Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this book served as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on more than a decade of personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy and tactics of warfare as described by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war, emphasizing that they must be combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.


1. What Is Guerrilla Warfare?


In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary
part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people
who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques
are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted
with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances,
the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality
of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to
an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our
regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat
the enemy.


These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form
of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the
revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between
oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance.
In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable
to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and
Revolution,[A] said: 'A people's insurrection and a people's revolution
are not only natural but inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as
but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality
of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the
struggle.


Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is
a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ
against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into
the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and
oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate,
and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to
advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages
to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.


During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox
forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army.
Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that
status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine
to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be
no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.


Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare
has certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship
of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of
a semi colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have
a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political
responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united
anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political
goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are
certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to
wit:


  1. Arousing and organizing the people.

  2. Achieving internal unification politically.

  3. Establishing bases.

  4. Equipping forces.

  5. Recovering national strength.

  6. Destroying enemy's national strength.

  7. Regaining lost territories.


There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national
policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord
with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla
action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities
is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain
this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political
effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people
to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.


What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political
goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives
do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy,
co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare
is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of
counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities.
Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported
by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their
sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla
action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities
of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla
operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate
success of guerilla action, mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare is an
insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is
no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those
who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that
the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for
one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the
masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from
hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.


What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands
that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization
at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that
makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and
military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such
units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they
may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people,
or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does
not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a
battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.


All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute,
loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary
technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able
to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for
the people. As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which
at first will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails;
they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing
their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.


Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who
attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand
the nature of guerrilla action. They say, 'This movement is a haven for
disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping
thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are
corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas
indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has
at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might
indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt
and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena
and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerilla warfare, and
to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help
for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must
try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them
and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla
warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are
anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.[B]


What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily
on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation,
the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths,
the weather and the situation of the people.


In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east
and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack;
withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas
engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when
he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla
strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital
points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and
annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of
independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular
armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory
if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on
the principles we have mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of territory
in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards
ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese
people.


A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare.
The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the
people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is
impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the
former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution;
those of the Reds China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the
past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast
anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these
struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the
greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and
all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have
existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they
are not contrary to national policy.


The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical
development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White
Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized
by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported
by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will
be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses
and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be
firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation
in the people.


If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities
mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied
by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that 'the invader can organize
guerrilla units from among the people'. Such a conclusion might well diminish
our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned,
we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.


Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely
'class' type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard
to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of
the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis
of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said:
'When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and
all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent
guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they
are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners' (Civil War in
Russia). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle
is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps
fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla
units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class
groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla
war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.


National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency,
has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ.
The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria
since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly
different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French
and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in
China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples
in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality
of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must
recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: 'Wars in every period
have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every
period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in On Guerrilla
Warfare said: 'As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally
requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions
of environment, the state of economic progress and the political ideas that
obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.'
Again: 'It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas
and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting,
for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations
and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes
in conditions create new methods.'


If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary
guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng
that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has
lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In olden days guerrilla
warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it
can be applied today.' These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate
of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist
on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making
the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other
national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating
our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla
hostilities.


To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is
one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing
the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of
area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our
regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat
on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that
is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable
from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese
and without which we cannot defeat them.


[A]
A document by this name was not written by Lenin.


[B]
This is a misquotation. No passage resembling this is in Lenin's Guerrilla Warfare.


2. The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilitiesto Regular Operations


The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position
and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There
are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament,
equipment supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms 'front' and
'rear'; in the matter of military responsibilities.


When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units
are many, as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest,
of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment,
of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A
primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people
themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this,
organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla
groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order and they must depend
for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.


The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox
operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement.
There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is
nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterizes orthodox
war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into
a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of
reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of
the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.


There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla
warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role and there
must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare
particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded
subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because
all units and all supporting arms in all districts must co-ordinate to the
highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable
but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities
to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated
with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must co-operate with
adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent
of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of
co-operation of many units.


When we discuss the terms 'front' and 'rear' it must be remembered, that
while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is
in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox
army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the
10,000-mile Long march of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units
operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.


As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are
to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces;
to attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting
independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the enemy to disperse
his strength; and to co-ordinate all these activities with those of the regular
armies on distant battle fronts.


From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare
and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two.
Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the
Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially
guerrilla in nature, for it operates in enemy's rear. On occasion, however,
Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike
an enemy in motion and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were
evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.


On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central
Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature.
In this connection the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions
to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations
should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities these orthodox
units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Line Tu, they were
not only able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary
to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to
changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.


Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into
regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox
mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared
to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear,
ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as unendurable as a group of
cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions,
they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing.
It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of
constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.


While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla operations, it is
equally improper to consider that there is a chasm between the two. While
differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions and this
fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship
between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject,
or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox
war, we fall into this error : We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and
minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who
says - 'Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking
to emancipate itself,' or with Kao Kang, who believes that 'Guerrilla strategy
is the only strategy possible for oppressed people', we are exaggerating
the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have
just quoted do not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations
into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not
only would those who oppose take advantage of our varying opinions to turn
them to the own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led assume
responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly
be carried out by orthodox force. In the meantime, the important guerrilla
function of co-ordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.


Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only strategy were
actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened, we would be divided
in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline. If we say, ' Let us
transform the regular forces into guerrillas', and do not place our first
reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy,
we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese
war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself
and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces
is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from
beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize
the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop
and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence
of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate
the potentialities of such war.


Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground
that war has no other aspects than the purely orthodox. This opinion is
often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla
regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a
screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt
practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla
bands that spring from the armed people. They say, 'Only the regular forces
are capable of conducting guerrilla operations.' This theory is a mistaken
one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.


A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort
and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated
this way: 'Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for certain
time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as
the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there
can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because
it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare
assists them in producing this favourable decision. Orthodox forces may under
certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain
conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla
forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their
proper combinations.'


To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and
guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal
element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may
at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general
guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often
becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is
equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of
such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards
of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical
counter-attack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would
be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must
again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement.
If we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war.
In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical
auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position
in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as
conducted by orthodox forces.


3. Guerrilla Warfare In History


Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present
day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought
by every class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions,
it has great possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their
points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes
and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience of those
whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless experience
gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot
be marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities
has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on
against us by foreign imperialists. But that experience should help the fighting
Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm
them in confidence of ultimate victory.


In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded
Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry,
cavalry, and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared
army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her strategy was the
use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla
operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions
of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized peasants,
carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When
the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked
the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counterattacks
on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon
was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers,
men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors
and depended largely on the activities of the regular army the function of
the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized
country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous
soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to
organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At times, guerrilla groups
were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was
insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between
"the fist and the axe" [Ivanov ].


