detachments which are dispatched
by a guerrilla area for short-term operations in the rear of the enemy in
the same area; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line.
"Operating without a rear area" is a special feature of revolutionary war
in the new era, wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced
political party and army are to be found; there is nothing to fear but much
to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.

54. Encirclement and counter-encirclement. Taking the war as a whole,
there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy because
he is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we
are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the
first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or more
of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply
the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior lines
by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing
on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our
counter-encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base
areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy
on all sides, like the Wutai Mountains, or on three sides, like the northwestern
Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one
considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to
the positions of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround
a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded
the Tatung-puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the
southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar
instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our
counter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement
by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own--rather like
a game of weichi. [16] Campaigns
and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's
pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and
our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains) resembles moves to
dominate spaces on the board. If the game of weichi is extended
to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between
us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggression
and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France
and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircle
Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like
the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart
the Universe, and the modern Sun Wu-kungs
[17]--the fascist aggressors--will finally be buried
underneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the international plane
we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as
one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may join
it as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as still
another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist
Sun Wu-kungs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's day of doom.
Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the
day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. We are not jesting;
this is the inevitable trend of the war.

55. Big areas and little areas. There is a possibility that the
enemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the Great
Wall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect of
the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the three
northeastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities,
the main lines of communication and some of the plains--which may rank first
in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the
occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be
taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another
aspect of the situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great
Wall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then the unoccupied
area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the
enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the three
northeastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The
area kept intact is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great efforts
to developing it, not only politically, militarily and economically but,
what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former
cultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we on our part must
transform the former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. At
the same time, the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind the
enemy lines is also extremely important, and we should attend to every aspect
of this work, including the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China's
territory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed into regions of progress
and light, while the small pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas and
especially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardness
and darkness.

56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance
Against Japan is a war of a jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically
and culturally. It is a marvellous spectacle in the annals of war, a heroic
undertaking by the Chinese nation, a magnificent and earth-shaking feat.
This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to
advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially
the oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. Every Chinese should
consciously throw himself into this war of a jig-saw pattern, for this is
the form of war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself, the special
form of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the Nineteen
Thirties and the Nineteen Forties.

FIGHTING FOR PERPETUAL PEACE


57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war is inseparably connected
with the fight for perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never has
there been a historical period such as the present in which war is so close
to perpetual peace. For several thousand years since the emergence of classes,
the life of mankind has been full of wars; each nation has fought countless
wars, either internally or with other nations. In the imperialist epoch of
capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and
with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years
ago was the first of its kind in history, but not the last. Only the war
which has now begun comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close
to the perpetual peace of mankind. By now one-third of the world's population
has entered the war. Look ! Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, then
China. The population of the countries at war now amounts to almost 600 million,
or nearly a third of the total population of the world. The characteristics
of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetual
peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attacked
Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan attacked China. What will come next?
Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers. "Fascism is war"
[18]--this is perfectly true. There will be no
interruption in the development of the present war into a world war; mankind
will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why then do we say the present
war is near to perpetual peace? The present war is the result of the development
of the general crisis of world capitalism which began with World War I; this
general crisis is driving the capitalist countries into a new war and, above
all, driving the fascist countries into new war adventures. This war, we
can foresee, will not save capitalism, but will hasten its collapse. It will
be greater in scale and more ruthless than the war of twenty years ago, all
nations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on for a very long time,
and mankind will suffer greatly. But, owing to the existence of the Soviet
Union and the growing political consciousness of the people of the world,
great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to oppose
all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle
for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war,
perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once man has eliminated capitalism,
he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need
for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison
gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never
again know war. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are part
of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countries
which have a combined population of over 500 million, will take an important
place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation
of the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable
from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance Against
Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

58. History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust.
All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress
are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but
we do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose
just wars, we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World War
I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore
the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose
a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks
out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war
with just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war that impedes
progress, and the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, should
oppose it and are opposing it. In our country the people and the government,
the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, have all raised the banner of
righteousness in the national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war
is sacred and just, it is progressive and its aim is peace. The aim is peace
not just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary but
perpetual peace. To achieve this aim we must wage a life-and-death struggle,
be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop short
of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed
to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies
clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China
and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving.
Fascism and imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put an end
to it in the not too distant future. The great majority of mankind should
exert their utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of China
constitute one quarter of the world's population, and if by their concerted
efforts they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom
and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution
to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for the
whole world is approaching this point in the course of its social and economic
development, and provided that the majority of mankind work together, our
goal will surely be attained in several decades.

MAN'S DYNAMIC ROLE IN WAR


59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final
victory will be China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war is
and what it is not. Now we shall turn to the question of what to do and what
not to do. How to conduct protracted war and how to win the final victory?
These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore successively discuss
the following problems: man's dynamic role in war, war and politics, political
mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence within
defence, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior
lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare,
positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities
of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements
in the anti-Japanese war, and the army and the people as the foundation of
victory. Let us start with the problem of man's dynamic role.

60. When we say we are opposed to a subjective approach to problems, we mean
that we must oppose ideas which are not based upon or do not correspond to
objective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will
lead to failure if acted on. But whatever is done has to be done by human
beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human
action. For such action to be effective there must be people who derive ideas,
principles or views from the objective facts, and put forward plans, directives,
policies, strategies and tactics. Ideas, etc. are subjective, while deeds
or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent
the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role
"man's conscious dynamic role", and it is a characteristic that distinguishes
man from all other beings. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective
facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas
are correct actions. We must give full scope to these ideas and actions,
to this dynamic role. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out
imperialism and transform the old China into a new China; this can be achieved
only when the whole Chinese people are mobilized and full scope is given
to their conscious dynamic role in resisting Japan. If we just sit by and
take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protracted
war nor final victory.

61. It is a human characteristic to exercise a conscious dynamic role. Man
strongly displays this characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat in
war is decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditions
on both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging and the international
support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone; in themselves,
all these provide only the possibility of victory or defeat but do not decide
the issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely,
the directing and waging of war, man's conscious dynamic role in war.

62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations
imposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they
can and must play a dynamic role in striving for victory. The stage of action
for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on
that stage they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound
and colour, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations,
the commanders in the anti-Japanese war should display their prowess and
marshal all their forces to crush the national enemy, transform the present
situation in which our country and society are suffering from aggression
and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; here is where
our subjective faculties for directing war can and must be exercised. We
do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objective
conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want every commander
to become a general who is both bold and sagacious. Our commanders should
have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability to
remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of
the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not flounder but
make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy
and tactics, as the laws for directing war, constitute the art of swimming
in the ocean of war.

