(March 3, 1938, 5:00 A.M.)

The Enemy's Situation and the Deployment of
the 115th Division

(March 3, 1938, midnight)

Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of Peng's telegram.¹ The precondition for the main force of
the Eighth Route Army to remain in Shanxi to attack the enemy is that the route of
retreat via the Yellow River and the Fen River not be cut. Otherwise, it would be
very harmful to the whole of the resistance effort and to Guomindang-Communist
relations. In particular, the two of you must come back. Even if one of you should
remain to command the forces, you should only remain at a place which is not
liable to be isolated (such as the Luliang mountain range). You absolutely should
not remain to the east of the Fen River. Therefore, it is hoped that the transfer of
the Headquarters [of the Eighth Route Army] and the deployment of Xu's brigade² and Liu's division³ will be guided by this orientation, that practical and
appropriate ways will be considered, and that you will notify us quickly of your
plans.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] [Mao] Zedong
[Ren] Bishi

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The enemy at Xiaoyi reached and occupied Shilou directly, without encountering resistance, and then advanced to the town of Yidie. There is the possibility
that he will launch a sudden attack on Jundu. Wang Jingguo's forces¹ are retreating in the direction of Zhongyang. The enemy at Jixian is pressing near Ganzhentan
and may possibly make a sudden attack on the ferry at Yanchang. We judge that
the enemy's intention is to drive out the Shanxi troops, seize the ferry crossings,
blockade the Yellow River, sever the routes of supplies and communications of the
Chinese armies, and threaten Yan'an.

2. Under such circumstances, it seems that the 115th Division should deploy
those units directly under it in the area of Yonghe, Daning, and Xian xian to mobilize the popular masses and work in concert with all the various forces. It should
use one regiment to make sudden attacks on the enemy in that region left and
right, taking Jixian as the center. It should use the other regiment to advance to the
region of Shilou and make a surprise attack on the enemy in the region of Shilou
and Yidie. Xiao's detachment² shall remain in the region of Damaijiao.³ In this
way, they will be able to support the forces on the west side of the river in consolidating river defenses. If we act appropriately, the enemy will be put in a difficult
situation in the towns of Shilou, Yidie, Jixian, and Xiangning, without food supplies or any other support, and will be forced to withdraw. We can then take advantage of their withdrawal to wipe them out. We look forward to hearing your opinion.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 177-78, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1. The reference is to Peng Dehuai's telegram of March 1, 1938, on strategic issues to
Mao, Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian], and others.
2. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army,
commanded by Xu Haidong.
3. The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu
Bocheng.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 179-80, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
1. Wang Jingguo was at this time commander of the Guomindang's Thirteenth Group
Army in the Second War Zone.
2. The reference is to the anti-Japanese forward column of the 115th Division of the
Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xiao Hua.
3. Damaijiao is located in Shanxi Province approximately 25 kilometers to the west of
the Fen River and approximately on the 37th parallel.