On the Basic Tactic of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla
Warfare-The Surprise Attack¹
(January 11, 1938)

1. Surprise Attacks Are the Basic Form of Fighting in
Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare cannot be carried out for one minute away from the popular
masses. This is the most fundamental principle. As for tactics, the basic form of
fighting in guerrilla warfare is none other than the surprise attack. Surprise attacks
are one form of offensive. Guerrilla warfare does not emphasize the form of regular positional offensives but, instead, stresses the form of sudden raids or the reputation for unexpected raids. This is because, at the level of strategy, guerrilla warfare
defeats the many by the few and the strong by the weak. There is no other way to
achieve the objective.

2. The Key Points of Surprise Attack Tactics

Generally speaking, there are twelve key points in the tactics of the surprise attack
in guerrilla warfare:
First, the basic principle of the surprise attack is the need to have secret and
meticulous planning and to take swift and sudden action.

Second, the overall objectives of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare are to
eliminate the small enemy, weaken the large enemy, harass enemy flanks and rear
areas, coordinate with the political work of guerrilla troops, wreck enemy political
power, arouse the popular masses to resist the enemy, and preserve or restore anti-
Japanese political power, so as to create guerrilla bases for the Anti-Japanese War.
This complements the fighting by regular armies because the capture of weapons
gradually develops guerrilla units into regular anti-Japanese armies. As for the
concrete objectives of the surprise attack, they are to eliminate small enemy units
one by one, to harass large enemy units, to eliminate enemy militia, to wreck
enemy institutions in the rear areas, to sabotage enemy communication routes, and
so forth.

Third, surprise attacks should choose favorable conditions to strike. When such
conditions are nonexistent or inadequate, attention should be paid to creating them.
Quite often, this is possible and it is only necessary to adopt the following methods
in view of the quality of the enemy units, the character of their commanders, and
the tactics they use: (1) Make the enemy overconfident. For example, deliberately
use guerrilla squads with weak fighting strength to engage the enemy, so as to
make the enemy think that everything is fine. Then launch a sudden surprise attack
against the enemy when he is unprepared. (2) Lull and confuse the enemy. For
example, create an uproar in the east and strike in the west;² strike in the south one
minute and in the north the next. Make the enemy uncertain. Then attack him by
surprise at one point. For another example, dispatch guerrilla squads or small groups
to operate in place A with handbills or notices under the name of larger guerrilla
units, while a large guerrilla detachment makes a surprise attack in place B or C.
(3) Exhaust and intimidate the enemy. For example, mobilize the popular masses
to harvest crops and hide grain in order to cause the invading enemy unbearable
hunger and fatigue. Again, divide a guerrilla detachment into several groups or
send several small guerrilla units to raid and harass enemy garrisons incessantly.
Startle and awaken them several times a night; leave them tired and depressed.
Then select an opportune moment and attack them by surprise. If the enemy is
strong in number but weak in quality and his commanders are timid, spread rumors and exaggerate one's own strength to increase his vacillation. Then launch a
surprise attack. (4) Send spies to sneak into the areas where the invading enemy is
garrisoned. Win over local people and soldiers who are sympathetic to us among
the enemy to become our supporters from within, and to improve the success of
surprise attacks. (5) Use small guerrilla units or the people's self-defense corps to
maneuver in all four directions so that the enemy in that area has to be entrenched
to defend himself. Pin down those enemy forces which could possibly counter our assault in order to assist the success of our surprise attack in another place. All the
above are the various circumstances in which we change the enemy with our own
actions to facilitate the success of guerrilla detachments. Although they may not
always work, they are often effective.

Fourth, reconnaissance before an attack is of primary importance. The content
of reconnaissance should include the following items: (1) The size of the enemy
forces, the state of their fighting capacity and arms. If an attack is to be launched
on an enemy garrison, it is essential to know the deployment of the enemy forces,
the degree of their alertness and security, their schedule for the changing of the
guard, and so forth. (2) Whether or not there are other enemy forces in the surrounding areas, their size and the possibility of reinforcement by them, transportation speed, the distances, the circumstances of their telephone or telegraph
communications, the minimum time required for reinforcement, and the directions and road conditions of reinforcements are all items that should be checked
carefully and taken into account individually. (3) The situation of the local residents. (4) The large and small roads that lead to the place where the surprise attack
will be carried out and whether or not there are areas nearby in which the surprise
attack troops can take cover. Secret and clever methods must be used in gathering
intelligence on the above items. The more precise is the intelligence information,
the more accurate will be the attack plan. Whenever possible, a simple map should
be drawn beforehand with the deployment of enemy forces marked on it.

