May 1938

[In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan, many people
inside and outside the Party belittled the important strategic role of guerrilla
warfare and pinned their hopes on regular warfare alone, and particularly
on the operations of the Kuomintang forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted
this view and wrote this article to show the correct road of development
for anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. As a result, the Eighth Route Army and
the New Fourth Army, which had just over 40,000 men when the War of Resistance
began in 1937, grew to a great army of one million by the time Japan surrendered
in 1945, established many revolutionary base areas, played a great part in
the war and thus, throughout this period, made Chiang Kai-shek afraid to
capitulate to Japan or launch a nation-wide civil war. In 1946, when Chiang
Kai-shek did launch a nation-wide civil war, the People's Liberation Army,
formed out of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, was strong enough to
deal with his attacks.]

CHAPTER I

WHY RAISE THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR?

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary and
guerrilla warfare supplementary. This point has already been correctly settled.
Thus, it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. Why
then raise the question of strategy?

If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was
only to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of the
regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategic
ones. On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the Soviet
Union and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even though
his expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas,
then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns,
and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.

The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case
of China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is
both a large and a weak country. This large and weak country is being attacked
by a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an era
of progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in these
circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that the
war has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of this
large country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficient
soldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that our
anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line
operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independent
operations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that is
to say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people, both led by the
Communist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrilla
warfare is in fact large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a whole series
of problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc.
The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have made
it imperative for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hence
such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare
into mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's guerrilla
warfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at
the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy.
The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive as
well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of
war. This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the Nineteen Thirties
and Nineteen Forties and that we now have the Communist Party and the Red
Army. Herein lies the heart of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing
fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchu
conquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America and
India, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc. But such dreams
have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors
present in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances,
and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. If
our enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.

These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying
only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless
be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principles
of the War of Resistance?

The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeed
closely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as
a whole, because they have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare
is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently
many peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrilla
warfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles
of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own
peculiarities.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONESELF AND DESTROY
  THE ENEMY

Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete
terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.

All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic
principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy
that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked
with basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principle
of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, i.e., its political
aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free
and happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means the
use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese
invaders. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take the
form of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength on the one hand
and destroy the enemies on the other. How then do we justify the encouragement
of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely
high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact,
there is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly; sacrifice and
self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. For
such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for
preserving oneself--partial and temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice,
or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent
preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding
military operations, all of which--from the principles of shooting (taking
cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the
enemy) to the principles of strategy--are permeated with the spirit of this
basic principle. All technical, tactical and strategic principles represent
applications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself
and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

CHAPTER III

SIX SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST
  JAPAN

Now let us see what policies or principles have to be adopted in guerrilla
operations against Japan before we can attain the object of preserving ourselves
and destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance
(and in all other revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expand
from a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves and, moreover,
they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles have
to be adopted before we can attain the object of preserving and expanding
ourselves and destroying the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) the use of
initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the
defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line
operations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordination with regular
warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive and
the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile
warfare; and (6) correct relationship of command. These six items constitute
the whole of the strategic programme for guerrilla war against Japan and
are the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our forces,
for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for co-ordination with regular
warfare and the winning of final victory.

CHAPTER IV

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING IN CONDUCTING OFFENSIVES
  WITHIN THE DEFENSIVE, BATTLES OF QUICK DECISION WITHIN PROTRACTED WAR, AND
  EXTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS WITHIN INTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS

Here the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationship
between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick
decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiative
in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in
all operations.

To start with the first.

If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that Japan is a strong
country and is attacking while China is a weak country and is defending herself
makes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as the
operational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on exterior and
we on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is another
aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms,
in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numerically
small, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, in arms, in certain qualities
of our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. Added
to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while
we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the following
strategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within
the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision
within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles
on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy
to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for
regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in
degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form
of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed
in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare,
the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and our
exterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles
is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla units have to concentrate
the maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise
and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoid
passive defence, procrastination and the dispersal of forces before engagements.
Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also the
tactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing and
outpost actions during battles; the disposition of forces for resistance
at narrow passes, strategic points, rivers or villages in order to deplete
and exhaust the enemy; and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic principle
of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and guerrilla warfare is more
offensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover,
must take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose ourselves by ostentatiously
parading our forces is even less permissible in guerrilla warfare than in
regular warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak it
necessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more than
in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on some occasions
guerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on a
small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersed
character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks,
as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, its
principle is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation,
must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy,
and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate
a big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principle
of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War of Resistance as a whole,
we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japanese
imperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns
and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulative
effect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulative
effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulative
effect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaigns
and battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which means
gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting
changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy,
in order to be able to launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive the
Japanese invaders out of China. We must concentrate superior forces and fight
exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stage
of strategic defensive or in that of strategic counter-offensive, in order
to encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them,
destroying part if not all of the forces we have encircled, and inflicting
heavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in large
numbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation
can we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves,
thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement--that is, his scheme of exterior-line
operations--and finally, in co-ordination, with international forces and
the revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japanese
imperialists and deal them the coup de grace. These results are
to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare making
a secondary contribution. What is common to both, however, is the accumulation
of many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategic
role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance.

Now let us discuss initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.

What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield,
in a battle area, in a war zone or in the whole war, for the initiative means
freedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, is
forced into a passive position and ceases to have freedom of action, faces
the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiative
is harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier
in offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism has
two basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that it
is fighting on foreign soil. Moreover, its underestimation of China's strength
and the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have given
rise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack of
strategic coordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack,
failure to grasp opportunities in some operations and failure to wipe out
encircled forces, all of which may be considered the third weakness of Japanese
imperialism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operating
on exterior lines, the Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative,
because of their shortage of troops (their small territory, small population,
inadequate resources, feudalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the fact
that they are fighting on foreign soil (their war is imperialist and barbarous)
and because of their stupidities in command. Japan is neither willing nor
able to conclude the war at present, nor has her strategic offensive yet
come to an end, but, as the general trend shows, her offensive is confined
within certain limits, which is the inevitable consequence of her three
weaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she swallows the whole of
China. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find herself in an
utterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passive
position at the beginning of the war, but, having gained experience, she
is now turning to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy of taking
the offensive, seeking quick decisions and operating on exterior lines in
campaigns and battles, which, together with the policy of developing
widespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position of
initiative day by day.

The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare. For
most guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting without
a rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lacking
experience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, etc.
Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative in guerrilla warfare,
the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Taking
advantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the war
as a whole), the guerrilla units can boldly use vast areas as their fields
of operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invader
and is pursuing a most barbarous policy, the guerrilla units can boldly enlist
the support of millions upon millions of people; and taking advantage of
the stupidities in the enemy's command, the guerrilla units can give full
scope to their resourcefulness. While the regular army must seize on all
these weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeat
him, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for the
guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the course
of the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the very
condition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely because
the guerrilla units are small that they can mysteriously appear and disappear
in their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able to
do anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massive
regular armies never can.

When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions, a guerrilla
unit can exercise initiative only with difficulty and can lose it all too
easily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, it
is liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the
converging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensive
and we are on the offensive. For the initiative results from making a correct
appraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and from
making the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal
out of accord with the objective conditions and the passive dispositions
ensuing from it will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative and
throw one into a passive position. On the other hand, an over-optimistic
appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the risky
(unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will also result in the
loss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to that
of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, but
is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and
correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military
and political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-made
but is something that requires conscious effort.

When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal and
disposition or through overwhelming pressure, a guerrilla unit must strive
to extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. In
many cases it is necessary to "move away". The ability to move is the distinctive
feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for getting
out of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not the
sole method. The moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in the
greatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turn
against him and in our favour. Frequently a favourable situation recurs and
the initiative is regained as a result of "holding out a little longer".