WAR AND POLITICS


63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics
and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never
been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese war
is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable
from the political aim of the war--to drive out Japanese imperialism and
build a new China of freedom and equality--inseparable from the general policy
of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the
mobilization of the entire people, and from the political principles of the
unity between officers and men, the unity between army and people and the
disintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable from the effective
application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front,
and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the
people inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated
from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle
politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea of war as an absolute
is wrong and should be corrected.

64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannot
be equated with politics in general. "War is the continuation of politics
by other . . . means." [19] When politics develops
to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war
breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. For instance, the
semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political growth of
Japanese imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep
away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been
an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many wars of
liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep it away. Japan is now using
war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance
of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War
of Resistance in her determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the
obstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained and the war concluded.
But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue
till the aim is fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise before
the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail, because
even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would
break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not
submit but would continue the war until its political objective was achieved.
It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war
is politics with bloodshed.

65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set
of organizations, a particular series of methods and a particular kind of
process. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes
with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The
process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed
forces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employing
strategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy.
Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All who take part
in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves
to war before they can win victory.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE


66. A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensive
and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war there
was no political mobilization for resistance to Japan, and this was a great
drawback, as a result of which China has already lost a move to the enemy.
After the war began, political mobilization was very far from extensive,
let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's gunfire and the bombs dropped
by enemy airplanes that brought news of the war to the great majority of
the people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us
by the enemy, we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remoter
regions beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as usual. This
situation must change, or otherwise we cannot win in our life-and-death struggle.
We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must make
full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of him.
This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority
in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common
people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the
enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms
and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty
in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in
the united front and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable
from the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect
political mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving the chariot
north", and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army
and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for every
soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns
him. The political aim of the war is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and
build a new China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this aim to
everybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japanese
upsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their all
to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them;
the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, there
must be a political programme. We already have the Ten-Point Programme for
Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Programme of Armed Resistance
and National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the army
and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a
clear-cut, concrete political programme it is impossible to mobilize all
the armed forces and the whole people to carry the war against Japan through
to the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets
and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films,
through schools, through the mass organizations and through our cadres. What
has been done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in the ocean,
and moreover it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastes
and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly,
to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance
must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political programme to the
people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political
mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of
the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a
matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

THE OBJECT OF WAR


68. Here we are not dealing with the political aim of war; the political
aim of the War of Resistance Against Japan has been defined above as "to
drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality".
Here we are dealing with the elementary object of war, war as "politics with
bloodshed", as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is
specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the
enemy means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and does
not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically). In ancient warfare,
the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy,
and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons
are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun,
the long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the
air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gas
mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the
functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying
the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate
object is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation,
because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence
the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defence
is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack.
Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while
pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction
of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary,
because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively
preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy,
is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy
and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief
role is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the rest of
the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does
it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; sacrifice and
self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War
is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high
price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred for
the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we
say that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, also
has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defence
must be accompanied by attack and should not be defence pure and simple.

70. The object of war, namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction
of the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities,
an essence which pervades all war activities, from the technical to the
strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no
technical, tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in any way depart
from it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "taking cover and
making full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is
self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The former
gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features,
advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter
gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of fire and organizing
a fire-net. As for the assault force, the containing force and the reserve
force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the
second for preserving oneself, and the third is for either purpose according
to circumstances--either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces
the assault force or serves as a pursuit force), or for self-preservation
(in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering
force). Thus, no technical, tactical, or strategical principles or operations
can in any way depart from the object of war, and this object pervades the
whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

71. In directing the anti-Japanese war, leaders at the various levels must
lose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each
side nor of the object of this war. In the course of military operations
these contrasting fundamental factors unfold themselves in the struggle by
each side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we strive
in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part
of the enemy and destroy a part of his men and materiel. We must
accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major
strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the
enemy, protecting the motherland and building a new China.

OFFENCE WITHIN DEFENCE, QUICK DECISIONS WITHIN A PROTRACTED
  WAR EXTERIOR LINES WITHIN INTERIOR LINES


72. Now let us examine the specific strategy of the War of Resistance Against
Japan. We have already said that our strategy for resisting Japan is that
of protracted war, and indeed this is perfectly right. But this strategy
is general, not specific. Specifically, how should the protracted war be
conducted? We shall now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows.
In the first and second stages of the war, i.e., in the stages of
the enemy's offensive and preservation of his gains, we should conduct tactical
offensives within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quick
decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles
on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage,
we should launch the strategic counter-offensive.

73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonial
and semi-feudal country, she has adopted the policy of the strategic offensive
while we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to execute the strategy
of a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy of
protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat
effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of her navy to encircle and
blockade China from both land and sea, and is using her air force to bomb
China. Her army has already established a long front stretching from Paotow
to Hangchow and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung; thus exterior-line
operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in
the position of operating on interior lines. All this is due to the fact
that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong,
does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory,
a large population and plenty of soldiers. Two important consequences follow.
First, the enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, can
only occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of the
plains. Thus there are extensive areas in the territory under his occupation
which he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for
our guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if the enemy manages
to occupy the line connecting Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and its adjacent
areas, he can hardly seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a general
rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory.
Secondly, in pitting his small forces against large forces, the enemy is
encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes,
strategically he is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines,
strategically he is on the offensive while we are on the defensive; all this
looks very much to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our two
advantages, namely, our vast territory and large forces, and, instead of
stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing
several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of
our men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns,
and suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from the exterior lines
of the battlefield. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and
on the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interior
lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior
lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into
exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way
to deal with one or indeed with any advancing enemy column. Both the consequences
discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we are
big. Moreover, the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and in
training) while our forces, though large, are weak (in arms and in training
but not in morale), and in campaigns and battles, therefore, we should not
only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against
interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. In
general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not a
stationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand
alongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and while he is on the
move, advance suddenly to encircle and attack him before he knows what is
happening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we may
destroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, and
even if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This
applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win one
sizable victory like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to speak
of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our
own forces and evoke international support. Thus our strategically protracted
war is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy's
war of strategic quick decision is bound to change into protracted war after
he is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

75. In a word, the above operational principle for fighting campaigns and
battles is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It
is the opposite of our strategic principle of "protracted defensive warfare
on interior lines", and yet it is the indispensable principle for carrying
out this strategy. If we should use "protracted defensive warfare on interior
lines" as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning
of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the circumstances
in which the enemy is small while we are big and the enemy is strong while
we are weak; in that case we could never achieve our strategic objective
of a protracted war and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we
have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country
into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy's
field armies but having two, three or four times its strength, and so keeping
the enemy engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with the principle
outlined above. This principle of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior
lines" can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in regular warfare.
It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course.
In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better equipped
technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong,
we shall be able to capture prisoners and booty on a large scale all the
more effectively if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decision
offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, three
or four mechanized divisions against one mechanized enemy division, we can
be all the more certain of destroying it. It is common sense that several
hefty fellows can easily beat one.

76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior
lines" on a battlefield, we shall not only change the balance of forces on
that battlefield, but also gradually change the general situation. On the
battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive,
we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior
numbers on interior lines, and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy,
try as he may, will not be able to protract the fighting in the expectation
of reinforcements; for all these reasons, the enemy's position will change
from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces
will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After many such
battles have been victoriously fought, the general situation between us and
the enemy will change. That is to say, through the accumulation of victories
on many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines,
we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, which will
necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes
in it. When that happens, these changes, together with other factors on our
side and together with the changes inside the enemy camp and a favourable
international situation, will turn the over-all situation between us and
the enemy first into one of parity and then into one of superiority for us.
That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive and drive the
enemy out of the country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes
in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort--winning
more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide
the possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility into
actuality both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is
then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING


78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines,
as discussed above, the crucial point is the "offensive"; "exterior lines"
refers to the sphere of the offensive and "quick-decision" to its duration.
Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It is
the best principle for waging a protracted war and it is also the principle
for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without
initiative, flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. We have already discussed man's conscious dynamic role, so why do we
talk about the initiative again? By conscious dynamic role we mean conscious
action and effort, a characteristic distinguishing man from other beings,
and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; all
this has been discussed already. The initiative here means an army's freedom
of action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action
is the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat
or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedom
of action through being forced into a passive position. The same is true
of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they can
to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said that the
quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate and
the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution are designed to
gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and
achieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But
initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in
the capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from the
correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition,
there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness
in order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These
points are analysed below.

80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while
passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such
superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity.
It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and
exercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always
and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only
when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority.
When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absolute
initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if,
for instance, she could throw in a huge force of several million or ten million
men all at once, if her financial resources were several times what they
are, if she had no opposition from her own people or from other countries,
and if she did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the desperate
resistance of the Chinese people, then she would be able to maintain absolute
superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history,
such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or
a campaign but is to be found towards its end. For instance, on the eve of
Germany's capitulation in World War I, the Entente countries became absolutely
superior and Germany absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated and
the Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority
and inferiority towards the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinese
victory at Taierhchuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced
after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolute
superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this
is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end of
a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority
or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or stalemate in
the campaign. But in most cases it is absolute superiority and inferiority
that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a
campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war,
it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior and
be defeated and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory.
But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side,
but is relative. With the advantages of her military, economic and
political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our
military, economic and political-organizational weakness, which creates the
basis for her initiative. But since quantitatively her military and other
power is not great and she has many other disadvantages, her superiority
is reduced by her own contradictions. Upon her invasion of China, her superiority
has been reduced still further because she has come up against our vast
territory, large population, great numbers of troops and resolute nation-wide
resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative
superiority, and her ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which
is thereby restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China, though
placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of her inferior
strength, she is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population
and troops, and also superior in the morale of her people and army and their
patriotic hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantages,
reduces the extent of her inferiority in military, economic and other power,
and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the
degree of China's passivity so that her strategic position is one of only
relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must
strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to
wage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla
warfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiority
and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through
such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually
create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves
from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the interrelation between
initiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiative
or passivity and the subjective directing of war. As already explained, it
is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority
and passivity, and the method is to create local superiority and initiative
in many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative
and plunging him into inferiority and passivity. These local successes will
add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority
and passivity for the enemy. Such a change depends upon correct subjective
direction. Why? Because while we seek superiority and the initiative, so
does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability
between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority
and for the initiative on the basis of material conditions such as military
forces and financial resources. Out of the contest there emerge a victor
and a vanquished; leaving aside the contrast in objective material conditions,
the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective direction
and the vanquished his defeat to wrong subjective direction. We admit that
the phenomenon of war is more elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty
than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter
of "probability". Yet war is in no way supernatural, but a mundane process
governed by necessity. That is why Sun Wu Tzu's axiom, "Know the enemy and
know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",
[20] remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise
from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and moreover the peculiar
nature of war makes it impossible in many cases to have full knowledge about
both sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations,
and hence mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the moves
in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is
possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction,
first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference
and judgement. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction", we
can win more battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our
passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related
to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

82. The thesis that incorrect subjective direction can change superiority
and initiative into inferiority and passivity, and that correct subjective
direction can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more convincing when
we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and
of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances
in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu
between the states of Tsin and Chu, [21] the Battle
of Chengkao between the states of Chu and Han,
[22] the Battle in which Han Hsin defeated the Chao
armies, [23] the Battle of Kunyang between the
states of Hsin and Han, [24] the Battle of Kuantu
between Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao, [25] the Battle
of Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei, [26]
the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,
[27] the Battle of Feishui between the states of
Chin and Tsin, [28] etc. Among examples to be found
abroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns and the civil war in the Soviet Union
after the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by
small forces over big and by inferior over superior forces. In every case,
the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's
local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the
enemy and then turned on the rest of his forces and smashed them one by one,
thus transforming the over-all situation into one of superiority and initiative.
The reverse was the case with the enemy who originally had superiority and
held the initiative; owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions,
it sometimes happened that he completely lost an excellent or fairly good
position in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general
without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although
superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis
determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative
or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actual
initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct subjective direction
can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative,
and incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The fact that every
ruling dynasty was defeated by revolutionary armies shows that mere superiority
in certain respects does not guarantee the initiative, much less the final
victory. The inferior side can wrest the initiative and victory from the
superior side by securing certain conditions through active subjective endeavour
in accordance with the actual circumstances.

83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority
and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy
and then springing surprise attacks upon him are two ways--indeed two important
means--of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are
misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Pakung as an enemy
soldier" [29] is an example of misconception.
And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating
misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good
to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed
in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions so that
he loses his superiority and the initiative. The saying, "There can never
be too much deception in war", means precisely this. What does "being caught
unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness superiority
is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped
this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior
enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely
because he is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points--creating
misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him-- mean
transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest
possible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiative
and victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for
attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the
people who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last man, make
widespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and provide
a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in the dark
about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will
be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largely
owing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and small
force of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the period
of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broader
mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result of
past mistakes [30] the people are in an unorganized
state, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes even
made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broad
scale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the
requirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in
carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catching
him unawares. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinine
ethics.[31] In order to achieve victory we must
as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and
ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their
minds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is
related to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective direction
is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of her offensive
by reason of her military power and her exploitation of our subjective errors,
past and present. But her initiative is beginning to wane to some extent
because of her many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors she
too has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and also
because of our many advantages. The enemy's defeat at Taierhchuang and his
predicament in Shansi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla
warfare in the enemy's rear has placed his garrisons in the occupied areas
in a completely passive position. Although he is still on the offensive
strategically and still holds the initiative, his initiative will end when
his strategic offensive ends. The first reason why the enemy will not be
able to maintain the initiative is that his shortage of troops renders it
impossible for him to carry on the offensive indefinitely. Our offensive
warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together
with other factors, constitute the second reason why he will have to cease
his offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to keep his initiative.
The existence of the Soviet Union and changes in the international situation
constitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's initiative
is limited and can be shattered. If, in military operations, China can keep
up offensive warfare by her main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously
develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and mobilize the people on
a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic
initiative.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the concrete
realization of the initiative in military operations; it is the flexible
employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of armed forces is the
central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. In
addition to organizing and educating the army and the people, the business
of war consists in the employment of troops in combat, and all these things
are done to win the fight. Of course it is difficult to organize an army,
etc., but it is even more difficult to employ it, particularly when the weak
are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high
order and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity and uncertainty
peculiar to war and the discovery of order, clarity and certainty in it;
only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