Fifth, the timing of a surprise attack involves no more than the following four
situations: (1) At night: This timing is generally used to deal with enemy garrisons,
and it is used because other times are not appropriate for such fighting. First, at
night one can best camouflage oneself and approach the enemy. Second, charging
in the darkness of night can reduce one's own casualties, inflate the impression of
one's own strength, and increase panic among the enemy. Third, it is difficult for
the enemy in the vicinity to bring in reinforcements at night. Therefore, guerrilla
units should regularly give attention to practicing their operations at night. (2) Before
dawn: This timing is also used to attack enemy garrisons. It takes advantage of the
darkness of night to approach the enemy and launch the attack before daybreak.
This is the most opportune time for attacks by guerrilla units that are quite far
away from the enemy or are still unfamiliar with night operations. But it is better
for the assault to start before the enemy gets up. (3) At dusk: This timing is also
generally used against enemy garrisons for surprise attacks, particularly when the
enemy is relatively alert at other times, the roads approaching the enemy are relatively under cover, and there are no problems in marching during daytime or it is
possible to disguise oneself in crossing the area. At this time, if the attack should
fail, it is still possible to withdraw safely under the cover of darkness. (4) During
the day: The enemy often maneuvers during the day, so surprise attacks on the
enemy on the move are always set during the day. If guerrilla troops want to make
the most effective surprise attack on the enemy, they must not miss the opportunity to catch the enemy on the move. Such opportunities must be seized frequently.

The most popular form of such surprise attacks is the ambush. If one desires to
attack an enemy garrison in broad daylight, it should take place only under the
following circumstances: (1) The quality of the enemy is very poor: not vigilant,
lacking fortifications, and very careless. (2) The enemy knows nothing of the forthcoming surprise attack by the guerrilla unit. (3) The enemy is isolated and lacks
reinforcements. (4) During heavy rains or fogs that can best cover the movements
of the surprise attack. Under such conditions, it is possible to mount a successful
surprise attack on enemy garrisons in daylight.

Sixth, the plans for the surprise attack must be kept secret. The plans of a surprise attack may be excellent, but if they are known to the enemy, they are not only
worthless but run the risk of losses. So it is of cardinal importance to keep surprise
attack plans strictly confidential. Apart from energetically using the anti-Japanese
people and small guerrilla groups to operate in all four directions for the purpose
of confusing the enemy, as mentioned in point 3 above, the following points also
deserve attention: (1) Do not inform the lower ranks of the whole surprise attack
plan. Tell them only what they need to know or tell them stage by stage (i.e.,
before setting off, during the march, and after arriving at the destination). (2) Neither the local people around the garrison nor the hired guides should be told of the
planned surprise attack by guerrilla troops. (3) Whenever possible, start off in a
false direction for a while and then turn toward the destination of the surprise
attack in a roundabout way. This method can be employed in places where the
enemy has many eyes and ears.

Seventh, the following points deserve emphasis for the advance of surprise
attack forces: (1) If rivers and areas with obstacles must be crossed, methods of
passages should be studied before departure and necessary tools should be brought
along. (2) Bring handbills and notices and such. (3) Agree on various kinds of
signals, such as the signal for the start of a charge and so forth and decide on a
meeting place in case the assault fails or special difficulties arise. (4) When on the
move, choose very hidden, small roads and even take routes that have no roads.
(5) During the march, keep absolutely quiet; forbid talking and laughing. Apart
from reconnaissance and security personnel, other group members should not carry
red markings (but only secret markings).3 (6) Ahead of the main column, assign a
few armed scouts in plain clothes to carry out reconnaissance and security duties.
(7) The marching should be as fast as possible. (8) During the march, preparations
should be made to fight any of the enemy accidentally encountered on the way.

