I. We Should Form a Clearer Understanding of the Enemy's Face

Over the past sixty years, particularly in the last six, China has drawn more than enough lessons from the Japanese aggressors. Yet, even now, many people still lack sufficient understanding of them and their actions, often committing grave errors in their observations. Take, for example, the recent serious incident of Japan's large-scale invasion of China. There are many bizarre and outlandish views regarding this event. Some believe that the Japanese attacks on North China and even Shanghai were entirely the actions of a few young militant officers in Japan, rather than a national policy of Japanese imperialism (they think even Japan's financial capitalists and the Konoe Cabinet disagree). Others hold that this incident erupted "by chance," not as a premeditated and planned action by the Japanese aggressors (their evidence being that Tokyo's financial markets were not disrupted before Japan launched its offensive against China; it was only after Japan began its attacks in China that government bonds and various commercial stocks began to plunge sharply). Still others even think Japan's actions this time are merely "demonstrative" in nature, and that, at the very least, subjectively they "have no intention of escalating the incident," and so on.

Needless to say, these views are all extremely mistaken. The error of the first viewpoint lies in mythologizing Japan's "young militant officers" without clearly understanding the true nature of Japanese imperialism and the Konoe Cabinet. Admittedly, it is Japan's "young militant officers" who started and are commanding the war in North China; but who sent these young militants? Whose interests do their actions represent? Anyone who pays even a little attention to current affairs knows that most of the cadres of the Japanese garrison in China, especially in North China, were transferred from Tokyo after the February 26 Incident or after the implementation of last year's plan to reinforce the North China garrison. The current head of the North China garrison, Kiyoshi Kōzuki, regarded as part of the Araki faction, was sent from Tokyo only after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. If the Tokyo authorities, after the "army purge," had no "arson" plan in advance, why send these "fire-starters" to highly flammable North China? Even if these fire-starters did not necessarily need Tokyo's consent at the moment of lighting or spreading the flames, and even if they might differ with their masters—the financial capitalists and landlords—on certain issues, their actions are undoubtedly carried out faithfully in the interests of their masters. To be frank, Japanese imperialism has already laid out its plan to "conquer the entire territory of China," and the young militant officers stationed in North China are merely following that plan loyally and energetically. If anyone believes that Japan's financial capitalists, great landlords, or even the Konoe Cabinet do not agree with the North China garrison's current war in North China, that is completely contrary to the facts and a fallacy. It is true that Tokyo's financial capitalists and great landlords hoped to continue the stable process of increasing capital returns over the past five years without incident; but they would also never hesitate to agree to war if that were the only way to resolve their crises and prolong their existence! Just look at how, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, all Tokyo political parties fully expressed support for the "Konoe policy" (which is, in essence, the military's policy), and you can see the stance of the financial capitalists and great landlords behind that policy. As for the idea that the Konoe Cabinet likewise disagrees with this war, that is even more absurd. We have long pointed out that the Konoe Cabinet emerged primarily to reconcile internal contradictions within Japan's ruling class and to carry out the war of aggression against China.

The roots of the errors in the second and third observations are the same as in the first, but their implications are even more serious. Because of failing to see clearly the unity of contradictions within Japan's ruling class, because of not grasping the inevitability of Japanese imperialism launching a large-scale war against China, and relying solely on some very superficial facts or unreliable materials to hastily draw conclusions without careful thought, one naturally falls, wittingly or unwittingly, into the poisonous trap of the enemy's propaganda! But we must point out that the enemy's daily propaganda claiming that this Sino-Japanese "minor clash"(!) is "accidental" and that the Japanese government "has no intention of escalating the incident"... is entirely a smokescreen! The reason they spread these smoke bombs is, on the one hand, to conceal their predetermined plan to monopolize China from other imperialist powers, allowing that plan to proceed unhindered; and on the other hand, to shake the unsteady elements in China, keeping alive illusions of temporary peace and safety! Chinese public opinion circles should have long since exposed these smokescreens; unfortunately, when the war in North China erupted, Chinese public opinion often focused solely on North China, and when the war in Shanghai began, it often focused only on Shanghai. Regarding the enemy's overall plan for attacking China, not only is there rarely a correct grasp, but some commentary has fallen into serious error! Let us ask in return: Was this war truly "accidental"? Does the Japanese government truly "not want to escalate the incident"? Before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, why did the Japanese government impose thorough control over the media, and why did several divisions in the Kansai region remain undecommissioned despite reaching the end of their service terms? After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese government immediately issued a general mobilization order and, in a short time, mobilized nearly 300,000 troops (including the 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 15th, 16th, 19th, and 20th Divisions, among others) to China—what was that for? Based on the facts, we must stress emphatically: Japanese imperialism's current large-scale offensive against China is not only a planned action, but the plan's meticulousness and vast scope are unprecedented! Readers with a good memory will recall that when Japanese militarists launched the "September 18th Incident" in 1931, opinions within Japan's ruling class were highly divided. At that time, Japan's then-Foreign Minister dared to admonish the Japanese militarists, saying, "Japan swallowing Manchuria is like swallowing a bomb" (roughly the meaning). But this time is different. According to Tokyo dispatches: After news of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident reached Tokyo, special telegraphic reports from newspapers, commentary in magazines, statements by political party leaders... were all virtually "identical in wording, unanimous in voice." From this, one can see that the Japanese government had meticulous arrangements both before and after the incident, so meticulous that even Japan's stock exchanges might have been unaware just before the war was launched (a government representing capitalists and landlords, when executing plans beneficial to its masters, especially military plans, does not necessarily need to secure their masters' full agreement in advance). As for the vast scope of Japanese imperialism's current plan of aggression, we can conclude it is unprecedented since the "September 18th Incident": a large-scale war of aggression and a nationwide war of resistance have already begun.

II. Why Japan Chose to Launch a Large-Scale War of Aggression Now

Ever since Japanese imperialism fulfilled the plan clearly recorded in the Tanaka Memorial to "conquer Manchuria," it has been preparing daily to realize the plan to "conquer the entire territory of China." The reason Japanese imperialism chose to decisively execute this plan at the present moment is, of course, driven by various objective causes.

First, let us examine Japan's economy. Signs of a new economic panic in Japan are already manifesting very clearly. Regardless of the abnormal development of Japan's munitions industry, the endless and unrestricted expansion of military expenditures has made it impossible to eliminate deficit bonds or curb soaring prices. Meanwhile, the need to import large quantities of raw materials for munitions has led to an unprecedented trade deficit; with the international balance of payments unmanageable, large amounts of gold must be shipped abroad. According to statistics released by the Japanese government: From April last year to January this year, the overall price index rose by 31 percent (domestic commodities rose 13 percent, imported commodities rose 56 percent), and over the past several months, the trend of rising prices has only intensified. As for the trade deficit and gold outflow, the figures are even more alarming: the trade deficit for the first half of this year reached 640 million yen, and to date, gold shipped to the United States totals four batches amounting to 270 million yen. Judging from the current situation, the deterioration of Japan's economy is growing ever more severe, with not the slightest sign of "improvement." Developing in this way, a new panic is merely a matter of time—something even the most incompetent economist can see. For Japanese imperialism, accustomed to plundering China to "break through" crisis situations, it is no "accident" to launch a large-scale war of aggression at such a juncture.

Second, let us examine Japan's internal politics. As the economic crisis deepens, contradictions between classes and within the ruling class in Japan grow increasingly acute—a natural consequence. According to Japanese official reports, from January to May this year, there were 1,332 strikes, nearly double the 700 of last year; peasant struggles reached 1,656 instances in just January through March. From these simple figures, one can see the unrest in Japanese people's lives and how the Japanese workers and peasants, under the world's most brutal police repression, are heroically demanding survival.

