The Eighth Route Army Should Prepare to
Fight Successive Battles in the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan Region
(March 9, 1938, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram sent between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. on the 7th.
1. The strategic orientation decided on by the Politburo covers two stages: the
present stage, during which we operate in North China, and the second stage,
when we will have moved to Shaanxi and Henan. It does not refer solely to the
present.
2. During the present stage, it is not just because of the orders of Chiang
[Kaishek], but mainly because of strategic requirements (as discussed in the telegram of February 23),¹ that under the circumstances in which we are not fundamentally isolated by the enemy, our troops must resolutely engage in combat in
the rear of the enemy in support of friendly forces, with a view to the effective
elimination and weakening of the enemy. We shall launch an extensive movement
to resist Japan. Only in this way will we be able to check and obstruct the advance
of the enemy's offensive in the direction of Tongguan,² Xi'an, and northern Shaanxi.
We must, however, avoid the risk of being cut off and must absolutely not cross
the river too early, still less cross the river disregarding Chiang's orders and the
timing of the river crossing by the friendly forces. In order to assure that it will be
easy to redeploy in the future, it is imperative to consolidate the Luliang mountain
range, the axis for redeployment, and to make arrangements for work in the Taiyu
and Wangwu mountains (Zhu Rui's department).³ Deployment for the first stage
must take into consideration dispositions for the second stage, when the situation
changes.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 192-94, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1. Translated above.
2. Tongguan is located in the northern part of Tongguan xian in Shaanxi and is an important pass between Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan.
3. At this time, Zhu Rui was secretary of the Military Committee of the Northern Bureau
of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, involved in united front work in the
mountainous areas on the border between Shanxi and Henan.

3. In the future stage, that is, during the stage in which the enemy massively
invades Tongguan, Xi'an, Wushengguan, Wuhan, and northern Shaanxi, after
obtaining the agreement of Chiang [Kaishek], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang],
the main forces of the Eighth Route Army and of other Guomindang armies should
cross to the west and south side of the river to fight in defense of the northwest and
of Wuhan. At the same time, an appropriate level of forces should be maintained in
the various regions of Shanxi to continue to fight a robust guerrilla war. If the
enemy breaks through the Wubao line, attacks Suide, and threatens Yan'an, then
we should be prepared to get one brigade from the 120th Division to cross the
river first to fight the enemy. If the enemy attacks Tongguan, and Xi'an is in danger, whereas Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, then we should
withdraw the 115th Division, or at least one of its brigades, as well as some units
from the forces of Yan and Wei, to cross the river first to attack the enemy. The
specific deployments will be made in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. But no matter how many troops cross the river, it will be imperative then to
strive very hard to obtain the prior consent of Chiang and to cooperate with friendly
forces.

4. In general, during the present stage, all forces within the borders of Shanxi
should carry out the task of eliminating the enemy and mobilizing the popular
masses. But at the same time, they should be prepared for redeployment during the
next stage when the situation is changing rapidly. If the whole of the Eighth Route
Army is confined in an encirclement by the enemy in North China and is completely unable to be redeployed to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan region, this will be
detrimental to the whole of the resistance effort and to political relations in the
whole country. This is the basic spirit of the strategic decision by the Politburo.
Proceeding from the prolonged character of the war, it must be so; this is the only
advantageous approach.

5. Therefore, when you report to Yan and Wei and convene officers' meetings,
you should point out the strategic significance of combat in the enemy's rear and
the great number of ways to rely on the popular masses. But at the same time, you
should not under any circumstances say anything about all the forces being permanently deployed in North China. In reality, even though Chiang has issued harsh
orders, Wei's 54th and 83rd Divisions have already passed Yichuan via Ji xian
(Wu Ting saw this himself), and one unit of He Zhuguo's forces has already
passed Fugu via Baode. (See the telegram of He, Xiao, and Guan.) It is totally
incorrect for them to cross the river at this time. But we may also see from this that

Wei Lihuang and others are wavering in carrying out orders. Also, please pay
attention to the double meaning of Chiang's orders. On the one hand, they contain
the positive significance of strategic requirements; on the other, it is difficult for
them not to harbor any malice.

6. We will notify you separately regarding the rest.

Mao Zedong

4. Wushengguan is located in the southern part of Xinyang xian in Henan and is one of
the passes into the Dabie mountains.
5. At this time Wu Ting was commander of the artillery regiment of the headquarters of
the Eighth Route Army.
6. The reference is to He Long, Xiao Ke, and Guan Xiangying, respectively commander,
deputy commander, and political commissar of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.