Eighth, preparations after arriving at the scene of the surprise attack. These are
important links in the entire plan of the surprise attack, so the following points
deserve attention: (1) Rapidly converge forces under cover outside the enemy
cordance line. If the enemy is still unaware of the imminent attack, by no means
alert him to it. At this time, the commander of the whole force should immediately
call together the leaders of the various groups and give concrete instructions on
the methods for this attack. In daylight, the leaders of various groups should be
directed to observe under camouflage the arrangement and deployment of the enemy forces and be told in person the specific tasks of their respective groups. If it
is possible, plainclothes scouts should quietly capture enemy sentries to further
the reconnaissance. (2) A large force (larger than a battalion) should be divided
into two routes (not separated too far from each other) to carry out the attack. A
small force (smaller than a company) should make the assault together. (3) Send a
few men and guns to feign an attack on the heavily defended area to tie down part
of the enemy, while the main force should storm one or two enemy positions that
are weak and relatively easy to break through. However, under no circumstances
should one's forces be divided equally. (4) If there are additional troops, a small
number of them may be dispatched to lay an ambush along the enemy's likely
escape route to cut it off. (5) A few people must be dispatched to guard the routes
by which reinforcements for the enemy could come and to sabotage their telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, and roads. (6) The position from where an
attack is launched should be neither too far away nor too near. Preparation time for
the attack should be as short as possible and preparations for the attack should be
completed as quickly as possible. (7) Surprise attacks at night require very good
identification signals to avoid confusion.

Ninth, the assault itself: (1) As soon as the assault starts, it should be carried out
swiftly and suddenly according to the prearranged time, direction, and route. If the
assault is carried out by several routes simultaneously, the time to start the whole
assault should be decided by the time needed for the main force to reach the assault point. The other routes should coordinate their advance in parallel with the
main route to avoid premature discovery by the enemy. (2) At the start of the
assault, no noise should be made, no guns should be fired (even if the enemy fires
first, it should be ignored), and no battle cries should be uttered. Instead, use bayonets, spears, and swords to storm enemy positions in one stroke, engage in face-toface fighting, and so destroy the enemy quickly. If there are hand grenades, they
should be thrown first. (Attention: Do not strike down our own people; prepare a
few men at the front of the assault to throw them and do not give any to those
behind.) Seize the disorientation of the hand grenade explosions to fall upon the
enemy and kill him. (3) Only where one tries to pin down the enemy forces should
one fire a few shots to attract their attention thereby assisting the rapid victory in
the main direction of assault. (4) If the enemy forces obstinately defend a building
and put up a stiff resistance, the building may be burned down to compel them to
surrender (only buildings defended stubbornly by the enemy may be burned down; no random burning is permitted), or advantage may be taken of the chaos among
the enemy forces to assail them from another building. (5) If the surprise attack
succeeds, and the enemy forces flee, the troops responsible for ambushing and
intercepting them should first block their retreat. At the same time, the troops who
have broken through should not concern themselves with capturing weapons and
goods. And, apart from the necessary troops who must take care of the captives
and guard the battlefield, the rest should all pursue and attack the enemy forces in
order to decimate their strength and make it impossible for them to launch counterattacks. But if there is suspicion that the enemy forces have reinforcements, do
not pursue them far.

Tenth, after the surprise attack: (1) After the success of the surprise attack, the
troops should be gathered at once, and, together with the wounded and the captured goods, they should be directed to concentrate in a position near the road
from which you have come. A portion of the troops should occupy the position to
prevent counterattacks by the enemy. (2) If the remnants of the enemy forces have
run far away, lacking any strength to counterattack, and there is no suspicion that
they have reinforcements, then the surprise attack troops may remain in the local
area for a while. During this time, some personnel may distribute captured enemy
goods to the local poor and help the people deal with notorious Chinese traitors.
The main force of the guerrilla unit should choose a position where there is room
to fight, to gather together, and to rest. It is absolutely forbidden to act on one's
own. Even so, the main force of the guerrilla unit should in general not take up
quarters in the local area and should move and take up quarters in a good location
a few li away. (3) If the situation is tense, then the time for handling matters after
the battle should be reduced and the guerrilla troops should leave the place quickly
and victoriously. (4) As for the prisoners, when you are close to our own base
areas or regular anti-Japanese armies, escort all the prisoners to the rear areas or
turn them over to the regular armies to handle. Otherwise, they should be released
immediately after questioning and given suitable propaganda. It is strictly forbidden to kill prisoners. Only leading traitors who are deeply hated by the popular
masses may be executed at the request of the popular masses. Even if captives
sometimes do not want to go with the guerrilla troops, they may only be disarmed
and let go. It must be clear that killing prisoners of war will only strengthen the
enemy's fighting strength and provides no advantage with respect to the war against
Japan. But one must take care to keep one's own actions secret while releasing
prisoners. To achieve this objective, one must first release the prisoners who wish
to go and lock in a room those who will not go, so that they will not see the
direction in which the guerrilla unit withdraws. (5) If the surprise attack fails or
enemy reinforcements come in the middle of the assault, our troops should quickly
disperse without any hesitation. If the retreat from the battlefield must be carried
out under pressure from the enemy, practice dispersed retreat under the cover provided by the most capable old guerrilla soldiers. Usually, the meeting place after
the retreat will be the previous day's camp site or other predesignated place.