Next, let us deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employment
of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

A guerrilla commander must understand that the flexible employment of his
forces is the most important means of changing the situation as between the
enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The nature of guerrilla
warfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordance
with the task in hand and with such circumstances as the state of the enemy,
the terrain and the local population, and the chief ways of employing the
forces are dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. In employing
his forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, which
he should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting his
net, the fisherman has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed of
the current and the presence or absence of obstructions; similarly, when
dispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur losses
through ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Just
as the fisherman must keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net in
tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communication
with all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as a
frequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shift
of position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration and
shifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrilla
warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up the
whole into parts", is employed chiefly: (1) when we want to threaten the
enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and there
is temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we want
to harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak;
(3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and try
to slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restricted
by terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a wide
area. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we should
pay attention to the following: (1) we should never make an absolutely
even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an area
convenient for manoeuvre, so that any possible exigency can be met and there
is a centre of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and
(2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fields
of operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly and ways and
means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole", is the method
usually applied to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimes
to destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive.
Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing
of the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining or
dispatching part of the forces for use in other directions to contain, harass
or disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.

Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to
circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also
know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels
seriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppress
them. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation.
If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should lose
no time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy units
one by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one place
may immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force;
sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have to
disengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces in
a certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla units
should not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general,
shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead,
decoy and confuse the enemy, they should constantly use stratagems, such
as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now in
the south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.

Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and shifts of position is a concrete
expression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidness and
inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But a
commander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance of
employing his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing, concentrating or
shifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. This
wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easily
acquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mind
and investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstances
is essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.

Lastly, we come to planning.

Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any idea
that guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates either
a flippant attitude or ignorance of guerrilla warfare. The operations in
a guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, must
be preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advance
for every action. Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing the
forces, giving military and political training, securing supplies, putting
the equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, etc.--all
these are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefully
consider and conscientiously perform and check up on. There can be no initiative,
no flexibility, and no offensive unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditions
do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare,
and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla
warfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditions
permit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.

The above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles of
guerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility and planning
in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision
within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line
operations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The
solution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrilla
warfare so far as military command is concerned.

Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolve
around the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisively
grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must
be organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibility
in the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive,
and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success in
offensive operations. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if they
are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support
to an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and
exterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroying
the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure
defence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in
self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.

The principle stated above is basically the same for both regular and guerrilla
war; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrilla
war it is both important and necessary to note this difference. It is precisely
this difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrilla
war from those of regular war. If we confuse the two different forms in
which the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will be
impossible.

CHAPTER V

CO-ORDINATION WITH REGULAR WARFARE

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its coordination with
regular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrilla
and regular warfare on the operational level, in the light of the nature
of actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relation is very
important for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare,
co-ordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.

Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripples
the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines and inspires the regular
forces and the people throughout the country, is co-ordinated with regular
warfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the three
northeastern provinces. Of course, the question of co-ordination did not
arise before the nation-wide War of Resistance, but since the war began the
significance of such coordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldier
the guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy expend, every
enemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall, can be reckoned
a contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is, moreover,
clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy army
and all Japan and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Still
clearer is the role in strategic co-ordination played by the guerrilla warfare
along the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow,
Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Railways. Not only are the guerrilla
units performing the function of co-ordination with the regular forces in
our present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive;
not only will they co-ordinate with the regular forces in disrupting the
enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategic
offensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will also
co-ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy forces and
recovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategic
counter-offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic coordination
must not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and of
the regular forces must clearly understand this role.

In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the function of coordination with
regular warfare in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsinkou, north
of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in co-ordination both
north and south of Yenmenkuan by wrecking the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the
motor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and Yangfangkou. Or take another
instance. After the enemy occupied Fenglingtu, guerrilla warfare, which was
already widespread throughout Shansi Province and was conducted mainly by
the regular forces, played an even greater role through co-ordination with
the defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shensi Province and south
of the Yellow River in Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked southern
Shantung, the guerrilla warfare in the five provinces of northern China
contributed a great deal through co-ordination with the campaigns of our
army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla base
behind the enemy lines, or the commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarily
dispatched there, must dispose their forces well and, by adopting different
tactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy's
most vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupt
his supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, and
so fulfil their duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each guerrilla
zone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to co-ordinating
with the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordination
will lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play some
such role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give this
point serious attention. To achieve co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutely
necessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to have
radio equipment.

Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fighting
on the battlefield, is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of
an interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla units
operating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatched
on temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform
whatever task it is assigned by the commander of the regular forces, which
is usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines,
conduct reconnaissance, or act as guides for the regular forces. Even without
such an assignment the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on its
own initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor fighting, or to move about
without fighting, would be an intolerable attitude for a guerrilla unit.

CHAPTER VI

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the
establishment of base areas, which is important and essential because of
the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of our lost
territories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive;
by then the enemy's front will have extended deep into central China and
cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our
territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear.
We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied
area, make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly
throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic
counteroffensive is launched and so long as our lost territories are not
recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's
rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely
for how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in order
to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step
up his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic
offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With
ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain
guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.

What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which the
guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the
object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving
out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend
on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the
war. It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that
it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the
country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow
without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.

History knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel" type, but none of them
ever succeeded. In the present age of advanced communications and technology,
it would be all the more groundless to imagine that one can win victory by
fighting in the manner of roving rebels. However, this roving-rebel idea
still exists among impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrilla
commanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor
important. Therefore ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea
is a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The
question of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regard
them as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishing
base areas and that of fighting like roving rebels, arises in all guerrilla
warfare, and, to a certain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is
no exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving-rebel ideology is
an inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and
the policy of establishing base areas is mutated and applied will there be
conditions favourable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long
period.

Now that the necessity and importance of base areas have been made clear,
let us pass on to the following problems which must be understood and solved
when it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems are the types
of base areas, the guerrilla zones and the base areas, the conditions for
establishing base areas, their consolidation and expansion, and the forms
in which we and the enemy encircle one another.

1. THE TYPES OF BASE AREAS

Base areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types,
those in the mountains, those on the plains and those in the river-lake-estuary
regions.

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious,
and those which have been, are being or will be established in the Changpai,
[1] Wutai, [2] Taihang,
[3] Taishan, [4] Yenshan
[5] and Maoshan [6] Mountains
all belong to this type. They are all places where anti-Japanese guerrilla
warfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholds
for the War of Resistance. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base
areas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.

Of course, the plains are less suitable than the mountains, but it is by
no means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish any base areas
there. Indeed, the widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hopei and
of northern and northwestern Shantung proves that it is possible to develop
guerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on the
possibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long,
it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible,
and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonal
use. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposal
and is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and on the other hand,
China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan;
the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporary
base areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent military
command, it should of course be possible to establish bases for small guerrilla
units there, bases which are long-term but not
fixed.[7] Broadly speaking, when the strategic
offensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage of
safeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attacks
on all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally be
the first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating on
the plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will gradually
have to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance,
from the Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, or from the Shantung
Plain to Taishan Mountain and the Shantung Peninsula in the east. But in
the circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous small
guerrilla units to keep going in various counties over the vast plains and
adopt a fluid way of fighting, i.e., by shifting their bases from
place to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal guerrilla warfare
by taking advantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in summer and of
the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare now and
will never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strength
to spare, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, for
the present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporary
base areas in the plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrilla
warfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas which
are not fixed.

Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and
establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than
in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought
by "pirates" and "water-bandits", of which our history is full, and the guerrilla
warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period,
both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of
establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however,
the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this
possibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yet
lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and
start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wide
guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the
Hungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu Lake region
south of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied
areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanent
base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtually
providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our
strategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time.

2. GUERRILLA ZONES AND BASE AREAS

In guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference between
guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but
whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some counties
in the Wutai mountain region (i.e., the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border
area) and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are
ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing
guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different,
as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountain
region, which include parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and in
many places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. When guerrilla warfare
began, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places but could
only make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillas
when they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are
therefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones.
Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone
through the necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is, when large
numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppet
regime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanese
mass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have been
developed, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By the
expansion of our base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these to
the bases already established.