As for the contradictions within Japan's ruling class, they have never been easy to thoroughly ease. Although Japanese rulers, in the face of various crises, have tried hard to smooth over the contradictions between the military and political parties, the "untimely and short-lived death" (lasting only 117 days) of the Hayashi Cabinet, which was tasked with achieving "military-capital cooperation," shows the unpromising prospects of such reconciliation. Fumimaro Konoe's rise to power, though also taking as its mission "easing domestic confrontations to realize national unity," has seen not only an inability to maintain the gains already made in "military-capital cooperation" (Yuki unwilling to remain Finance Minister) and an inability to eliminate the many existing confrontations, but even within the cabinet, harmony between Baba, Hirota, and Kaya is nowhere in sight. Time flies, and the special Diet session is drawing near, yet the organization of a "new party" remains utterly uncertain—this cannot but cast a shadow over the Konoe Cabinet's prospects. Economic and political crises are linked. Under the threat of such crises, Japan's rulers are bound to go mad and throw themselves rabidly at China.

Third, let us examine the military aspect. For militaristic Japan, in order to remedy its lack of resources for munitions industries and complete the establishment of advantageous military bases for attacking the Soviet Union and confronting Britain and America, after securing and fairly solidifying its "lifelines" in Manchuria and Jehol, further seizing North China, Central China, and even South China was the inevitable path and set policy. Now, seeing the Soviet Union's Third Five-Year Plan about to begin, China's capacity for resistance markedly increasing, and the final struggle between global forces of peace and aggression drawing ever nearer, under such multiple stimuli, Japanese imperialism—"inherently deficient, acquiredly underdeveloped, yet stubbornly trying to act the hero"—cannot but accelerate and "resolutely" execute the set policy it has long been plotting day and night!

Fourth, let us examine Japan's international environment. In this regard, from the perspective of Japan's rulers, the present moment is relatively favorable for executing their "set policy." They believe the European powers are preoccupied with dealing with their allies Hitler and Mussolini's "tough actions" in Spain, and naturally have no spare capacity to interfere in Far Eastern affairs. They are especially pleased with Britain's "friendly attitude." Indeed, the attitude of the British gentlemen has given no small encouragement to Japan's launching of a large-scale offensive against China. The Soviet Izvestiya has long pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese negotiations were one of the main factors prompting Japan to start the war. In my article "China's War of Resistance and Britain," I also explained how Britain's consistently vacillating old policy in the Far East plays a tremendous role in aiding Japan's attack on China. Furthermore, America's fondness for its "neutrality" policy and the Japanese militarists' erroneous assessments of the Soviet Union's severe party and army purges have both been mistaken by Japanese militarists as favorable conditions.

Finally, what is the relationship between recent trends in China's internal politics and Japan's launching of a large-scale war of aggression? We can conclude this: If China's internal unity had been firmly consolidated long ago and democratic politics already realized, then Japan would have hesitated in its attack on China. Unfortunately, since the Xi'an Incident, though China's peace and unification have achieved initial success, the thorough reform of the central political structure, the establishment of a national defense government, the purge of pro-Japanese elements, and the realization of democratic politics are still far away. Seizing these gaps, Japanese imperialism has therefore hurriedly opened fire on China.

The above several factors are, of course, interconnected. It is under the mutual promotion and influence of these factors that Japanese imperialism has decided to seek a way out by attacking China.

III. Is Invading China a Way Out for Japan?

Six years ago, the Japanese warlords attempted something similar under conditions of a very deep domestic crisis but a relatively favorable international environment, and the outcome was, one could say, rather successful. Now, they are preparing to do it a second time. Will this attempt be as smooth as the last one? To answer this question, we must examine it from several perspectives.

First, the Japanese rulers believe that invading China can "break open" their economic impasse. I consider this to be a complete miscalculation. Before the war was even launched, Japan’s economic crisis was already so severe and its financial situation so hopeless. How much war expenditure will Japan need annually once the war begins? According to expert estimates, it will require at least 15 to 20 billion yen, which is no less than one-third or one-fourth of the total income of the entire Japanese populace. Beyond causing financial bankruptcy, the war will further worsen foreign trade and drive prices even higher—developments that are entirely foreseeable. According to a recent Tokyo dispatch: "Following the North China incident, the financial markets have been thrown into utter chaos. Grain merchants, in particular, have seized the opportunity to manipulate grain prices, hoarding supplies and driving up prices relentlessly" (Shen Bao). The longer the war drags on, the more pronounced the financial and economic bankruptcy will become. "Seeing harm before seeing benefit" will be the inevitable outcome of Japan’s attempt to use war to resolve its economic crisis!

Second, the Japanese rulers’ attempt to alleviate domestic political crises by attacking China will inevitably backfire. It cannot but compel the Japanese invaders to create a "fait accompli" in China, thereby forcing Britain into recognition.

In its typically cunning manner, Japan outwardly spreads diplomatic rhetoric such as "non-expansion of the conflict" and "local resolution," while in reality undertaking massive aggressive military operations against China. On one hand, this crafty approach is designed to mask Japan’s globally condemned war of aggression, allowing it to wage an "undeclared war" of large-scale invasion against China under the cover of diplomatic phrases, thereby blunting international public opinion and minimizing irritation to Britain and America. On the other hand, this diplomatic language is used to weaken China’s self-defense efforts and to lure certain individuals into harboring illusions of peace, hoping to sacrifice China under the guise of peace. At the same time, it allows certain pro-Japanese elements to retain "useful" positions within the Nanjing government. These pro-Japanese figures, long loathed and reviled across the nation, have gradually lost their standing within the Nanjing government since the inception of domestic peace and unification.

The defeat in the Lugouqiao resistance and the fall of Beiping and Tianjin were also due to the crafty maneuvers of the Japanese invaders. Song Zheyuan was thoroughly deceived by the Japanese, falling into their trap. Harboring illusions that Japan might seek a peaceful resolution and indulging in wishful self-preservation, he vacillated at a critical moment, refrained from actively engaging in a self-defense war, and instead entered into compromise negotiations with the Japanese. As a result, politically, economically, militarily, and culturally significant bastions of China were easily lost. Of course, other factors contributed to the fall of Beiping and Tianjin, such as the Nanjing government’s past policy of concession, which allowed the Japanese to establish a position of strength there. But this had long become an error, and during the Lugouqiao incident, it could have been remedied had there been a resolute policy of resistance and an active self-defense war. However, the Hebei-Chahar authorities under Song Zheyuan did not take such action, and although the Nanjing government, in the context of the Lugouqiao incident, espoused a staunch resistance policy toward XXX, it did not oppose, but rather tolerated, the Hebei-Chahar authorities’ compromise with the Japanese. The Nanjing government’s declaration on August 14 stated: "China’s local authorities, in the interest of maintaining peace, have accepted the settlement proposed by the Japanese side. The central government, with the utmost forbearance, has likewise not opposed this settlement." At the outset of the Lugouqiao incident, no active self-defense war was undertaken to reinforce Beiping and Tianjin. The lesson of Beiping and Tianjin’s fall once again demonstrates that retaining illusions of a "peaceful resolution" with the Japanese invaders leads directly into their trap and deception, causing immense losses to the Chinese nation.

Following the Lugouqiao incident, the people across the nation unanimously demanded resistance to the war. National public opinion and the overall atmosphere were overwhelmingly in favor of resolute resistance. The anti-war policy representing the Nanjing government, announced by XXX on July 17, and the military measures taken by the Nanjing government deserve the approval of the entire Chinese people. In the battles of Beiping-Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nankou, the Chinese army’s heroic resistance commands the respect of the entire nation. Beginning with the Lugouqiao incident, a nationwide war of resistance has commenced.

The sacred task before the Chinese people is to do everything to secure victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The only path to survival for the Chinese nation is to wage a sacred, nationwide self-defense war against the Japanese imperialists’ war of aggression, utterly eliminating their war of aggression.

We have now reached the "final juncture," transitioning from preparations for resistance to the implementation of resistance, entering a new phase. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in its decision on August 15, pointed out: "From this point onward, China’s political situation has entered a new stage—the stage of waging actual resistance. The phase of preparing for resistance is over. The central task in this new stage is to mobilize all forces to secure victory in the resistance war."