(6) Guerrilla units should withdraw under disguise even if there is no great enemy
pressure. For example, they should go some li in a false direction and then come
back to the route really intended to be taken in order to confuse the enemy, and
leave nothing to aid their pursuit.

Eleventh, surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled
towns.4 Surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled
towns will not work if one relies only on the meager weapons of guerrilla units
and ordinary fighting methods. Surprise attacks can work against these things, but
the following conditions should be taken into consideration: (1) It is better to arrange spies or people and enemy soldiers who are sympathetic to the guerrilla unit
to serve as supporters from within the city, village, or blockhouse before the surprise attack. Guerrilla units should regularly do such political work in a planned
way. (2) Select the most neglected point of the enemy's security to sneak in quietly under the cover of the darkness of night and at a time when the enemy is
unprepared. The most dangerous place is also the place to which the enemy pays
the least attention and sometimes it is also the best place for us to steal in quietly.
But this is certainly not usual. (3) If the surprise attack is discovered by the enemy,
a small unit should also launch a false strike in another direction to lure the main
force of the enemy, while the main force of the guerrilla unit strikes through the
enemies' weak and neglected points. (4) When conducting surprise attacks in daylight over long distances, guerrilla units should disguise themselves as enemy troops
whenever possible and seize opportunities to strike. (5) When the enemy forces
are put to flight on a battlefield immediately outside such fortifications, engage
them in a hot pursuit and take the opportunity to storm the city. Such opportunities
should not be wasted. (6) The methods of siege and dynamiting walled town and
blockhouse fortifications in the vicinity of our anti-Japanese base areas, and sometimes also in the distant or weak rear areas of the enemy, may be used, provided
that the conditions of the popular masses are good and the guerrilla unit has ample
forces. But this method can be used only when the enemy is isolated and without
support.

Twelfth, harassing and pinning down the enemy. Harassment is a secondary
but necessary part of the tactics of surprise attack in guerrilla warfare, and its
purpose is to increase the anxiety of enemy and diminish their threatening posture.
This creates the conditions for us to wipe them out or force them out. The methods
are as follows: (1) When a nighttime surprise attack is unsuccessful, shift the goal to harassment. Shouting slogans, singing loudly, and shooting from all four directions are all ways of harassing. Before retreating, scatter slogan handbills on open
ground. (2) In coordinating fighting with regular armies, harassment may be adopted
to disperse enemy forces and to tie them down to one place, unable to offer support in other directions. At such times, the guerrilla units may be split into several
groups, creep near the enemy garrisons, and shoot and shout suddenly in turns at
dusk, midnight, and dawn. This will cause bewilderment and uncertainty among
the enemy forces and make them unable or too slow to offer reinforcement. (3)
Another method is to bluff and bluster. This method puts up more flags and bonfires in the vicinity of the enemy garrisons. The ancients called this the tactics of
sowing doubt. The objective is to deceive the enemy and facilitate our own actions
at other places or to intimidate the enemy and increase its sense of panic. At such
times, our guerrilla units should only make mock engagements with the enemy
and never engage in serious fighting, so as to avoid unnecessary losses.

