(February 23, 1938)

To Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Lin [Biao]; Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long],
Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng
[Xiaoping]; Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]; Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang
Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Evaluation of the enemy's intentions
a. In order to seize the two railways, the Longhai and the Pinghan,¹ the enemy
will advance directly toward Xi'an and Wuhan; the key battlegrounds will
certainly be at Tongguan and Wushengguan.²
b. If the enemy wants to take Tongguan, it would be relatively difficult to attack
westward from Luoyang because of the terrain and easier to attack southward from Linfen. Therefore, enemy forces on the Pinghan and Tongpu³
lines will probably split into several columns to advance from the north and
the east toward southern Shanxi, with the overall objective of driving our
forces out of Shanxi, occupying Linfen and Fenglingdu, and, finally, seizing
Tongguan and providing protection for the right wing that will be attacking
Wushengguan. The plan of the enemy force that is advancing along the
Daoqing line appears to be to begin by trying to cross the river at Mengjin

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 162-65, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
1. The Longhai line ran from Baozhi near the Gansu-Shaanxi border to the sea in northern Jiangsu. The Pinghan line was the main north-south line from [Bei]ping to Han[kou].
2. Tongguan was located in the northeastern part of Tongguan xian in Shaanxi Province, at the strategic point where Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan meet. Wushengguan was
located in the southern part of Xinyang xian in Henan Province, at a strategic point on the
boundary between Henan and Hubei, on the Pinghan line. It was one of the passes leading
into the Dabie mountains.
3. The Tongpu line was a narrow-gauge line running southward from Datong to
Fenglingdu.
4. The Daoqing line ran in Henan from Daokou city in Hua xian to Qinghua city in Bo'ai
xian.

and occupy Luoyang, thus forcing our army in Shanxi to retreat toward the
south.
c. The forces the enemy will be employing to attack Wushengguan will be
transferred mainly via the Jinpu line. The enemy units on the Pinghan and
Tongpu lines will be used primarily to seize Tongguan.
2. The first phase of our strategic plan
a. The battle to defend Tongguan and Xi'an cannot be fought successfully by
deploying all our forces on interior lines, west of the Pinghan line and south
of the Yellow River. If we attempt to do so, we will certainly not be able to
defend Tongguan and Xi'an, just as previously we were unable to defend
Taiyuan by positioning all our forces inside Yanmenguan and Niangzhiguan.
b. To defend Tongguan, we consider that our forces must be split into two groups.
The first group consists of the units of Liu Shi, Song Zheyuan, Shang Zheng,
Hu Zhongnan, and Fan Songpu; they are to defend the Zhengzhou-Luoyang-
Tongguan line, devise tactics for the units fighting north of the line, and
prevent the enemy from crossing the river. The second group consists of all
the armies north of the Yellow River, including Yan [Xishan] and Wei
[Lihuang], as well as the whole of the Eighth Route Army, who are to defend
the combat positions in southern and western Shanxi. Under favorable circumstances, they should attempt to annihilate the enemy in the areas north
and east of Linfen, check the enemy's offensive, and dispatch a strong force
to the north of Daoqinglu to put pressure on the enemy units attempting to
cross the river. Under unfavorable circumstances, supposing that, by some
chance, Linfen cannot be defended, Luoyang is taken, and our units in Shanxi
are unable to cross the river, and we have to transfer to exterior lines, then we
should, on the contrary, attack the enemy's rear, cut the route by which the
enemy came, and then seek to find a way to annihilate the enemy and completely foil his plan to attack Tongguan. When the enemy attacks and takes
the three points at Jincheng, Huo xian, and Xi xian, our army should use no
less than half its forces to move to areas outside these three points (move to
the enemy's rear); only thus can we control the enemy.
c. We believe that every effort must be made to seek the approval of Chiang
[Kaishek], Bai [Chongxi], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang] for the above
plan, and encourage all units to execute it. Only such efforts can defend

5. The Chinese text reads "Wuhanguan" but the editors believe this is a typographical
error for "Wushengguan."
6. The Jinpu line, from Tianjin to Pukou, across the river from Nanjing, was a segment of
today's main line from the north to Shanghai.
7. Yanmenguan is situated in the northern part of Dai xian, Shanxi Province; it is one of
the important strategic passes in the Great Wall. Niangziguan is located in the eastern part
of Pingding xian in Shanxi and is an important thoroughfare between Shanxi and Hebei.

Tongguan; Wushengguan will also thus be made secure, and Wuhan will
then be safe. Otherwise, once Tongguan is lost, Wushengguan will be in
danger.
d. If Yan and Wei are unwilling or unable to execute the above plan and retreat
across the river in defeat, these units will not only be unable to take part in the
defense of Tongguan, but on the contrary will have a harmful influence on
the units in Luo[yang] and Tong[guan].
3. The second phase of the strategic plan
a. In order to defend Wushengguan and Wuhan, we must first make sure that
Tongguan remains in our hands. Second, we must fight a frontal, positional
battle to provide support for the battles of movement on the flanks.
b. A force of at least 200,000 fighting men is required for the mobile warfare on
the flanks. They should be kept to the east of the Pinghan railway for a long
time. This force is as important as the massive forces deployed in Shanxi. It
must not retreat to the west of Henan and Hubei unless there is no alternative.
Only thus can this force act in coordination with the units in the front and on
the western flank, and vigorously defend Wushengguan and Wuhan. Even if
Wuhan cannot be defended, this will put the enemy inside our encirclement.
4. The future actions of the Eighth Route Army
a. Suppose we gain advantage in providing support for Yan and Wei in their
battles in Shanxi, and achieve the objective of annihilating and checking the
enemy and successfully defending Tongguan and Xi'an, while at the same
time Wushengguan is not in danger. In this case, all the forces [of the Eighth
Route Army] will remain in Shanxi and continue to fight, and they should
prepare to send an additional unit to Hebei to establish a strong base for the
War of Resistance in North China, to be used to defend the Central Plains,
the Northwest, and Wuhan.
b. Assuming that Yan and Wei can execute the above plan, and secure Tongguan
and Xi'an, but Wushengguan and Xi'an are in danger, we should take out a
division and move it to the east of Wushengguan to provide support for the
friendly forces.
c. Assuming that Yan and Wei are unable to execute the above plan, and
Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, but Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet
in danger, we should also take out one division and move it into the line west
of Tongguan to provide support for the friendly forces.
d. Assuming that both Tongguan and Wushengguan are in danger, we should
take out two divisions and move them southward, one of them to be deployed east of the Pinghan railway line, and the other west of the Pinghan
railway line, to provide battle support for the friendly forces. There will remain one more division, to conduct operations in Shanxi and Hebei; it is not
to be withdrawn unless some necessity arises.
e. The units left behind for garrison duty in the Border Region are to defend
Shanxi and Gansu.

5. We believe that we must inform the Guomindang that, if nearly a million
troops all withdraw to interior lines south of the Yellow River and west of the
Pinghan railway line, while the Longhai and Pinghan railway lines are all occupied by the enemy, great difficulties will take shape. Therefore, the overall guideline must be that, when the enemy launches deep-penetration offensives, we must
deploy sufficient forces on exterior lines, for only thus can we provide combat
support for the main forces fighting on interior lines, increase difficulties for the
enemy while reducing our own difficulties, and create favorable military and political conditions for a protracted war.
6. Our views are as stated above. What are your views? We hope you will
inform us.

Mao Zedong Ren Bishi