From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and
intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White
Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories
and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of
the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian
guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in
the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion,
the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously
been defeated by regular Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and
the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas,
were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. 'Thus not only was
the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with
the ever-moving guerrilla' [The Nature of Guerrilla Action].


The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where
there were detached groups of several thousands in strength, old, middle-aged,
and young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known
as 'silver-haired units'; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the
middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups
for the children. Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried
on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed
the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who
condemned it. Experience tells us that 'Orthodox armies are the fundamental
and principal power, guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in
the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces [Gusev,
Lessons of Civil War.]. Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually
developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized
regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was entirely derived from
guerrillas.


During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against
Italy. The cause of defeat — aside from the most important political
reasons that there were dissentient political groups, no strong government
party, and unstable policy—was the failure to adopt a positive policy
of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement with
large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely
passive defence, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians.
In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely
populated country was contributory. Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian
Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized
Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period, there were
several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla
operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were
retaken and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been
steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate
winner. At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia,
and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such
activities is probable.


In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English;
again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in
1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable
degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla
operations were most extensive and the Ch'ing troops were often completely
exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.


In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action. Perhaps
these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular
operations, or perhaps there was a lack of co-ordination. But the fact that
victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity
but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs.
Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering
the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities
are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce
final victory.


From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed
guerrilla tactics contently. At the very beginning, a positive policy was
adopted. Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds
were able to develop into regular armies. As these armies fought, new guerrilla
regimes were developed over a wide area. These regimes co-ordinated their
efforts with those of the regular forces This policy accounted for the many
victories gained by the guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were
armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that
period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both
strategically and tactically. They depended primarily upon alertness. They
stressed the correct basis for both political affaires and military operations.
They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then determined
upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable
difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation
in the anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification
of China is now a permanent and definite fact, and that the experience gained
during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous
to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There are many valuable
lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among
them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depend upon powerful political
leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders
must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy
to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.


After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened
in each of the three north-east provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there
in spite of the cruelties and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense
of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the
land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The struggle can
be divided into two periods . During the first, which extended from 18 September
1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly
in all three provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese
regime in Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin. the National Salvation Army and the
Self-Defence Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng
T'ien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units The influence of these
forces was great. They harassed the Japanese unceasingly, but because there
was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to co ordinate
military command and operations and to work with the people, and, finally,
failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole
organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified. As a direct result
of these conditions, the campaigns failed and the troops were finally defeated
by our enemy.


During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present
time, the situation has greatly improved, This has come about because great
numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist
him, because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese
warm and because of the fine work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas
have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and
in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful influence.
Already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons
have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese
to send troops after them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese
and undermine their control in the north-east, while, at the same time they
inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such activities are not merely
of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate
victory.


However, there are still some weak points. For instance: National defence
policy has not been sufficiently developed; participation of the people is
not general; internal political organization is still in its primary stages,
and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not
yet sufficient. But if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these
weaknesses will be overcome. Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop
to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty o the Japanese
and the many methods they have device to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish
guerrilla activities extinguish guerrilla activities in the three north-eastern
provinces.


The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been
outlined; prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are
possible, natural and necessary. They prove that if the present anti-Japanese
war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate
victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.


Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that
the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history
that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China
in her present anti-Japanese war but will be world-wide.


4. Can Victory Be Attained By Guerrilla Operations?


Guerrilla hostilities are but one phase of the war of resistance against
Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate
victory can be given only after investigation and comparison of all elements
of our own strength with those of the enemy. The particulars of such a comparison
are several. First, the strong Japanese bandit nation is an absolute monarchy.
During the course of her invasion of China, she had made comparative progress
in the techniques of industrial production and in the development of excellence
and skill in her army, navy, and airforce. But in spite of this industrial
progress, she remains an absolute monarchy of inferior physical endowments.
Her manpower, her raw materials, and her financial resources are all inadequate
and insufficient to maintain her in protracted warfare or to meet the situation
presented by a war prosecuted over a vast area. Added to this is the anti-war
feeling now manifested by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by
the junior officers and, more extensively, by the soldiers of the invading
army. Furthermore, China is not Japan's only enemy. Japan is unable to employ
her entire strength in the attack on China; she cannot, at most, spare more
than a million men for this purpose, as she must hold any in excess of that
number for use against other possible opponents. Because of these important
primary considerations, the invading Japanese bandits can hope neither to
be victorious in a protracted struggle nor to conquer a vast area. Their
strategy must be one of lightning war and speedy decision. If we can hold
out for three or more years, it will be most difficult for Japan to bear
up under the strain.


In the war, the Japanese brigands must depend upon lines of communication
linking the principal cities as routes for the transport of war materials.
The most important considerations for her are that her rear be stable and
peaceful and that her lines of communication be intact. It is not to her an
advantage to wage war over a vast area with disrupted lines of communication.
She cannot disperse her strength and fight in a number of places, and her
greatest fears are these eruptions in her rear and disruption of her lines
of communication. If she can maintain communications, she will be able at
will to concentrate powerful forces speedily at strategic points to engage
our organized units in decisive battle. Another important Japanese objective
is to profit from the industries, finances, and manpower in captured areas
and with them to augment her own insufficient strength. Certainly, it is
not to her advantage to forgo these benefits, not to be forced to dissipate
her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate
for the losses. It is for these reasons that guerrilla warfare conducted
in each bit of conquered territory over a wide area will be a heavy blow
struck at the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces
as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei has absolutely established the
truth of this assertion.


China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a country that is
politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable
conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population,
a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for
communication are poor. All theses factors favour a protracted war, they
all favour the application of mobile warfare and guerilla operations. The
establishment of innumerable anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines
will force him to fight unceasingly in many places at once, both to his front
and his rear. He thus endlessly expends his resources.


We must unite the strength of the army with that of the people, we must strike
the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must
make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of
his strength. Thus the time will come when a gradual change will become evident
in the relative position of ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes,
it will be the beginning of our ultimate victory over the Japanese.


Although China's population is great, it is unorganized. This is a weakness
which must be then into account.


The Japanese bandits have merely to conquer territory but rapacious, and
murderous policy of the extinction of the Chinese race. We must unite the
nation without regard to parties and follow our policy of resistance to the
end. China today is not the China of old. It is not like Abyssinia. China
today is at the point of her greatest historical progress. The standards
of literacy among the masses have been raised; the
rapprochement of Communists and Nationalists has laid the
foundation for an anti-Japanese war front that is constantly being strengthened
and expanded; government, army and people are all working with great energy;
the raw material resources and the economic strength of the nation are waiting
to be used; the unorganized people are becoming an organized nation.


These energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that
should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall
still gain final victory. Not only must those behind our lines organize for
resistance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied territory in every
part of the country. The traitors who accept the Japanese as fathers are
few in number, and those who have taken oath that they would prefer death
to abject slavery are many. If we resist with this spirit, what enemy can
we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours?


The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivilized lines. For that
reason, Japanese of all classes oppose the policies of their government,
as do vast international groups. On the other hand, because China's cause
is righteous, our countrymen of all classes and parties are united to oppose
the invader; we have sympathy in many foreign countries including even Japan
itself. This is perhaps the most important reason why Japan will lose and
China will win.


The progress of the war for the emancipation of the Chinese people will be
in accord with these facts. The guerrilla war of resistance will be in accord
with these facts, and that guerrilla operations correlated with those of
our regular forces will produce victory is the conviction of the many patriots
who devote their entire strength to guerrilla hostilities.


5. Organization For Guerrilla Warfare


Four points must be considered under this subject. These are:


    How are guerrilla bands formed?

    How are guerrilla bands organized?

    What are the methods of arming guerrilla bands?

    What elements constitute a guerrilla band?


These are all questions pertaining to the organization armed guerrilla units;
they are questions which those who had no experience in guerilla hostilities
do not understand and on which they can arrive at no sound decisions; indeed,
they would not know in what manner to begin.


  How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed


The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

  a) From the masses of the people.

  b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.

  c) From regular army units permanently detailed.

  d) From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from
  the people.

  e) From the local militia.

  f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.

  g) From former bandits and bandit groups.


In the present hostilities, no doubt, all these sources will be employed.


In the first case above, the guerrilla unit is formed from the people. This
is the fundamental type. Upon the arrival of the enemy army to oppress and
slaughter the people, their leaders call upon them to resist. They assemble
the most valorous elements, arm them with old rifles or whatever firearms
they can, and thus a guerrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued
throughout the nation that call upon the people to form guerrilla units both
for local defense and for other combat. If the local governments approve
and aid such movements, they cannot fail to prosper. In some places, where
the local government is not determined or where its officers have all fled,
the leaders among the masses (relying on the sympathy of the people and their
sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country ) call upon the people
to resist, and they respond. Thus, many guerrilla units are organized. In
circumstances of this kind, the duties of leadership usually fall upon the
shoulders of young students, teachers, professors, other educators, local
soldiery, professional men, artisans, and those without a fixed profession,
who are willing to exert themselves to the last drop of their blood. Recently,
in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and
other provinces, extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out. All these
are organized and led by patriots. The amount of such activity is the best
proof of the foregoing statement. The more such bands there are, the better
will the situation be. Each district, each county, should be able to organize
a great number of guerrilla squads, which, when assembled, form a guerrilla
company.


There are those who say: 'I am a farmer', or, 'I am a student'; 'I can discuss
literature but not military arts.' This is incorrect. There is no profound
difference between the farmer and the soldier. You must have courage. You
simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no
difference, and if you have education, that is so much the better. When you
take your arms in hand, you become soldiers; when you are organized, you
become military units.


Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war, and after you have fought
several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops
and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers.
Without question, the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses
of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves.


The second type of guerrilla unit is that which is organized from small units
of the regular forces temporarily detached for the purpose. For example,
since hostilities commenced, many groups have been temporarily detached from
armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned guerrilla duties.
A regiment of the regular army may, if circumstances warrant, be dispersed
into groups for the purpose of carrying on guerrilla operations. As an example
of this, there is the Eighth Route Army, in North China. Excluding the periods
when it carries on mobile operations as an army, it is divided into its elements
and these carry on guerrilla hostilities. This type of guerrilla unit is
essential for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare situations, the co-ordination
of guerrilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until
guerrilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one
to carry out guerrilla missions but regulars. Historical experience shows
us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla
campaigning over long periods. The leaders of regular units engaged in guerrilla
operations must be extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla
war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment
of stratagems are all of the utmost importance. As the guerrilla status of
regular units is but temporary, their leaders must lend all possible support
to the organization of guerrilla units from among the people. These units
must be so disciplined that they hold together after the departure of the
regulars.


The third type of unit consists of a detachment of regulars who are permanently
assigned guerrilla duties. This type of small detachment does not have to
be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear
of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization.
As an example of this type of organization we may take the Wu Tat Shan district
in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi area. Along the borders of these
provinces, units from the Eighth Route Army have established a framework
or guerrilla operations. Around these small cores, many detachments have
been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas
in which there is a possibility of cutting the enemy's lines of supply, this
system should be used. Severing enemy, supply routes destroys his lifeline;
this is one feature that cannot be neglected. If, at the time the regular
forces withdraw from a certain area, some units left behind, these should
conduct guerrilla operations in the enemy's rear. As an example of this,
we have the guerrilla bands now continuing their independent operations in
the Shanghai- Woosung area in spite of the withdrawal of regular forces.


The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular
detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular forces may dispatch a
squad, a platoon, or a company, which is placed at the disposal of the local
guerrilla commander. If a small group experienced in military and political
affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the local guerrilla unit. These several
methods are all excellent, and if properly applied, the intensity of guerilla
warfare can be extended. In the Wu Tat Shan area, each of these methods has
been used.


The fifth type mentioned above is from the local militia, from police and
home guards. In every North China province, there are now many of these groups,
and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued mandate
to the effect that the people are not to depart from war areas. The officer
in command of the county, the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the
chief of police are all required to obey this mandate. They cannot retreat
with their forces but must remain at their stations and resist.


The sixth type of unit is that organized from troops that come over from
the enemy—the Chinese 'traitor' troops employed by the Japanese. It is
always possible to produce disaffection in their ranks, and we must increase
our propaganda efforts and foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately
after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The
concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, and the
units rebuilt politically and reorganized militarily. Once this has been
accomplished, they become successful guerrilla units. In regard to this type
of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of utmost importance.


The seventh type of guerrilla organization is that formed from bands of bandits
and brigands. This, although difficult, must be carried out with utmost vigour
lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantages. Many bandit groups pose
as anti-Japanese guerrillas, and it is only necessary to correct their political
beliefs to convert them.


In spite of inescapable differences in the fundamental types of guerrilla
bands, it is possible to unite them to form a vast sea of guerrillas. The
ancients said, 'Tai Shan is a great mountain because it does not scorn the
merest handful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb
the waters of small streams.' Attention paid to the enlistment and organization
of guerrillas of every type and from every source will increase the
potentialities of guerrilla action in the anti-Japanese war. This is something
that patriots will not neglect.


  THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES


Many of those who decide to participate in guerrilla activities do not know
the methods of organization. For such people, as well as for students who
have no knowledge of military affairs, the matter of organization is a problem
that requires solution. Even among those who have military knowledge, there
are some who know nothing of guerrilla regimes use they are lacking in that
particular type of experience. The subject of the organization of such regimes
is not confined to the organization of specific units but includes all guerrilla
activities within the area where the regime functions.