86. The basic principle of field operations for the War of Resistance Against
Japan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various
tactics or methods for giving effect to this principle, such as dispersion
and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the
offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and
outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics,
but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three crucial
links are the time, the place and the troops. No victory can be won unless
the time, the place and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking
an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and
give the enemy a chance to prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemy
may have encamped and concentrated his forces, presenting us with a hard
nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault
on the left flank which actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point,
victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing
will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit
of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but
if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve
results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how
to employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the important
task is to make changes such as from the offensive to the defensive or from
the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to
advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, from
encirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to encirclement, and to make
such changes properly and in good time according to the circumstances of
the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaigns
and strategic command as well as of command in battles.

87. The ancients said: "Ingenuity in varying tactics depends on mother wit";
this "ingenuity", which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution
of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness;
recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligent
commander's ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basis
of objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation"
(the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation and the terrain),
and this flexibility is "ingenuity in varying tactics". On the basis of this
ingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfare
on exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our favour, gain the
initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush him so that the final
victory will be ours.

88. Let us now discuss the question of planning. Because of the uncertainty
peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to
plan than is the case with other activities. Yet, since "preparedness ensures
success and unpreparedness spells failure", there can be no victory in war
without advance planning and preparations. There is no absolute certainty
in war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We are
comparatively certain about our own situation. We are very uncertain about
the enemy's, but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow
and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of
relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war.
Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, airplanes, motor vehicles,
railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the possibilities of planning in
war. However, complete or stable planning is difficult because there is only
very limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change with
the movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in degree according to
the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defence
by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day.
A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally
stand till the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however,
it is often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A strategic plan
based on the over-all situation of both belligerents is still more stable,
but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed
when the war moves towards a new stage. The making and changing of tactical,
campaign and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstance is
a key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete expression of flexibility
in war, in other words, it is also ingenuity in varying one's tactics. Commanders
at all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take note.

89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war
plans or policies can be relatively stable, describing such plans or policies
as "mechanical". This view is wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognized
that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the
flow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war plans or policies can be only
relatively stable and have to be changed or revised in good time in accordance
with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would become
mechanists. But one must not deny the need for war plans or policies that
are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything,
including the war itself as well as the negator himself. As both military
conditions and operations are relatively stable, we must grant the relative
stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example,
since both the circumstances of the war in northern China and the dispersed
nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations are relatively stable for a
particular stage, it is absolutely necessary during this stage to acknowledge
the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic principle of
operation, namely "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile
warfare under favourable conditions." The period of validity of a plan for
a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic plan, and for a tactical plan
it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone denying
this point would have no way of handling warfare and would become a relativist
in war with no settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or just
as right as another. No one denies that even a plan valid for a given period
is fluid; otherwise, one plan would never be abandoned in favour of another.
But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of the various war
operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence;
in other words it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within such
a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what
we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of
absolute fluidity throughout the war there is relative stability at each
particular stretch--such is our fundamental view regarding war plans or policies.

90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy
and with quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns
and battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility and planning, we can
now sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese war must have a plan. War plans, which
are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible so
that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always
seek to transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into
the initiative so as to change the situation as between the enemy and ourselves.
All these find expression in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior
lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior
lines in strategy.

MOBILE WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND POSITIONAL
  WARFARE


91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the framework
of the strategy of interior lines, protracted war and defence. Mobile warfare
is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns
and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of
operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defence", which is conducted
when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional
attack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristics
are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the
offensive, and fluidity.

92. China has a vast territory and an immense number of soldiers, but her
troops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on the
other hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. In
this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare
as our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating
them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance",
which is flightism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat"
which is desperate recklessness.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only
permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides.
However, it has nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fu-chu
brand.[32] The primary requirement of war is to
destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object
of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is
in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfare
is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fu-chu and can never mean moving
only backward, and never forward; that kind of "moving" which negates the
basic offensive character of mobile warfare would, in practice, "move" China
out of existence despite her vastness.

94. However, the other view, which we call the desperate recklessness of
"only advance, never retreat", is also wrong. The mobile warfare we advocate,
the content of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines
in campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary
role, "mobile defence" and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannot
be fully carried out. Desperate recklessness is military short-sightedness,
originating often from fear of losing territory. A man who acts with desperate
recklessness does not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity,
which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw
in great strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into a
fight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, it is usually necessary that
he should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages,
such as favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can
prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness.
This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not grudge a temporary
loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory
is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory,
including the recovery of lost territory. On the negative side, whenever
we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers
the preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat, so
as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise.
In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action will
contest a city or a piece of ground even when the position is obviously and
definitely unfavourable; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground
but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of
"luring the enemy in deep", precisely because it is the most effective military
policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a
strong army.

95. Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war mobile warfare comes
first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobile
warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the
outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile
form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility
in deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that the role of guerrilla
warfare is unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the strategy
of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for without
its support we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind
the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla
warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but
will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic
role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform
itself into regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent and duration
of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important
not to underestimate its strategic role. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore,
has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I have
already discussed this in "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against
Japan". As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages
of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfare
is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In
the second stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and will
be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile
warfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional
and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no
longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly
quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally
guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare.
From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance Against
Japan, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war will
present a great drama unparalleled in the annals of war. For this reason,
out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessary
to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all
enemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrilla
warfare in co-ordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned
should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think
their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time
being do not appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong. Guerrilla
warfare does not bring as quick results or as great renown as regular warfare,
but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man's
heart", and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare will
demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover,
such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile
warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principle
of the Eighth Route Army is, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance
for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This principle is perfectly
correct; the views of its opponents are wrong.

