To Fan Changjiang¹
(February 15, 1938)

Mr. Changjiang:

Thanks to Mr. Ma's visit, I have received and read your letter. Comrade Zhang
returned to Yan'an and passed on to me your esteemed letter of January 3. I beg
your forgiveness for not responding for so long.
The issues you raised are all crucial issues for the country, and a short missive
is not enough to explain them clearly. But the main point in solving the problems
you have raised comes down, I believe, to truly recognizing and carrying out a
common program. At present, quite a number of things are already being said and
done jointly, from waging the War of Resistance to certain democratic freedoms,
but not everything. There is not yet a complete thing extending from the War of
Resistance to building the country, a thing which inspires the Guomindang and the
Communist Party, as well as all social groups in the country, sincerely to recognize
it and to strive for its realization. If this thing existed, and people sincerely recognized it and sought to put it into practice, then all the problems you, Sir, have
raised would be solved.² As for using practical action to help the Guomindang
perfect itself, we have already begun to do so and hope that the press and everybody else in the country will do the same. Precisely as you feel, this is an important
issue. But, on the other hand, it is also necessary that the comrades of the
Guomindang should welcome, or at least not reject, such assistance. We have already raised the slogan of mutual assistance. If there is a common program, things
will be a lot easier. The problem of the military, which you regard as an obstacle to
the mutual trust between the two parties, is really caused by the absence of a program covering the period from the War of Resistance to building the country. If
there were one, neither party would have had such concerns. Because, in the light

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 120-22, where it is reproduced
from the manuscript.
1. Fan Changjiang (1909–1970), a native of Sichuan, had been sent to Xi'an and Yan'an
by the *Tianjin Dagongbao* to report on developments following the Xi'an Incident. See, in
Volume V, p. 631, Mao's letter to him thanking him for his positive assessment. On his
return from the Northwest in 1939, he joined the Chinese Communist Party.
2. Presumably the "thing" referred to in this and the previous sentence is the "common
program" mentioned above and referred to again below.

of the lessons from the past decade, any party which wanted to go against this
program and launch a new civil war would certainly be opposed by the people of
the whole country and would not be able to start a civil war even if it wanted to.
Otherwise, there will be obstacles to the mutual trust not only between the two
parties but within one party. Do not the innumerable wars fought during the past
decade inside the Guomindang—under the same ideology and within the same
political party—provide the clearest evidence of this? In the conclusion of my
report delivered at a meeting in Yan'an in May of last year (I expect that you, Sir,
must have read this text), I pointed out that the Communist Party should seek a
peaceful transition and avoid bloodshed not only in the period during which we
are defeating external enemies and building a democratic state but also in China's
distant future—the transition from the democratic revolution to the social revolution.³ Therefore, the essence of the question lies in the true political attitude, not of
the Communist Party but of the Guomindang, that is, its attitude toward a comprehensive program governing the whole period from the War of Resistance to building the country. Historically speaking, it is clearly established by solid evidence
known by everyone who initiated the split and who was on the receiving end ten
years ago, and why this took place. You, Sir, can certainly tell us who broke with
that common program (the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the
Guomindang) at that time and thus started the civil war. If we remain mindful of
earlier lessons, this instructs us about the future. In the future, therefore, the key
lies not only in the presence of a program but also in a guarantee that neither side
will be allowed to tear it up. This is the most central issue. There was no Eighth
Route Army ten years ago. It came into being because of the split between the two
parties. Based on this logic, even if the Eighth Route Army, or even the Communist Party, were to be disbanded today, who could guarantee that another Eighth
Route Army would not emerge, or another Communist Party would not be created, inside the borders of China? One must know that these things do not happen
without a reason; they are not, as certain people see it, deliberately and willfully
caused by the leaders of the Communist Party, nor are they, as is claimed, "unsuitable to the conditions of our country." Indeed, these are the consequences of our
country's politics and economy. As for the second issue you raised—that, on the
one hand, the authorities feel uneasy, and, on the other, the people demand reform—I believe that it is of the same nature as the above problem, and the crux lies
in the Guomindang's acceptance and carrying out of a common program.
To reach this objective, efforts from all sides are undoubtedly required. Members of both parties and their leaders, as well as all those in our country concerned

3. The reference is to Mao's concluding remarks at the Party Congress of the Soviet
Areas on May 7, 1937, which appear in Volume V, pp. 651-58. The statement about avoiding bloodshed is not quite so generous as Mao suggests here. The relevant sentence, which
appears on p. 656, reads: "A sound transition (that is, bloodless) is what we would like and
we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses."