(March 18, 1938, midnight)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 18th at 7 A.M. Several words were
not decoded clearly. Were you saying that it is better for [Peng] Dehuai to stay on
the east side and Zhu [De] to go to the west side?
2. Liu [Bocheng]'s division has determined that at the present stage it is advantageous to remain on the east side, but during the stage when the enemy is attacking Wuhan, we think there will definitely be a power vacuum in the eastern sector
of the Longhai railway¹ and the middle sector of the Grand Canal along the lower
reaches of the Yellow River. There will still be the need and the possibility to go to
Hebei, pass through Shandong, and enter Anhui. If there is a way out, then, even if
we are isolated we will not be afraid of them.
3. With the boats we had at Laoyaguan, Xinguan, Hekou, and Yongheguan, we
were able to take ten thousand men across every night. Now that we have built
twenty more big boats, in addition to the boats we had before, we will be able to
take at least twenty thousand men across every night. All the boats have been put
in the Wuding River under camouflage ready for use.
Pingduguan has been lost. The boats were sunk so as to prevent the enemy from
using them.

Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan]²

1. Gao Shuangcheng was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Eighty-sixth
Division.
2. Gao Gang was at this time the public security commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-
Ningxia garrison force of the Eighth Route Army.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 199-200, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. The Longhai railway runs westward from the sea to Xi'an.
2. Teng was at this time chief of staff of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party.