The time has come to undertake a nationwide general mobilization, to wage an all-encompassing, nationwide war of resistance, in order to guarantee victory in the fight against Japanese aggression. The debate today is no longer about whether or not to resist, but about how to secure victory in the war of resistance. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China further noted: "At this stage, the differences and debates we have with the Kuomintang and other anti-Japanese factions are no longer about whether to resist, but about how to achieve victory in the resistance war." "The pivotal key to winning the resistance today lies in expanding the KMT-initiated resistance into a comprehensive and nationwide war of resistance. Only this kind of comprehensive, nationwide resistance can bring about ultimate victory."

To guarantee the ultimate triumph of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed the Ten Great Platforms for Winning the Resistance:

(See pages 225–226 of Volume I of *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought* for details.)

The above Ten Great Platforms represent the only correct policy to ensure China’s final victory in the war of resistance. We call upon all the Chinese people and the Chinese government to resolutely implement these Ten Great Platforms to secure ultimate victory.

To date, the KMT and the Nanjing government have still confined resistance efforts to purely governmental combat, everywhere restricting the people and barring them from joining the war. They hinder the integration of government and military forces, refuse to grant democratic rights to the people for resisting Japanese aggression and saving the nation, and are unwilling to fundamentally reform the government’s political apparatus. This approach to the war of resistance harbors immense danger: while temporary, localized victories may be achieved, it cannot guarantee final victory. The setback at Nankou attests to this reality. Certain front-line units have not only failed to mobilize popular participation in the resistance, but have suppressed national salvation movements and disbanded people’s organizations at the front dedicated to saving the nation.

The same phenomenon is evident in the battles around Shanghai. The national salvation organizations in Shanghai and Nanjing have been banned from operation by the authorities, and patriotic publications in the cultural community have been shut down. While the 87th and 88th Divisions fought heroically in Shanghai, members of the public who spontaneously joined in the effort or came to offer support were turned away by certain Shanghai authorities. The Shanghai Anti-Enemy Support Association, manipulated by certain individuals, failed to provide active assistance to the 87th and 88th Divisions in their resistance. Consequently, these frontline units went an entire day and night without food or water, while the Support Association allowed mountains of comfort supplies to rot rather than deliver them to the troops. As a result, soldiers on the front line complained that the people of Shanghai were not as zealous this time as they had been during the "January 28th" incident. In truth, the people’s assistance to the resistance effort in Shanghai far exceeded that of the "January 28th" period. Yet, due to KMT’s restrictive policies, the people and the military were kept apart. If this situation persists, the resistance in Shanghai may well repeat the lesson of Nankou.

The setback of the Lugouqiao resistance and the fall of Beiping and Tianjin occurred despite the valiant struggle of the 29th Army and the brave sacrifices of Tong Lingge and Zhao Dengyu. However, because Song Zheyuan lacked the determination to resist, he naturally failed to implement a correct anti-Japanese war policy. When the people of Beiping, Tianjin, and the entire country rose to assist the 29th Army, Song not only rejected their aid but also declared martial law and suppressed the people’s patriotic movements. True, there were numerous unfavorable conditions in Beiping and Tianjin, but these do not imply that the cities were absolutely indefensible. If the broad masses had been mobilized and armed at that critical moment, Beiping and Tianjin could have remained under Chinese control for a substantial period, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. Instead, Song made a nocturnal withdrawal from Beiping, preferring to abandon the city to the Japanese invaders rather than allow the people of Beiping to rise and defend it.

We call upon the entire Chinese people: only by resolutely carrying out the anti-war policy advanced by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China can victory in the war of resistance be ensured. We call upon all members of the KMT to adopt a spirit of self-criticism, to abandon policies of control, and to adopt the policies proposed by the Chinese Communist Party. This is the only policy that can guarantee victory in the war of resistance.