In some places, for example, eastern Hopei, the whole area of guerrilla
operations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppet
regime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area of
operations has been a guerrilla zone both for the people's armed forces that
have grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatched
from the Wutai Mountains. At the outset of their activities, all they could
do was to choose some fairly good spots there as temporary rear or base areas.
Such places will not be transformed from guerrilla zones into relatively
stable base areas until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of arousing
the people is in full swing.

Thus the transformation of a guerrilla zone into a base area is an arduous
creative process, and its accomplishment depends on the extent to which the
enemy is destroyed and the masses are aroused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regions
the enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet regimes, however much
he tries to maintain control, while we, on our part, will not be able to
achieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power, however much
we develop guerrilla warfare. Examples of this kind are to be found in the
enemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the neighbourhood of big
cities and in certain areas in the plains.

As for the big cities, the railway stops and the areas in the plains which
are strongly garrisoned by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend to
the fringes and not right into these places which have relatively stable
puppet regimes. This is another kind of situation.

Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal
of the state of affairs described above, i.e., a guerrilla base
may turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an area
under relatively stable enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, and
they deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders.

Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us and
the enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the following
three categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by our guerrilla units
and our organs of political power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialism
and its puppet regimes; and third, intermediate zones contested by both sides,
namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to expand the
first and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second category
to the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

3. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING BASE AREAS

The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there should
be anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employed
to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people to
action. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matter
of building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energy
to building one or more guerrilla units, and must gradually develop them
in the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into units and
formations of regular troops. The building up of an armed force is the key
to establishing a base area; if there is no armed force or if the armed force
is weak, nothing can be done. This constitutes the first condition.

The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that the
armed forces should be used in co-ordination with the people to defeat the
enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy, and not guerrilla,
base areas, and obviously cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areas
unless the enemy is defeated. Unless we repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat
him, even places held by the guerrillas will come under enemy control, and
then it will be impossible to establish base areas.

The third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the use
of all our strength, including our armed forces, to arouse the masses for
struggle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we must arm the people,
i.e., organize self-defence corps and guerrilla units. In the course
of this struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must organize the workers,
peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people--according
to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm--into
the various mass organizations necessary for the struggle against Japanese
aggression, and we must gradually expand them. Without organization, the
people cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. In the course
of this struggle, we must weed out the open and the hidden traitors, a task
which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people.
In this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish,
or to consolidate, their local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where
the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by
the enemy, we must reorganize and strengthen them with the support of the
broad masses, and where they have been destroyed by the enemy, we should
rebuild them by the efforts of the masses. They are organs of political power
for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and
should unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy,
Japanese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and reactionaries.

A base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only with the gradual
fulfillment of the three basic conditions, i.e., only after the
anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeats and
the people are aroused.

Mention must also be made of geographical and economic conditions. As for
the former, we have already discussed three different categories in the earlier
section on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one major
requirement, namely, that the area must be extensive. In places surrounded
by the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturally
offer the best conditions for setting up base areas which can hold out for
a long time, but the main thing is that there must be enough room for the
guerrillas to maneuver, namely, the areas have to be extensive. Given an
extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even in
the plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and large,
the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide
guerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, even
a primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare
is concerned, and small countries like Belgium which lack this condition
have few or no such possibilities.[8] In China,
this condition is not something which has to be striven for, nor does it
present a problem; it is there physically, waiting only to be exploited.

So far as their physical setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemble
the geographical conditions. For now we are discussing the establishment
of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behind
the enemy lines; every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chinese
inhabitants and an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question of
choice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does not
arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost to
develop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas in
all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. In
a political sense, however, the economic conditions do present a problem,
a problem of economic policy which is of immense importance to the establishment
of base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must follow
the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitably
distributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the local
organs of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles,
or otherwise the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrilla
warfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financial
burden means that "those with money should contribute money", while the peasants
should supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. The
protection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highly
disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proved
traitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but the
policy is set and must be put into effect.

4. THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF BASE AREAS

In order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, to
the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must
do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely
as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his
existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This is
essential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare.
Whether originating in the desire for an easy life or in overestimation of
the enemy's strength, conservatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistance
and is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. At
the same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the
chief task being to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrilla
units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintaining
protracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence energetic expansion
is impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidation
in our guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks,
and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endanger
the very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is expansion
with consolidation, which is a good method and allows us to take the offensive
or the defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war, the problem of
consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla
unit. The concrete solution depends, of course, on the circumstances. At
one time, the emphasis may be on expansion, i.e., on expanding the
guerrilla zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At another, the
emphasis may be on consolidation, i.e., on organizing the masses
and training the troops. As expansion and consolidation differ in nature,
and as the military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly,
an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate the
emphasis according to time and circumstances.

5. FORMS IN WHICH WE AND THE ENEMY ENCIRCLE ONE
  ANOTHER

Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are
strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive
and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive
and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy
encirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing
on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensive
and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically
preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior
lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if
we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken
singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region,
or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the second
form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base
areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular
forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In
Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway
on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city
of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and
Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy.
Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms
of encirclement by our own--rather like a game of
weichi.[9] Campaigns and battles
fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and
the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas
by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter
of "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base
areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this question
in the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authorities
and the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda the
development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment
of base areas wherever possible, and carry this out as a strategic task.
If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the
Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and
other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then
have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against
us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which
to encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical
significance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible.

CHAPTER VII

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA
  WAR

The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensive
and the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the policy of offensive
warfare, which we mentioned in our discussion of the first problem, is to
be carried out in practice, when we are on the defensive and when we are
on the offensive in our guerrilla warfare against Japan.

Within the nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to be
more exact, the strategic counter-offensive), small-scale strategic defensives
and offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategic
defensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on
the offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we mean
our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the defensive and
we are on the offensive.

1. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent,
the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially in
the period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is
brought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas.
It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwise
the guerrilla commanders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the face
of heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confused
and their forces will be routed.

To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resorts
to converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive
expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made a
planned advance in three, four or even six or seven columns simultaneously.
The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the position
of the base areas, and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centres
and vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks.
Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater
the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is being
effectively coordinated with the regular fighting.

When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrilla
policy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashed
if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or
small, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the route
of advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launches
a converging attack, he is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines,
while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for our
dispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy
columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in
the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column,
striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened
by repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he is halfway;
the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuit
and weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the county towns
or other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or begins
to withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supply
and severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and begins
to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After
smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, by
smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.

A big base area like the Wutai mountain region forms a military area, which
is divided into four or five, or even more, military subareas, each with
its own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics described
above, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously
or successively.

In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generally
place our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength to
spare, we should use our secondary forces (such as the county or the district
guerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior lines
to disrupt the enemy's communications and pin down his reinforcements. Should
the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the tactics, namely,
leave some of our forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employing
the main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up our
activities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our main
force; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the
state of Wei".[10]

In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese
self-defence corps and all the mass organizations should mobilize for action
and in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In fighting the enemy,
it is important both to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible,
to "strengthen our defence works and clear the fields". The purpose of the
former is to suppress traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information,
and of the latter to assist our own operations (by strengthening our defence
works) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the herds). "Clearing
the fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.

When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities and
towns he has occupied and razes the villages along his route, with the purpose
of destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himself
of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage recoils upon his
own head. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and the
same thing having two contradictory aspects.

A guerrilla commander should not think of abandoning his base area and shifting
to another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations to smash
the enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guard
against pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle,
it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold on to the
base areas in the mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, when
confronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should consider
other measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leaving
many small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting large
guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return
and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy
move away.

Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot adopt the principle of blockhouse
warfare, which the Kuomintang employed in the days of the civil war, because
their forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. However,
we should reckon with the possibility that they may use it to some extent
against those guerrilla base areas which pose a particular threat to their
vital positions, but even in such circumstances we should be prepared to
keep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experience
of being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there is
not the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war.
Though, in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forces
that are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some of
our base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction between
us and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victories
are based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in our
operations.

2. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR

After we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a new
offensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic
offensive.