96. At China's present technical level, positional warfare, defensive or
offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests
itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory
to bypass our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be an
important, still less the principal, means for us. But in the first and second
stages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobile
warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role in
campaigns. Semi-positional "mobile defence" is a still more essential part
of mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every
step, thereby depleting his forces and gaining extra time. China must strive
to increase her supplies of modern weapons so that she can fully carry out
the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive.
In this third stage positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role,
for then the enemy will be holding fast to his positions, and we shall not
be able to recover our lost territory unless we launch powerful positional
attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too,
we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of
warfare. For the art of directing war and the active role of man are largely
nullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe in
the second half of World War I. It is only natural that the war should be
taken "out of the trenches", since the war is being fought in the vast expanses
of China and since our side will remain poorly equipped technically for quite
a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technical position
will be better, she will hardly surpass her enemy in that respect, and so
will have to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which she cannot
achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance China will
not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary or important forms are
mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford
full play to the art of directing war and to the active role of man-- what
a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION


97. As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserve
oneself and destroy the enemy. Since there are three forms of warfare, mobile,
positional and guerrilla, for achieving this object, and since they differ
in degrees of effectiveness, there arises the broad distinction between war
of attrition and war of annihilation.

98. To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a war
of attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still
exploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority and strategic
initiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation,
we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiority
and initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves
of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns
and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and
international situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence campaigns
of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition.
In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using
the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted
war.

99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns
of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of
annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla
warfare performs both simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thus
distinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is different
from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary
in protracted war.

100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's needs, in order to achieve
the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in
her defensive stage should not only exploit the function of annihilation,
which is fulfilled primarily by mobile warfare and partially by guerrilla
warfare, but also exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled primarily
by positional warfare (which itself is supplementary) and partially by guerrilla
warfare. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functions
of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for
further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at
protracting the war, gradually changing the general balance of forces and
preparing the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategic
counter-offensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through
annihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.

101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months
that many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of
attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its proper function
of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect is that at least we
depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted warfare
and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks
are first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, that
we were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little war booty.
Although we should recognize the objective cause of this situation, namely,
the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the
training of troops, in any case it is necessary, both theoretically and
practically, to urge that our main forces should fight vigorous battles of
annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. And although our guerrilla
units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks
such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to advocate and vigorously
carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are
favourable, so as greatly to deplete the enemy's forces and greatly replenish
our own.

102. The "exterior lines", the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" in
quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines and the "mobility" in
mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encircling
and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces.
Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflanking
tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decision
offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the
enemy forces.

103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also
in the training of its officers and men--its degree of organization, its
self-confidence arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious
belief in the Mikado and in supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contempt
for the Chinese people and other such characteristics, all of which stem
from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from the Japanese
national tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken very few
prisoners, although we have killed and wounded a great many enemy troops.
It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To
destroy these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The first thing
to do is to give the matter serious attention, and then patiently and
systematically to work at it in the political field and in the fields of
international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military
sphere war of annihilation is of course one of the means. In these enemy
characteristics pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national
subjugation, and passively minded military men a basis for opposition to
war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points
of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has already
begun. The chief method of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldiers
politically. We should understand, rather than hurt, their pride and channel
it in the proper direction and, by treating prisoners of war leniently, lead
the Japanese soldiers to see the anti-popular character of the aggression
committed by the Japanese rulers. On the other hand, we should demonstrate
to the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn
fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, we
should deal them blows in battles of annihilation. Our experience in the
last ten months of military operations shows that it is possible to annihilate
enemy forces--witness the Pinghsingkuan and Taierhchuang campaigns. The Japanese
army's morale is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the aim
of the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies and by the Chinese people,
in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on;
all these are objective factors favourable to waging battles of annihilation,
and they will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted.
From the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening arrogance through
battles of annihilation, such battles are one of the prerequisites for shortening
the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the
Japanese people. Cats make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do
cats make friends with mice.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferior
to the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it
is often difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing
the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting
on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists
of quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our forces in the
anti-Japanese war is that they should fight battles of annihilation as far
as possible. In favourable circumstances, we should concentrate superior
forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics--encircle
part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled
forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we
cannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battles
of annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourable
circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces,
and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for the
relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of
centralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in the
latter. These are the basic principles of field operations for the War of
Resistance Against Japan.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THE ENEMY'S MISTAKES


105. The enemy command itself provides a basis for the possibility of defeating
Japan. History has never known an infallible general and the enemy makes
mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, the
possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of
his war of aggression the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy
and tactics. There are five major ones.

  First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation
  of China and also to his shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked
  down on us. After grabbing the four northeastern provinces at small cost,
  he occupied eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic
  reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was that the Chinese nation
  is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single
  blow, he mapped out a plan of "quick decision", attempting with very small
  forces to send us scampering in panic. He did not expect to find such great
  unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the
  past ten months, forgetting as he did that China is already in an era of
  progress and already has an advanced political party, an advanced army and
  an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then increased his forces
  piecemeal from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If he wants to advance,
  he will have to augment his forces still further. But because of Japan's
  antagonism with the Soviet Union and her inherent shortage of manpower and
  finances, there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men she can
  throw in and to the furthest extent of her advance.

  Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Taierhchuang campaign,
  the enemy had divided his forces more or less evenly between northern and
  central China and had again divided them inside each of these areas. In northern
  China, for instance, he divided his forces among the Tientsin-pukow, the
  Peiping-Hankow and the Tatung-Puchow Railways, and along each of these lines
  he suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied,
  after which he lacked the forces for further advances. After the Taierhchuang
  defeat, from which he learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated his main forces
  in the direction of Hsuchow, and so temporarily corrected this mistake.

  Third, lack of strategic co-ordination. On the whole coordination exists
  within the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in central China,
  but there is glaring lack of coordination between the two. When his forces
  on the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway attacked Hsiaopengpu,
  those on the northern section made no move, and when his forces on the northern
  section attacked Taierhchuang, those on the southern section made no move.
  After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese minister of war
  arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of general staff turned up to
  take charge, and for the moment, it seemed, there was co-ordination. The
  landlord class, the bourgeoisie and the warlords of Japan have very serious
  internal contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of military
  co-ordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.

  Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously
  shown in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking and Taiyuan, chiefly
  because of his shortage of troops and his lack of a strategic pursuit force.

  Fifth, encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers. Before
  the Taierhchuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow,
  Paoting, Nankow, Hsinkou and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but
  few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.


These five errors--piecemeal reinforcement, absence of a main direction of
attack, lack of strategic co-ordination, failure to grasp opportunities,
and encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers--were all points
of incompetence in the Japanese command before the Taierhchuang campaign.
Although the enemy has since made some improvements, he cannot possibly avoid
repeating his errors because of his shortage of troops, his internal
contradictions and other factors. In addition, what he gains at one point
he loses at another. For instance, when he concentrated his forces in northern
China on Hsuchow, he left a great vacuum in the occupied areas in northern
China, which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla warfare. These mistakes
were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can
deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead him and
manoeuvre him into the desired position by ingenious and effective moves
with the help of a well-organized local population, for example, by "making
a feint to the east but attacking in the west". This possibility has already
been discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, we
can find some basis for victory. Of course, we should not take it as an important
basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course
is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes.
Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit his. It
is the duty of our command to allow him the minimum of opportunities for
doing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed errors, will again commit
errors in the future, and can be made to do so through our endeavours. All
these errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our generals in the
War of Resistance to do their utmost to seize upon them. However, although
much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent,
there are quite a few excellent points in his battle command, that is, in
his unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from him.

THE QUESTION OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE
  WAR


106. The question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war should
be approached from three aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisive
engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we
should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we
are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive
engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. The characteristics
differentiating our War of Resistance Against Japan from many other wars
are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first
and second stages of the war, which are marked by the enemy's strength and
our weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces
for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want
to choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate superior forces and fight
decisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in the
battles at Pinghsingkuan, Taierhchuang and other places; we want to avoid
decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not sure of
victory, this being the policy we adopted in the Changteh and other campaigns.
As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of
the whole nation is staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recent
withdrawal from Hsuchow. The enemy's plan for a "quick decision" was thus
foiled, and now he cannot help fighting a protracted war with us. These
principles are impracticable in a country with a small territory, and hardly
practicable in a country that is very backward politically. They are practicable
in China because she is a big country and is in an era of progress. If
strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the green
mountains are there, one need not worry about firewood", for even though
some of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room for
manoeuvre and thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, international
support and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy
for us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a
protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of
quick victory clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the moment
the situation takes a slightly favourable turn. To do what they want would
be to inflict incalculable damage on the entire war, spell finis to the
protracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually, it would
be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements,
we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so
when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times we
should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of trading space for
time is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to
avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his
age. Today China should do likewise.

107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "non-resisters"? No, we are
not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with the enemy -- that is
non-resistance, which should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated.
We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but in order to avoid the
enemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we should not allow
our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficult
to continue the War of Resistance--in brief, it is absolutely necessary to
avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be shortsighted
on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the
subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of "only advance,
never retreat" precisely because, if it became the fashion, this doctrine
would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead
to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favourable,
whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we
should never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive engagements can
we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and
every soldier in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play his part. For
this purpose considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; to avoid any
sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by
the fear of Japan and must be firmly opposed. The execution of Li Fu-ying,
Han Fu-chu and other Rightists was justified. Within the scope of correct
war planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of heroic self-sacrifice
and dauntless advance in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable from
the waging of protracted war and the achievement of final victory. We have
strongly condemned the flightism of "only retreat, never advance" and have
supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through
heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish
the powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, gives direct support to the
theory of national subjugation.

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon
territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That
is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to empty
your bowels--is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up--is
this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would
suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fighting
heroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop--these are subjectivist
and formalist illusions, not realities of life. As everybody knows, although
in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the
counter-offensive we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we have
gained time, we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting
enemy forces we have acquired experience in fighting, we have aroused hitherto
inactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood been
shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve
our military forces and indeed to preserve territory, because if we do not
abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but blindly
fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall
lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our
territory; to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist
must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is no longer
a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it
all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events
have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is
no exception; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

110. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in
the stage of strategic counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy will
be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fighting
profitable decisive engagements and avoiding unprofitable ones" will still
apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu
River. This is how we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginning
to end, and as for the enemy's "challenges" and other people's "taunts",
we should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them. In the War of
Resistance only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed
courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those who "jump whenever touched".
Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically in this
first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign;
and of course we should have the initiative throughout the later stages.
We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk
everything on a single throw.

THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF
  VICTORY


111. Japanese imperialism will never relax in its aggression against and
repression of revolutionary China; this is determined by its imperialist
nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all China without
firing a single shot, as she did the four northeastern provinces. Since China
is resisting, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this
resistance until the force of her repression is exceeded by the force of
China's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very
ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and north to Siberia,
they have adopted the policy of breaking through in the centre by first attacking
China. Those who think that Japan will know where to stop and be content
with the occupation of northern China and of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provinces
completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to
a new stage and is approaching extinction, differs from the Japan of the
past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men
Japan can throw in and to the extent of her advance, we mean that with her
available strength, Japan can only commit part of her forces against China
and only penetrate China as far as their capacity allows, for she also wants
to attack in other directions and has to defend herself against other enemies;
at the same time China has given proof of progress and capacity for stubborn
resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by
Japan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole
of China, but she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in
all the areas she can reach, and will not stop until internal and external
developments push Japanese imperialism to the brink of the grave. There are
only two possible outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either the
downfall of her entire ruling class occurs rapidly, political power passes
to the people and war thus comes to an end, which is impossible at the moment;
or her landlord class and bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and maintain
the war until the day of their downfall, which is the very road Japan is
now travelling. There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that the moderates
among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war are only
harbouring illusions. The reality of Japanese politics for many years has
been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlords
and the financial magnates. Now that Japan has launched war against China,
so long as she does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still
retains sufficient strength, she is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia,
or even both. She will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in their wishful
calculations' the rulers of Japan have it worked out on a grandiose scale.
Of course, it is possible that Japan will have to drop her original plan
of invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive attitude towards the Soviet
Union on account of Soviet strength and of the serious extent to which Japan
herself has been weakened by her war against China. But in that case, so
far from relaxing her aggression against China she will intensify it, because
then the only way left to her will be to gobble up the weak. China's task
of persevering in the War of Resistance, the united front and the protracted
war will then become all the more weighty, and it will be all the more necessary
not to slacken our efforts in the slightest.

112. Under the circumstances the main prerequisites for China's victory over
Japan are nation-wide unity and all-round progress on a scale ten or even
a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress
and has achieved a splendid unity, but her progress and unity are still far
from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due not
only to her strength but also to China's weakness; this weakness is entirely
the cumulative effect of the various historical errors of the last hundred
years, and especially of the last ten years, which have confined progress
to its present bounds. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without
making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to
exert ourselves to do; here I will deal only with two fundamental aspects,
the progress of the army and the progress of the people.

113. The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved
technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across
the Yalu River. In our employment of troops we need progressive, flexible
strategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless,
soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with a progressive
political spirit, and unless such a spirit is fostered through progressive
political work, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers
and men, impossible to arouse their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance
to the full, and impossible to provide a sound basis for the most effective
use of all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say that Japan will
finally be defeated despite her technical superiority, we mean that the blows
we deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from inflicting losses,
will eventually shake the morale of the enemy army whose weapons are not
in the hands of politically conscious soldiers. With us, on the contrary,
officers and men are at one on the political aim of the War of Resistance.
This gives us the foundation for political work among all the anti-Japanese
forces. A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army,
chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and by
having officers and men share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity will
be achieved between officers and men, the combat effectiveness of the army
will be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain
the long, cruel war.