As an example of such organization, we may take a geographical area in the
enemy's rear. This area may comprise many counties. It must be sub-divided
and individual companies or battalions formed to accord with the sub-divisions.
To this 'military area', a military commander and political commissioners
are appointed. Under these, the necessary officers both military and political,
are appointed. In the military headquarters, there will be the staff, the
aides, the supply officers, and the medical personnel. These are controlled
by the chief of staff, who acts in accordance with orders from the commander.
In the political headquarters, there are bureaus of propaganda organization,
people's mass movements, and miscellaneous affairs. Control of these is vested
in the political chairman.


The military areas are sub-divided into smaller districts in accordance with
local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of guerrilla
development. Each of these smaller divisions within the area is a district,
each of which may consist of from two to six counties. To each district,
a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under
their direction, military and political headquarters are organized. Tasks
are assigned in accordance with the number of guerrilla troops available.
Although the names of the officers in the 'district' correspond to those
in the larger 'area', the number of the functionaries assigned in the former
case should be reduced to the least possible. In order to unify control,
to handle guerrilla troops that come from different sources, and to harmonize
military operations and local political affairs, a committee of from seven
to nine members should be organized in each area and district. This committee,
the members of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers,
should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political
matters.


All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two
groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit
with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized
into one of three general types of units. The first of these is the small
unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be
organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies.
One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally
belongs to the county in it was organized, it may operate in other counties.
While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local
units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local
terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.


The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four
of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufficient manpower is available,
a guerrilla a brigade of from two to four regiments may be formed.


Each of the units has its own peculiarities of organization. A squad, the
smallest unit, has a strength of from nine to eleven men, including the leader
and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five Western-style
rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles of local manufacture,
fowling-pieces, etc., spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form
a platoon. This too has a leader and an assistant leader, and when acting
independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on political
propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder
of its four of such units from a company, which, like the platoon, has a
leader, an assistant leader, and a political officer. All these units are
under the direct supervision of the military commanders of the areas in which
they operate.


The battalion unit must be more thoroughly organized and better equipped
than the smaller units. Its discipline and its personnel should be superior.
If a battalion is formed from company units, it should not deprive subordinate
units entirely of their manpower and their arms. If in a small area, there
is a peace-preservation corps, a branch of the militia, or police, regular
guerrilla units should not be dispersed over it.


The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. This must
be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla
regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squad per platoon, three
platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions
to the regiment. Two of such regiments form a brigade. Each of these units
has a commander, a vice-commander, and a political officer.


In North China, guerrilla cavalry units should be established. These may
be regiments of from two to four companies, or battalions.


All these units from the lowest to the highest are combatant guerrilla units
and receive their supplies from the central government. Details of their
organization are shown in the tables.


All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must
be organized into anti-Japanese self-defence units, the basis of which is
voluntary service. As a first step, they must procure arms, then they must
be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are
: local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors,
and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda. When the enemy launches
a guerrilla-suppression drive, these units, armed with what weapons there
are, are assigned to certain areas to deceive, hinder, and harass him. Thus,
the defence units assist the combatant guerrillas. They have other functions.
They furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded , carriers to take
food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide the troops with tea and
rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defence unit as we have described,
the traitors cannot hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb the peace of
the people. Thus the people will continue to assist the guerrilla and supply
manpower to our regular armies. 'The organization of self-defence units is
a transitional step in the development of universal conscription. Such units
are reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces.'


There have been such organizations for some time in Shansi, Shensi, Honan,
and Suiyuan. The youth organizations in different provinces were formed for
the purpose of educating the young. They have been of some help. However,
they were not voluntary, and confidence of the people was thus not gained.
These organizations were not widespread, and their effect was almost negligible.
This system was, therefore, supplanted by the new-type organizations,. Which
are organized on the principles of voluntary co-operation and non-separation
of the members from their native localities. When the members of these
organizations are in their native towns, they support themselves . Only in
case of military necessity are they ordered to remote places, and when this
is done, the government must support them. Each member of these groups must
have a weapon even if the weapon is only a knife, a pistol, a lance, or a
spear.


In all places where the enemy operates, these self-defence units should organize
within themselves a small guerrilla group of perhaps from three to ten men
armed with pistols or revolvers. This group is not required to leave its
native locality.


The organization of these self-defence units is mentioned in this book because
such units are useful for the purposes of inculcating the people with military
and political knowledge, keeping order in the rear, and replenishing the
ranks of the regulars. These groups should be organized not only in the active
war zones but in every province in China. 'The people must be inspired to
co-operate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be
ineffectual.' This is extremely important.


In order to control anti-Japanese military organization as a whole, it is
necessary to establish a system of military areas and districts along the
lines we have indicated.


  EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS


In regard to the problem of guerrilla equipment, it must be understood that
guerrillas are lightly-armed attack groups, which require simple equipment.
The standard of equipment is based upon the nature of duties assigned; the
equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class
units. For example, those who are assigned the task of destroying rail
communications are better equipped than those who do not have that task.
The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want,
to even what they need, but must be based on what is available for their
use. Equipment cannot be furnished immediately but must be acquired gradually.
These are points to be kept in mind .


The question of equipment includes the collection, supply, distribution,
and replacement of weapons, ammunition, blankets, communication materials,
transport, and facilities for propaganda work. The supply of weapons and
ammunition is most difficult, particularly at the time the unit is established,
but this problem can always be solved eventually. Guerrilla bands that originate
in the people are furnished with revolvers, pistols, rifles, spears, big
swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. Other elementary
weapons are added and as many new-type rifles as are available are distributed.
After a period of resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment
by capturing it from the enemy. In this respect, the transport companies
are the easiest to equip, for in any successful attack, we will capture the
enemy's transport.


An armory should be established in each guerrilla district for the manufacture
and repair of rifles and for the production of cartridge, hand grenades and
bayonets. Guerrillas must not depend to much on an armory. The enemy is the
principal source of their supply.


For destruction of railway tracks, bridges, and stations in enemy-controlled
territory, it is necessary to gather together demolition materials. Troops
must be trained in the preparation and use of demolitions, and a demolition
unit must be organized in each regiment.


As for minimum clothing requirements, these are that each man shall have
at least two summer-weight uniforms, one suit of winter clothing, two hats,
a pair of wrap puttees, and blanket. Each man must have a pack or a bag for
food. In the north, each man must have an overcoat. In acquiring this clothing,
we cannot depend on captures made by the enemy, for it is forbidden for captors
to take clothing from their prisoners. In order to maintain high morale in
guerrilla forces, all the clothing and equipment mentioned should be furnished
by the representatives of the government in each guerrilla district. These
men may confiscate clothing from traitors or ask contributions from those
best able to afford them. In subordinate groups, uniforms are unnecessary.


Telephone and radio equipment is not necessary in lower groups, but all units
from regiment up are equipped with both. This material can be obtained by
contributions from the regular forces and by capture from the enemy.