3. Surprise Attacks on the Enemy When He Is on the Move

Although the above twelve points address the general principles of the tactics of
surprise attacks, they mainly deal with surprise attacks on enemy garrisons. Often,
surprise attacks on the enemy when it is on the move offer the best chances for the
greatest victories in guerrilla warfare. Therefore, guerrilla units should not waste
any opportunity to strike the enemy when it is on the move and when the conditions are right. By nature, all these attacks are contact engagements, which may
still be divided into two types of attacks: ambushes and sudden raids. An ambush is
by nature a planned encounter, but it takes the form of entrapment. A sudden raid
occurs in an unexpected encounter and takes the form of a rapid attack. The former
is an important tactic of guerrilla units and therefore needs more detailed explanation. The latter refers to a fortuitous situation, so it shall be addressed only briefly.
First, an ambush is to lie in wait. It is the planned and camouflaged deployment
of guerrilla troops along one side or both sides of the road that the enemy forces
must take followed by a sudden attack when they pass. Such operations are called
hidden attacks.5 Based on different circumstances and deployment of troops, there
are two types of ambushes: (1) To lie in wait. Forces are concealed beforehand
along the road that the enemy must pass and make a sudden attack when they pass.
(2) To lure the enemy into a trap. The main force should be deployed to lay the trap
and small units may be used deliberately to display weaknesses and induce the
enemy into the trap. Then the surprise attack is launched.

Second, according to the enemy's tactics and the quality of its troops, as well as
the terrain and various other factors, several methods may be taken in laying an
ambush: hiding on one side, on two sides, on several sides, or in multiple layers.

Third, the objectives of an ambush are as follows: (1) Destroy or weaken enemy infantry, artillery, cavalry, transportation units, requisition and dispatch units,
automobiles, trains, ships, and so on. (2) Capture individual or several enemy
messengers, scouts, telephone operators, and quartermasters in order to collect
information about the enemy. (3) Use an ambush to intercept the enemy in retreat.

Fourth, an ambush requires, first and foremost, a clear understanding of the
circumstances. If the circumstances are unclear, it is possible that the ambush may
be futile, or may even cause us to suffer losses. Therefore, the scouting must be
thorough and precise before making an ambush. In scouting, attention should be
focused on the following points: (1) Methods of scouting. First, employ local residents sympathetic to the guerrilla units to approach the enemy by any means available to obtain the necessary information from the mouths of enemy soldiers and
coolies. Second, use plainclothes scouts to approach the enemy to conduct intelligence work. Third, eavesdrop on enemy telephone calls. Fourth, seize enemy personnel to acquire information from their mouths or their documents. (2) The key
facts to scout out are mainly the departure time of the enemy, the size of enemy
troops, the route they will take, their destination, the presence of special weapons
and equipment, whether or not they will have supply wagons, the state of communications and liaison during the movement of their troops, particular habits in
marching, and so forth. (3) The techniques of reconnaissance follow the principle
of concealing one's own intentions while obtaining information about the enemy.
Except for those who need to know, the information acquired through reconnaissance should all be kept secret and leaks should be prevented. You must keep in
mind that, no matter where, no matter when, enemy spies may be hidden both in
the rear areas of the enemy and in the anti-Japanese areas.

Fifth, the choice of ambush sites. The choice of an ambush site should be based
on the principle of maximizing the use of our greatest power and the minimizing
the enemy's ability to use his greatest power. So, in choosing ambush sites, pay
attention to the following points: (1) Good hiding spots make it easy for guerrilla
units to see the enemy and difficult for the enemy to see the guerrillas. (2) Good
terrain makes it easy for the guerrilla unit to attack the enemy and difficult for the
enemy to strike at the guerrilla unit. (3) The roads near ambush sites must be
convenient for the guerrilla units to retreat but not for the enemy. (4) The ambush
site should be picked in areas other than directly in front of the enemy's march or
patrols. There may be good spots by the side of a road, but if they are too close to
the road that the enemy uses, such spots should not serve as secret gathering places
in an ambush. Appropriate places should be selected in areas farther back. (5) There
should be good observation positions. It is better for an ambush to have all these
conditions, but it is not necessary to have every one of these to lay a trap.

Sixth, deploying ambush troops: (1) An ambush should not be laid too early, in
order to save the guerrilla units from a long ambush, which diminishes tension and
caution, making the exposure of our intentions more likely, and increases the danger of detection by the enemy. But neither should it be laid too late, so that there is not enough time to arrange the trap. (2) The road for the deployment should be
hidden. It is better to take small roads and even mountain and valley routes that
have no roads. (3) During the march, plainclothes scouts posing as the enemy
should be sent ahead of the troops to look out and provide security. If it is necessary to pass residential areas, it is best to disguise our troops as the enemy and
keep operational secrecy. (4) After arriving at the ambush area, this news should
be blocked.