At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces which
are entrenched in defensive positions and which we are not sure of defeating,
but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and puppet
forces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal
with, and to expand our areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan,
replenish and train our troops and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemy
still remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expand
our new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communication
lines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasks
of the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the fact
that the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up our
own military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength and
prepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts an
offensive again.

It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doing
so is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shutting
ourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of finding
time for rest and training while expanding our areas, mopping up small enemy
units and arousing the people. This is usually also the time for tackling
the difficult problem of getting food supplies, bedding, clothing, etc.

It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a large
scale, hampering his transport and giving direct support to the regular forces
in their campaigns.

At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones and guerrilla units
are in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are gradually
rehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories are
also delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas resounds everywhere. On the
other hand, in the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the traitors,
panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of the
guerrillas and their base areas and preparations to deal with them are
intensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissible
for the guerrilla commanders to become so elated as to underrate the enemy
and forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate their
base areas and their forces. At such times, they must skilfully watch the
enemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that the
moment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order,
turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WAR INTO MOBILE WAR

The fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its development
into mobile war, a development which is necessary and possible because the
war is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japanese
invaders and recover her lost territories, and if the war were neither protracted
nor ruthless, this would not be necessary. But as, on the contrary, the war
is protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to such
a war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protracted
and ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessary
steeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular forces, so that
their mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare develops
into mobile warfare. The necessity and possibility of this development must
be clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persist
in, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfare
into mobile warfare.

In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrilla
warfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regular
forces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character,
have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. This
element will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantage
which makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrilla
warfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditions
for guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the three
northeastern provinces.

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces
waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary--an increase in numbers,
and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people
to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small
units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving
their weapons in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism,
whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and
centralization is impeded, and, on the other, guard against the purely military
approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.

Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, which
are frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of the
general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they are
unaccustomed to acting in larger groups. The commanders of the main guerrilla
units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt
the method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing the
localities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare;
the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bring
about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization
or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly
into the larger group.

As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint
held in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own strength
and who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize that
the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the
abandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual formation, in the midst
of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile
warfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla units
carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerful
auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its
continuous growth. Therefore, if a commander of a main force has made the
mistake of neglecting the interests of the local population and the local
government as a result of a purely military approach, he must correct it
in order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the
local armed units may both receive due attention.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise their
political and organizational level and improve their equipment, military
technique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselves
on the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it is
imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessity
of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage
them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means
of political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfil
all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects--military
and political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system,
a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire
better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary
communications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics,
it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a
regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise
the level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed
without fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks
requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is
the direction in which we must develop. Only thus can a main force be built
up in each guerrilla base area and mobile warfare emerge for more effective
attacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by the
regular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regular
forces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to develop
into regular units.

CHAPTER IX

THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMAND

The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns the
relationship of command. A correct solution of this problem is one of the
prerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.

Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized
by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not
allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attempt
is made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare,
its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped.
A highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility
of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without some
centralized command. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla
warfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properly
co-ordinated; hence the need for a command co-ordinating the two,
i.e., for a unified strategic command by the national general staff
and the war-zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area with
many guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations
(sometimes together with regular formations) which constitute the main force,
a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which represent the
supplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawn
from production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex to
concert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problem
arises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zones
or base areas.

Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute
decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralized
strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.

Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla
warfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with
regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the
anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lack
of harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must be
made to ensure all three. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy,
the lower levels should report to the higher and follow their instructions
so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at this
point, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with
the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for
a campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specific
conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are
quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. This
is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and
battles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especially
when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means guerrilla warfare
waged independently and with the initiative in our hands within the framework
of a unified strategy.

Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into sub-areas,
each comprising several counties, each of which is again divided into districts,
the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of the
military area and sub-areas down to the county and district governments,
is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, according
to its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principle
that has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levels
matters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, while
actual operations should be carried out in the light of the specific
circumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independent
action. If a higher level has something to say about the actual operations
undertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as
"instructions" but must not issue hard and fast "commands". The more extensive
the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between
the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater
independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give
those operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements,
so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability
to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully
expand guerrilla warfare. For an armed unit or bigger formation which is
engaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one of
centralization in its internal relationship of command, since the situation
is clear to the higher command; but the moment this unit or formation breaks
up for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general matters
and of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specific
situation cannot be clear to the higher command.

Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higher
levels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which can
be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially
in the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it should
be, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack of
initiative on the part of the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated
in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the command
of guerrilla warfare. The above principles constitute the only correct policy
for solving the problem of the relationship of command.

NOTES

1. The Changpai mountain range is situated on the northeastern
border of China. After the Japanese invasion on September 18, 1931, the region
became a base area for the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Chinese Communist
Party.

2. The Wutai mountain range is situated on the borders
between Shansi, Hopei and what was then Chahar Province. In October 1937
the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mountain region
as its centre.

3. The Taihang mountain range is situated on the borders
between Shansi, Hopei and Honan Provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth Route
Army started building the southeastern Shansi anti-Japanese base area with
the Taihang mountain region as its centre.

4. The Taishan Mountain is one of the chief peaks of the
Tai-Yi mountain range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla
forces led by the Communist Party started building the central Shantung
anti-Japanese base area with the Tai-Yi mountain region as its centre.

5. The Yenshan mountain range is situated on the border
of Hopei and what was then Jehol Province. In the summer of 1938 the Eighth
Route Army started building the eastern Hopei anti-Japanese base area with
the Yenshan mountain region as its centre.

6. The Maoshan Mountains are in southern Kiangsu. In June
1938 the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party started building the
southern Kiangsu anti-Japanese base area with the Maoshan mountain region
as its centre.

7. Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that
it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas
in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the
correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization
of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung affirmed
this possibility more definitely in later directives.

8. Ever since the end of World War II, the national and
democratic revolutionary movement has been surging forward in Asia, Africa
and Latin America. In many countries the people, led by their own revolutionary
and progressive forces, have carried on sustained armed struggles to overthrow
the dark rule of imperialism and reaction. This demonstrates that in the
new historical circumstances--when the socialist camp, the revolutionary
forces of the people in the colonial countries and the forces of the people
striving for democracy and progress in all countries are taking giant strides
forward, when the world capitalist system is weakening still further, and
when the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration--the
conditions under which the people of various countries conduct guerrilla
warfare today need not be quite the same as those which were necessary in
the days of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Chinese people against Japan.
In other words, guerrilla war can be victoriously waged in a county which
is not large in territory, as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and southern
Viet Nam.

9. Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which the
two players try to encircle each ocher's pieces on the board. When a player's
pieces are encircled, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there
is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the
latter are still "alive" (not captured).

10. In 353 BC the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital
of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered
his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing
that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory
weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops
withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion,
the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present
Horse County in Shantung). The siege of Hanean, capital of Chao, was thus
lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as
"relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".


Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.

This work was first published in Jiefang, no. 40, May 30, 1938. Our source is Mao Zedong
ji, Vol. 6, pp. 7–47, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao’s Selected Works.
It was also included in a slim volume entitled Kang-Ri youji zhanzheng de yiban wenti (All
the Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War), dated July 7, 1938, on the title page, but
published, according to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 74, only in 1939. Although the title of this latter
volume appears on the first page in Mao’s calligraphy, there is no evidence that he played a
major role in editing it, so the other six chapters are not translated in this volume.³

Editor’s Foreword

This book summarizes not only the lessons of the guerrilla warfare in the civil war
but also the lessons of the guerrilla warfare in the first ten months of the Resistance
War and solves many basic problems in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. This book
was written collectively; Mao Zedong, Chen Changhao, Liu Yalu, Xiao Jingguang,
and Guo Huaruo were the authors. None of it has ever been published before, except
the chapter entitled “Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War” by Mr.
Mao, which has been published in Jiefang. Sections on the tactics and political work
of the guerrilla war have already been put together and will be printed soon.

The Editor

1. May 30 is the date of publication in Jiefang; in the various Chinese editions of this
work it is dated simply May 1938.
2. I → Chapter I
3. Because Mao was involved to some degree in putting together this volume, we reproduce here the editor’s foreword to the collection as subsequently published.