In the guerrilla army in general, and at bases in particular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides
the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. Although
guerrillas can depend on the enemy for some portion of their medical supplies,
they must, in general, depend upon contributions. If Western medicines
are not available, local medicines must be made to suffice.


The problem of transport is more vital in North-China than in the south,
for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla
units need no animals, but regiments and brigades will find them necessary.
Commanders and staffs of units from companies up should be furnished a riding
animal each. At times, two officers will have to share a horse. Officers
whose duties are of minor nature do not have to be mounted.


Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should
have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on
which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with
large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there should be a printing press or a
lead-type press.


For the purpose of printing training instructions, this material is of the
greatest importance.


In addition to the equipment listed above, it is necessary to have field-glasses,
compasses, and military maps. An accomplished guerrilla group will acquire
these things.


Because of the proved importance of guerrilla hostilities in the anti-Japanese
war, the headquarters of the Nationalist Government and the commanding officers
of the various war zones should do their best to supply the guerrillas with
what they actually need and are unable to get for themselves. However, it
must be repeated that guerrilla equipment will in the main depend on the
efforts of the guerrillas themselves. If they depend on higher officers too
much, the psychological effect will be to weaken the guerrilla spirit of
resistance.


  ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY


The term 'element' as used in the title to this section refers to the personnel,
both officers and men, of the guerrilla army. Since each guerrilla group
fights in a protracted war, its officers must be brave and positive men whose
entire loyalty is dedicated to the cause of emancipation of the people. An
officer should have the following qualities: great powers of endurance so
that in spite of any hardship he sets an example to his men and be a model
for them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that
of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese.
If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla group
with officers of this calibre would be unbeatable. I do not mean that every
guerrilla group can have, at its inception, officers of such qualities. The
officers must be men naturally endowed with good qualities which can be developed
during the course of campaigning. The most important natural quality is that
of complete loyalty to the idea of people's emancipation. If this is present,
the others will develop; if it is not present, nothing can be done. When
officers are first selected from a group, it is this quality that should
receive particular attention. The officers in a group should be inhabitants
of the locality in which the group is organized, as this will facilitate
relations between them and the local civilians. In addition, officers so
chosen would be familiar with conditions. If in any locality there are not
enough men of sufficiently high qualifications to become officers, an effort
must be made to train and educate the people so these qualities may be developed
and the potential officer material increased. There can be no disagreements
between officers native to one place and those from other localities.


A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers
are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service.
As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition or position
is no consideration, but only men who are courageous and determined can bear
the hardships of guerrilla campaigning in a protracted war.


A soldier who habitually breaks regulations must be dismissed from the army.
Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium
habit must be forbidden, and a soldier who cannot break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon
keeping the membership pure and clean.


It is a fact that during the war the enemy may take advantage of certain
people who are lacking in conscience and patriotism and induce them to join
the guerrillas for the purpose of betraying them. Officers must, therefore,
continually educate the soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them. This will
prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be
discovered and expelled, and punishment and expulsion meted out to those
who have been influenced by them. In all such cases, the officers should
summon the soldiers and relate the facts to them, thus arousing their hatred
and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning
to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some
prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of
eliminating traitors in the army begins with their elimination from among
the people.


Chinese soldiers who have served under puppet governments and bandits who
have been converted should be welcomed as individuals or as groups. They
should be well-treated and repatriated. But care should be used during their
reorientation to distinguish those whose idea is to fight the Japanese from
those who may be present for other reasons.


6. The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare


In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise
conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization
to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and
discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry
out the political activities that are the life of both the guerilla armies
and of revolutionary warfare.


First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both
military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them,
the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese
merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea
must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may
succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement.
In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be
emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith
or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to
understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing
a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their
determination.


The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants
of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete
explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla
troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political
goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled System of National
Organization for War, which should be widely distributed throughout
guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential
unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.


A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of
the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla
troops. There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics
but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded
militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics
and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political
goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it
is impossible to isolate one from the other.


It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority
of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that
will bring justice to the oppressed peopled of the world. No matter how long
this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented
epoch of peace The war that we are fighting today for the freedom of all
human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting
to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this
is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore
be carefully explained to him.


There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad
question of political activities. These are political activities, first,
as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as
applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification
of officers and men within the army; second spiritual unification of the
army and the people; of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of
the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities
are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled
Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.


A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited
democratic basis. In all armies, obedience the subordinates to their superiors
must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the
basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With
guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any
revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and
men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is
self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as
in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This
must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand
completely, why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes
a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly
harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.


In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that
exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one
to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash
their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of
self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal
unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary
characteristic of a democratic system in the army .


A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers
and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty
and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not
only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must encouraged. Further,
in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must
not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerilla
troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for
that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration
and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality
in all things. But there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships
and dangers of war, thus we may attain to the unification of the officer
and soldier groups a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical,
that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present
that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.


There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local
inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as 'Three
Rules and the Eight Remarks', which we list here:


Rules:


    All actions are subject to command.

    Do not steal from the people.

    Be neither selfish nor unjust.


Remarks:


    Replace the door when you leave the house.

    Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.

    Be courteous.

    Be honest in your transactions.

    Return what you borrow.

    Replace what you break.

    Do not bathe in the presence of women.

    Do not without authority search those you arrest.


The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army
and other units have since adopted it.


Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's
rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that
should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened
to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these
two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people
their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.


We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops,
by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those
of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we
strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.


7. The Strategy Of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan


It has been definitely decided that in the strategy of our war against Japan,
guerrilla strategy must be auxiliary to fundamental orthodox methods. If
this were a small country, guerrilla activities could be carried out close
to the scene of operations of the regular army and directly complementary
to them. In such a case, there would be no question of guerrilla strategy
as such. Nor would the question arise if our country were as strong as Russia,
for example, and able speedily to eject an invader. The question exists because
China, a weak country of vast size, has today progressed to the point where
it has become possible to adopt the policy of a protracted war characterized
by guerrilla operations. Although these may at first glance seem to be abnormal
or heterodox, such is not actually the case.


Because Japanese military power is inadequate, much of the territory her
armies have overrun is without sufficient garrison troops. Under such
circumstances the primary functions of guerrillas are three: first, to conduct
a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish
bases, and, last, to extend the war areas. Thus, guerrilla participation
in the war is not merely a matter of purely local guerrilla tactics but involves
strategical considerations.


Such war, with its vast time and space factors, establishes a new military
process, the focal point of which is China today. The Japanese are apparently
attempting to recall a past that saw the Yuan extinguish the Sung and the
Ch'ing conquer the Ming; that witnessed the extension of the British Empire
to North America and India; that saw the Latins overrun Central and South
America. As far as China today is concerned, such dreams of conquest are
fantastic and without reality. Today's China is better equipped than was
the China of yesterday, and a new type of guerrilla hostilities is a part
of that equipment. If our enemy fails to take these facts into consideration
and makes too optimistic an estimate of the situation, he courts disaster.


Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole,
the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of orthodox
operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods
suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special
situations that confront guerrillas.


Before we treat the practical aspects of guerrilla war, it might be well
to recall the fundamental axiom of combat on which all military action is
based. This can be stated: 'Conservation of one's own strength; destruction
of enemy strength.' A military policy based on this axiom is consonant with
a national policy directed towards the building of a free and prosperous
Chinese state and the destruction of Japanese imperialism. It is in furtherance
of this policy that government applies in military strength. Is the sacrifice
demanded by war in conflict with the idea of self-preservation? Not at all.
The sacrifices demanded are necessary both to destroy the enemy and to preserve
ourselves; the sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve
the whole. All the considerations of military action are derived from this
axiom. Its application is as apparent in all tactical and strategical conceptions
as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a
covered position.


All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. What methods should we select
to ensure the conservation and development of our own strength and the
destruction of that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the
six listed below:


    Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks
    in a war of strategical defence; tactical speed in a war strategically
    protracted, tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducts strategically
    on interior lines.

    Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.

    The establishment of bases.

    A clear understanding of the relationship that exits between the attack and
    the defence.

    The development of mobile operations.

    Correct command.


The enemy, though numerically weak, is strong in the quality of his troops
and their equipment; we, on the other hand, are strong numerically but weak
as to quality. These considerations have been taken into account in the
development of the policy of tactical offence, tactical speed, and tactical
operations on exterior lines in a war that, strategically speaking, is defensive
in character, protracted in nature, and conducted along interior lines. Our
strategy is based on these conceptions. They must be kept in mind in the
conduct of all operations.


Although the element of surprise is not absent in orthodox warfare, there
are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during guerrilla hostilities.
In the latter, speed is essential. The movements of guerrilla troops must
be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware,
and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination in the execution
of plans; no assumption of a negative or passive defence; no great dispersion
of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a
violent and deceptive form.


While there may be cases where the attack will extend over a period of several
days ( if that length of time in necessary to annihilate an enemy group ),
it is more profitable to launch and push an attack with maximum speed. The
tactics of defence have no place in the realm of guerrilla warfare. If a
delaying action is necessary, such places as defiles, river crossings, and
villages offer the most suitable conditions, for it is in such places that
the enemy's arrangements may be disrupted and he may be annihilated.


The enemy is much stronger than we are, and it is true that we can hinder,
distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although
guerrilla warfare is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes
desirable to concentrate in order to destroy an enemy. Thus, the principle
of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is applicable
to guerrilla warfare.


We can prolong this struggle and make of it a protracted war only by gaining
positive and lightning-like tactical decisions; by employing our manpower
in proper concentrations and dispersions; and by operation on exterior lines
in order to surround and destroy our enemy. If we cannot surround whole armies,
we can at least partially destroy them, if we cannot kill the Japanese, we
can capture them. The total effect of many local successes will be to change
the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The destruction of Japan's
military power, combined with the international sympathy for China's cause
and the revolutionary tendencies evident in Japan, will be sufficient to
destroy Japanese imperialism.


We will next discuss initiative, alertness, and the matter of careful planning.
What is meant by initiative in warfare? In all battles and wars, a struggle
to gain and retain the initiative goes on between the opposing sides, for
it is the side that holds the initiative that has liberty of action. When
an army loses the initiative, it loses its liberty; its role becomes passive;
it faces the danger of defeat and destruction.


It is more difficult to obtain the initiative when defending on interior
lines than it is while attacking on exterior lines. This is what Japan is
doing. There are, however, several weak points as far as Japan is concerned.
One of these is lack of sufficient manpower for the task; another is her
cruelty to the inhabitants of conquered areas; a third is the underestimation
of Chinese strength, which has resulted in the differences between military
cliques, which, in turn, have been productive of many mistakes in the direction
of her military forces. For instance, she has been gradually compelled to
increase her manpower in China while, at the same time. the many arguments
over plans of operations and disposition of troops have resulted in the loss
of good opportunities for improvement of her strategical position. This explains
the fact that although the Japanese are frequently able to surround large
bodies of Chinese troops, they have never yet been able to capture more than
a few. The Japanese military machine is thus being weakened by insufficiency
of manpower, inadequacy of resources, the barbarism of her troops, and the
general stupidity that has characterized the conduct of operations. Her offensive
continues unabated, but because of the weaknesses pointed out, her attack
must be limited in extent. She can never conquer China. The day will come
— indeed already has in some areas — when she will be forced into
a passive role. When hostilities commenced, China was passive, but as we
enter the second phase of the war we find ourselves pursuing a strategy of
mobile warfare, with both guerrillas and regulars operating on exterior lines.
Thus, with each passing day, we seize some degree of initiative from the
Japanese.


The matter of initiative is especially serious for guerrilla forces, who
must face critical situations unknown to regular troops. The superiority
of the enemy and the lack of unity and experience within our own ranks may
be cited. Guerrillas can, however, gain the initiative if they keep in mind
the weak points of the enemy. Because of the enemy's insufficient manpower,
guerrillas can operate over vast territories, because he is a foreigner and
a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen;
because of the stupidity of enemy commanders, guerrillas can make full use
of their own cleverness. Both guerrillas and regulars must exploit these
enemy weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our
weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength.
For example, the very fact that most guerrilla groups are small makes it
desirable and advantageous for them to appear and disappear in the enemy's
rear. With such activities, the enemy is simply unable to cope. A similar
liberty of action can rarely be obtained by regular forces.


When the enemy attacks the guerrillas with more than one column, it is difficult
for the latter to retain the initiative. Any error, no matter how slight,
in the estimation of the situation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas
into a passive role. They will then find themselves unable to beat oft the
attacks of the enemy.


It is apparent that we can gain and retain the initiative only by a correct
estimation of the situation and a proper arrangement of all military and
political factors. A too pessimistic estimate will operate to force us into
a passive position, with consequent loss of initiative; an overly optimistic
estimate, with its rash ordering of factors, will produce the same result.


No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative.
It is the intelligent leader who does so after a careful study and estimate
of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved.
When a guerrilla unit, through either a poor estimate on the part of its
leader or pressure from the enemy, is forced into a passive position, its
first duty is to extricate itself. No method can be prescribed for this,
as the method to be employed will, in every case, depend on the situation.
One can, if necessary, run away. But there are times when the situation seems
hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It is at such times that the
good leader recognizes and seizes the moment when he can regain the lost
initiative.


Let us revert to alertness. To conduct one's troops with alertness is an
essential of guerrilla command. Leaders must realize that to operate alertly
is the most important factor in gaining the initiative and vital in its effect
of the relative situation that exists between our forces and those of the
enemy. Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation,
to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert
to sense changes in these factors and make necessary modifications in troop
dispositions to accord with them. The leader must be like a fisherman, who,
with his nets, is able both to cast them and to pull them out in awareness
of the depth of the water, the strength of the current or the presence of
any obstructions that may foul them. As the fisherman controls his nets through
the lead ropes, so the guerrilla leader maintains contact with control over
his units. As the fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla
commander. Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—it
is in these ways that guerrillas employ, their strength.