Seventh, carrying out the ambush: (1) The deployment of troops should depend
on the size of the guerrilla unit, the size of the enemy forces, and the terrain. Usually a small unit (below 30 percent of the total force) will seize positions that have
strategic importance and are difficult to reach, and from them pin down the enemy
with firepower and inflict casualties on him. The main force will lay the trap at the
best place for the assault and carry out the attack. Sometimes, a few men with a few
guns should be posted to watch out in the direction from which enemy reinforcements may come and to secure the protective positions for withdrawal. (2) When
making a surprise attack on a large enemy force, let its advance and main troops
pass, and launch a surprise attack on its tail. Meanwhile, if possible, a small guerrilla detachment can raid the forward troops of the enemies and draw their attention. This will help the surprise attack of the ambushing troops. It is also possible to
destroy roads and bridges by any means available in advance (flooding, blocking,
barricading with stones and turning ordinary bridges into unsafe ones, and so on)
to extend the enemy's column, so that it is hard for the head and the tail to assist
each other. (3) In a surprise attack on a small enemy force, it may be possible to
block its escape, cut off its incoming route, and eliminate it completely. (4) Regarding the signals for the start of an attack, the specific tasks of the various subunits, the routes of the strike, which unit starts firing first, and so forth, all leaders
of various subunits should be informed in detail in advance. (5) Before an attack,
keep well hidden and keep utmost silence. No eating or smoking, no talking and
laughing, no casual looking about and visiting. (6) Survey the battlefield. Establish
two observation posts in advance. The first one may be set up some ten *li* up the
route by which the enemy will come. Three or four communication personnel, all
disguised in enemy uniform, carry out these observation duties. They provide constant reports to the commander of the guerrilla units on the length of the enemy
ranks, the strength of the enemy troops, and their surveillance efforts, so that the
commander may make timely decisions in light of these developments. After the
complete passage of the enemy, this post should return to the main group. The
second observation post should be set up close to the ambush area for the commander so that he can observe the scene personally and issue the signal for the start
of an attack at the right time. (7) The timing to begin the attack should be selected
for the moment most opportune for ourselves to attack the enemy on the march. At
the same time, all the guerrilla troops must strictly obey orders. No free movement
is permitted so as to avoid alerting the enemy in advance. (8) The actual attack
should be swift and fierce and should catch the enemy "off guard." In short order all weapons should be fired together. The charge should start at once, and the battle
should be finished quickly. Any doubt or hesitation will be harmful.

Eighth, as soon as the fighting has succeeded, immediately gather the troops
together, deal with the prisoners of war, and collect the captured matériel and the
wounded for a speedy withdrawal. If only a part of the enemy has been destroyed,
a quicker withdrawal should begin to prevent a counterattack. All heavy equipment and goods that cannot be carried away should be destroyed.

Ninth, arrangements in case an ambush is impossible or unsuccessful: (1) If an
attack has started but the battle between the two sides has not begun, and it is
discovered suddenly that the enemy forces are too overwhelming or that they have
found out in advance about our ambush and have already taken positions such that
the attack is unlikely to be successful, stop the attack immediately and by all means
quit the field. This is to preserve our own strength. Such times require the best
judgment and inspiration from the commander. (2) If the fighting has already started
and the enemy puts up stiff resistance and it is certain that the battle cannot be
won, then stop fighting and retreat with determination.

Tenth, harassing the enemy. When the objective is not to destroy the enemy or
the ambush cannot conclude the battle decisively, then take on the work of harassment. This method uses a small detachment to spread them over several points, to
kill and wound the enemy with firepower for the purpose of harassing their columns on the march or to push huge rocks and old trees from high mountain cliffs
to kill and wound their men and horses.

Eleventh, the tasks of the plainclothes scouts sent by small guerrilla groups
[*xiaozu*] or guerrilla detachments are to ambush individual or groups of enemy
dispatchers, purchasing agents, scouts, and so on. There are many such opportunities which should not be wasted.