114. The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.
It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses that
Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese
aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded
by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of
their voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death.
China's armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the
abuses of press-ganging and of buying
substitutes,[33] which now exist at the lower
levels, must immediately be banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic
political mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist millions of men.
We now have great difficulties in raising money for the war, but once the
people are mobilized, finances too will cease to be a problem. Why should
a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army
must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such
an army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like Japan will be no
match for it.

115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations
between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I always
tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle), of
having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude
that the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from this
attitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong, and
the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people
are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army's
political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity
between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy
forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic
attitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect for the
human dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down their arms. Those
who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude are
indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.

116. At this moment when the defence of Wuhan and other places has become
urgent, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse the initiative and
enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to the full in support
of the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and other
places must be seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we can
be certain of holding them depends not on our subjective desires but on concrete
conditions. Among the most important of these conditions is the political
mobilization of the whole army and people for the struggle. If a strenuous
effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions, indeed even if
one of these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of Nanking and
other places are bound to be repeated. China will have her Madrids in places
where the conditions are present. So far China has not had a Madrid, and
from now on we should work hard to create several, but it all depends on
the conditions. The most fundamental of these is extensive political mobilization
of the whole army and people.

117. In all our work we must persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United
Front as the general policy. For only with this policy can we persevere in
the War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring about a widespread
and profound improvement in the relations between officers and men and between
the army and the people, arouse to the full the initiative and enthusiasm
of the entire army and the entire people in the fight for the defence of
all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of what we have
lost, and so win final victory.

118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people
is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of
repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are,
of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political
mobilization is the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United Front
is a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is certainly
not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few political
parties; our basic objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National United
Front is to mobilize the whole army and the whole people to participate
in it.

CONCLUSIONS


119. What are our conclusions? They are:

  "Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces
  of Japan?" "Three conditions are required first, the establishment of an
  anti-Japanese united front in China second, the formation of an international
  anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement
  of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of
  the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important
  of the three conditions."

  "How long do you think such a war would last?" "That depends on the strength
  of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors
  involving China and Japan."

  "If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged.
  But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China
  will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there
  will be a very painful period."

  "Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended
  and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their
  warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields."

  "Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize
  great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants."

  "In the course of the war, China will be able to . . . reinforce the equipment
  of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional
  warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the
  Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain
  of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break
  under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the
  growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and
  large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines
  to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors
  will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications
  and bases in the Japanese occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of
  aggression out of China." (From an interview with Edgar Snow in July 1936.)

  "Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation.... In the present
  stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory
  in the War of Resistance."

  "The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that
  has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only
  through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won."

  "The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to
  setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises
  and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will
  be arduous and protracted. But we are confident that, through the efforts
  of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep
  aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." ("Resolution on
  the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central
  Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 1937.)


These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the subjugationists the enemy are
supermen and we Chinese are worthless, while in the eyes of the theorists
of quick victory we Chinese are supermen and the enemy are worthless. Both
are wrong. We take a different view; the War of Resistance Against Japan
is a protracted war, and the final victory will be China's. These are our
conclusions.

120. My lectures end here. The great War of Resistance Against Japan is
unfolding, and many people are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate
the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed is simply the general
experience of the past ten months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind of
summary. The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention and discussion;
what I have given is only an outline, which I hope you will examine and discuss,
amend and amplify.

NOTES


1. This theory of national subjugation was the view held
by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was unwilling to resist Japan and fought
Japan only under compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937),
the Chiang Kai-shek clique reluctantly took part in the War of Resistance,
while the Wang Ching-wei clique became the representatives of the theory
of national subjugation, was ready to capitulate to Japan and in fact
subsequently did so. However, the idea of national subjugation not only existed
in the Kuomintang, but also affected certain sections of the middle strata
of society and even certain backward elements among the labouring people.
As the corrupt and impotent Kuomintang government lost one battle after another
and the Japanese troops advanced unchecked to the vicinity of Wuhan in the
first year of the War of Resistance, some backward people became profoundly
pessimistic.

2. These views were to be found within the Communist Party.
During the first six months of the War of Resistance, there was a tendency
to take the enemy lightly among some members of the Party, who held the view
that Japan could be defeated at a single blow. It was not that they felt
our own forces to be so strong, since they well knew that the troops and
the organized people's forces led by the Communist Party were still small,
but that the Kuomintang had begun to resist Japan. In their opinion, the
Kuomintang was quite powerful, and, in co-ordination with the Communist Party,
could deal Japan telling blows. They made this erroneous appraisal because
they saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan,
but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt.

3. Such was the view of Chiang Kai-shek and company. Though
they were compelled to resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang pinned
their hopes solely on prompt foreign aid and had no confidence in their own
strength, much less in the strength of the people.

4. Taierhchuang is a town in southern Shantung where the
Chinese army fought a battle in March 1938 against the Japanese invaders.
By pitting 400,000 men against Japan's 70,000 to 80,000, the Chinese army
defeated the Japanese.

5. This view was put forward in an editorial in the Ta
King Pao, then the organ of the Political Science Group in the Kuomintang.
Indulging in wishful thinking, this clique hoped that a few more victories
of the Taierhchuang type would stop Japan's advance and that there would
be no need to mobilize the people for a protracted war which would threaten
the security of its own class. This wishful thinking then pervaded the Kuomintang
as a whole.

6. For many decades, beginning with the end of the 18th
century, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. This
traffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plundered
China of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, under
the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armed
aggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance,
and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps",
which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however,
the corrupt Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. This
treaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkong
to Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton
were to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goods
imported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.

7. The Taiping Revolution, or the Movement of the Taiping
Heavenly Kingdom, was the mid-19th century revolutionary peasant movement
against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In
January 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and other leaders launched
an uprising in Chintien Village in Kueiping County, Kwangsi Province, and
proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Proceeding northward
from Kwangsi, their peasant army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hupoh in
1852. In 1853 it marched through Kiangsi and Anhwei and captured Nanking.
A section of the forces then continued the drive north and pushed on to the
vicinity of Tientsin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable base
areas in the places it occupied; moreover, after establishing its capital
in Nanking, its leading group committed many political and military errors.
Therefore it was unable to withstand the combined onslaughts of the
counter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government and the British, U.S.
and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864.

8. The Reform Movement of 1898, whose leading spirits were
Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and Tan Szu-tung, represented the interests of
the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. The movement was favoured
and supported by Emperor Kuang Hsu, but had no mass basis. Yuan Shih-kai,
who had an army behind him, betrayed the reformers to Empress Dowager Tzu
Hsi, the leader of the die-hards, who seized power again and had Emperor
Kuang Hsu imprisoned and Tan Szu-tung and five others beheaded. Thus the
movement ended in tragic defeat.

9. The Revolution of 1911 was the bourgeois revolution
which overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10
of that year, a section of the Ching Dynasty's New Army who were under
revolutionary influence staged an uprising in Wuchang, Hupeh Province. The
existing bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionary societies and the broad
masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers responded enthusiastically,
and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. In January 1912, the
Provisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, with
Sun Yat-sen as the Provisional President. Thus China's feudal monarchic system
which had lasted for more than two thousand years was brought to an end.
The idea of a democratic republic had entered deep in the hearts of the people.
But the bourgeoisie which led the revolution was strongly conciliationist
in nature. It did not mobilize the peasant masses on an extensive scale to
crush the feudal rule of the landlord class in the countryside, but instead
handed state power over to the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai under imperialist
and feudal pressure. As a result, the revolution ended in defeat.

10. The Northern Expedition was the punitive war against
the Northern warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched north
from Kwangtung Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army,
with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and under
the Party's influence (the political work in the army was at that time mostly
under the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support of
the broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and
the first half of 1927 it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangtse
and Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 this
revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary clique
under Chiang Kai-shek within the revolutionary army.

11. On January 16, 1938, the Japanese cabinet declared
in a policy statement that Japan would subjugate China by force. At the same
time it tried by threats and blandishments to make the Kuomintang government
capitulate, declaring that if the Kuomintang government "continued to plan
resistance", the Japanese government would foster a new puppet regime in
China and no longer accept the Kuomintang as "the other party" in negotiations.

12. The capitalists referred to here are chiefly those
of the United States.

13. By "their governments" Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here
referring to the governments of the imperialist countries--Britain, the United
States and France.

14. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that there would
be an upswing in China during the stage of stalemate in the War of Resistance
Against Japan was completely confirmed in the case of the Liberated Areas
under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. But there was actually
a decline instead of an upswing in the Kuomintang areas, because the ruling
clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek was passive in resisting Japan and active
in opposing the Communist Party and the people. This roused opposition among
the broad masses of the people and raised their political consciousness

15. According to the theory that "weapons decide
everything", China which was inferior to Japan in regard to arms was bound
to be defeated in the war. This view was current among all the leaders of
the Kuomintang reaction, Chiang Kai-shek included.

16. See "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against
Japan", Note 9, p. 112 of this volume.

17. Sun Wu-kung is the monkey king in the Chinese novel
Hsi Yu Chi (Pilgrimage to the West), written in the 16th
century. He could cover 108,000 li by turning a somersault. Yet
once in the palm of the Buddha, he could not escape from it, however many
somersaults he turned. With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his fingers
into the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements, and buried Sun Wu-kung.

18. "Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory
war," said Comrade Georgi Dimitrov in his report to the Seventh World
Congress of the Communist International in August 1935, entitled "The Fascist
Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International" (see Selected
Articles and Speeches, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart London, 1951,
p. 44). In July 1937, Comrade Dimitrov published an article entitled
Fascism Is War.

19. V. I. Lenin, Socialism and War, Eng. ed.,
FLPH, Moscow, 1950, p. 19.

20. Sun Tzu, Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".

21. Chengpu, situated in the southwest of the present
Chuancheng County in Shantung Province, was the scene of a great battle between
the states of Tsin and Chu in 632 BC. At the beginning of the battle the
Chu troops got the upper hand. The Tsin troops, after making a retreat of
90 li, chose the right and left flanks of the Chu troops, their
weak spots, and inflicted heavy defeats on them.

22. The ancient town of Chengkeo, in the northwest of
the present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was of great military importance.
It was the scene of battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King of
Han, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu captured Hsingyang and
Chengkao and Liu Pang's troops were almost routed. Liu Pang waited until
the opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the
Szeshui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.

23. In 204 B.C., Han Hsin, a general of the state of Han,
led his men in a big battle with Chao Hsieh at Chinghsing. Chao Hsieh's army,
said to be 200,000 strong, was several times that of Han. Deploying his troops
with their backs to a river, Han Hsin led them in valiant combat, and at
the same time dispatched some units to attack and occupy the enemy's weakly
garrisoned rear. Caught in a pincer, Chao Hsieh's troops were utterly defeated.

24. The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the present
Yehhsien County, Honan Province, was the place where Liu Hsiu, founder of
the Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of the
Hsin Dynasty, in A.D. 23. There was a huge numerical disparity between the
two sides, Liu Hsiu's forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against Wang
Mang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals,
Wang Hsun and Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with only three
thousand picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up
this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops.

25. Kuantu was in the northeast of the present Chungmou
County, Honan Province, and the scene of the battle between the armies of
Tsao Tsao and Yuan Shao in A D 200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, while
Tsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantage
of the lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled
the enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surprise
attack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown
into confusion and its main force wiped out.

26. The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the state
of Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the south bank of the Yangtse
River, to the northeast of Chisyu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsao
led an army of over 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be 800,000 strong,
to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao's
antagonist Liu Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao Tsao's
army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, the
allied forces of Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet and
crushed his army.

27. Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang, Hupeh Province,
was the place where Lu Sun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the army
of Liu Pei, ruler of Shu, in A D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored successive
victories at the beginning of the war and penetrated five or six hundred
li into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Sun, who was defending
Yiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Pei "was at his wits'
end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he crushed Liu Pei's
troops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents.

28. Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty, defeated
Fu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in AD 383 at the Feishui River in Anhwei
Province. Fu Chien had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalry
force of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than 30,000, while the land and
river forces of Eastern Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies lined
up on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan, taking advantage
of the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Chien
to move his troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops to
cross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien complied, but when he ordered
withdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing
the opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the river, launched an offensive
and crushed the enemy.

29. In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state of Chin,
belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked them. The Tsin troops defeated
the enemy's advance units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province, and
pushed forward by land and water. Ascending the city wall of Shonyang, Fu
Chien observed the excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistaking
the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, was frightened by
the enemy's apparent strength.

30. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the fact
that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed the first national
democratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927,
launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus made it impossible for
the Chinese people to be organized on a large scale. For this the Kuomintang
reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held responsible.

31. Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and Autumn
Era. In 638 BC, the state of Sung fought with the powerful state of Chu.
The Sung forces were already deployed in battle positions when the Chu troops
were crossing the river. One of the Sung officers suggested that, as the
Chu troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack. But
the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared."
When the Chu troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed their
battle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate attack, and once
again the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which has
not yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave the order for attack
on after the Chu troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops
met with disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded.

32. Han Fu-chu, a Kuomintang warlord, was for several
years governor of Shantung. When the Japanese invaders thrust southward to
Shantung along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway after occupying Peiping and Tientsin
in 1937, Han Fu-chu fled all the way from Shantung to Honan without fighting
a single battle.

33. The Kuomintang expanded its army by press-ganging.
Its military and police seized people everywhere, roping them up and treating
them like convicts. Those who had money would bribe the Kuomintang officials
or pay for substitutes.