In general, guerrilla units disperse to operate:


    When the enemy is in over-extended defence, and sufficient force cannot be
    concentrated against him, guerrillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize
    him.

    When encircled by the enemy, guerrillas disperse to withdraw.

    When the nature of the ground limits action, guerrillas disperse.

    When the availability of supplies limits action, they disperse.

    Guerrillas disperse in order to promote mass movements over a wide area.


Regardless of the circumstances that prevail at the time of dispersal, caution
must be exercised in certain matters:


    A relatively large group should be retained as a central force. The remainder
    of the troops should not be divided into groups of absolutely equal size.
    In this way, the leader is in a position to deal with any circumstances that
    may arise.

    Each dispersed unit should have clear and definite responsibilities. Orders
    should specify a place to which to proceed, the time of proceeding, and the
    place, time, and method of assembly.


Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is
opportunity to fall upon him and destroy him. Concentration may be desirable
when the enemy is on the defensive and guerrillas wish to destroy isolated
detachments in particular localities. By the term 'concentrate', we do not
mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary for the
task. The remaining guerrillas are assigned missions of hindering and delaying
the enemy, of destroys isolated groups, or of conducting mass propaganda.


In addition to the dispersion and concentration of forces, the leader must
understand what is termed 'alert shifting'. When the enemy feels the danger
of guerrillas, he will generally send troops out to attack them. The guerrillas
must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they
wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately
shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. For example; after a guerrilla
group has destroyed an enemy detachment at one place, it may be shifted to
another area to attack and destroy a second detachment. Sometimes, it will
not be profitable for a unit to become engaged in a certain area, and in
that case, it must move immediately.


When the situation is serious, the guerrilla must move with the fluidity
of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt,
and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe that they will
attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the
west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move
at night.


Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert
shifting of forces. If guerrillas are stupid and obstinate, they will be
led to passive positions and severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla
operations, however, lies not in merely understanding the things we have
discussed but rather in their actual application on the field of battle.
The quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation
and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action is found only
in keen and thoughtful observers.


Careful planning is necessary if victory is to be won in guerrilla war, and
those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla
action. A plan is necessary regardless of the size of the unit involved;
a prudent plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case of
the regiment. The situation must be carefully studied, then an assignment
of duties made. Plans must include both political and military instruction;
the matter of supply and equipment, and the matter of co-operation with local
civilians. Without study of these factors, it is impossible either to seize
the initiative or to operate alertly. It is true that guerrillas can make
only limited plans, but even so, the factors we have mentioned must be
considered.


The initiative can be secured and retained only following a positive victory
that results from attack. The attack must be made on guerrilla initiative;
that is, guerrillas must not permit themselves to be maneuvered into a position
where they are robbed of initiative and where the decision to attack is forced
upon them. Any victory will result from careful planning and alert control.
Even in defence, all our efforts must be directed toward a resumption of
the attack, for it is only by attack that we can extinguish our enemies an
preserve ourselves. A defence or a withdrawal is entirely useless as far
as extinguishing our enemies is concerned and of only temporary value. as
far as the conservation of our forces is concerned. This principle is valid
both for guerrillas and regular troops. The differences are of degree only;
that is to say, in the manner of execution.


The relationship that exists between guerrilla and the orthodox forces is
important and must be appreciated. Generally speaking, there are types of
co-operation between guerrillas and orthodox groups. These are:


    Strategical co-operation.

    Tactical co-operation.

    Battle co-operation.


Guerrillas who harass the enemy's rear installations and hinder his transport
are weakening him and encouraging the national spirit of resistance. They
are co-operating strategically. For example, the guerrillas in Manchuria
had no functions of strategical co-operation with orthodox forces until the
war in China started. Since that time, their faction of strategical co-operation
is evident, for if they can kill one enemy, make the enemy expend one round
of ammunition, or hinder one enemy group in its advance southward, our powers
of resistance here are proportionately increased. Such guerrilla action has
a positive action on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same
time, it encourages our own countrymen. Another example of strategical
co-operation is furnished by the guerrillas who operate along the P'ing-Sui,
P'ing-Han, Chin-P'u, T'ung-Pu, and Cheng-T'ai railways. This co-operation
began when the invader attacked, continued during the period when he held
garrisoned cities in the areas, and was intensified when our regular forces
counter-attacked, in an effort to restore the lost territories.


As an example of tactical co-operation, we may cite the operations at Hsing-K'ou,
when guerrillas both north and south of Yeh Men destroyed the T'ung-P'u railway
and the motor roads near P'ing Hosing Pass and Yang Fang K'ou. A number of
small operating base were established, and organized guerrilla action in
Shansi complemented the activities of the regular forces both there and in
the defence of Honan. similarly, during the south Shantung campaign, guerrillas
in the five northern provinces co-operated with the army's operation on the
Hsuchow front.


Guerrilla commanders in rear areas and those in command of regiments assigned
to operate with orthodox units must co-operate in accordance with the situation.
It is their function to determine weak points in the enemy dispositions,
harass them, to disrupt their transport, and to undermine their morale, If
guerrilla action were independent, the results to be obtained from tactical
co-operation would be lost and those that result from strategical co-operation
greatly diminished. In order to accomplish their mission and improve the
degree of co-operation, guerrilla units must be equipped with some means
of rapid communication. For this purpose, two way radio sets are recommended.


Guerrilla forces in the immediate battle area are responsible for close
co-operation with regular forces, Their principal functions are to hinder
enemy transport to gather information, and to act as outposts and sentinels.
Even without precise instructions from the commander of the regular forces,
these missions, as well as any others that contribute to the general success,
should be assumed.


The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance. This is
so because this war is a cruel and protracted struggle. The lost territories
can be restored only by a strategical counter-attack and this we cannot carry
out until the enemy is well into China. Consequently, some part of our country
— or, indeed, most of it — may be captured by the enemy and become his
rear area. It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this
vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the
enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied
territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive.


A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which
the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation
and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental
characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrilla
can exist and function over a long period of time without the development
of base areas. History shows us many example of peasant revolts that were
unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized
by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in this era of improved communications
and military equipment. Some guerrilla leaders seem to think that those qualities
are present in today's movement, and before such leaders can comprehend the
importance of base areas in the long-term war, their mind must be disabused
of this idea.


The subject of bases may be better understood if we consider:


    The various categories of bases.

    Guerrilla areas and base areas.

    The establishment of bases.

    The development of bases.


Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first,
mountain bases; second, plains bases; and last, river, lake, and bay bases.
The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident. Those which are
now established are at Ch'ang P'o Chan, Wu Tai Shan, Taiheng Shan, Tai Shan,
Yen Shan, and Mao Shan. These bases are strongly protected. Similar bases
should be established in all enemy rear areas.