Abyssinia’s fall was not because it launched a large-scale national war against the Italian aggressors, but because it failed to implement a correct national resistance program. The Emperor of Abyssinia did not rely on the strength of the whole people; he personally controlled the national war. While he became a national hero, the entire nation was doomed to subjugation. In contrast, Spain’s national war relied on the people’s strength, enabling it to fight against the fascist aggressors—the two major powers Germany and Italy—for more than a year, still retaining Madrid in the government’s hands, repulsing repeated fascist offensives, and achieving victories. We should also be aware that when the Spanish government resisted the attack of Franco’s rebel forces, 80 percent of Spain’s original army was under the rebels’ control. Yet, because the Spanish government adopted a correct anti-war policy, it rapidly formed a new army. The Chinese nation’s total war of resistance against Japanese aggression must draw lessons from both the Abyssinian and Spanish national wars.

The key to saving China lies in implementing a correct policy for the war of resistance. We must transform the government’s war into a national war, and transform a purely military resistance into a comprehensive resistance. The Ten Great Platforms of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China embody the policy of a comprehensive, nationwide war of resistance.

The most essential condition for implementing the Ten Great Platforms is to develop democratic rights and liberalize the people’s patriotic movements for the sake of the war of resistance. This is the only way to mobilize the people to participate in the resistance, to allow them to join the fight freely. Only when the people participate in the resistance can government and military forces truly integrate and transform a purely military, government-led resistance into a comprehensive, nationwide war of resistance.

Some within the KMT argue that democracy can be realized only after complete victory in the war of resistance. This mistaken view clearly fails to grasp that without democracy, victory in the war of resistance cannot be achieved. As noted in a decision of the CCP: "In the previous stage, due to the unwillingness of the KMT and the insufficiency of mass mobilization, the task of winning democracy remained unfulfilled. This task must be accomplished in the process of striving for victory in the war of resistance going forward." Pursuing victory in the war of resistance and achieving democratic rights are not separate pursuits; they are interconnected and mutually dependent.

Some within the KMT claim that fighting the war requires sacrificing certain freedoms. This viewpoint is similarly erroneous, comparable to the misunderstanding of the relationship between democracy and the war of resistance. Without political freedom and the freedom to express patriotism, mobilizing the masses to join the war becomes impossible, and securing victory in the war of resistance can have no guarantee.

We are in favor of unifying the national popular movement on a democratic basis, aiming at victory in the war of resistance. However, unifying the popular movement must not be construed as controlling it. Control of the popular movement, in practice, amounts to its suppression. Under a control-based policy, it is naturally impossible to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the war of resistance. Hence, we advocate for the unity of the popular movement, while opposing its suppression.

Certain national defeatists, under the prevailing atmosphere of resistance that overwhelms the nation, dare not openly raise the banner of opposing the war. Instead, they cloak themselves in various wordings to propagate sentiments of national failure. They say things like, "China is a weak country and cannot sustain a war of resistance," or "If we fight, we will only suffer defeat—so let us honestly accept defeat." These national defeatists fail to understand that although China is a weak nation, precisely because it is a victim of aggression, waging a sacred and just war of self-defense in reliance on the strength of the masses, it can achieve ultimate victory in the war of resistance.

To secure victory in the War of Resistance, we must rely on the strength of the people and launch a nationwide national resistance. We are certainly capable of defeating Japanese imperialism. If the war is regarded merely as a government war or a purely military war, such a resistance carries immense dangers and risks severe setbacks or failure. To avoid these dangers and to strive for the final victory in the War of Resistance, we must resolutely implement the correct policy of resistance, which means waging a comprehensive, all-nation resistance. This is the guarantee for achieving final victory in the War of Resistance.

Uphold the Ten-Point Program of the Chinese Communist Party for Winning the War of Resistance!

Resolutely implement the Ten-Point Program of the Chinese Communist Party for Winning the War of Resistance!

Mobilize all forces to fight for victory in the War of Resistance!

(Originally published in Collected Speeches of Mao Zedong, Paris National Salvation Times, pages 47–172)