Twelfth, ambushing cavalry. (1) The power of movement and attack of enemy
cavalry is relatively strong, so choose forests or narrow roads (sometimes residential areas may also be appropriate), where the enemy cavalry will have difficulty
maneuvering, to carry out the ambush. (2) Firepower should be concentrated on
killing and wounding horses. After that, the people are easily captured. (3) When
ambushing a few enemy cavalry offers the certainty of catching them, then a multilayered ambush from all directions may be laid. (4) Our troops may disguise
themselves as civilian residents, hide in a village ahead of time, wait for the enemy
cavalry to enter the village, and then launch a surprise attack against them when
the enemy personnel and horses are scattered.

Thirteenth, ambushing trucks. The ambush site should be selected in a mountain valley, the bottom of a valley, the bottom of a gully, a corner, or on a rising or
falling slope. Set up barricades and booby traps or lay mines (or bind together
hand grenades and mortar shells) ahead of time, thus forcing the trucks that reach
them to stop or to be blown up and turned over. Then the guerrilla units hidden
nearby wait for the moment when the trucks stop or turn over to block their advance with one small force and cut off their retreat with another small force, while the main force launches a direct assault on the vehicles and captures people and
goods. If there are guards, they should be disarmed first before burning the vehicles. Attention should, however, be placed on winning over the captured drivers
and soldiers, who should not be killed or harmed.
Fourteenth, ambushing trains. (1) Turns, rising or falling slopes, high embankments, hollows, and entrances of tunnels are all good sites for laying an ambush.
(2) Methods: First, loosen spikes on train rails or dismantle a section of the railroad to derail the train when it arrives. Or erect barricades by piling up big rocks
and large logs on the rail lines or at the mouths of tunnels to halt the advance of the
train. The guerrilla unit should divide into three parts: One part should take over
the position and prevent the guards on the trains from resisting. Another part should
fire at the train carriages. The last part should prepare to enter the carriages, seize
weapons, and capture the personnel. Finally, the train should be set on fire and
destroyed. (3) Special attention should be paid in particular to armored trains, for
they are moving cannon platforms. Guerrilla units should not only loosen rail
spikes in advance but also try to blow them up with mines. Attacks should be
launched only after the rails collapse.
Fifteenth, ambushing ships and boats: (1) The ships and boats which guerrilla
units may ambush are mainly commercial ships and smaller inland river gunboats
used by the enemy for transportation. (2) Ambush sites should be in concealed
places along riverbanks, at river bends, and near our location on the banks. (3) During an ambush, the main firepower and military force of the guerrilla unit should
be ready to attack the head and a small force should be responsible for striking at
the tail, ready to intercept it with firepower if the enemy turns around. As soon as
the enemy ship arrives, start a fierce barrage of rifle and machine-gun fire. Cannon
fire is especially good. (In case there are no foreign cannons, homemade cannons
and pine tree cannons can also serve the purpose.) (4) Wooden ships should be
ordered to stop and anchor near the banks. Search them for military equipment
and goods. Private ships should be let go, and the crew should be given back their
belongings. Official ships should be set on fire and burned.
Sixteenth, ambushing enemy requisition teams: (1) Ambush enemy requisition
teams before they reach the villages. Guerrilla units must lay the ambush in advance along the sides of the road that the enemy forces must take, wait for them to
arrive, and launch a surprise attack and wipe them out. (2) Or launch a surprise
attack against the enemy requisition teams when they have entered a village and
started to collect from house to house. At such times, the enemy is dispersed and
cannot concentrate his forces, and so is easiest to eliminate. If a small detachment
of guerrillas in disguise is planted in a village ahead of time, and the main force
attack from outside the village, the outcome will be even better. But those concealed inside the village must wait for the major force outside the village to act
first, so as not to alarm the enemy and allow him to flee. (3) If, because there is not
enough time, the above two methods cannot be adopted, then you can wait for the
enemy forces to finish their requisitioning and return with all the goods, and ambush them from the side of the road on their return. After the success of such an
ambush, all captured money and goods should be returned to the popular masses
from whom the goods were taken originally. Only when the popular masses want
to express thanks to the guerrilla unit voluntarily can a portion of the money and
goods be distributed to add to the supplies of the guerrilla unit. (4) However, the
objective of ambushing enemy requisition teams, no matter when it takes place,
can be achieved only by sudden action and the destruction of their covering troops
first.
Seventeenth, ambushing enemy transportation units: (1) Narrow roads or bottlenecks of roads should be selected. (2) If the enemy guard troops are relatively
powerful, then the guerrilla unit can be split into two. The main force should fight
the enemy guard troops and draw them toward itself, while a small force should
seize the goods being transported or burn them. (3) If the enemy guard troops are
few, then these troops should be destroyed first, and then the transport goods should
be captured. (4) The general principle in ambushing enemy transportation units is,
first, to fire at the advance part of their ranks to cause disorder in the procession, as
civilian porters try to escape and the road is blocked. Next, destroy or drive away
the enemy guard troops with sudden force and then seize the supplies. (5) To
prevent the transportation unit from turning back and running away, a small force
should be deployed in advance to cut off their retreat.
Eighteenth, sudden raids: This is a method to handle unexpected encounters.
(1) Guerrilla units on the move may encounter enemy suppression troops,6 requisition teams, or transportation units on the move. So guerrilla units on the move
should always be ready for such sudden attacks. (2) During their advance, guerrilla units should regularly dispatch plainclothes scouts to places three to five li in
front of the advance part of the our troops, so that news of encountering the enemy
may be obtained and ways of dealing with them may be decided quickly. (3) If a
small enemy unit or an enemy unit with a force equivalent to our own is encountered, then the earliest opportunity should be seized and the guerrilla unit should
turn rapidly toward the flanks of the enemy forces, open fire at them suddenly,
charge toward them with full force, and destroy them in one stroke. Meanwhile, if
the enemy forces retreat in defeat and there are no worries about support from
other enemy forces, then they should be pursued and eliminated completely. But
they should not be pursued too far. (4) If large numbers of enemy forces are encountered and the facts are unclear, a rapid withdrawal should be carried out without any hesitation, with the aim of getting away. If the enemy fires first, we should
use a small force to occupy positions to resist and cover the main force as it with-

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Notes

This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 28, January 11, 1938. It is there attributed to
Chen Bojun, who prepared this extract, but, as indicated in note 1 below, it was actually
written and revised by Mao. Our source is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 138-52,
where it is reproduced from the version in Jiefang.
1. This article as published in Jiefang was introduced by the following paragraph:

This essay is Comrade Chen Bojun's excerpt of the section on guerrilla tactics in
Comrade Mao Zedong's 1934 pamphlet, Guerrilla Warfare. In order to adapt it to the
conditions of the anti-Japanese war, Comrade Chen has made some additions and
deletions in wording and paragraphing, and it has also been revised by Comrade
Mao. It is now published in this periodical as reference material for leading cadres in
the anti-Japanese guerrilla war around the country.

The editors of Junshi wenji (p. 152) confirm that this introduction was actually written
by Mao. Mao's 1934 pamphlet is not available to us and could not be included in Volume IV
of this edition.
2. The formula "Create an uproar in the east and strike in the west" occurs in the commentaries to Sunzi's Art of War and is frequently cited. For the source, see Samuel B. Griffith's
translation of Sunzi, The Art of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 79-80 (Commentary of Zhang Yu).
3. It seems probable that the security people were to wear red markings because there
were relatively few of them; it was essential that they be able to identify themselves to the
Communist forces, and they were presumably skilled at concealment when necessary. Others were to wear markings described as an (literally "dark," but here perhaps meaning "secret"), i.e., markings which would not identify the other soldiers as "Reds" and therefore
giving warning to the enemy.
4. Mao is referring to the most likely fortified spots guerrilla units might come up against.
Blockhouses were used more in the Guomindang's encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi
soviet in the early and mid-1930s, when the original version of this text was produced,
though the Japanese built some after 1938. Stockades would be fortified army encampments. Finally, since rural violence was not new to China, many villages had mud walls
around them (especially in North China), and local administrative towns usually had high
stone walls.
5. In these two sentences Mao is distinguishing two related terms, maifu (to lie in ambush) and fuji (to attack from a hidden position).
6. Suppression troops (taofa dui) was the term used for the Guomindang troops carrying
out the encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi soviet in the early and mid-1930s. After
1938, Japanese occupation troops also organized to suppress Communist guerrilla units in
areas of North China under Japanese military control.