Plains country is generally not satisfactory for guerrilla operating bases,
but this does not mean that guerrilla warfare cannot flourish in such country
or that bases cannot be established there. The extent of guerrilla development
in Hopeh and west Shantung proves the opposite to be the case Whether we
can count on the use of these bases over long periods of time is questionable.
We can, however, establish small bases of a seasonal or temporary nature.
This we can do because our barbaric enemy simply does not have the manpower
to occupy all the areas he has overrun and because the population of China
is so numerous that a base can established anywhere. Seasonal bases in plains
country may be established in the winter when the rivers are frozen over,
and in the summer when the crops are growing. Temporary bases may be established
when the enemy is otherwise occupied. When the enemy advances, the guerrillas
who have established bases in the plains area are the first to engage him.
Upon their withdrawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind
them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from
base to base on the theory that they must be in one place one day and another
place the next.


There are many historical examples of the establishment of bases in river,
bay, and lake country, and this is one aspect of our activity that has so
far received little attention. Red guerrillas held out for many years in
the Hungtze Lake region. We should establish bases in the Hungtze and Tai
areas and along rivers and watercourses in territory controlled by the enemy
so as to deny him access to, and free use of, the water routes.


There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An
area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a 'base
area'. Wu Tai Shan, and Taiheng Shan are examples of base areas. On the other
hand, the area east and north of Wu Tai Shan (the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border
zone) is a guerrilla area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only
while they actually physically occupy them. Upon their departure, control
reverts to a puppet pro-Japanese government. East Hopeh. for example, was
at first a guerrilla area rather than a base area. A puppet government functioned
there. Eventually, the people, organized and inspired by guerrillas from
the Wu Tai mountains, assisted in the transformation of this guerrilla area
into a real base area. Such a task is extremely difficult, for it is largely
dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain
garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones contiguous to the railways,
the guerrillas see unable to drive the Japanese and puppets out. These areas
remain guerrilla areas. At other times, base areas might become guerrilla
areas due either to our own mistakes or to the activities of the enemy.


Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one or three situations
may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the
Japanese and puppets or it may be divided between the combatants. Guerrilla
leaders should endeavour to see that either the first or the last of these
situations is assured.


Another point essential in the establishment of bases is the co-operation
that must exist between the armed guerrilla bands and the people. All our
strength must be used to spread the doctrine of armed resistance to Japan,
to arm the people, to organize self-defence units, and to train guerrilla
bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized
into anti-Japanese groups. Their political instincts must be sharpened and
their martial ardour increased If the workers, the farmers, the lovers of
liberty, the young men, the women, and the children are not organized, they
will never realize their own anti-Japanese power. Only the united strength
of the people can eliminate traitors, recover the measure of political power
that has been lost, and conserve and improve what we still retain.


We have already touched on geographic factors in our discussion of bases,
and we must also mention the economic aspects of the problem. What economic
policy should be adopted? Any such policy must offer reasonable protection
to commerce and business. We interpret 'reasonable protection' to mean the
people must contribute money in proportion to the money they have. Farmers
will be required to furnish a certain share of their crops to guerrilla troops.
Confiscation, except in the case of business run by traitors, is prohibited
.


Our activities must be extended over the entire periphery of the base area
if we wish to attack the enemy's bases and thus strengthen and develop our
own. This will afford us opportunity to organize, equip, and train the people,
thus furthering guerrilla policy as well as the national policy of protected
war. At times, we must emphasize the development and extension of base areas;
at other times, the organization, training, or equipment of the people.


Each guerrilla base will have its own peculiar problems of attack and defence.
In general, the enemy, in an endeavour to consolidate his gains, will attempt
to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over
a number of different routes. This must be anticipated and the encirclement
broken by counter-attacks As such enemy columns are without reserves, we
should plan on using our main forces to attack one of them by surprise and
devote our secondary effort to continual hindrance and harassment. At the
same time, other forces should isolate enemy garrison troops and operate
on their lines of supply and communication. When one column has been disposed
of, we may turn our attention to one of the others. In a base area as large
as Wu Tat Shan, for example, there are four or five military sub-divisions.
Guerrillas in these sub-divisions must co-operate to form a primary force
to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which he came, while a secondary
force harasses and hinders him.


After defeating the enemy in any area, we must take advantage of the period
he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. we must not attack
an objective we are not certain of winning. We must confine our operations
to relatively small areas and destroy the enemy and traitors in those places.


When the inhabitants have been inspired, new volunteers accepted trained,
equipped, and organized, our operations may be extended to include cities
and lines of communication not strongly held. We may hold these at least
for temporary (if not for permanent ) periods. All these are our duties in
offensive strategy. Their object is to lengthen the period that the enemy
must remain on the defensive. Then our military activities and our organization
work among the masses of the people must be zealously expanded; and with
equal zeal, the strength of the enemy attacked and diminished. It is of great
importance that guerrilla units be rested and instructed. During such times
as the enemy is on the defensive, the troops may get some rest and instruction
may be carried out.


The development of mobile warfare is not only possible but essential. This
is the case because our current war is a desperate and protracted struggle.
If China were able to conquer the Japanese bandits speedily and to recover
her lost territories, there would there would be no question of long-term
war on a national scale. Hence there would no question of the relation of
guerrilla hostilities into mobile warfare of an orthodox nature, both the
quantity and quality of guerrilla must be improved. Primarily, more men must
join the armies; then the quality of equipment and standards of training
must be improved. Political training must be emphasized and our organization,
the technique of handling our weapons, our tactics — all must be improved.
Our internal discipline must be strengthened. The soldiers must be educated
politically. There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to
orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both
political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must
be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The
standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased.
Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline
must be established.


Because guerrilla formations act independently and because they are the most
elementary of armed formations, command cannot be too highly centralized.
If it were, guerilla action would be too limited in scope. At the same time,
guerrilla activities, to be most effective, must be co-ordinated, not only
in so far as they themselves are concerned, but additionally with regular
troops operating in the same areas. This co-ordination is a function of the
war zone commander and his staff.


In guerrilla base areas, the command must be centralized for strategical
purposes and decentralized for tactical purposes. Centralized strategical
command takes care of the general management of all guerrilla units, their
co-ordination within war zones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla
base areas. Beyond this, centralization of command will result in interference
with subordinate units, as, naturally, the tactics to apply to concrete
situations can be determined only as these various situations arise. This
is true in orthodox warfare when communications between lower and higher
echelons break down. In a word, proper guerrilla policy will provide for
unified strategy and independent activity.


Each guerrilla area is divided into districts and these in turn are divided
into sub-districts. Each sub-division has its appointed commander, and while
general plans are made by higher commanders, the nature of actions is determined
by inferior commanders. The former may suggest the nature of the action to
be taken but cannot define it. Thus inferior groups heave more or less complete
local control.